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The case in opposition to a common Tamil candidate rests upon the assumption that incremental progress is possible under the Sinhala political framework. It is not. Tamils are better off with a candidate standing as a symbol of their defiance. It stands as a stark reminder to the international community that the Tamil issue cannot be swept over.
The Tamil common candidate, Pakkiyaselvam Ariyanenthiran, pays tribute at the Mullivaikkal genocide memorial.
The case in opposition to a common Tamil candidate rests upon the assumption that incremental progress is possible under the Sinhala political framework. It is not. Tamils are better off with a candidate standing as a symbol of their defiance. It stands as a stark reminder to the international community that the Tamil issue cannot be swept over.
On September 21, Tamils will head to the polls for Sri Lanka’s presidential elections. After decades of unfulfilled promises and continued assaults on Tamil livelihood, there is a pervasive sense of pessimism among the Tamil community. Voter turnout has traditionally dwindled, with only an estimated 50% of Tamil voters participating from 1988 until 2010. In light of the lacklustre candidates, all seemingly committed to upholding Sinhala Buddhist nationalism, some Tamil groups have fielded a common candidate to uphold their values and advocate for accountability and self-determination.
This proposal, however, has been opposed by a section of the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi (ITAK), with parliamentarian M A Sumanthiran, arguing it would be “an act of deception” against the Tamil people. Sumanthiran’s stance is based on two main points: first, supporting a Tamil candidate might allow a more extreme Sinhala nationalist leader to win, as seen in the 2005 election where a boycott led to Mahinda Rajapaksa’s victory by a narrow margin. This brought about a genocidal military solution. The prospect of another war criminal in office, such as Sarath Fonseka, still looms in this election.
Second, Sumanthiran argues for the strategic value of supporting a “moderate” Sinhala leader, as demonstrated in 2015 when his party’s backing of Maithripala Sirisena helped him win by a small margin. This victory not only blocked Rajapaksa’s return but also created space for Tamils to push for accountability and devolution.
The overarching argument is that the Tamil vote, though small, can strategically influence the election, either as a thorn in the side of Sinhala nationalists or as a force for incremental progress. Fielding a common candidate, on the other hand, might amount to a boycott, enabling Sinhala leaders to dismiss Tamil political aspirations.
However, this argument has two key flaws: first, the limited impact of a “moderate” regime in Colombo, and second, the role of international pressure in any progress made.
The Sirisena administration initially raised hopes among Tamils and the international community, but this optimism was short-lived. Whilst his regime initially seemed to co-operate with demands for international accountability at the UN Human Rights Council, Sirisena quickly rejected recommendations for a hybrid court to address war crimes. Tamil Families of the Disappeared engaged with the government’s task force, but the newly created Office of Missing Persons (OMP) became a smokescreen, diverting international condemnation without advancing accountability. To this day, it remains toothless. As a result, participating in the political process may have further delayed justice for Tamil survivors.
Moreover, Sirisena’s true colours emerged in October 2018 when he attempted to replace Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe with his former foe Mahinda Rajapaksa, recognizing his waning support among Sinhala voters. This demonstrates that even a “moderate” administration can shift gears quickly and revert to its more chauvinistic leanings to maintain political survival, a lesson that Tamils have learnt throughout history with agreements like the Bandaranike-Chelvanayakam pact, which were ultimately aborted under Sinhala pressure.
While Tamil electoral support is valuable to Sinhala leaders, international pressure holds even greater weight. The Sirisena administration sought Tamil support in 2015, but it was also driven by significant international scrutiny over human rights abuses and corruption. The promise of an uptick in international relations and economic renewal helped pacify the Sinhala base. It is the threat of sanctions and the risk of Sri Lanka becoming an international pariah that drives action in Colombo.
A common Tamil political candidate could unify the nation in pressing that message globally and advocating for an uncompromising vision of self-determination and justice. This is not without challenges, as the ITAK has voiced opposition, highlighting fractures within the Tamil community. However, this approach recognizes that decisions made in Colombo have rarely served Tamil interests. As the common candidate, Pakkiyaselvam Ariyanenthiran, himself has declared, his candidacy is not about winning the election. Instead, it is about sending a message to the international community about the Tamil people’s continued resolve and demand for justice, demilitarisation and self-determination.
Boycotting the elections entirely is a move that has been raised by other Tamil groups and one that also carries its own merits. It recognises that there is little utility in participating in a system that has brought nothing to the Tamil people.
Whatever choices the Tamil nation makes this month, it is clear - progress has been achieved not through compromise with Colombo, but through continued Tamil defiance and concrete international action.
