Sri Lanka’s newly elected president, Aruna Kumara Dissanayake, has made it clear that strengthening ties with India, the regional powerhouse, will be a cornerstone of his foreign policy. Within hours of his election victory, Dissanayake held his first meeting with a foreign official—India’s High Commissioner, Santosh Jha, in Colombo. He is also set to make his first official overseas visit to New Delhi, marking his second trip to the Indian capital this year alone. This represents a significant shift from the vehement, and violent, anti-Indian stance once held by Dissanayake’s party, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). However, New Delhi must approach this cautiously. Unless Dissanayake is willing to fully embrace not only India but also the concerns of Tamils on both sides of the Palk Strait, progress in building these ties could quickly unravel.
The history of the JVP’s anti-India stance is not from its Marxist or anti-imperialist roots. Instead, it stems from the rabid Sinhala nationalism that has gripped the South for decades. India was equated with Eelam Tamils, particularly given the proximity of Tamil Nadu, a state of more than 70 million people with millennia-long history of ties to the Tamil North-East. There remains strong affection for the Tamil liberation struggle in the state, which once housed and supported various Tamil armed movements. Indeed, the JVP’s 1987 rebellion, which claimed tens of thousands of lives, was not a revolution against capitalism, but a reaction to the concerns that an Indian presence on the island would ‘infringe on Sri Lankan sovereignty’ and facilitate Tamil independence.
Dissanayake’s overtures come in the context of the Tamil armed movement having been defeated for over 15 years and fears of Tamil autonomy in the South overshadowed by a disastrous financial crisis. Looking North for Indian assistance, which could provide a vital lifeline for the island’s flailing economy, is now much more politically palatable. Yet, remarks from his most trusted colleague Vijitha Herath over their opposition to the Indo-Lanka Accord, the longstanding Indian distrust amongst the party’s grassroots, and Dissanayake’s refusal to disavow Sinhala Buddhist nationalism should give New Delhi reason for caution.
Under the tenure of Sri Lanka’s previous president, India rapidly expanded its footprint on the island, with a focus on the Tamil North-East in particular. Though there are concerns about the exploitative and environmental impacts of one project in Mannar, there is still widespread enthusiasm within the Tamil homeland for strengthening ties with India due to the historic bond between the regions. Even during the height of the Mullivaikkal genocide, when India supported Sri Lanka’s military offensive, LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran maintained that "our people always consider India as our friend." The recent resumption of ferries and flights between Tamil Nadu and Tamil Eelam, for example, has been widely welcomed and is gaining in popularity.
Successive Indian administrations have been keen to cement further those ties, including through the construction of a literal bridge between the two regions. Tamil Nadu, India’s second most prosperous state, remains a driver of national growth and is rapidly establishing itself as an education, business and technology hub. With thousands of years of Tamil culture established across the Palk Strait, and an influential global Tamil diaspora waiting, opportunities abound.
However, Sri Lankan racism and political intransigence have long hindered the full realisation of these opportunities. The North-East remains in the grip of Colombo, with a military occupation continuing to plague the daily livelihoods of Tamils. It lags behind the island on several development markers and remains one of the most militarised places in the world. Armed soldiers are still imposing themselves in educational, commercial and even cultural events. This is in addition to the complete control of the region by the Sri Lankan state, with the lack of any meaningful devolution. Colombo continues to stifle Tamil development.
Indian officials should be cognisant of these dynamics. It is only by breaking those shackles on the Tamil homeland, that the true potential of the region can be reached. Even within Tamil Nadu too, where fishermen continue to be arrested, assaulted and murdered by the Sri Lankan navy, the demand to ensure greater freedom for their kinfolk across the strait continues to resonate.
As India’s foreign minister visited Colombo, these are issues he reported raised with Sri Lanka’s new president. But the simple repetition of the same hollow talking points that Delhi has made for years will bear the same results - no devolution of powers and the continued harassment of Tamil Nadu fishermen. Concrete action is needed to enforce any change.
While Dissanayake’s pivot to Delhi may be a welcome development and economic issues may dominate the agenda, India should remain cautious. As the Central government should know, reliable partners in Colombo are hard to come by. The anti-Indian, Sinhala chauvinistic sentiment remains deeply embedded within Sri Lanka’s polity and previous agreements have been delayed, ignored or scrapped entirely. For the stability and mutual prosperity that Delhi seeks in the region, Dissanayake should be forced to act. Demilitarisation and devolution of powers would be a welcome first step.
