The decision by the government to ask the INGOs and UN to leave the Wanni, ostensibly on the grounds that it cannot ensure their security and wants to prevent a Muttur type atrocity, heightens expectations that the final battle for the Wanni is nigh and that the war will soon be over.
The UN it is reported, will be allowed in with supplies. The LTTE according to some reports has joined battle in earnest and the betting of pundits is that whilst casualties will be high, the end result is a foregone conclusion. The security forces will win and the LTTE will either be vanquished in toto or remnants of it will scupper off into the jungles to attempt guerrilla resistance and terrorist attacks into the future.
Whilst all of this goes on, there is the burgeoning crisis of displacement. The LTTE stands accused of preventing the movement of people and of using them as a civilian shield; the government on the other hand, wants to empty the Wanni of civilians so that it can wreak havoc on LTTE military infrastructure and capability. The civilians of course are caught in the middle – fleeing from and further into the LTTE controlled area to escape the fighting.
Tens of thousands are involved. There has been talk of civilian corridors to let people out and criticism that the people will have to languish in what are effectively "detention centres" once they come out. And since it is likely that most of them would have undergone some training by the LTTE in civil defence, there is concern that they could be considered suspect, with all the unpleasant consequences that could entail.
It would be prudent of the regime to recognise that it is in such situations that the seeds of future conflict are sown and likewise, in such situations that the first and firm steps of reconciliation can and must be taken.
The acid test of the regime’s professed commitment to civilian welfare and of its understanding of Tamil sensitivities – shortcomings in respect of which the Defence Secretary himself has conceded – will be on the ground in the Wanni and not in the corridors of power and diplomacy in
All of this holds even if victory though certain, persists in being imminent. There is every likelihood that the LTTE will do its damndest to inflict as much damage militarily, before it is, itself destroyed.
That it was able to launch an air and ground attack on the security forces and police in Vavuniya – the first such attack in government held territory in the current phase of fighting which has been reported as one in which the LTTE has lost or ceded large chunks of territory to the security forces, indicates that it has not lost its capacity for daring and for damage.
Whilst some may contend that this was a flash in the pan or a desperado raid by a desperate foe, this is not a conclusion that can be taken for granted.
Yet, it is a question as to what the LTTE hopes to be able to achieve at this juncture in the hostilities. Is its strategic objective a hurting stalemate, which will force another round of talks or is it some notion of international intervention to force negotiations and a political deal?
The latter, were it to be at all a possibility, will depend on the political winds prevalent across the Palk Strait as
The last time it achieved this was in 2000/2001 in different circumstances in which they held the upper hand. They were able to hit the airport and port and move around with greater ease than they are at present. They also faced a regime that was ideologically committed to a political settlement, with them if there was no alternative, but preferably without them.
If there is to be another time around for them, the balance of power will be different. It will revolve around their ability to exact leverage from their demonstrable destructive potential as opposed to their control over territory and the pretension of a state in the state of becoming.
It looks like military victory will be delayed, perhaps temporarily, but conflict resolution, perhaps indefinitely.
