The 2 km to Kilinochchi is proving a hard slog, unless one is marching there the other way round the globe; but jokes and the success at Pooneryn apart, what are the implications of a military stalemate for the Rajapaksa regime?
Even if the army takes the town by year’s end one thing is now sure; the war will be far from over, not even half over. Reckless declarations of victory are foolish and the regime and the military knew this well, so why do it? Perhaps it was hubris, perhaps the regime deluded itself; but more likely this was the only road it could travel, it had nothing else to offer.
With corruption out of control, the economy in the doldrums, abuse of power by politicos rampant and its international reputation in tatters, the regime had but one thing to hold before the nation. Victory! Pirapaharan’s broken body dumped underfoot Rajapaksa’s upraised sandal, the Tiger cornered and vanquished, the nation liberated.
It was a necessity, born of political bankruptcy that drove the regime to the risky step of promising the Sinhala public a quick and final triumph. Disappoint them now and will the government’s grip precipitately unravel? Promise victory in six or twelve months and will their patience hold?
What if the war is prolonged?
Until recently I too reckoned that the LTTE would suffer a substantial defeat soon. I took my cue from pundits who write weekly defence columns here and in the Hindu, or pontificate on Aljazeera, and I reckoned defence ministry press releases were worth at least a scrap. All turned out to be vapid and a sensible revised assessment should read: The Tiger is wounded but has plenty of fight left, conventional war is far from over, and next year will witness more battles on land, sea and air.
e are not on the brink of a transition from positional warfare to guerrilla combat. Whether Kilinochchi falls sooner or later has become irrelevant; rather, the inability to take the town thus far implies that positional warfare will continue into next year. The blood-lust of racists from Temple Trees to Geneva will have to forego satiation and the regime will be running on a short fuse as public anger accumulates.
How much longer can the regime sell gains like Pooneryn and Mankulam to camouflage perpetual war? If it has nothing to show on the economic and governance spheres and the war is only limited successes - anything less than complete destruction of LTTE’s conventional warfare capability must count as a disappointment - the regime cannot stem public anger by clever tricks alone.
True the Rajapaksas have been wily in political fiddling - con artists supreme - but they cannot survive indefinitely on wits alone.
Furthermore, a Tamil Nadu agitated by the plight of Lanka’s Tamils, even if depicted as support for Tamils not Tigers, cannot but discomfit Colombo. Delhi has bent over to shield Colombo, but as the TN backlash mounts against the background of a looming Congress election defeat, this can no longer be taken for granted.
The economic outlook is grim
Is there reason to hope that as if by magic economic achievements will come to the government’s rescue?
The big targets are all infrastructural; the Southern and Katunayake expressways, Hambantota harbour and airport developments, power and refinery expansion projects, and of course the showpiece reconstruction of the East.
Some of these initiatives will produce respectable deliverables, some will not. The more politically useful ones seem to be the more doubtful - the two road projects, the two Hambantota schemes and the Eastern Province showcase, are difficult to pull off.
Inflation is what hits the common man directly. The 2009 war budget has been raised to nearly Rs 200 billion ($1.8 billion), nevertheless even the warmongering JVP has threatened to oppose the budget “because of the government’s track record.” Trade unions are again showing signs of restiveness. Globally, economic forecasters are dismissing inflation fears and discussing deflation, but here in Lanka inflation cannot be brought below the 20% to 25% mark.
The war is one reason, another is that there is no way this regime can extricate the country from a debt trap - both foreign and local. Oil prices, the big culprit, have fallen, but inflation will remain high; we are in a complex inflationary trap and correction in global oil and commodity prices will not liberate Lanka from high double digit inflation. Employment in the Middle East will be the next sector to be hit.
The private sector is currently stabilising the economy and the regime remains more popular with the business classes than the UNP. The UPFA is now the principal party of Lankan capitalism, the UNP the alternative party. Nor is Ranil a more direct agent of imperialism than Mahinda; all these old cliches are simplistic and dated.
Everything has to be reassessed in the light of the imperatives and processes of the civil war. Imperialism will dump Mahinda for just one reason, if he is going to lose the war leading to a huge crisis of destabilisation in the South. Neither India nor the West will pull the rug from under him except in such extremis. The economic outlook is grim, but will not alone push the regime to extremis, the addition of a military setback will.
The bright note on the national question is that the large Tamil population which emigrated to the South, particularly the environs of Colombo, has without hullabaloo integrated into employment and business. The 1956 to 1983 experience of discrimination in employment, and burning of shops and homes, seems to be a thing of the past; a residual scar on the Tamil psyche, but not a fact of life today. This quiet process of social and economic reintegration, if sustained, will outweigh the folly of this and future regimes, hence its social and economic dimensions are worth the attention of sociologists and political scientists.
