The Sri Lankan government’s own commission into the last stages of the war has commenced its sittings. The eight member panel has heard from civilians, government officials, politicians and mandarins, with many more due to appear before it in the future. Even as the panel was announced, many months ago, many international commentators rushed to question the validity of the panel and the authority, authenticity and reliability of any findings it may make, with comments like “no reason to believe this is any more serious than the previous commissions” (Robert Templar, ICG) and the lack of faith in the government’s capacity to investigate its own actions. Even local rights activists were skeptical, mentioning the “big gap between the words and deeds of the government” on human rights (Jehan Perara, NPC) and calling it a “cynical gesture” that is no substitute for a UN investigation (M.C.M Iqbal, two-time Secretary to Presidential Commissions of Inquiry into Disappearances in Sri Lanka). Why then would Sri Lanka proceed with the panel?
There are many plausible explanations for proceeding with the panel. To begin with, let us dismiss the possibility that Sri Lanka is serious about the panel serving as a vehicle to rectify the structural flaws in the country and bring about reconciliation. As numerous other commentators have pointed out, there is no indication that Sri Lanka is willing – or able – to make the fundamental mindset changes needed to establish the kind of liberal order that is the only kind acceptable in today’s world. While countries like China can restrict political freedoms, Sri Lanka is not China, and it is unwilling to even allow the economic freedoms equally to all the country’s citizens that China has allowed its people. And as Jehan Perara has noted, the gap between words and deeds on the part of the Sri Lankan government is huge indeed. Thus to the question of why Sri Lanka is proceeding with it Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission even as the panel is dismissed. What Sri Lanka faces in the near future is the kind of international scrutiny it has never been exposed to previously, and no trumped up panel of inquiry in going to be able to assist the country in dodging that bullet.
The remainder of this article sets out three plausible explanations for why Sri Lanka is proceeding with the panel, before demonstrating why each can only ever be (at best) partially successful. These are not mutually exclusive explanations and indeed, the reality is probably that a little of each played a role in the decision to proceed. But they are presented discretely here so as to lay out the arguments for each. The first explanation for Sri Lanka proceeding with the lessons learnt panel despite it already being dismissed by significant international actors is that some ‘friends’ of the government have told it such a panel is an essential step to reconciliation and necessary to show that the reconciliation process is genuine. South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission is seen by these ‘friends’ as the model Sri Lanka needs to follow in order to demonstrate its intention to achieve a lasting peace and reconciliation on the island. That some international news media are covering the panels sittings (almost religiously) is indication that some in the international community are prepared to pretend the commission has legitimacy it in reality does not have. These friends seek to dig Sri Lanka out of the hole the country has ended up in once the end of the war with the Liberation Tigers exposed the illiberal practices and ideologies that had always been at the heart of Sri Lanka. Part of the driver for this is selfish on the part of those friends – those friends are among those who encouraged others in the international community to follow certain policies that rewarded the Sri Lankan government and punished the LTTE even when it was obvious the issues were not that clear cut – but part of it is because those friends are aware that a truly felt reconciliation is the only way forward for peace in Sri Lanka and they still choose to believe that the Sri Lankan state (as it is currently structured) is capable of taking the necessary steps towards that reconciliation.
A second possible explanation for why Sri Lanka is proceeding with the panel is that such a step preempts an international enquiry and could rule out the possibility of one. Under international covenants and treaties, an international enquiry is not possible if the state in question can demonstrate that it is capable of conducting its own investigations. The issues of capacity and willingness are of course subjective judgments, and the comments by international observers show that despite Sri Lanka’s claims to capacity and willingness, many are not willing to accept these assurances. By proceeding with its own commission however, Sri Lanka has gone beyond the promise of an inquiry and actually initiated one, thereby strengthening it arguments about willingness and capacity. Further, the panel is due to present its report to the President by 15 November 2010, thereby possibly (probably) preempting the beginning of any international commissions. Thus, by enacting this panel – however vague or weak it may be – the Sri Lankan state is hoping to have done enough to rule out the possibility of an international investigation into allegations of war crimes.
The third, and perhaps most relevant explanation for Sri Lanka continuing with its own panel of inquiry is that through the process, Sri Lanka is able to modulate the picture of the country that is presented to the world – i.e. it is a public relations exercise. The early press reports about the commission alone show what kind of whitewashing is planned. Firstly, it will be argued that the Sri Lanka state has demonstrated its ability to respond to the concerns of the international community and indeed go further – while the international calls have been for an investigation into the last phase of the war (i.e. 2008/9) the Sri Lankan panel is looking at the period from 2002 to 2009. Thus, the government hopes to show a state that listens to international concerns and responds accordingly. Also, the members of the panel come from the Sinhalese, Muslim and Tamil communities – an attempt to deny the reality of institutional racism in the country. Just as one swallow does not a summer make, or the existence of a female national leader does not mean there is no sexism in the country, the structural discrimination in Sri Lanka cannot be negated by presence of a few token Tamils and Muslims on the panel. But to a state that has to date been able to rely on style over substance in the past, this must seem like an easy way to blunt what it sees as criticisms from enemies.
The panel has also been set a relatively short reporting timeframe – it is due to report by 15 November 2010. This can be spun as a government responding to international pressure – being a good global citizen – but as many observers have noted, the findings of the panel are so irrelevant to how Sri Lanka proceeds that the timing was irrelevant anyway. Further, while the panel is based in Colombo, hearings are being held across the North and East as well. This, the state hopes, will demonstrate that the panel is genuine in carrying out its mission – after all it is willing to go to the people and thus access evidence from those ho perhaps cannot afford to travel to the capital. Also, those who appear before the panel have been promised anonymity if required. The commission chairman allegedly told the BBC that “no one needs to fear testifying, as secrecy and anonymity can be guaranteed”.
This suggests a desire to protect those who might give evidence against persons in power, so as to ensure accurate and honest accounts are provided by those appearing before the panel. While not challenging the sincerity of the individual members, nevertheless this false integrity cannot be accepted at face value. In a country where the police and armed forces are implicated in most of the human rights abuses, any sensible observer has to question what kind of protection can be provided by the state. Further, the panel having sittings in towns across the north and east is noteworthy, but its value has to be questioned given the large number of those impacted by the last phase of the war still living in camps (from which a journey to appear before the panel cannot be hidden) or the extreme poverty of those who have left the camps only to be ‘returned’ to their homes in the far flung corners of the north and east with no access to basic facilities, let alone transport.
Finally, the reports of evidence provided at the initial hearings also contribute to the picture of Sri Lanka the country’s PR agencies are hoping to modify. While there have been reports of ‘white van’ disappearances, most have been unable to ‘prove’ involvement by the military or police, even though informally many (if not all) in Sri Lanka know who is behind most disappearances and to whom they pay the ransom demands. Similar accusations that the military has ‘disappeared’ suspected former combatants cannot not be proven by those who make them, according to press reports. “Others said they believed the military was holding their husbands, who had previously worked with the Tamil Tigers, but they lacked clear information,” reported the BBC after the first week of hearings.
Thus, Sri Lanka has extremely plausible reasons for proceeding with it Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation panel. But to those who are aware of the island’s history and its structural constitution, these reasons are not sufficient. This panel should not be allowed to serve its purpose of thwarting justice or of washing the blood off the hands of the Sri Lankan state and its representatives.
