When the Norwegian sponsored peace process began more than four years ago, there were many in the Tamil community who asked why the LTTE was stopping its armed struggle when it seemed to be in a position of strength, having only just recaptured huge swathes of territory and inflicted heavy losses on the Sri Lankan military.
It became clear, particularly as the peace process unfolded, that the LTTE was seeking to gain a measure of legitimacy in the eyes of the international community (the LTTE maintains that it has already established its legitimacy amongst the Tamils, who continue to provide recruits and support, by fighting the Sri Lankan state to a standstill and precipitating the conditions in which Colombo and, for that matter, the international community, had to engage seriously with their political demands).
Beginning
In 2002, therefore, the LTTE expected its participation in the internationally monitored ceasefire and associated Norwegian peace process to enable the international community to engage with itself and the Tamils and to ascertain for themselves the extent of the support the organization enjoyed on the ground. Secondly, and consequently, it expected the international community to help establish a peaceful transition to Tamil-self rule (whatever form that would ultimately take).
The LTTE attempted through numerous means to establish this legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. It used the ballot box, the backing the Tamil National Alliance, which, having on the basis of ''LTTE as sole representatives of the Tamils'' swept the polls in the Northeast. The LTTE''s support organisations staged a series of massive public rallies drawing hundreds of thousands of people across the Northeast and the Diaspora.
To no avail
The LTTE also attempted to establish a temporary governance mechanism (the Interim Self Governing Authority) incorporating many of the values demanded of the international community and when that was thwarted, a multi-ethnic power-sharing mechanism of limited scope and duration to meet the desperate needs of the people in its controlled areas (the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure).
All to no avail. Perhaps convinced the LTTE''s participation in the peace process stemmed from military weakness, the international community refused to acknowledge the LTTE''s numerous attempts at legitimising itself. But the international community did more than ignore the LTTE''s effor-ts. In some cases, it worked actively to undermine and thwart them.
Pullback
No sooner had the P-TOMS been signed, the United States announced it not would not contribute any funds through the agreed mechanism. Whilst unwilling to fund the joint mechanism even though, as US embassy spokesman Philip Frayne said, "[it] holds the prospect for efficient and equitable reconstruction assistance to those affected by the tsunami," the United States insisted on continuing to fund the Sri Lankan state. This was even though the state had been criticised by donors for its inequitable distribution of aid in the wake of the tsunami.
Another example of the inherent anti-LTTE, pro-state bias of the international community is its unabashed lack of commitment to the conditions attacked to the aid pledged in Tokyo three years ago this month. The 2003 Tokyo Declaration states: "assistance by the donor community must be closely linked to substantial and parallel progress in the peace process towards fulfilment of the objectives agreed upon by the parties in Oslo".
Weak link
The donors made much of the US$ 4.8b pledge, asserting that a carrot was being dangled for both sides to get them to stay the course to peace. The reality is that, whilst the conditionality on the LTTE (and thus its controlled areas) remained, around 75% of the aid (over US$ 3.5b) was released anyway to the government (a quarter apparently went to the ''Northeast'' - in other words, to government controlled areas there).
In effect, the international community continues to fund the Sri Lankan state despite the lack of progress in the peace process and this has continued even when the state is deliberately steering the island back to war.
At the start of the Norwegian initiative in 2002, the international community asserted that ''a hurting stalemate'' - i.e. a balance of forces - had precipitated the peace process. This month the Sri Lankan government agreed to purchase $250 million worth of arms from Pakistan. But this, according to the logic of the international community, is acceptable because the state is fighting against the Liberation Tigers and therefore needs to be armed. The LTTE, however, has been criticised for shipping in arms, even though these could not amount to more than a fraction of the state''s purchases - and that was before this month''s orders to Pakistan.
The problem
In the eyes of the international community, any cycle of action and reaction always starts with the Tigers making the first negative move. The LTTE, not the state, is to blame for the war in the first place, the failure of the peace process and, ultimately, the present state of affairs.
Throughout the peace process, any request by the LTTE (regardless of how reasonable it was or not) was always viewed through the lens of "what do the Tigers ga-in from this?" For example, when the LTTE called for the disbanding of the high security zones in the Tamil areas, the response of the Sri Lankan government - echoed by the international community - was that the LTTE was looking to move into those areas itself. There was no consideration of the 800,000 Tamil internally displaced people and refugees who still live in camps, unable to return to their homes inside the sprawling network of military bases.
Double standards
Similarly, the demand that Army-backed paramilitaries be disarmed - a call echoed from the outset by many Tamils, including the editorial column of this newspaper - was seen purely as an LTTE objective of weakening its opponents. But Sri Lanka has been brought to the brink of war precisely because the paramilitaries, secure the international community shared this view, were able to continue the Army''s shadow war against the Tigers.
While the Tigers have been criticised, sometimes rightly, for their failure to live up to the very high expectations of a legitimate government, the same international community which has judged the LTTE wanting has refused to hold the Sri Lankan state to the sa-me standard. On the contrary, the Sri Lankan government has been praised for its military''s ''restraint'' at the same time that civilians were fleeing government-controlled territory (for LTTE areas or to India) and atrocities were being reported every day.
Mechanics
That Sri Lanka holds elections is enough to deem it a democracy in international eyes. It matters not that Sri Lanka is also a country where those targeting and killing Tamil civilians not only continue to enjoy impunity, but often rise in establishment ranks. To quote Am-nesty International, "there is a disturbing pattern of incomplete or ineffective investigations by the government, with the result that perpetrators of such violence generally operate with impunity." But the international community''s consideration for Tamils'' rights has been amply demonstrated by the lack of a single government willing to condemn the attacks on civilians by Sri Lankan military personnel.
Consider, the massacre of 13 civilians in the islets off the coast of Jaffna, of which Amnesty said it has received: "credible reports that Sri Lanka Navy personnel and armed cadres affiliated with the Eelam People''s Democratic Party, a Tamil political party that is opposed to the LTTE, were present at the scene of the killings." But just two weeks after these killings, the US Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs, Richard Boucher, was praising the government, saying: "I told the President that we welcome the restraint that the government has shown in the face of many provocations by the Tamil Tigers."
Hypocrisy
In the face of international community''s hypocrisy - high standards for the non-state actor and seemingly non-existent standards for the state- what, if anything, does the LTTE gain by continuing to attempt to satisfy the demands of the international community? Indeed, it can be argued that rather than gaining, the LTTE - and, therefore, the Tamils - currently stand to lose more if they continue to blindly pursue an ever-denied international legitimacy.
For example, if the Tigers fall in line with international - especially US - demands and disarm while Tamils are clearly without security, the LTTE will lose its legitimacy in the eyes of the Tamils (not to mention be wiped out by the security forces). From the Tamil perspective, when physical security is at stake, of what use is an organisation that cannot protect them?
While recognising the LTTE to the extent that it has been included as a party at the negotiating table, the international community has worked hard during that process to weaken the organisation''s claim to legitimacy. This has been through repeated calls for additional (i.e. opposing) actors at the negotiating table, strengthening other organisations whose sole raison d''etre is their opposition to the Tigers, repeatedly condemning actions of the LTTE while keeping silent on the actions of the Sri Lankan government, and so on.
Unheard
It has also become clear the international community will not recognise the legitimate calls of the Tamil Tigers on behalf of the Tamil people. Instead the LTTE will perversely be blamed for their continued hardships.
And legitimacy in the eyes of the international community might not be possible for the LTTE anyway - if the EU statement at the time of proscribing the Tiger is any indication, legitimacy seems to be awarded only to those who in fact oppose the Tigers.
Little wonder then that after more than four years of engaging with the international community and attempting to demonstrate to the world their earned right to represent the Tamil people, the Tigers have now begun the process of reconsidering the efficacy of this approach.
Fundamentals
The Tamils have to consider the fundamentals of the present situation, to look at the cards they hold, as opposed to the cards they should have been dealt. Sri Lanka''s conflict went from a ''civil war'' somewhere in South Asia to an issue that necessitated Japan, US and EU as ''Co-chairs'' because of a dramatic change in the ground situation within Sri Lanka.
As has often been argued, the actions of the international community have, if anything, hastened the slide towards another war. Now war is advocated not only by the nationalists of the south, but also by many Tamils who see power as the only currency that might bring the international community around to viewing their grievances as being genuine.
And given that one interpretation of recent actions and statement by the European Union and the United States is that the LTTE have only been demonised to the extent they have because they are a non-state actor, if ever there was an argument for pursuing statehood, the international community has, over the past few weeks, convincingly made it.
It became clear, particularly as the peace process unfolded, that the LTTE was seeking to gain a measure of legitimacy in the eyes of the international community (the LTTE maintains that it has already established its legitimacy amongst the Tamils, who continue to provide recruits and support, by fighting the Sri Lankan state to a standstill and precipitating the conditions in which Colombo and, for that matter, the international community, had to engage seriously with their political demands).
Beginning
In 2002, therefore, the LTTE expected its participation in the internationally monitored ceasefire and associated Norwegian peace process to enable the international community to engage with itself and the Tamils and to ascertain for themselves the extent of the support the organization enjoyed on the ground. Secondly, and consequently, it expected the international community to help establish a peaceful transition to Tamil-self rule (whatever form that would ultimately take).
The LTTE attempted through numerous means to establish this legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. It used the ballot box, the backing the Tamil National Alliance, which, having on the basis of ''LTTE as sole representatives of the Tamils'' swept the polls in the Northeast. The LTTE''s support organisations staged a series of massive public rallies drawing hundreds of thousands of people across the Northeast and the Diaspora.
To no avail
The LTTE also attempted to establish a temporary governance mechanism (the Interim Self Governing Authority) incorporating many of the values demanded of the international community and when that was thwarted, a multi-ethnic power-sharing mechanism of limited scope and duration to meet the desperate needs of the people in its controlled areas (the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure).
All to no avail. Perhaps convinced the LTTE''s participation in the peace process stemmed from military weakness, the international community refused to acknowledge the LTTE''s numerous attempts at legitimising itself. But the international community did more than ignore the LTTE''s effor-ts. In some cases, it worked actively to undermine and thwart them.
Pullback
No sooner had the P-TOMS been signed, the United States announced it not would not contribute any funds through the agreed mechanism. Whilst unwilling to fund the joint mechanism even though, as US embassy spokesman Philip Frayne said, "[it] holds the prospect for efficient and equitable reconstruction assistance to those affected by the tsunami," the United States insisted on continuing to fund the Sri Lankan state. This was even though the state had been criticised by donors for its inequitable distribution of aid in the wake of the tsunami.
Another example of the inherent anti-LTTE, pro-state bias of the international community is its unabashed lack of commitment to the conditions attacked to the aid pledged in Tokyo three years ago this month. The 2003 Tokyo Declaration states: "assistance by the donor community must be closely linked to substantial and parallel progress in the peace process towards fulfilment of the objectives agreed upon by the parties in Oslo".
Weak link
The donors made much of the US$ 4.8b pledge, asserting that a carrot was being dangled for both sides to get them to stay the course to peace. The reality is that, whilst the conditionality on the LTTE (and thus its controlled areas) remained, around 75% of the aid (over US$ 3.5b) was released anyway to the government (a quarter apparently went to the ''Northeast'' - in other words, to government controlled areas there).
In effect, the international community continues to fund the Sri Lankan state despite the lack of progress in the peace process and this has continued even when the state is deliberately steering the island back to war.
At the start of the Norwegian initiative in 2002, the international community asserted that ''a hurting stalemate'' - i.e. a balance of forces - had precipitated the peace process. This month the Sri Lankan government agreed to purchase $250 million worth of arms from Pakistan. But this, according to the logic of the international community, is acceptable because the state is fighting against the Liberation Tigers and therefore needs to be armed. The LTTE, however, has been criticised for shipping in arms, even though these could not amount to more than a fraction of the state''s purchases - and that was before this month''s orders to Pakistan.
The problem
In the eyes of the international community, any cycle of action and reaction always starts with the Tigers making the first negative move. The LTTE, not the state, is to blame for the war in the first place, the failure of the peace process and, ultimately, the present state of affairs.
Throughout the peace process, any request by the LTTE (regardless of how reasonable it was or not) was always viewed through the lens of "what do the Tigers ga-in from this?" For example, when the LTTE called for the disbanding of the high security zones in the Tamil areas, the response of the Sri Lankan government - echoed by the international community - was that the LTTE was looking to move into those areas itself. There was no consideration of the 800,000 Tamil internally displaced people and refugees who still live in camps, unable to return to their homes inside the sprawling network of military bases.
Double standards
Similarly, the demand that Army-backed paramilitaries be disarmed - a call echoed from the outset by many Tamils, including the editorial column of this newspaper - was seen purely as an LTTE objective of weakening its opponents. But Sri Lanka has been brought to the brink of war precisely because the paramilitaries, secure the international community shared this view, were able to continue the Army''s shadow war against the Tigers.
While the Tigers have been criticised, sometimes rightly, for their failure to live up to the very high expectations of a legitimate government, the same international community which has judged the LTTE wanting has refused to hold the Sri Lankan state to the sa-me standard. On the contrary, the Sri Lankan government has been praised for its military''s ''restraint'' at the same time that civilians were fleeing government-controlled territory (for LTTE areas or to India) and atrocities were being reported every day.
Mechanics
That Sri Lanka holds elections is enough to deem it a democracy in international eyes. It matters not that Sri Lanka is also a country where those targeting and killing Tamil civilians not only continue to enjoy impunity, but often rise in establishment ranks. To quote Am-nesty International, "there is a disturbing pattern of incomplete or ineffective investigations by the government, with the result that perpetrators of such violence generally operate with impunity." But the international community''s consideration for Tamils'' rights has been amply demonstrated by the lack of a single government willing to condemn the attacks on civilians by Sri Lankan military personnel.
Consider, the massacre of 13 civilians in the islets off the coast of Jaffna, of which Amnesty said it has received: "credible reports that Sri Lanka Navy personnel and armed cadres affiliated with the Eelam People''s Democratic Party, a Tamil political party that is opposed to the LTTE, were present at the scene of the killings." But just two weeks after these killings, the US Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs, Richard Boucher, was praising the government, saying: "I told the President that we welcome the restraint that the government has shown in the face of many provocations by the Tamil Tigers."
Hypocrisy
In the face of international community''s hypocrisy - high standards for the non-state actor and seemingly non-existent standards for the state- what, if anything, does the LTTE gain by continuing to attempt to satisfy the demands of the international community? Indeed, it can be argued that rather than gaining, the LTTE - and, therefore, the Tamils - currently stand to lose more if they continue to blindly pursue an ever-denied international legitimacy.
For example, if the Tigers fall in line with international - especially US - demands and disarm while Tamils are clearly without security, the LTTE will lose its legitimacy in the eyes of the Tamils (not to mention be wiped out by the security forces). From the Tamil perspective, when physical security is at stake, of what use is an organisation that cannot protect them?
While recognising the LTTE to the extent that it has been included as a party at the negotiating table, the international community has worked hard during that process to weaken the organisation''s claim to legitimacy. This has been through repeated calls for additional (i.e. opposing) actors at the negotiating table, strengthening other organisations whose sole raison d''etre is their opposition to the Tigers, repeatedly condemning actions of the LTTE while keeping silent on the actions of the Sri Lankan government, and so on.
Unheard
It has also become clear the international community will not recognise the legitimate calls of the Tamil Tigers on behalf of the Tamil people. Instead the LTTE will perversely be blamed for their continued hardships.
And legitimacy in the eyes of the international community might not be possible for the LTTE anyway - if the EU statement at the time of proscribing the Tiger is any indication, legitimacy seems to be awarded only to those who in fact oppose the Tigers.
Little wonder then that after more than four years of engaging with the international community and attempting to demonstrate to the world their earned right to represent the Tamil people, the Tigers have now begun the process of reconsidering the efficacy of this approach.
Fundamentals
The Tamils have to consider the fundamentals of the present situation, to look at the cards they hold, as opposed to the cards they should have been dealt. Sri Lanka''s conflict went from a ''civil war'' somewhere in South Asia to an issue that necessitated Japan, US and EU as ''Co-chairs'' because of a dramatic change in the ground situation within Sri Lanka.
As has often been argued, the actions of the international community have, if anything, hastened the slide towards another war. Now war is advocated not only by the nationalists of the south, but also by many Tamils who see power as the only currency that might bring the international community around to viewing their grievances as being genuine.
And given that one interpretation of recent actions and statement by the European Union and the United States is that the LTTE have only been demonised to the extent they have because they are a non-state actor, if ever there was an argument for pursuing statehood, the international community has, over the past few weeks, convincingly made it.
