The Co-Chairs communiqué of September 13th from Brussels has suggested that talks resume in early October. It warns that the “failure to cease hostilities, pursue a political solution, respect human rights and protect humanitarian space could lead the international community to diminish its support.”
It is being argued that the International Community is fast losing its patience with the current regime in Colombo – a sense underlined again by the Co-Chairs threat of an iron fist if both the Government and the LTTE fail to reenter a dialogue.
But we have been here before – Tokyo also promised that a failure to resume a dialogue would result in repercussions for Colombo – although as yet little has materialised. If anything the capacity of the Co-Chairs to shape events in Sri Lanka has been overestimated.
This may be one reason why New Delhi has stayed well clear of getting directly involved with Colombo. Where some commentators see the Brussels communiqué as a make or break moment for the Sri Lankan state, I am increasingly convinced that the desire for further involvement by the Co-Chairs is just not there beyond the usual threats of action. Sri Lanka barely figures on the league table of international crises, which at present are dominated by Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel/Palestine and Darfur in Sudan. These are crises that the International Community can barely handle at present and they are unlikely to add Sri Lanka to the list beyond the current remit of the Co-Chairs.
Furthermore, Sri Lanka is seen as coming within India’s regional sphere. With Pakistan (and China by extension) stepping into the breach supposedly left by India’s failure to provide military hardware to Colombo the impression has recently been created of a weakened LTTE
If however the LTTE were seriously weakened given the suggestions of Sri Lankan aerial superiority and the defection of Karuna, then would not the LTTE be suing for peace with the backing of the Co-Chairs? While the LTTE might have suffered losses in recent months, I am skeptical of the irredeemable weakness attributed to them by some commentators in the Colombo media. With the monsoon season soon arriving it will be the SLA, on the offensive, that risks getting bogged down in a guerrilla war.
It is unlikely that the LTTE will be drawn into a major retaliation against the SLA until the Co-Chairs October deadline has passed. So October’s meeting of the Co-Chairs will be a pivotal moment in Sri Lanka’s post-CFA peace process.
Lets assume that there are no peace talks between the two sides and lets assume that the Co-Chairs begin to disengage from the process. Interestingly even though the Co-Chairs issued a sharply worded rebuke to Colombo in the Brussels communiqué, the donor community is already talking of extending the debt moratorium for Sri Lanka. Human rights violations will therefore have to get a lot worse, on a par with the late 1980s and early 90s before aid conditionality is used as a weapon against Colombo.
But by default a disengagement from the modalities of the process initiated by the Co-Chairs in 2002, will increase New Delhi’s role and to this end they have begun engaging the wider Tamil community in both India and Sri Lanka. New Delhi at present will not accept a separate Tamil dominated state on its southern flank. Indeed what the Sinhala nationalists have never quite grasped is that the possibility of Eelam rests more with New Delhi than with Colombo.
Given India can never disengage, the Co-Chairs will in effect leave it up to New Delhi to formulate a response if Colombo opts for a military solution which seeks to ethnically cleanse the East of Tamils and perhaps the Muslims.
India is an astute observer of Lankan politics - they know fully well how entrenched the logic of Sinhalese nationalism is within the apparatus of the state. They understand that it will take an all mighty effort to reform the Sri Lankan state in a pluralist and inclusivist direction. In short India’s response will be determined by how Colombo acts in response to a disengagement from the peace process by the Co-Chairs.
In the event of full-scale war which now seems the most likely scenario, New Delhi will respond only once the tensions in Tamil Nadu become unmanageable. In this regard Colombo needs to think carefully before it launches an all out assault on the LTTE which, given the terrain and political loyalties of the majority of the Tamils in the Northeast, will become a war against the Tamil people.
If Colombo is astute and does not launch an all out assault on the LTTE, but carries on with its ‘shadow war’ it can probably secure adequate support from the West for a significant period of time. But bear in mind that Tokyo/Beijing are not that concerned with aid conditionalities and will continue to provide aid to Colombo regardless of the war.
The prospects for a just resolution of this conflict within a united but federal Sri Lanka is bleak. Indeed the prospect of any kind of resolution is bleak. It will however be shaped on how New Delhi responds to the competing moves of both Colombo and the LTTE. While the Brussels communiqué appears a wake up call for the forces of Sinhalese extremism, it appears unlikely that the warning will be heeded - or that the Co-Chairs will follow their warning through with conviction.
