Stung by criticism by expatriate Tamils of its report last week claiming the Diaspora was gripped by ‘a culture of fear’ regarding LTTE extortion, Human Rights Watch this weekend issued a statement that stepped back from its earlier sensational claims.

Acknowledging that accusations of extortion were only being made about “a small number of individuals” who were “claiming to represent the LTTE or groups linked to the LTTE,” HRW said: “we do not suggest that significant numbers of Tamils are engaging in extortion or other unlawful activity. We also note that many Tamils actively and willingly support the LTTE.”

Last week a HRW report titled ‘Funding the ‘Final War’: LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora,’ the New York based organization urged government authorities in Canada and the UK “to take stronger steps to protect members of the Tamil diaspora from violence, intimidation and extortion.”

“The Tamil Tigers are exporting the terrors of war to Tamils in the West,” the report’s author, Jo Becker, said. “The culture of fear is so strong that even Tamils who don’t support them still feel they have no choice but to give money.”

HRW said its 45-page report “details how representatives of the LTTE and pro-LTTE groups use unlawful pressure among Tamil communities in the West to secure financial pledges.”

However, the report triggered a storm of protest and outrage amongst expatriate Tamils.

The Toronto Star reported that at a press conference Wednesday organized by the Canadian Tamil Congress, the message was that anonymous allegations made to HRW don’t equal proof of a crime.

“At the event, attended by some of Toronto’s most prominent Tamils, the group told reporters the LTTE was the victim of a smear campaign,” the Star reported.

Pointing out there has not been a single prosecution for extortion in Canada amongst the Tamil community, the CTC questioned the basis on which such sweeping allegations could be made about a community.

HRW responded this weekend with a statement on its website.

The human rights group said it had spoken to dozens of members of the Tamil community in Canada and UK.

However, in its clarification, it said there were “credible and consistent reports … of a widespread and systematic campaign by the LTTE obtain funds from Tamils in the West.”

This, Tamil expatriates point out, is quite different from a widespread campaign of extortion or intimidation. Indeed, HRW’s clarification admits: “While a large number of Tamils are subjected to demands for money, we do not suggest that significant numbers of Tamils are engaging in extortion or other unlawful activity. We also note that many Tamils actively and willingly support the LTTE.”

“The extortion activities described in our report are being carried out by a small number of individuals claiming to represent the LTTE or groups linked to the LTTE,” the

However, HRW said the fact there have been no prosecutions did not mean it did not take place, but that people were too scared to complain to Police.

The organization denied it had been instigated by the Sri Lankan government to file the report to smear the LTTE and defended its author, Ms. Becker, as a researcher with 8 years experience.

Expatriate Tamils protested, however, that the accusations, leveled anonymously, were impractical to disprove.

“Unless you interview all 300,000 [Tamils], you’re not going to be able to counter these allegations,” Dushy Gnanapragasam, a spokesman for Toronto’s Tamil community told the Toronto Star.

The Star quoted Tamils suggesting that HRW had probably been fed bogus information by anti-LTTE Tamil groups.

Within a day of HRW’s report coming out, expatriate Tamils in Canada condemned it and called a press conference to rebut the accusations in it.

The report had characterized their entire community as one moribund by fear and questioned its integration into Canadian society, they argued.

Pointing out there has not been a single prosecution for extortion in Canada amongst the Tamil community, they said anecdotal evidence and assumptions, not sound social science research, formed the basis for HRW’s allegations.

“The report makes disparaging conclusions about our community’s ability to report extortion and casts doubts about our integrity as law abiding citizens of Canada,” said David Poopalapillai, spokesperson for the CWC.

“This report makes me sick because it is saying that we are covering something up and our community is living in fear. In Toronto alone, there are 30 independent Tamil newspapers, three 24 hour radio stations, and three 24 hour Televisions stations. There is no veil of silence – Ms. Becker simply has her facts wrong,” he said.

“Not only are the report’s findings completely false– they seem to be based on anecdotal evidence and misguided assumptions,” said Ashwin Balamohan, incoming Vice President University Affairs for the Students’ Administrative Council at University of Toronto.

HRW also suggest that Canadian police set up a task force to investigate extortion. But a spokesman for the Toronto Police told the Globe and Mail that the force has not received complaints.
Ms. Becker, who some Tamil organizations said had conducted telephone interviews in an aggressive and inquisitorial manner, alleges in her report that Tamils are silent about what she claims is widespread extortion, because of fear of reprisals against them or relatives in Sri Lanka.

Nehru Gunaratnam, a spokesman for the Tamil community in Toronto, also told local reporters the report creates a skewed and offensive image of the Tamil people.

Neither he nor other prominent community leaders were interviewed by Ms. Becker, the Canadian Press news agency quoted him as saying.

The HRW report, which appeals to Canadian and British authorities to take action on behalf of the Tamil Diaspora, was condescending towards long-settled community, the CWC said.

More seriously, by tarring the entire community as somehow distinct from Canadian society, the HRW report “potentially place Tamil Canadians at great risk of racial discrimination and harassment,” CWC protested.

“Extortion is already a criminal code offence in Canada – why has no one been charged?” the CWC asked. “If no one has been charged, how can it be determined that they belong to a particular group?”

At any other time it would have been routine and not worthy of more than a couple of column inches. But Ranil Wickremesinghe’s visit to Oslo last week seemed to confirm what close observers of Sri Lanka’s politics had been speculating for some time: that powerful members of the international community are keen to actively bring about a scenario where the peace process could no longer be a target for political ‘outbidding’ in the south.

In short, they want a national government between Sri Lanka’s main parties, President Mahinda Rajapakse’s ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and Wickremesinghe’s main opposition United National Party (UNP). Inevitably, this necessitates Rajapakse dumping his present ultra-nationalist allies – the Janatha Vimukthi Perumana (JVP) and the Jeyathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) – and ending their present hold on the peace process.

The national government story ‘broke’ in The Sunday Leader this week – though most political actors, not least the shrewd leadership of the JVP, had figured out what was going on the moment Wickremesinghe left the island (even though, UNP officials insist, the trip was scheduled a long time ago). Yet, the Leader, known for its close links with the UNP, claimed the idea of a national government originated from President Rajapakse himself and noted only that the international community was ‘in favour’ of the idea.

For President Rajapakse, a tie-up would not only guarantee the parliamentary stability of his minority government, but would end some of his other difficulties, not least the reluctance of foreign investors and the incessant pressure from international actors to push on with the peace process.

For the UNP, a tie-up would stem the relentless flow of defectors from its divided ranks to the SLFP - Rajapakse, assured of a stable majority in parliament, would desist from his highly effective campaign of wooing them over. Wickremesinghe, whose position as UNP leader has been under severe pressure, would be also relieved. As for the UNP rebels, a tie-up might undermine their pressure to make Wickremesinghe step down, but they too would welcome an end to the debilitating defections. The UNP, as a whole, would welcome a rift between Rajapakse and his JVP/JHU allies.

The only loser in this scenario, it appears, is the JVP and, understandably, the Marxists are beside themselves with rage. Having backed Rajapakse’s Presidential campaign – more effectively than even his own divided SLFP – the JVP has had a grip on the levers of power (whilst not being responsible for the Rajapakse’s mistakes) and had taken a commanding position on the flank of the peace process and other key matters of state. Now that grip is being prised away.

One of the immediate consequences of the Wickremesinghe visit, therefore, has been the vehement campaign unleashed last week by Sinhala nationalist forces against Norway. Both the JVP and its support organisations such as the Patriotic National Movement (PNM) have come out in full fury against Oslo. The charges are not new – that Norway is biased against the Liberation Tigers, that there is a Norwegian conspiracy against Sri Lanka, and so on.

But the JVP knows full well that Norway is merely the visible tip of a powerful international iceberg. And it also knows that it cannot take a strident line against those actors without significant consequences, not least it if expects (as it undoubtedly does) to govern Sri Lanka one day. Thus Oslo serves as the only viable target.

In any case, the matter of a national government can only be decided after the outcome of March 30 elections is known. But some questions about its salience to a peace process are already showing through.

The logic behind a tie up between Sri Lanka’s two main parties is hardly novel. It was raised most famously in the late nineties by visiting British officials Liam Fox and, later, Minister Derek Fatchet. But that initiative failed as neither the UNP nor the SLFP-led People’s Alliance (PA) saw much mileage in it for themselves. Also, with every expectation that President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s ‘war for peace’ was going to wipe the LTTE out once and for all, the international community was not inclined to use pressure to ensure the tie-up came through.

What is different between then and now is the JVP. The party has grown in parliament (indeed, it is now challenging the disintegrating SLFP for the number two slot), in grassroots reach, in other capacities. But it has also become a political phenomenon. A powerful standard bearer of Sinhala nationalism, the JVP has positioned itself as cure for the myriad of ills afflicting Sri Lanka. As a result, the bipolar politics of yore have been replaced by a system that is almost tripolar. And there is nothing to suggest this process is going to be arrested. If anything, a national government presiding over the same corrupt, inefficient state is likely to enhance the JVP’s argument on the street that it is the one and only answer to Sri Lanka’s ills.

This is the first reason why the notion of a national government being a panacea for the competitive outbidding that has undermined past peace efforts becomes questionable.

In the recent past it is the JVP, not the main opposition, that has spearheaded strong resistance to any effort to advance the peace process. Be it the sharing of tsunami aid (P-TOMS) with the Tigers, or even of holding talks with them, the JVP has been the most vocal and the most effective opponent.

True, the UNP-led government that signed the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) and then held six rounds of talks with the LTTE struggled against Kumaratunga’s resistance to its efforts. And the UNP, once ejected from power in April 2004, has subsequently been less than helpful, not least in defending the peace process. But true resistance to peace efforts have come from the JVP and JHU and their supportive organisations.

Ironically, it is the ferocity of their opposition that has led to recent calls for greater inclusivity in the peace process (and the logic that such political actors are better brought into the process, rather than left to mobilise against it from outside). The demonstrable weaknesses of that approach (note the circumstances of the last Geneva round) have no doubt helped build the case for a more forceful stab at the national government approach.

But, secondly, a close look at the compulsions of both President Rajapakse and the UNP suggest that whilst a national government serves their present needs, it does not suit their longer term interests.

Rajapakse wants to be re-elected. The UNP wants to win the next Parliamentary election and its leader – Wickremesinghe or whoever else – also wants to be the next President. How would a national government help either?

A quick skim through Sri Lanka’s history makes it obvious that the main political parties have (since 1956) consistently put their own electoral interests above a solution to the ethnic question. Wickremesinghe’s UNP resisted the PA’s devolution package of 1995 till it was gutted to be utterly meaningless (no one, quite rightly, took the UNP’s own devolution proposals seriously). Last year, President Rajapakse was elected on – even by Sri Lankan standards – an unashamedly anti-peace process ticket.

And therein lies the rub. Rajapakse was elected. Of course, there is the question of what might or might not have been if the LTTE hadn’t called a boycott. But Rajapakse, even without the Muslim or Estate Tamil vote, won over the majority of the Sinhala voters (despite a divided SLFP with a resentful outgoing President as its leader) to a sufficient degree to come home by a clear margin.

Both Rajapakse and Wickremsinghe, moreover, offered generous subsidies to the Sinhala voter (even though Wickremesinghe had to share his promised largess amongst his minority backers).

It was undeniably the JVP with its peerless party machine and its strident, compelling platform, which delivered Rajapakse to office (the JHU meanwhile provided an invaluable moral legitimisation). The point is unlikely to be far from his mind, particularly if he mulls his chances at the next Presidential. (Moreover, for Rajapakse, despite the self-reassuring claims of some his erstwhile liberal backers, this is not simply a question of rational calculation, there are core beliefs too.)

The JVP has grown through war and peace, through economic growth and decline, whilst in government and in opposition, and through a myriad of international positions on how to solve Sri Lanka’s national question.

The push for a national government is thus, a sign of the lack of a suitable international response to the JVP and its powerful political message amongst the Sinhalese.

Indeed, the JVP’s growth has arguably been helped by the international community’s failure to confront – rather than manoeuvre around - the complex processes by which Sinhala nationalism has, since prior to independence from Britain, worked its way into the very fabric of the state and Sri Lankan society.

Whilst nominally a welcome contribution to the peace process, a national government will merely defer this dilemma: how can Sinhala nationalism (which reproduces itself through the guidance of the Sangha, the practice of the military, the curriculum of schools, academic research, and so on) be contained and marginalized?

Undoubtedly only international pressure that can forge a national government in Sri Lanka today. More importantly, it is only continuing international pressure that will keep it together. But for how long? Particularly with the JVP continuing its project on the outside?

Singapore has laid to rest one of its founding fathers - the former Deputy Prime Minister and senior statesman, Mr. Sinnathamby Rajaratnam. Born in Jaffna, Sri Lanka on Feb 25, 1915, Rajaratnam, of Tamil descent, grew up in Malaysia.

More than 1,000 people attended the state funeral on Saturday February 25, culminating in a solemn service at the Esplanade. They included President S.R. Nathan, Cabinet ministers, members of parliament and foreign dignitaries.

Mr Rajaratnam died the previous Wednesday of heart failure. He would have turned 91 on the day of his funeral.

An anti-colonial firebrand under British rule, Rajaratnam became a journalist and political activist. He went to King’s College, London to pursue a law degree, but due to World War II, unable to receive funding from his family to continue his studies. So, instead, he turned to journalism.

He threw in his lot as a founding member of the People’s Action Party (PAP) in November 1954 together with Lee Kuan Yew, who subsequently became Singapore’s first prime minister.

The PAP still rules the city-state.

He became the “ideas man” as culture minister from 1959 to 1965, through racial riots, merger with Malaysia and then independence.

Among his visions was a “Singaporean Singapore” - a multi-racial society whose citizens lived in harmony and progressed on merit - an ideal he enshrined into the Singapore pledge of allegiance.

Rajaratnam was Singapore’s first foreign minister, following its abrupt independence in 1965 and remained in the post until 1980, also taking on the position of labour minister from 1968 to 1971.

Rajaratnam was one of the five “founding fathers” of ASEAN in 1967.

From 1980 to 1984, he was second deputy prime minister and then became senior minister in the prime minister’s office. He left politics in 1988.

“On my identity card, it says my race is Indian,” Mr. Rajaratnam often said in his later years. “But I don’t care if you call me an Indian or an Eskimo. What is important is whether you consider me a good man.”

Rajaratnam was a strong believer in multi-racialism in Singapore, and when drafting the Singapore National Pledge in 1966 just two years after the 1964 Race Riots, he wrote the words “One united people, regardless of race, language or religion.”

In the 1980s and 1990s, when the government began implementing several policies to promote the use of “mother tongue” languages and ethnic-based self-help groups such as Chinese Development Assistance Council (CDAC) and Mendaki, Rajaratnam expressed his opposition to these policies which, in his view, ran counter to the vision of establishing a common Singaporean identity where “where race, religion, language does not matter”. He advocated for greater racial integration which he felt was still lacking in the country.

In his eulogy, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong hailed Mr. Rajaratnam as a Singapore hero and a champion for multi-racialism.

Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew also spoke at the funeral, and gave an emotional tribute to the man who was one of his oldest friends and colleagues.

Giving his eulogy at the service, Prime Minister Lee called Mr. Rajaratnam an extraordinary leader with the ideals, courage and passion.

He said Singapore would not be here today if not for men like the late politician who fought and changed history.

Prime Minister Lee said: “Throughout his years in public life, Raja would continue to think deeply and speak ardently about Singapore - our values, our future and our relevance to the world.

“He was an idealist and a visionary. He believed profoundly in a multi-racial, multi-religious society. The National Pledge which he drafted has helped to shape the nation’s psyche and entrench a core value for Singa­pore.

“In this age of extremist terrorism and tensions between Islam and the West, multi-racialism and harmony is more vital than ever to our very survival, both as a nation and a civilised society.”

Prime Minister Lee remembered the late statesman fondly - as “Uncle Raja” and said that he had benefited much from his political guidance.

One of his most vivid memories were of Mr Rajaratnam’s impassioned speeches both at home and defending Singapore’s interests abroad.

Prime Minister Lee said: “His speeches not only convinced the mind but stirred the soul. He was genuine and considerate; he spoke with conviction and passion, and even when he stuck a stiletto into an opponent - for he knew how to defend himself - it was done so nicely that the victim would smile with him.”

In his eulogy, Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew recalled his first meeting with Mr Rajaratnam in April 1952 just as the postman’s union was striking.

He spoke of how they had worked together to form the PAP, and remembered Mr Rajaratnam as a tireless fighter who enjoyed stringing words together to influence the people.

Minister Mentor Lee said: “His strength was as a thinker and a writer, a man of honour, with great moral courage. He had a way with people, enormous charm, integrity and character. He was self-possessed, had a good strong voice, and won the confidence of those who dealt with him.

“With his passing, Singaporeans have lost a patriot, a man of deep conviction and principle. His contribution was not in bricks and mortar, or concrete and glass, but in ideas, sentiments and spirit. Everyday when the pledge is recited in our schools, our children are reminded to live up to our aspirations as Raja expressed them.”

The family of one of the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchchi (ITAK) contestants, an ethnic Muslim, at the forthcoming poll for the Jaffna Municipal Council was attacked last week amid a general campaign of intimidation against the party.

ITAK is the name under which the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), an alliance of Sri Lanka’s four biggest Tamil parties and which is strongly supportive of the Tamil Tigers, is competing in the island-wide local government polls this month.

Mr. S. M. Suhaib’s family was attacked on Friday morning by armed men, suspected to belong to one of the Army-backed paramilitary organisations operating in Jaffna.

Moulavi S. M. Shahil, a co-contestant for the Jaffna Municipal Council, said in a statement Saturday that “the attack on Suhaib’s family is an ‘act of State terrorism’, and exposes the political bankruptcy of the paramilitaries assisting the chauvinist State.”

“We are certain that the Tamil speaking people will express their aspirations in the local council elections, and will demonstrate that efforts of many nefarious forces to destroy the increasing amity between Muslim and Tamil people cannot succeed,” Shahil, who is also a Muslim, said.

“The attack … is a provocative attack planned to worsen the climate of fear that has already been created by the Sri Lanka Military and collaborating paramilitaries,” said the Secretary of Jaffna Consortium of Welfare Associations, Mr. E. Parvatharajah, in a communiqué issued Saturday.

“While the TNA is keen on using the local elections as an instrument to highlight the aspirations of Tamil speaking people, the violence on Suhaib’s family portends ominous signs that anti-democratic forces are bent on suppressing the democratic rights of the Tamil people,” the communiqué added.

“We strongly condemn this attack and are confident that Tamil speaking people will teach a harsh lesson to the perpetrators of the crime during the forthcoming local council elections,” the communiqué said.

Army-backed paramilitaries have been threatening dozens of ITAK local government election candidates ever since their names were announced last month. ITAK is now contesting ten local councils excluding Padavi Siripura PS and Gomarankadawela PS.

The head of the Karuna Group, one of the paramilitary organisations operating in the NorthEast, has urged Tamils in the NorthEast to boycott the upcoming polls, alleging that the LTTE is attempting to use the election to promote its “gun culture.”

In leaflets distributed in Batticaloa by the political arm of the Karuna Group, the Tamil Eela Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP), Karuna, who is leading a violent campaign against LTTE supporters and members says he does not support the holding of the polls in the north and east at this point. He says that his party would not contest the elections as it would be neither free nor fair. Sri Lanka’s election commission disagrees.

Meanwhile ITAK has appointed Mr. Sabapathipillai Soundararajah as Chairman, and Mr. Vairan Nagendran as Vice Chairman of the Verugal Pradesiya Sabah in the Trincomalee district. ITAK was returned uncontested in the Verugal PS when the nomination closed on February16 for the thirteen local authorities in the district.

The other members named include Mr. Veerakutti Ariyanesarajah, Mr. Nallathamby Arasaratnam, Mrs. Santhamathy Thevathas, Mr. Subramaniam Thurairasa and Mr. Paransothy Disayakumar.

Burying the past, MDMK leader Vaiko, last week switched sides to align with the AIADMK in the coming Assembly elections in Tamil Nadu in a sudden realignment of forces that is seen as a setback to the DMK-led Democratic Progressive Alliance (DPA).

Ending days of speculation about his tying up with Jayalalithaa, who had jailed him under POTA for 19 months, Vaiko drove to the Poes Garden residence of the Chief Minister around noon and signed an agreement under which his party will contest 35 of the 234 Assembly seats.

After clinching the deal and posing for photographers, jointly holding the agreement with Jayalalithaa, he said “This is the finest hour in the political history of Tamil Nadu.”

Describing the new alliance as “formidable”, Vaiko said AIADMK will have a majority on its own to form the government. “The new government to be formed after the elections will be under your leadership,” he told her.

“It feels great to be friends. In politics, there are no permanent friends or enemies,” Jayalalithaa said when asked how she felt sharing platform with a former POTA detenu.

DMK chief Karunanidhi, declined to comment on the development in Tiruchirappalli, where he yesterday virtually served an ultimatum to Vaiko on his continuance in the alliance saying he could offer only a maximum of 22 seats and it was upto Vaiko to decide. Vaiko had demanded 25 seats.

For the DMK-led alliance, Vaiko’s decision comes as a major setback after the grouping’s spectacular victory sweeping all the 39 Lok Sabha in the 2004 elections, while for a friendless AIADMK it could be considered a major boost. Only a few days ago, the ruling AIADMK got its first electoral partner in Dalit Panthers of India which was given nine seats.

MDMK, a constituent of the ruling UPA at the Centre, has four MPs providing outside support to the government. Welcoming Vaiko, Jayalalithaa said the cadres of both the parties would work for the victory of each other. “The AIADMK will have individual majority to form the government,” Vaiko intervened to say.

She said issues like POTA were “matters of the past.” “We do not believe in looking back but looking at the future. We are meeting here on a positive note, on a positive matter and we will be making only positive statements,” she said adding the future was “glorious” for the AIADMK and MDMK.

MDMK activists burst crackers in various parts of the state to hail the accord. Vaiko had tied up with AIADMK in 1999 and 2004 Lok Sabha elections. He contested alone in the last Assembly polls.

Right from the day when seat-sharing talks began between the DPA constituents, the MDMK had been adopting a dilly-dallying attitude, leading the DMK Chief to virtually serve an ultimatum, saying Vaiko should take the offer of 22 seats or leave the conglomeration.

The MDMK had been demanding parity with the PMK on the plea that its strength was much more than the PMK and that it was the “number three” party in the state. The MDMK cadre had been opposing the tie-up with the DMK and was seeking a tie-up with AIADMK which had offered the party more seats.

As soon as news of the MDMK tie-up with AIADMK spread, DMK workers started pulling down Vaiko’s cutouts at the venue where the DMK party conference is in progress at Tiruchirappalli and set them ablaze.

Describing Vaiko as “ungrateful”, the activists claimed that they were paying the price for the hardship “we underwent seeking the release of Vaiko” (when he was detained under POTA in 2004).

Meanwhile, Mr. Tirumavalavan of the Dalit Panthers Party has also aligned with AIADMK. After months of discussions, Mr.Tirumavalavan signed the deal with Ms. Jayalalitha and signed a deal on 27th February, under which the DPI will be offered 9 seats.

Mr. Tirumavalavan attacked Mr. M. Karunanidhi accusing him of delaying a decision as he never wanted due respect and recognition for his party. When asked how two parties with opposite views on the Tamil Eelam question can come together Mr. Tirumavalavan replied that this issue will not be raised or discussed during the elections.

US President George W Bush said Friday that a strategic partnership launched with India could transform the world and urged New Delhi to take a lead in spreading freedom and democracy.

And following landmark talks between Bush and Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh, the two countries have finalised a landmark nuclear deal which will give New Delhi access to US civilian nuclear technology and open its nuclear facilities to international inspections.

The deal is a boost for India which has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Critics say it will compromise nuclear non-proliferation efforts as India, which is a neighbour of two other nuclear nations, China and Pakistan, could use the information to develop more powerful atomic weapons. The deal still has to be ratified by the US Congress.

The two countries signed a 10-year agreement to strengthen defence ties between the two countries. The landmark agreement will help facilitate joint weapons production, co-operation on missile defence and the transfer of technology.

The US Defence Department hailed the new accord aimed at helping meet India’s defence needs. It also cited the US commitment to providing India with modern fighter aircraft.

And an India-US Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation released on March 2 commits the two nations to a “comprehensive cooperation in ensuring a secure maritime domain.”

“The United States and India have entered a new era,” a statement issued after the signing of the agreement in Washington said. “We are transforming our relationship to reflect our common principles and shared national interests.”

The world’s most powerful democracy and its most populous democracy would rally global efforts to push for democracy, fight terrorism and break down trade barriers, Bush said in a keynote address at the end of his three-day visit.

Speaking a day after clinching a landmark nuclear deal with India, Bush paid glowing tribute to India, saying he was “dazzled by this vibrant and exciting land.”

“India in the 21st century is a natural partner of the United States because we are the brothers in the cause of human liberty,” he said, speaking from a 16th century fort in the Indian capital.

“The United States and India, separated by half the globe, are closer than ever before and the partnership between our free nations has the power to transform the world.”

Referring to the Cold War, he said that for many years, the United States and India were kept apart by the rivalries that divided the world.

“That’s changed. Our two great democracies are now united by opportunities that can lift the people, and threats that can bring down all our progress,” he said. “America and India are allies in the war against terror … America and India are in this war together and we will win this war together.”

Calling India “a global power”, he said New Delhi had “a historic duty to support democracy around the world”. Bush went on to describe the role India has played in fostering democracy in Afghanistan since the 2001 ouster of the Taliban regime.

He described India as the world’s largest democracy, “the birthplace of great religions”. “We are brothers in the cause of human liberty.”

“India and US have ambitious goals for our partnership. We can look to the future with confidence. Our relations ship has never been better. We will work together. There is no limit to what we can achieve.”

“India’s leadership is needed in a world that is hungry for freedom,” Bush said. “Men and women from North Korea to Burma, to Syria, to Zimbabwe, to Cuba, yearn for their liberty.”

“Our nations must not pretend that people of these countries prefer their own enslavement.”

Bush called on New Delhi to raise foreign direct investment limits (FDI) and open its market to US farm and industrial goods as well as services.

Bush drew the longest applause from a gathering that included the Who’s Who of Indian politics and business when he said that India and the US would never succumb to terrorism.

“(The terrorists) target democracies because they think we are weak... America and India love freedom and we will love to keep it.”

Bush concluded by saying: “We are optimistic about your future. May god bless India.”

Later, Bush also said he had no objections to an Iranian linked pipeline to supply natural gas to India and Pakistan, despite the growing crisis over Iran’s nuclear programs, saying “Our beef with Iran is not the pipeline, our beef with Iran is in fact they want to develop a nuclear weapon.”

Residents of this thin strip of Tamil Tiger-held territory look across to government-held land, just a few hundred meters away across a no-man’s land of mined scrub and lagoons, and regard it with a mixture of envy and fear.

A 2002 truce halted 20 years of civil war in Sri Lanka and left the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in control of a seventh of the island in the minority Tamil-dominated north and east.

“We need proper peace,” 24-year-old Tamil fisherman Santhalingam Povarajah told Reuters through a translator. “We are safe because the LTTE is here. But we need more. We cannot go out and fish in case the navy take us away.”

Passing the Tiger checkpoint on the southern edge of government-held Trincomalee harbor, the roads become worse, the houses more basic and the poverty more serious. On the beach near the village of Karakadaichani, in sight of Sri Lanka army positions, women scrabble in the sand to collect tiny shellfish to eat.

The war left the north and east much poorer than the rest of the country. Some aid workers describe it as “Africa poor”.

The Tiger-held east is visibly less developed than the rebels’ northern heartland, but the contrast with the richer, boutique and hotel-lined roads along the majority-Sinhalese south and west coasts is striking.

The Tigers say the government is keeping development aid for the south, including funds donated after the 2004 tsunami. But some officials say the Tigers continue arming for war and cannot be trusted with development cash, and a post-tsunami aid sharing deal was blocked by the courts.

In the meantime, local government officials report to both LTTE and state authorities, but checkpoints hamper trade and residents say recent violence made things worse.

A string of suspected LTTE attacks on the military in December and January pushed the island to the brink of war, with new restrictions imposed on fishermen after an apparent LTTE suicide attack sank a naval gunboat and killed 13 sailors.

Fishing and farming are the only significant industry in LTTE territory, which the Tigers hope will one day be the economic foundation of a separate Tamil homeland.

But in Karakadaichani, fishermen say they dare not take out large new fishing boats donated by aid agencies after the tsunami for fear of arrest or harassment by the Navy, and some have temporarily given up fishing for manual work.

Tensions fell after the two sides agreed to meet last week in Geneva, and residents on both sides of the lines say they hope a new war has been averted. But restrictions remain and tales of military abuse, denied by the army, scare many Tamils.

In January, five young men were found dead on the beach in Trincomalee. The army initially said they were Tiger sympathizers who accidentally blew themselves up, but truce monitors found they had all been shot in the head.

“You can go to school here but there is no higher education,” says Santhalingam, who himself missed formal education because of the war. “You have to go to the university in Trincomalee and that is dangerous. Two of the five who were killed were students from here.”

But some do go and others will leave Sri Lanka, joining the vast Tamil diaspora in Europe, Canada or elsewhere. The Tigers say overseas Tamils help fund development in their areas, but deny they are also financing a LTTE military buildup.

With LTTE spies said to be everywhere, no-one will criticize the Tigers -- indeed, almost without exception, young men pledge loyalty and say they would fight for them if war comes. But for many, economic progress is most important.

“It is not about the government or the LTTE,” says 38-year-old grocer Velu Sathyan in Sampoor, the local Tiger headquarters, a dusty town of a couple of streets dominated by memorials to the rebel war dead. “It is my native place and I want to see it developed.”

It was clear, even as it was being read out by the Norwegian facilitators, that the joint statement by the Liberation Tigers and the Sri Lankan government following two acrimonious days of talks in Geneva, was going to ignite a crisis in Colombo. Seasoned observers knew that any optimism that a deal struck in Geneva presaged a more peaceful short term was misplaced. And it took just two days for it to erupt. At the heart of the ongoing furore is the status of the February 2002 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA): was it amended or not?

On the one hand, the bickering over whether the CFA was amended or not (and despite the government delegation’s clumsy posturing, it was not) and, now, on whether it should have been amended or not, might seem puerile, even incredulously dangerous. Almost forgotten, it seems, is the near daily violence on both sides that in December and January killed two hundred people and seemed to herald a new eruption of Sri Lanka’s protracted conflict.

But for both the Sinhala and Tamil polities, the CFA is at the heart of the contest between two antithetical visions of what Sri Lanka should be.

As far as the LTTE is concerned, the CFA is an internationally recognised agreement that is key to the alleviation of the hardships that a million Tamils are still – four years after it was signed – enduring.

For the Sinhala nationalist phalanx in Colombo - and, despite the best will in the world, this is certainly now the driving force behind the state – the CFA is a mistake (committed by Ranil Wickremesinghe’s UNP government) that President Rajapakse is duty bound to rectify (both because he said he would and because that is the right thing to do).

To begin with, for the LTTE (and as Wickremesinghe himself publicly stated at the time), the CFA recognises the prevailing ground reality: two separate military formations controlling two separate controlled areas. This separation – concretised in a minimum distance to be maintained between opposing personnel – is arguably the first plank on which the prevailing cessation of hostilities rests.

The LTTE has argued that the CFA is bedrock on which the peace process must be built. For the Tigers, this is less an ideational position, than a manifestation (albeit an unpalatable one for the Sinhala nationalists) of ground reality.

But for the Sinhala far right, it is the CFA itself that recognises – and thus gives life to – what they consider an aberration: the repudiation of the Sri Lankan state’s practical (even if not theoretical) sovereignty over an estimated 70% of the Tamil-dominated Northeast.

Other joint concepts like the P-TOMS and ISGA also had the same intolerable logic, concretising a rupture of Sinhala hegemony, and they too drew the wrath of the Sinhala far right (even before they were inked).

But unlike those structures, whose abrogation or rejection has had little or no impact on the Sinhala polity (particularly given donors’ collective failure to follow through on their conditionality), the collapse of the CFA has far reaching implications. War would be inevitable, for a start, and it is hard to see how a new truce could subsequently be agreed upon without much blood flowing first.

Nevertheless, the angst the CFA stirs amongst Sinhala nationalists frequently manifests in vehement paroxysms such as the sentiments expressed by the JVP and JHU at the All Party Conference (APC) held in Colombo this Monday.

The international community’s staunch support for the CFA and the pressure being brought on both protagonists to abide by it also fuel Sinhala nationalists’ hostility. Despite the strong, sometimes blistering, criticism levelled against the LTTE by some international backers of the Norwegian peace process, there is a gnawing concern that the de facto state in the north has become a routine facet of international engagement in Sri Lanka.

Which is why the Sinhala right is more prepared to risk a war than leave the CFA unchallenged. Its vocal challenge is not simply, as those with indefatigable faith in a liberal polity emerging in Sri Lanka through the peace process are sometimes wont to argue, merely posturing for the voters (though the JVP – unlike the JHU - uses nationalist rhetoric with considerable more precision than an initial glance might suggest).

In fact, the Sinhala nationalist phalanx – and that includes, by virtue of their tendency to engage in anti-LTTE, even anti-Tamil ‘outbidding’, the two main parties - sees a strategic slippage in its ability to secure international support for its political vision: a unitary state subordinate to majoritarian whim.

For a considerable period, particularly during President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s appallingly destructive and ultimately abortive ‘war for peace’, tacit international approval for a military solution to the Tamil question and repeated international assertions of support for Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity fuelled Sinhala nationalists’ confidence in international sympathy for their core position.

Little wonder, also, that international advocacy of concepts such as ‘pluralism’ or ‘a multi-ethnic state’ were interpreted by the Sinhala polity as support for their vision of Sri Lanka as a single majoritarian state, posited as these notions seemed to be, against those of ‘homeland’ or even ‘self-determination’ as argued by the other side.

The battlefield stalemate – and that doesn’t mean strategic or ideological exhaustion – of 2001 resulted in the CFA. For both protagonists and all communities, the truce produced welcome relief, which even President Kumaratunga’s vehement opposition to the truce failed to blight.

Four convoluted years later, some observers have argued that the peace process – conducted by leaderships on both sides with international diplomatic support – has generated anxieties and suspicions because of the concomitant failure to include a wider range of actors. In the face of powerful onslaughts against the peace process by the JVP et al, this argument has gained credence.

A quick glance at other successful peace processes suggest the jury is still out on the efficacy of inclusiveness. But in Sri Lanka, as recent developments underline, this notion has allowed powerful spoilers to gain better purchase.

Press reports have suggested that during the Geneva talks, for example, JVP leaders were in constant touch, if not in the same room as President Rajapakse as he was managing his delegation’s performance. Whatever the truth of that, there is no doubt that the JVP and JHU are kept closely informed by the President and have a strong influence over affairs of state, far exceeding even those of the main opposition UNP.

The point is this: if it was the exclusion of powerful players in the margin which is to be blamed for the failures of the peace process so far, then last month a very different dynamic manifested itself. The massive delegation that President Rajapakse despatched to Geneva had a number of Sinhala nationalists, including the constitutional lawyer H. L. De Silva, in its ranks. In Colombo, the same forces were kept permanently in the loop.

And the result was a near total collapse of the talks. Standing on a manifestly public stage – at least in terms of the Sinhala right’s supervision - and, no doubt, working to a specific mandate from the President, the government delegation engaged not in negotiation, but in grandstanding. Acrimony inevitably followed the accusations and counter-accusations.

Progress, limited as it was, was only possible when stripped down, skeletal delegations on both sides (and on the government’s part, without nationalist elements) huddled in a smaller room to thrash out the finer points of the joint statement.

Even then, at one stage, according to press reports, the government delegation flatly refused to accept the title ‘Ceasefire Agreement’ being included in the joint statement, thereby precipitating a crisis that was only averted by robust Norwegian advocacy of international law.

In the wake of subsequent developments in Colombo, that crisis has now returned. The elevated supervisory position President Rajapakse has extended actors like the JVP and JHU cannot easily be withdrawn – even should he want to, and there is no sign he does.

But withdrawn it must be if progress is to be made at the negotiating table. Else, as one LTTE negotiator pithily stated, ‘the next round will [still] be the first round.’

Inclusiveness has thus, since being promoted as a panacea for the ills afflicting Sri Lanka’s peace process, paved the way for a series of impasses. The major failures to advance the peace process – including the scuttling of P-TOMS and talks on ISGA – are linked back to the growing influence of the Sinhala right wing.

Indeed, President Kumaratunga signed the P-TOMS and confronted the JHU and JVP, only under severe international pressure. Last month, President Rajapakse’s delegation reaffirmed its commitment to the CFA, again only under international pressure. On the opposite side to this pressure was Sinhala nationalist resistance.

Ironically, whilst much is made of the role of international pressure on getting the LTTE to the table – and a close examination of the ground dynamics of the last few months does not entirely accord with that claim – there is no sign the Sinhala right will be subject to the same pressures (and if it was, whether it will simply acquiesce and play ball is another matter, of course).

The point here is that the peace process – indeed any peace process – with the LTTE is an anathema for the ever-growing Sinhala nationalist bloc. Efforts to skirt this contradiction in peacemaking and recent attempts to induct the JVP et al into the peace process under the banner of ‘inclusivity’ have only worsened things.

Whilst for many advocates of the peace process, stabilising the badly frayed ceasefire is indubitably the first step to turning around Sri Lanka’s slide towards the abyss, for the Sinhala nationalists this is the first point of resistance to a what they consider a fundamental challenge to their vision of a unitary majoritarian state.

It is in this context that the JVP leader’s declaration on Monday should be seen: ‘We firmly believe that it is better to walk away from the negotiation table without any progress being made, rather than agreeing to any conditions detrimental to the sovereignty of the country.’

Tamil Nadu politics are hotting up ahead of the forthcoming Assembly elections, the date for which has now been announced: May 8.

In a stunning development, MDMK chief Vaiko last met AIADMK leader, Ms. Jayalalitha, and signed an alliance giving his party 35 of the 234 seats in the Assembly. Vaiko broke with the DMK’s leader, Mr. Karunanidhi, after the latter informed him - through the press - that he would not offer more than 22 seats against the MDMK demand for 25.

Vaiko’s decision comes as a major setback for the DMK-led alliance, given the grouping’s spectacular victory sweeping all the 39 Lok Sabha in the 2004 elections. Conversely, for a friendless AIADMK, it is a major boost. It was only a few days ago the ruling AIADMK got its first electoral partner – the Dalit Panthers of India, which has been promised nine seats.

Past election results indicate that alliances are crucial in Tamil Nadu politics - the margin between the winners and losers in a neck and neck race is less than 3000 votes in many of the constituencies.

The significance of the MDMK-AIADMK accord is that Vaiko’s party has units throughout Tamil Nadu capable of drawing that magic 3000 in numerous constituencies.

The AIADMK’s archrival, the DMK, is holding its political conference at Tiruchy this week and chiefs of its allies, including Congress leader Sonia Gandhi, are expected to participate.

But the positions of many parties will not be known till this week. Both the BJP and Vijayakanth’s new party have, for example, announced that they will fight the elections without any alliances.

However, they may also end up tying to AIADMK. The BJP cannot join the DMK since the Hindu nationalist party’s arch rival, the Congress party, is already a DMK ally. Vijayakant, meanwhile, is widely seen as more anti-DMK than AIADMK.

However, if both the parties decide to fight on their own it could prove very costly as there is almost room for a third political front between the two poles, the DMK and AIADMK. Amid the charged political battles between the pair, voters tend to ignore any third front - as the MDMK’s experience underlines; the party contested separately in 211 seats and was lost heavily.

On the other hand, the worrying factor for AIADMK is that Vijayakant’s campaign is drawing good crowds and if he sticks on to his decision of contesting independently he will only eat into AIADMK votes with both parties sharing an anti –DMK platform. And if the AIADMK decides to join hands with BJP then there is a risk of it losing the minority vote bank at the cost of garnering Hindu nationalist votes.

However, this being Tamil Nadu, nothing can be predicted as politicians habitually play their cards close to their chest. And as Jayalalitha observed last week: “In politics, there are no permanent friends or enemies.”

LTTE Chief Negotiator and Political Strategist Anton Balasingham explains the circumstances in which the talks were held and the issues discussed.

This interview first appeared in The Sunday Leader.

Q: Could you first of all tell us your assessment of the talks after two days of deliberations?

A: Even though talks ended on a positive note it has been a very tough, difficult dialogue I should say frankly because the government came with a different agenda.

The LTTE from the very start, from the day Mr. Erik Solheim met Mr. Pirapaharan, we were making statements that the agenda for talks will be the effective or rather the smooth implementation of the terms and conditions of the Cease Fire Agreement. But we were disappointed to note from what Norway came and told us that the government had ideas of coming out with certain amendments and with the aim of revising the entire document.

Then I insisted we will not discuss anything about revision or reworking of the cease fire document because our agenda is that we should stick to the letter and spirit of the agreement and only see how we could implement the terms and conditions of the Cease Fire Agreement.

So with all that when the peace talks started I made my initial opening address with the purpose of articulating our point of view. Our objective in coming for the talks as you would have observed from my address was that the talks should be confined to the implementation of the Cease Fire Agreement.

Q: As you point out in the first paragraph of your opening statement itself you said the most important achievement of the Norwegian facilitation of the peace process has been the signing of the Cease Fire Agreement between the government and the LTTE. You also said the CFA was not finalised in haste to the advantage of one party as argued by some critics but to be the foundation on which the peace process can be built. Was that the position you maintained right throughout the deliberations?

A: Exactly. Absolutely. I’m also one of the architects of the CFA document and we spent months. Specific attention was given to each clause and both the parties were consulted with our military experts and Mr. Pirapaharan and from the government side Ranil Wickremesinghe was also informed of the various terms, conditions, obligations and finally both the parties agreed and both parties signed the ceasefire agreement.

So it was not worked out in haste to the advantage of one party. Both parties were given quite a lot of time to work out various formations. So what happened after my initial opening speech, I was disappointed to note chief negotiator of the government side, Mr. Nimal Siripala de Silva, insisting there were serious flaws in the CFA and that there should be amendments, revisions and it had to be reworked.

Q: Mr. De Silva said in his opening statement that the CFA in its present form, signed by Ranil Wickremesinghe and Velupillai Pirapaharan was unconstitutional, and against the laws of Sri Lanka. Is that the position he maintained during the two days of deliberations?

A: Not two days. Later on they had to give it up. After the first day, their legal expert, H. L. de Silva, he came out with the proposition that certain clauses in the ceasefire document contravened the constitution and that it was not endorsed by the President who had executive authority, so on and so forth. I challenged their contention saying that it was signed by both the parties with international assistance.

It was not the LTTE and the government of Sri Lanka only who were involved. The Norwegian government was also involved in this agreement and also five Nordic countries. So it was an international agreement and also we know that it is determined by the Supreme Court in the P-TOMS case where the Supreme Court ruled the CFA did not contravene the constitution, therefore we argued and said it is not a question of legal or constitutional validity of the document that is in question.

We have come here with the objective of analysing and arguing that each term, condition and obligation must be implemented and I read out what the main clauses that the government of Sri Lanka has failed to implement.

Q: But wouldn’t you say the government also had a moral obligation to seek a revision because President Rajapakse had signed an agreement with the JVP wherein he said there were clauses in the CFA, which were not only unconstitutional but also leading to separation and compromising national security. He pledged to redo and revise the CFA. Did you therefore expect the government to sit and discuss the implementation of an agreement, which it claimed was unconstitutional and paved the way for separation?

A: We are fully aware of Mahinda Rajapakse’s manifesto, his position with regard to the CFA, and we know that the government delegation brought a team of legal experts to question the legal and constitutional validity of the CFA. But we took up the position and argued there with the Sri Lankan delegation and Norwegians that the LTTE will not discuss any issues pertaining to the revision or the rewording of the agreement. That is not the mandate given to me by Pirapaharan, I said.

In front of me Pirapaharan told Erik Solheim that the LTTE will only participate in the peace negotiations to fully and effectively implement the clauses and terms of the ceasefire document.

So I told the delegation that I have come with a specific mandate from Mr. Pirapaharan to only talk about the implementation of the CFA. I said we will walk out if anybody raises anything or starts discussing constitutional or legal problems pertaining to this document.

I said the moment you claim the CFA is incorrect, then you are coming out of the CFA. That means you are giving two weeks notice for the resumption of hostilities. You better think very carefully, I said. So they kept quiet. Then after that they have been discussing among them and the Norwegians also. Erik Solheim openly said that the agenda for the talks according to Mr. Pirapaharan is to discuss the implementation of the CFA and not about changing the structure or coming out with amendments, so they kept quiet. They agreed.

Matters pertaining to implementation were taken up on the second day. The most contentious issue that was discussed on the second day was the disarming of the paramilitary groups. I took up Clause 1.8 of the CFA.

Q: Does that mean even when the next round of talks comes in April or even thereafter that the issue of amending, revising or rewording the CFA will not arise? That it is now only the implementation of the CFA that will be discussed? That the government has accepted the CFA?

A: Of course, the government has openly issued a joint statement reaffirming its commitment to the CFA. What does that mean? That they have accepted the meaning and content of this document.

Q: Are you saying then in the future the issue of bringing any amendment to the CFA is shut out for good?

A: That is absolutely correct. I can assure you the LTTE will not permit even in the future any suggestions for amendments or rewording of the CFA.

Q: Are you saying the understanding at the end of the two days of talks is that the government of Sri Lanka and that of President Mahinda Rajapakse have in fact accepted this CFA, every word, every comma, every full-stop?

A: Yes.

Q: You were talking about the paramilitary issues…

A: That is very important. There when we raise the issue of paramilitaries, it is very clearly stated in Clause 1.8 that Tamil armed paramilitaries will be disarmed by the government of Sri Lanka and should be offered the opportunity of being fully integrated with the Sri Lanka military structure if they want to. That matter was taken up and I argued at length the violence cause by the paramilitaries.

We also provided the government with ample information, documents stating the entire paramilitary groups, how they operate, the location of their camps, the commanding officers of the various districts, how they are working in collusion with the Sri Lankan armed forced and particularly the Sri Lanka military intelligence.

Q: Did the government team dispute those charges?

A: Wait. We have given documentary proof. Of course the government says no. Mr. Nimal Siripala de Silva said, ‘I wish to dispute the arguments and say there is no connection between the Sri Lanka military and the paramilitaries.’ We know they will say that but I insisted there is a connection.

Mr. H.L. De Silva said the concept of paramilitaries does not apply because it entails, he said, quoting me regarding the definition I tabled of paramilitaries, that is paramilitary groups are ancillary forces who work in collusion with the regular forces. So we said these armed groups are working with the army and since they are working with the army under the control of the army, they are being supported and sustained and given sanction by the armed forces. They are undeniably paramilitary forces. I said, ‘Don’t bring any legal arguments, Mr. Silva, because this is the ground reality I am talking about.’

I said, you have no idea what the ground reality is. Because I have been working with the leaders of these paramilitary groups for the last 30 years. Some of them were my disciples. So I know who they are and how they operate and why they operate.

Then I explained the history of these paramilitaries and how they originally took up arms for the Tamil cause, how they joined the IPKF as mercenary groups, then when the Indians left they joined the so-called democratic mainstream as political parties and changed their masters. Their masters are now the Sri Lanka government and military intelligence. So this is the true history of these people.

The IGP, Chandra Fernando came out with a list of killings from various times. I told him it is not the question of individual killings that we are discussing here. It is a question of an armed conflict coming down for the last 25 years. Of course, the LTTE has killed several soldiers. There have been communal riots. And the army has killed a lot of civilians. So if we go through the history of the entire armed conflict I can say 70,000 Tamils have been killed by the security forces. We also killed. Our cadres – 20,000 – were also killed in battle. Therefore I said don’t pick up individual cases and say Alfred Duraiappah was killed, Amirthalingam was killed, etc. Then they said okay, that is in the past but after the CFA we have killed so many people.

Q: Did the government raise the issue of Lakshman Kadirgamar?

A: Yes. I said the government has no evidence to prove the LTTE killed him. They say so because everybody thought Kadirgamar was a target and the LTTE was angry with him. And it is an assumption. Assumptions cannot be a direct argument to accuse somebody unless you can prove. ‘Have you got any proof?’ I asked.

Q: Did the government furnish the proof?

A: No, no. Nothing at all.

Then the question they raised was that recently, in the last few months there has been intense violence in the north -east in which 80 or 90 soldiers were killed and civilians were killed and there were assassinations. Even those killings cannot be categorised as individual assassinations or political killings.

This is a phenomena we call shadow war. A subversive war because some of these paramilitary groups, particularly the Karuna group has launched a dirty war in collusion with Sri Lankan intelligence against the LTTE cadres and we have listed out the various people who were killed— Pararajasingham, Nehru, important journalists like Sivaram, so on and so forth.These are killings done in the context of a subversive war launched against the LTTE by paramilitaries.

So it cannot be categorised as intensified violence but action against the LTTE

Q: You stated that the LTTE conceded to the government the non inclusion of the word ‘paramilitary’ in the joint statement. Were you really being magnanimous or as some people describe you as being a cunning fox got it incorporated through the play of words and trapped the government into accepting the disbanding of paramilitary groups through the joint statement

A: Yes, there is no need to use the concept of paramilitary if you study the text of the joint statement because it specifically states that in accordance with the ceasefire agreement, that these armed groups will not be able to function.When we say in accordance with the CFA, there is a specific clause which is 1.8, which says these armed groups are none other than the paramilitaries. So the paramilitaries are specifically included in an undefined form.

Q: In the joint statement it says the government is committed to take all necessary measures in accordance with the CFA to ensure no armed groups other than the security forces will conduct armed operations or carry arms. Now the government in the same statement says it is committed to upholding the CFA. Now the moment you commit the government to upholding the CFA, Article 1.8 comes into play. Are you now expecting the government on the strength of the joint statement to disband all paramilitary groups including Karuna?

A: Of course they should because they are bound by this statement.And also by the obligations of the CFA they have to disarm the para military groups.We have also requested the government that if our political cadres are to go back to Batticaloa and Jaffna this should be done.You know that a few months back we withdrew our political cadres because of the violent activities of the paramilitaries.

Now we have told the government, you better start disarming these groups and put an end to their armed military operations so that we could send our cadres to the north and east.We are ready to do that.And if anything happens to them, it will constitue a very very serious violation of the joint statement issued by both the parties.

Q: Through this joint statement and the deliberations over two days, you have placed the government and President Rajapakse in a very vulnerable situation in that the President who said the CFA was unconstitutional and will pave the way for separatism,has now agreed to uphold and implement it.The President has thus been put in the position of intentionally violating Sri Lanka’s constitution which is an impeachable offence.Now you have put him into that position.You have also got him committed to disbanding the paramilitaries. Now did the government realise when issuing the joint statement that they were committing to disbanding the para militaries and what have you given in return for all these concessions by the government?

A: I dont want to go into the constitutional complexities because most probably President Rajapakse would have made this statement in his manifesto without considering the serious implications of the CFA. As far as we are concerned the CFA is signed by two parties, the GOSL and LTTE and endorsed by international monitors including Norway and Nordic countries. It is an international instrument. I also told you we know the Supreme Court has made a ruling that the CFA does not contravene your constitution. We have no problem in maintaining our position that the CFA has to be accepted and implemented without any amendments.

But the problem of Mr. Rajapakse, whether he has made any mistakes or faces political difficulties or whatever is not a matter for me to comment.

Q: Once talks on the CFA ends and political issues are gone into. are you expecting the government to start from where the talks stalled, that is with the ISGA or would you expect a fresh approach given the President’s position the ISGA will not be a basis for discussion?

A: Because we are going to talk about various other obligations under the CFA. Only we discussed in detail two issues, about under aged recruitment and the disarming of the paramilitaries. We have given an undertaking of putting an end to recruitment of underage children. Secondly so has the paramilitaries.There is a two month space for it.We have to see whether the government is going to disarm these groups.And if they are disarmed and made disfunctional and their operations halted then we will send our political cadres into Jaffna and Batticaloa. That is one issue.

Second time we are going to take up the issue of High Security Zones.It is a very sensitive and critical issue because it is concerning the security of your country and your military in the north-east and as far as we are concerned it is a fundamentally humanitarian problem.Thousands and thousands of people are thrown out of their houses, their villages,from their farm lands and languishing in refugee camps. So this is a very very important problem. For the last 10-15 years people are suffering

Time has come for the government to take some action because we will definitely come out with some proposals for the government. We are not asking the government to withdraw its troops from the north-east.At least there must be some relocation of these camps to enable and facilitate these people to go back.There are other issues such as fishing restrictions.Next time also there will be critical issues not implemented by the government.We will take it up. Political issues will come only when there is a total de-escalation and normalisation of civilian life in the north and east

That has being our stand for the last so many decades.

Even with Mr. Ranil Wickremesinghe we insisted on fulfilling the existential problems of our people. Day to day problems. Here we are going to insist on de-escalation and normalisation of civilian life as a necessary condition to move towards the next stage which is the political discussion.

Even when we go to the political discussion, Mr. Rajapakse will have difficulties because there is a difference. Both the parties are living in different ideological universes.They conform to what is called the Mahinda Chintana but we go by Pirapaharan’s vision. So these are two different universes with a wide gulf between them. He is insisting on a unitary structure and we are fighting for a regional autonomy with self government in our own homeland. To bridge these two conflictual and controversial positions at the negotiating table is not going to be a simple matter. It is going to be a very very difficult task. Let us see.

SLMM rejects Army denials

The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) last week urged the military to be truthful on the issue of armed groups operating in the east with outgoing SLMM head Hagrup Haukland insisting “there is no doubt that such groups do exist.”

Mr. Haukland’s hard-hitting statement follows comments reportedly made by top Sri Lanka Army (SLA) brass in the local media after the Geneva talks. The military officials reportedly said there was no evidence to prove that such armed groups operated in the east.

“There is no doubt that such groups do exist. The army should be truthful about this issue,” Mr. Haukland said.

In Geneva, the government gave a commitment to the LTTE that it would ensure no group other than the government security forces would be allowed to carry arms after the LTTE claimed that there were at least five armed groups in operation in the North and East.

Mr. Haukland in an interview with the Daily Mirror referred to the comments made by renegade LTTE commander Karuna Amman who insisted his group would not disarm despite the agreement reached between the government and the LTTE in Geneva.

The SLMM head said he believed Karuna’s comments further substantiated claims that armed Karuna cadres were operating in the east despite the military saying otherwise.

Mr. Haukland said the SLMM was monitoring the activities of the armed groups and would present a report at the next round of talks in Geneva from April 19-22.

Meanwhile the LTTE has alleged that a paramilitary cadre under rebel custody had revealed there were plans to disrupt the Geneva talks by launching an attack against the LTTE in Batticaloa.

The LTTE quoted the Karuna loyalist as saying he was given instructions to launch a claymore mine attack against LTTE Commander Jayarthanan and Tiger Intelligence Official Uma Ramanan on the day talks between the government and the LTTE were set to begin in Geneva. (Daily Mirror)

A senior delegation of the Liberation Tigers met with senior Norwegian officials and politicians in Olso following the successful negotiations with the Sri Lanka government in Geneva last month.

Last Friday, Mr. S. P. Tamilselvan, head of the LTTE’s Political Wing, met with Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahre to discuss developments since the talks in Switzerland on February 22 and 23.

The LTTE’s Southern Forces Commander Colonel Jeyam, the Head of Thamileelam Police Mr. G. Nadesan and the Director of LTTE’s Peace Secretariat S. Puleedevan participated in the meeting.

The LTTE also met the Former Foreign Minister, Jan Petersen, Chairman of Defence Committee, and the Former Prime Minister Thorbjørn Jagland who is the President of the Norwegian Parliament (Storting) on March 01

On February 28, the LTTE delegation met with the Norwegian State Secretary for International Development, Anne Margareth Fagertun Stenhammer and State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Raymond Johansen.

Norway’s Minister for International Development, Mr. Erik Solheim, chaired the hardfought negotiations in Geneva. Mr. Solheim has been Oslo’s Special Envoy to the Sri Lankan peace process for almost eight years. He became a minister after his party, in a coalition, won last year’s elections in Norway.

The LTTE delegation also paid a visit to the Norwegian Nobel Institute and met the Director of the institute Geir Lundestad.

Mr. Tamilselvan also met various party officials including Norwegian Labour Party MPs, Christian Democratic Party MPs and the right wing Progressive Party MP Morten Høylund, who is a (FrP) Foreign Affairs Committee member.

Speaking to Norwegian Foreign Minister Gahre, Mr. Tamilselvan conveyed LTTE leader Vellupillai Pirapaharan’s congratulations to Norway’s new Government and expressing appreciation on behalf of the Tamil people to the continued Norwegian engagement in facilitatiting the peace efforts and monitoring the February 2002 Ceasefire Agreement.

The disarming paramilitary cadres in Sri Lanka Army (SLA) controlled areas would be the key in demonstrating Colombo’s commitment, he said, discussing developments since Geneva.

“We also emphasized the humanitarian situation prevailing in the Tamil homeland. We also brought to focus the fate of war affected, war displaced and the tsunami ravaged people in our homeland,” LTTE’s political head also said adding that the dialogue between the LTTE delegation and the Norwegian Foreign Minister was constructive.

The LTTE delegation was scheduled to return to Sri Lanka on Tuesday this week, having returned to Switzerland from their visit to Norway.

Nearly a fortnight after the Sri Lanka government agreed in Geneva to implement the February 2002 Ceasefire Agreement, military repression against Tamil residents and attacks on the LTTE continued.

In the most serious act of paramilitary violence after the Geneva talks, two LTTE cadres were shot dead Saturday at a Vavunathuivu sentry-point in the Batticaloa district - dDespite the government pledging to take “all necessary measures … to ensure that no armed group or person other than Government security forces will carry arms or conduct armed operations.”

And there were several other incidents ranging from an attack by suspected Army-backed paramilitaries on the family of a Tamil candidate in Jaffna to continuous harassment of fishermen by the Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) and allegations of disappeared LTTE cadres having been arrested by the Sri Lanka Army (SLA).

Two Liberation Tigers were killed on Saturday when a heavily armed group of attackers, who entered the LTTE-controlled area in Vavunathivu, launched an attack on an LTTE sentry point before towards Vavunathivu SLA base.

Ten LTTE cadres were at the sentry-point when they were attacked by an armed group, suspected to be Army-backed paramilitaries and military intelligence officers in an encounter that lasted about ten minutes.

International truce monitors, who were notified of the attack. rushed to the area. Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) head Hagrup Haukland said later he had taken up this matter with the Sri Lankan government.

“It is a very serious incident because the attackers had come from the cleared areas in vehicles,” he said, using a term used by the government to refer to areas it controlled – LTTE-controlled areas are ‘uncleared.’

“This attack is yet another blow to the Ceasefire Agreement and is also seriously undermining both parties’ commitment to the Joint Statement from the Geneva talks,” he said.

“If such attacks and killings should re-occur SLMM fears that the next round of talks is put at stake.”

The Nordic monitoring group said it “urges the parties to do all in their power to maintain the ceasefire and to implement the agreed measures spelt out in the Joint Statement, thus creating and maintaining a stable and safe environment for all, conducive to the Peace Process.”

The LTTE condemned the attack in a statement issued by its Batticaloa Political Wing:

“We point out that the killings are a gross violation of the Cease Fire Agreement and provides further evidence that Sinhala extremists, SLA, its intelligence wing and the collaborating paramilitary forces are engaged in nefarious activities designed to trigger an all out war in our homeland to bring further calamity to our people”

“When our fighters returned fire, the SLA soldiers and the paramilitaries withdrew towards the Vavunathivu SLA camp. We have received reliable information that soon after that an ambulance from the SLA camp, escorted by military vehicles, drove towards Batticaloa,” the statement said.

“We strongly condemn the attack and killings of the two LTTE cadres, and point out that the killings are a gross violation of the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA),” the statement said.

But SLA Spokesman Prasad Samarasinghe denied any military involvement in the Vavunathivu attack.

The LTTE has also accused the government of failing to honour its pledge to disarm armed groups in the NorthEast, especially citing the Karuna Group of continuing to carry weapons in government-controlled areas in the eastern province.

LTTE Batticaloa district political head Daya Mohan was quoted as saying that since the conclusion of the Geneva talks the Karuna Group has penetrated Batticaloa town and has setup its offices in the area.

A recent issue of the Karuna Group Tamil newspaper, Alai (Waves), published colour photographs of Karuna cadres reportedly undergoing military training somewhere in the East, reported the Sunday Times.

The paper also confirmed the opening of an office in Batticaloa town by the political wing of the Karuna Group.

“There has been no change since the Geneva talks. The government security forces continue to harbour armed groups in their area. This does not augur well for the future”, Daya Mohan said.

Meanwhile, the family of one of the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi (ITAK) candidates for the Jaffna Municipal Council was attacked by suspected paramilitary cadres last Friday.

Other ITAK candidates and civil society organisations have accused paramilitary operatives of being behind the attack. The Tamil National Alliance, the main Tamil party in the Sri Lankan parliament, is fielding candidates for the local government polls under the ITAK symbol.

In other news, the fishermen from Valligamam south and west have suspended all fishing activities in northern seas from Saturday in protest against SLN forces’ persistent harassment and attacks on fishermen, the Fishermen Societies Consortium in Jaffna said Friday.

370 families of fishermen in Mathagal and 212 families in Seenthipanthan, Urany and Senthankulam may face death due to starvation should this boycott drag longer, TamilNet reported.

The fishermen are demanding freedom to fish without hindrance and complain that SLN attacks on fishermen fishing in the seas of Chullipuram, Urany, Senthankulam, Seenthipanthan and Mathagal are on the increase.

The Fishermen Societies Consortium further said that a SLN Dvora patrol boat Thursday rammed into a boat belonging to the secretary of a fishermen society in Chullipuram intentionally in the high seas causing the boat to capsize and injuring and throwing overboard the secretary’s son.

“Though more than twelve incidents of this nature had occurred in our fishing waters during last week alone and as repeated complaints to the SLN authorities remain unheeded, we have decided to boycott fishing,” said the members of the Consortium of Fishermen societies.

Meanwhile, the Liberation Tigers in Trincomalee said Thursday that they have submitted fresh evidence to the SLMM to confirm that five of their members who have been reported missing since 25 February were arrested by SLA soldiers.

“Our organisation has lodged a fresh complaint based on evidence though eye-witnesses to substantiate our earlier complaint,” said Mr. S. Elilan, Trincomalee district political head of the LTTE.

“The LTTE members were arrested while they were travelling from Aathiamkerni towards Ralkuli, in Muttur, south of Trincomalee, in an area held by our organisation,” Mr. Elilan said.

“We immediately brought this matter to the SLMM in Trincomalee. The SLA has, however, informed the truce monitors that no such arrests were made,” he said.

“Today we renewed our complaint made earlier to the SLMM stating that we are in a position to provide evidence to prove our complaint. We are yet to receive a response from SLMM on this matter,” Mr. Elilan told Tamilnet Thursday evening by telephone.

In his report Mr. Elilan said he was given details of the five missing cadres and the events leading to their disappearance which makes him firmly believe they were in the hands of the army.

However the SLA has denied Mr. Elilan’s claims. The Daily Mirror also quoted the SLMM as saying it had no knowledge of the alleged arrest the evidence the LTTE says it had given to the ceasefire monitors to prove the allegations.

The SLMM also charged both parties of violating the ceasefire agreement by constructing bunkers at Omanthai.

SLMM’s acting spokesman Robert Nilsson told the Daily Mirror there were complaints from both parties accusing each of constructing bunkers and defence lines.

“Our monitors confirmed that both parties have constructed or repaired their bunkers and defence lines, in what can be seen as a clear violation of the ceasefire agreement”, he said.

The spokesman said the military and the LTTE agreed to dismantle these constructions soon. “We will continue our investigations into the matter and hope the parties will keep their promises”, he added.

Despite the hopes of most of Sri Lanka’s people, almost every indicator suggests that this week’s talks between the Liberation Tigers and the Sri Lankan government in Geneva will be acrimonious. Even the release of prisoners by both sides has been largely ignored by those anxious about the prospects of peace. To begin with, the mutual respect that is sine qua non of successful negotiations is completely lacking. What ought to be an exercise in joint problem solving is instead being approached by Colombo as ‘a continuation of war by other means,’ to paraphrase Clauswitz.

The opening salvo was fired last week by President Mahinda Rajapakse himself, in an interview with Reuters. Speaking ten days before the first direct talks between the protagonists in three years, President Rajapakse did not use the opportunity to send a conciliatory message of cooperation to the Tigers and the Tamils. Instead, digressing unnecessarily on sensitive matters unrelated to the agenda of the forthcoming talks, he railed against the notions of a Tamil nation and homeland and even threatened the LTTE. His comments have predictably raised hackles across the Tamil community. The LTTE response two days later was acidic and its own warning, though more subtle than Rajapakse’s, was equally unmistakable.

Nothing has sent a clearer message as to the Norwegian brokers’ expectations of these talks than the media blackout that has been hurriedly imposed. According to the Swiss hosts, the press will have two opportunities - before the talks kick off and after they ‘adjourn.’ This, as is now well known in Colombo, is at the insistence of the Sri Lankan government. But, as President Rajapaske ought to know full well, this is unlikely to thwart Sri Lanka’s resourceful media hounds. But it has certainly dampened expectations.

Ever since the Norwegians’ shock announcement mid-January about the imminent talks, there has been a peculiar degree of anxiety in Colombo which has not been alleviated even by the professional advice of US-based negotiation experts. This, in turn, seems to have fuelled an unhelpful hostility in the south, with even the American advisors suffering the Sinhala regime’s ire (particularly, it seems, for making the unspeakable suggestion that the government try to build bridges with the LTTE so as to pave the way for future agreement). The entire saga has been a pitifully ludicrous sight.

And despite the Norwegians’ best efforts, a crucial, even pivotal problem - contradictory stances on the agenda - has not been resolved, with Colombo reverting at the last minute to its earlier stance - already rejected by the LTTE - that changes to the February 2002 ceasefire agreement (CFA) be discussed. The LTTE delegation has stated repeatedly that it has been mandated by the Tiger leadership to only discuss the implementation of the truce and not changes to the text. The reason, the LTTE argues, is that it is Sri Lanka’s failure to implement crucial aspects of the CFA that has led inexorably to the dangerous instability that has rocked the island’s Northeastern areas for the past few months. The problem is therefore, the LTTE argues, one of will, not practicality. The talks, for the Tigers, are thus about testing Colombo’s commitment to de-escalation.

And the signs are not good. Instead of engaging with the issue of Army-backed paramilitaries according to the spirit and intention of the CFA, Sri Lanka is splitting hairs on technicalities and attempting to escape its obligations. There seems to be no recollection of the maelstrom of violence that has gripped the Northeast since December and abated only in the past few weeks. And everyone knows that the present lull is not necessarily going to last. It hardly inspires confidence that President Rajapaske is more concerned with organizing a political circus around a fiction of a peace process than in taking resolute steps to help take down the sword dangling over the actual one.

But President Rajapaske cannot be described as a man of the moment. Indeed, he has a history of being a man of the wrong moment - we have not forgotten, for example, how, barely three days after the tsunami wiped out tens of thousands of Sri Lankans, his first public comment was to assert that the LTTE should not receive any of the international aid being raised. Arguably, he thus contributed more than anyone else to destroying the communal amity the indiscriminate waves spurred. Now he has contributed more than anyone else to poisoning the mood before this week’s crucial talks. Moreover, instead of dealing boldly with the demonstrable threat to peace posed by the Army’s paramilitary forces, President Rajapakse is instead sending his delegation with a deal-breaking brief - to re-write the CFA. The irony is, where others see ineptitude, he sees guile.