Tsunami survivors were among tens of thousands people forced from homes and makeshift shelters across Sri Lanka this week after heavy rains triggered severe flooding.

The rains badly affected the Northern and Eastern provinces, where hundreds of thousands of coastal residents are still living in wooden shacks and concrete shelters almost a year after their homes were swept away by the Indian Ocean tsunami.

Several low-lying areas in the districts of Jaffna, Killinochchi and Mullaithivu have been submerged and hundreds of families have been affected by torrential rains in Batticaloa and Trincomalee districts.

Thousands of tsunami- and war- affected refugees living in transitional shelters and temporary huts in the Northeast have been displaced again. Around three hundred families have also been displaced due to flood in the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) controlled areas of Jaffna.

Unconfirmed reports said two children drowned in the heavy floods in Kilinochchi resulting from some reservoirs bursting their banks.

In Colombo, many people in residential areas were marooned and unable to get to work along flooded roads after 10 inches of rain was dumped on the capital, Reuters reported.

The Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) has deployed volunteers to provide basic facilities to displaced families who are now being sheltered in public and school buildings and with relatives.

“Around 4,000 families have been evacuated from transitional camps in the Mullaittivu and Vadamarachi East districts,” Laurence Christy, TRO planning director, told the Daily Mirror.

He said another 20,000 families, many of them living in mud shelters after being displaced by the decades long war, had been affected by drenching rains which began pounding the Northeast on Sunday.

The monsoon rains flood these areas annually and some families may have to be accommodated at schools or in makeshift shelters until January when they abate, he said.

In Trincomalee, torrential rain flooded several villages, forcing hundreds of tsunami-affected families to seek refuge in schools and public buildings from their inundated shelters, TamilNet reported. Several roads have gone under water interrupting transport between villages and outstations of the district.

“We have evacuated those in the camps to public schools on higher ground,” Mr. Christy said. “Because there are not enough schools, we also gave tarpaulins and plastic sheeting to some families,”

“We are concerned about the hygiene situation,” he added.

TRO’s Emergency Rescue Team, volunteers from local organizations and LTTE cadres are helping people encircled by water in Vadamaradchi East, Mullaithivu and Kilinochchi, to move to safer areas.

International aid organisations UNICEF, UNHCR and SCiSL are also providing assistance.

“As water in many irrigation tanks in Vanni have reached spill level destructive levels of flooding is expected in two or three days,” TRO warned Tuesday in an appeal to the international humanitarian organizations for joint efforts to overcome hardships faced by the people in the affected areas.

Tarpaulin sheets, plastic sheets, food and non food items, purified water, makeshift toilets, medical and hygiene items and material needed for children and women were the immediate need in the centres where displaced families are being sheltered, according to the rehabilitation officials.

Christy said some of the war displaced had been evacuated to schools in Kilinochchi though others had managed to stay in their houses.

“They were affected to greater and lesser degrees. Some houses collapsed while others were leaking or the floors were flooded.” He said some camps housing tsunami survivors had been built in low-lying jungle areas, which is why they had been flooded.

“We don’t like people living in the schools, it is a problem,” he said. “We may have to find alternative accommodation for them.”

Although it is eleven months since the tsunami, people are still unable to find permanent houses due to financial difficulties, the TRO says, adding that some of those being evacuated were being displaced for the third time -- first by the war, then by the tsunami and now by the floods.

India sends medicines to Kilinochchi

The Indian Government Wednesday gifted “urgently-required medicines” for use at a district hospital in the Tamil Tiger-held Kilinochchi district.

The Indian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka, Nirupama Rao, handed over the medicines to the Sri Lankan Director-General of Health Services, H.A.P. Kahandaliyanage.

“The medicines will help alleviate a current shortage at the hospital, thus benefiting the people living in Kilinochchi district,” the Indian High Commission said in a release.

Though held by the LTTE, government institutions, such as hospitals and schools also function in Kilinochchi, as in other areas under the control of the Tigers.(The Hindu)

Last Thursday’s Presidential elections have shaken the kaleidoscope of Sri Lankan politics and the pieces will undoubtedly take a while to settle. Nevertheless, there are many lessons to be drawn from the results, as underlined by the intense soul-searching and horse-trading in Colombo. Despite numerous controversies, including the near total Tamil boycott, Mahinda Rajapakse of the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) has convincingly defeated Ranil Wickremesinghe of the main opposition United National Party (UNP). Many, not least those supportive of Wickremesinghe, point to the narrow margin: Rajapakse took 50.3% against Wickremesinghe’s 48.4%.

But the inferences they suggest may be drawn from figures are misleading. Whilst Wickremesinghe’s tally is compiled from a number of vote banks, including those of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) and the Upcountry parties - including the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC) – as well as the UNP’s loyalists, Rajapakse clearly won over the overwhelming majority of the Sinhalese. What can be inferred of Ranil’s ‘support’, furthermore, when the possibility that the SLMC and CWC might switch and join Rajapakse’s SLFP in government is being floated in Colombo? What is clear, therefore, is that the Sinhalese have overwhelmingly backed Rajapakse and his hardline stance on the peace process with the Tamils while Wickremesinghe’s minority allies’ supported him not on his peace platform per se, but his pledges of post-victory political largess. The notion that last week’s election was a referendum on the peace process is thus only partly true; patronage clearly played its part.

The main controversy of the elections was undoubtedly the Tamil boycott. Less than 1% of Jaffna’s voters participated – and only 1 person from Kilinochchi’s 90 odd thousand people. Colombo’s Tamils also stayed away and in the multi-ethnic eastern province, few Tamils participated. That Tamils were undecided as how to vote has been clear for some time. The months of criticism in the Tamil press and popular disgruntlement over the lack of normalcy in the Northeast after four years of ceasefire should have alerted everyone, not least the UNP, that the Tamil vote could not be taken for granted. Instead, there is now vehement condemnation of the Liberation Tigers for inspiring the boycott. In the east some crossing points were blocked by LTTE supporters and, reportedly, cadres. These incidents have been rendered emblematic of the entire Tamil boycott and, amid sensational press coverage, is obscuring a stark ethnic polarisation amongst Sri Lankans.

The UNP and its leader must take the blame for his failure to bring the Tamils out in its favour. It may be easier – and certainly more comforting - to write off the Tamil boycott as a consequence of LTTE coercion, as many, including some members of the international community, have. But to assume that Tamils saw the ‘obvious’ benefit for peace of having Wickremesinghe as President is to misunderstand both Tamil sentiments and, we suggest, the man and his party. The UNP is gripped this week by internal post-poll wrangling: but the debate is not about the Tamils and the peace process, but how to recover the Sinhala heartland. Supports of the liberal peace in Sri Lanka undoubtedly would have preferred a Wickremesinghe win. But to fixate on the LTTE and any role it may or may not have had is to ignore the overarching dynamic: the Sinhalese have swarmed to support Rajapakse and his ultra-nationalist platform.

This – and the Tamil boycott - should not be a surprise to close observers of Sri Lanka’s politics. Resentments and antagonism have long been part of the vernacular streets, both Tamil and Sinhalese. Before the elections Wickremsinghe did not utter a word on sharing tsunami aid with LTTE areas or setting up an interim administration for the Northeast – remember the ISGA? But these factors have simply been ignored amid misguided confidence that the hardline platform trod by Rajapakse and his allies, the ultra nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Perumana (JVP) and hardline monks party, the Jeyatha Hela Urumaya (JHU), would make Wickremesinghe the Tamils’ de facto choice. The UNP leader did absolutely nothing to build bridges with the Tamils. Moreover, he – as many are equally erroneously doing now – assumed that the Tamil constituency can be separated from the LTTE.

The aftermath of Mahinda Rajapakse’s victory in the Presidential elections has been marked as much by diagnosis of the Tamil boycott as it has by the usual speculation over cabinet reshuffles which follows any election. The Tamil boycott has resulted in severe criticism of the Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) by the United States and European Union and equally robust denials of the accusations by the LTTE. Whilst the furore has exercised questions of whether or not Tamils should or could have voted, it has failed to address the central issue thrown up by the whole episode: under what conditions does the act of voting become central to democratic governance? The answer is not obvious.

Democracy’s central demand is that the government’s authority to rule must rest on the consent of the governed. Free and fair elections with universal franchise and without arbitrary restrictions on public office are a central part of the minimum procedural requirements that ensure governments rule by consent. The others include a free and independent media that allows all citizens to hear the full range of opinion and to make their views known. Such conditions are intuitively plausible as minimal requirements of democratic governance. It is also arguable that as Sri Lanka meets many of these conditions, albeit with qualifications, the act of voting equally enables all citizens to hold the government, or more recently the president, to account.

However, the procedural criteria can only guarantee democratic accountability to all citizens if electors and political parties exclude ethnicity from their decisions and campaigns. The minimal criteria of democracy require citizens to choose between alternatives based on rational and objective criteria that provide two generic reasons for adopting a particular policy. Policies can be adopted either because a majority considers them in the public interest or because it is in the personal interests of a particular majority group, for example farmers.

In either case the model ensures that no individual will find themselves in a permanent minority perpetually excluded from the decision making process. In the first case, citizens vote by political conviction, which is voluntary and in the second because of economic interests that can also be changed. For example, socialists in a country that continuously elected neo liberal governments can be said to enjoy a democratic government in so far as they have every opportunity to campaign in favour of socialist policies. Similarly capitalist interests in a country that adopted policies favouring the state sector or small farmers cannot complain of undemocratic or unjust treatment in so far as their fundamental rights are not violated, they have equal access to other means of earning an income and of campaigning vigorously for pro market policies.

Whilst Sri Lanka might meet the minimal procedural criteria for democracy, the processes of electoral choice and party political competition departs radically from norms required to ensure that certain groups do not become permanently excluded minorities. The realities of a Sinhala Buddhist demographic majority and the emergence of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism as the dominant political ideology has meant that governments, and presidents, can be elected by appealing to the this majority alone. Sri Lankan elections, including the most recent, have provided almost textbook demonstrations of the phenomenon of ethnic ‘outbidding’ where parties offer ever more extreme ethnic positions in the hope of gaining the majority of the ethnic vote. Whilst Rajapakse embraced the JHU and JVP, Wickremasinghe – belatedly - wrapped himself in the lion flag while his deputy claimed credit for splitting the LTTE and sinking two of its ships even whilst negotiating with it. The two main Sinhala parties, the UNP and SLFP, which have formed every government since independence, have to trade off pursuing minority votes with losing majority support and invariably opt for the safer option of shoring up their Sinhala vote banks.

Ever since the momentous electoral victory of S.W.R.D Bandaranaike on a platform of ‘Sinhala Only’ in 1956, all Sri Lankan governments have justified their policy programmes, whether neo liberal or socialist, in Sinhala Buddhist terms. This has had specific material consequences. Minorities have been discriminated against in public sector employment and education whilst public sector investment, in infrastructure, public institutions and manufacturing capital has been directed towards the Sinhala heartlands. Even under neo liberal policy regimes, minority areas have been denied the benefits of private investment, because the south enjoys better infrastructure and more careful political attention. Anecdotal observation is enough to confirm the glaring disparities in capital investment between the Sinhala majority areas in the south – west and the minority areas of the northeast. The major ports, tourism related developments, free trade zones, public sector institutions, airports, ports, railway lines and trunk roads are all outside the minority areas.

Sri Lankan governments are therefore not democratically accountable to all citizens, but ethnically accountable to the majority. Sri Lankan politicians habitually confuse democracy with narrow ethnic accountability when they use argue that any constitutional change has to take into account the views and interests of the majority Sinhalese. Under these conditions, the simple but powerful act of voting is insufficient to ensure that governments are democratically accountable to the minorities. Because of their ethnicity, Tamils, Upcountry Tamils and Muslims have found themselves as permanent minorities, structurally excluded from influencing policies that have materially damaged their interests.

The best that minority parties can achieve is to negotiate in coalitions for portfolios that can affect the most important interests of their constituencies. Parties representing Upcountry Tamils typically negotiate for the plantations portfolio while Muslim parties seek the ports ministry. However, this approach has very clear limits. The Upcountry Tamil parties are powerless to demand policy action to alleviate the terrible conditions of estate workers and Muslim parties were unable to secure urgent Tsunami relief for the Muslim majority areas in the east. In short, minority coalition parties are precluded from demanding large shifts in policy that cannot be promoted as furthering the interests of the Sinhala Buddhist majority, even if such policies are arguably for the larger public good.

The discussion on whether Tamils should or could have voted makes little sense unless it is placed within a larger context that examines how far voting furthers democratic accountability. In order to ensure that Sri Lankan governments become democratically accountable to all citizens, regardless of ethnicity, one of two fundamental transformations is required. The first option is the replacement of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism as the mainstream political ideology by a form of political rhetoric that gives equal weight to all the ethnic and religious identities in the island. The second option is a constitutional transformation that recognises and enshrines the plural, even multinational character of Sri Lankan society.

Under the current conditions voting alone cannot bring about either of these changes. Voting is not just an expressive act; it is not just about making one’s views known to others. The act of voting is only meaningful within a larger structure of democratic governance in which citizens can meaningfully hold their governments accountable. Despite the concern over the Tamil boycott, it is clear that Tamil electoral participation cannot effect the structural changes needed to make minority votes really count.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) last week announced their decision not to back either of the major Sinhala coalition parties contesting this week’s Presidential elections. The organization argued that in its view neither the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) nor the United National Party (UNP) would successfully implement the structural changes that were required to deliver the dividends of the peace process which had eluded the residents of the areas the LTTE controls. The organization’s position has been misinterpreted, intentionally in some quarters, as further evidence of its continuing effrontery to democratic principles.

The Tamil residents of Sri Lanka have participated in the island’s various democratic processes since it achieved independence from the British in 1947. The dawn of Sinhala nationalist politics within years of the island’s independence sparked a countdown to an ethnic confrontation - which the island’s Tamil speaking minority sought to challenge, initially at least, through legal and political recourse with an admirable Gandhian faith.

Two decades later, after a series of political treaties repudiated by Sinhala leaders unwilling to appear weak to their followers, the rules of the democratic process were immutably altered. The introduction of the 1972 Constitution by leaders of the then ruling Sinhala party disposed of the safeguards to protect the island’s minorities embedded within the Soulbury Constitution and deemed to be unalterable by Her Majesty’s Privy Council in Great Britain. The new republic’s Constitution would establish hurdles which would render the minority vote superfluous to the main issues of the island’s politics. The combined minority population of the island is under twenty-five percent, making the attainment of the sixty-six percent majority in Parliament necessary for reforms possible only in the realms of political theory.

In the subsequent three decades, the island’s Tamil minority have been trapped in a democratic purgatory, having enough in numbers to balance the nationalist contenders, but never enough clout to alter their distressing predicament. Despite persistently backing the more dovish of the main Sinhala contenders, the demographics of the island ensure that no party is, in any case, able to dominate parliament to the extent required for constitutional reform.

Sri Lanka’s 2005 Presidential election places the Tamil electorate in their familiar, unappealing position. Should the Tamil community take their lead from the LTTE’s statements and choose not to participate in the election, the likely favourite is Mr. Mahinda Rajapakse. However, with Christians concerned about the anti-conversion bills and other minority anxieties the outcome is a very close call.

Despite lacking the leadership experience of his opponent, the UPFA candidate in his inaugural presidential campaign is proving to be a serious contender for the post - an admirable achievement considering that he is following in the footsteps of President Chandrika Kumaratunga. In keeping with their nationalist manifesto, Mr. Rajapakse and his party have also chosen to ally with the Marxist-cum-nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the Buddhist nationalist Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU). The distinguishing features of the UPFA’s electioneering seem to be their no-nonsense stance in dealing with the LTTE. More recently, the party has attempted to allay the concerns of the International Community, insisting that despite its alliances with extremist parties, it will in fact pursue peace with the Tamil community, albeit in its own uncompromising style.

The previous permutations of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) led coalition governments headed by President Kumaratunga, applied a similarly non-conciliatory approach, illustrated best by her disastrous ‘war-for-peace’. Her inaugural People’s Alliance (PA) coalition government, which came to power in 1994, was itself an example of the failings of the Sri Lankan state, as far as the Tamils are concerned. The President was brought to power in a landslide victory, with considerable support from the island’s minorities based upon her promises of peacefully resolving the conflict. Having failed to reach a compromise with the LTTE which would be palatable to the country’s parliament, Mrs. Kumaratunga engaged in the most bloody phase of the ethnic conflict for the next seven years. President Kumaratunga’s political transformation from the princess of peace to warrior queen dealt another blow to Tamil confidence in Sinhala leaderships.

In contrast to the PA, Mr. Ranil Wickremesinghe’s government UNP-led, has arguably enjoyed the greatest success of contemporary Sri Lankan governments in challenging the LTTE’s military and political ascendancy. The then Prime Minister, whose party took power in 2001, successfully engaged the LTTE in a peace process which allowed the space for the government to rebuild the country’s debilitated military and its crumbling economy. The failure (or, from a Sinhala nationalist perspective, the success) of the Wickremesinghe administration, meanwhile, to deliver any benefits to the residents of the Northeast have been exhaustively outlined in the columns of this newspaper. Most notably, the UNP, like many of its predecessors, failed to deliver on deals it signed with the LTTE aimed at returning normalcy to residents of the Northeast. The sole redeeming feature of Mr. Wickremesinghe’s tenure may be the aversion of an all out war; however, this is more likely attributable to the military’s incapacitated condition than the state’s benevolent intent.

However, Sinhala leaders cannot be blamed solely for their belligerent strategic decisions. The reality is that the island’s present political system was constructed to ensure only a united Sinhala polity could deliver any concessions the island’s minorities. However, Sinhala parties sitting in opposition are frequently seduced by Sinhala nationalism when approaching the ethnic question. Whilst in opposition to Mrs. Kumaratunga, Mr. Wickremesinghe’s party obstructed – on three separate occasions - devolution proposals submitted by Mrs. Kumaratunga’s government. The charge, as ever was that her government was being too accommodating of Tamil demands. That her proposals had already been rejected by the LTTE for being woefully inadequate was irrelevant. Similarly, President Kumaratunga rejected the UNF government’s notion of providing the LTTE with two-year administration in the North-East - despite claiming to have offered the Tigers a similar ten year deal during her government’s tenure. The dynamics of Sri Lankan politics ensure that at least one of the major contenders will seek the powerful nationalist lobby in its pursuit of the control of parliament.

Nevertheless, throughout the contemporary political history of the island, the Tamil lobby has repeatedly backed the more dovish of the main Sinhala candidates. The resulting delicate balance of power in parliament has impeded any structural changes to Sri Lanka’s constitution that may deliver a resolution to the minority’s grievances. From a Tamil perspective, a decision to cease participation in process where they have no influence appears long overdue.

One may counter that by repudiating their democratic rights, the island’s Tamil community is spurning its only peaceful means of stimulating change. However, it has been demonstrated that there are unassailable limits to the impact the Tamil electorate can have on the island’s political system. Continued engagement in this pointless political process can only detract from more inventive efforts to seek a genuine and permament solution to the underlying issues.

The most puzzling aspect of Sri Lanka’s political landscape is not that the Tamils have finally decided to boycott the process, but the consistent and inexplicable assertion that the more hawkish coalition would enjoy a resounding victory without the dovish Tamil counter-balance. In spite of Mr. Wickremesinghe’s resounding strategic successes against the LTTE, his party has had to revert to crudely hardline rhetoric to retain any chance of returning to power. By contrast, Rajapakse is a major contender chiefly as a result of his unwaveringly hardline positions and his alliances with the right-wing JVP and JHU.

Populist ethnicity-based politics are not the preserve of the rival political campaigns this week alone. Perhaps the most revealing development on the Southern political landscape is the exponential rise of the JVP over the past decade based on the twin policies of promoting nationalist solutions to the ethnic conflict, whilst simultaneously promising to confer the economic benefits of a socialist state to its voters.

Despite being the pro-peace camp’s choice, Mr. Wickremesinghe’s credentials as a patriotic leader are impeccable. His government reversed the deteriorating military position of the Sri Lankan state through a series of political maneuvers – as the UNP has proudly pointed out. His only mistake, relative to Mr. Rajapakse, appear to be politically engaging the LTTE in doing so. And yet, the country’s Prime Minister, along with his uncompromisingly hawkish position, appears to be enjoying the support of a substantial part of the Sinhala people. Joseph de Maistre famously noted that ‘every nation has the government it deserves.’ The Sinhala nation has repeatedly and enthusiastically chosen populist hawkish leaders unwilling and, in any case, unable, to deliver a lasting peaceful solution to the ethnic problem. And this week, whoever it picks, it will do so again.

Sri Lankans go to the polls Thursday to pick a replacement for outgoing President Chandrika Kumaratunga. Irrespective of which of the leading contenders, Ranil Wickremesinghe of the United National Party (UNP) or Mahinda Rajapakse of the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), wins, it is clear that a major change in the country’s political dynamics will follow. As this newspaper has pointed out before, despite Kumaratunga’s assertion she is leaving without mud or blood on her hands, she is wrong on both counts. It remains to be seen what role, if any, she will now play in the island’s fractious politics, but it will undoubtedly depend on who wins – and the irony is Kumaratunga would rather it was her former archrival, Wickremesinghe.

With the island’s most powerful office up for grabs, the contest will go all the way down to the wire. In true Sri Lankan tradition, the outcome will be decided not only by the popularity of policy, charisma of candidate or efficiency of party machinery, but also by the practicability of electoral fraud. In this regard, the opposition UNP has a distinct disadvantage. The ruling party’s control of the security forces and, by extension, the Army-backed paramilitaries, will give Rajapakse an edge – should he need it, of course. On Wednesday cadres of the ‘moderate’ Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) were reported to be seizing voters’ identity cards in parts of Army-controlled Jaffna. The UNP had even earlier cried foul, alleging Army deserters have been flown into the northern peninsula to assist the rigging.

Rajapakse may need the scales to be tipped. The loose class and urban/rural divides inherent in the UNP and SLFP’s support bases, along with the various alliances these parties have struck have created profound uncertainty as to who will triumph. The yo-yoing Colombo stock market is just one indicator the contest is too close to call. Rajapakse’s unabashed embracing of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism has alarmed Sinhala Catholics as well as the island’s ethnic minorities. On the other hand, the JVP’s formidable cadre based machine is at work, alongside whatever effort the disunited SLFP can summon. Most importantly for Rajapakse, President Kumaratunga has called a truce in the party’s internal squabbles, freeing him to concentrate on campaigning.

The election is being interpreted by many as a referendum on the peace process. The voters are deemed to have a choice between a ‘pro-peace’ Wickremesinghe and a ‘hardline’ Rajapakse. Whilst understandable a few months ago, this view is not shared by the Tamils and the Liberation Tigers today. The LTTE’s scepticism has been amply justified by the events of the past two weeks. When it became clear that the Tamils were backing away from him, Wickremesinghe’s response was not to appeal to their interests, as he had with the hill country Tamils and Muslim communities, but to stumble back towards the Sinhala nationalists. In a particularly crude display of patriotism, Wickremesinghe, the darling of local and international liberals, is reported to have held a Lion flag aloft and vowed to unite the island under it. The pledge will no doubt be put to a practical test should he win.

The LTTE’s undisguised disgust with both candidates and its less than subtle call for a Tamil boycott have infuriated many observers, including some international ones. But the irony of the Tamils being called on to boost the chances of a candidate whose lieutenants only last week were boasting about how their government trapped and split the Tamil struggle through the peace process is not lost on us. Of course, there is more than just the peace process riding on the Thursday’s election - the international neoliberal project, for example. A phalanx of non-state actors anxious about life under Rajapakse have lambasted the LTTE for ‘interfering’ in the election and dispensed much advice about what the international community is and isn’t like and what the Tamils might or might not want. We suggest the LTTE’s finely honed intelligence machine might give the movement a much better idea as to sentiments prevailing in the Northeast – to say nothing of the Diaspora.

There has been some incredulity at the suggestion the Tamils are waiting for a signal from the LTTE in deciding who to vote for. Some have reduced this to a matter of fear, an analysis reinforced by the observers’ own prejudices against the Tigers. The simple fact is that the now highly politicised Tamil electorate are looking for a course of action which could meaningfully contribute to the advancement of their political struggle. The best insight in this regard, from a Tamil perspective, must come from the LTTE - as unpalatable as this is to those in the Sri Lankan peace caravan who cling to expectations of a Wickremesinghe-delivered federal solution. True, Wickremesinghe may be better for some aspects of the peace process. But the catchall of ‘federalism’ demands close inspection and not merely blind faith. In this regard, as far as the Tamils are concerned, Wickremesinghe and Rajapakse have laid out the facts of the matter clearly over the past few weeks. Both are products of the same Sinhala-dominated political system. Both have now wrapped themselves in the Lion flag. And both are equally committed to denying a Tamil political identity and, thence, political rights. There is no real choice between them.

Doyen of Tamil expatriate social activists, Mr C J T Thamotheram, passed away Tuesday. A retired teacher, Mr Thamotheram, devoted his years in UK working on Tamil issues.

He established the London’s first Tamil School - the West London Tamil School and was among those involved in forming the Standing Committee of Tamils (SCOT) in 1977. In October 1981 he founded the monthly Tamil Times which served as the voice of the expatriate community for many years, but which he later criticised as having turned against the Tamil cause.

He then set up the League of Friends of the Jaffna University and a London-based think tank, the International Tamil Foundation (ITF). Earlier this year, despite poor health, he launched the Tamil Writers' Guild.

The funeral service is on Friday November 4 at 11.00 AM at the Rivercourt Methodist Church, King Street, Hammersmith, London W6 9JT. It will be followed by a private family cremation.

He is survived by his wife Florence (Malar), his sons, Vijay, Priya, and Raj, daughters Sunetra, Thiru and Shantini, six grand children and two great grand children. Family requests not to send flowers but encourages making donations made payable to 'White Pigeon', (Registered Charity).

Amidst the liberal hand-wringing over the prospects for peace in Sri Lanka, political culture in the Tamil areas of the island has become a critical point of concern for many activists and analysts in the south. The ongoing violence in the Northeast that prevents vigorous electoral campaigning and widespread electoral participation is seen as symptomatic of a deeper political malaise. It is argued that extensive democratisation of the Tamil areas is an absolute prerequisite for a genuinely lasting and peaceful solution to the island’s ethnic conflict.

In this view the democratic deficit in the Tamil areas is characterised in two ways. The first is the presence of the authoritarian and anti democratic LTTE that has consistently stifled the growth of a genuinely democratic culture. The second area of democratic deficit is to be found in the Tamil people themselves, who have either been seduced by the LTTE’s exclusivist ideology and have become ‘comfortable with terror’ or are so terrified by its coercive might that they are unable or unwilling to voice their true opinions. Democratisation and therefore peace therefore requires not only radical transformation of the LTTE but also of the Tamil people themselves, who need amongst other things education about the basic processes and principles of democracy

The force of this argument rests on a simplistic assumption about the nature of the LTTE and, by implication, its support base. This assumption checks a more nuanced analysis of both the LTTE and politics in the north-east as a whole. Demands for greater democratisation in the northeast inevitably characterise the LTTE as a clandestine organisation, immersed in an exclusivist ideology and held together by the authoritarian and charismatic leadership of one man. This caricature of the LTTE allows many committed human rights activists living in Sinhala dominated areas to provide two very different explanations of deviations from liberal democratic norms in the north and the south. Assassinations of journalists and political opponents, systematic electoral malpractice, and widespread human rights abuses in the south are criticised, but understood mainly as deviations from the norm. In other words, the Sri Lankan state, its armed forces and political parties are seen as complex multifaceted institutions that can be reformed. In contrast, human rights violations by the LTTE are often held up as merely symptomatic of its dark and menacing nature.

Such a one dimensional and simplistic portrayal cannot capture the reality of a large organisation that engages in a wide range of both military and civilian activities. An estimated force of twenty thousand cadres in uniform and several thousand more civilians including both paid workers and volunteers cannot be held together by the sheer force of charismatic personality. Like any other complex organisation, the LTTE has bureaucratic structures, chains of command and decision-making processes. It could not function as it does otherwise, either in a military or civilian capacity. Even its most ardent critics have been forced to admit that the LTTE’s all out mobilisation in the aftermath of the Tsunami was effective in both halting the spread of disease and rehabilitating the worst affected civilians. To refuse to engage the LTTE’s successes and failures in terms that recognise it as a complex, multi-layered and multi-faceted organisation is to abandon the terms of rational analysis for those of mystification and obfuscation.

The related simplifying assumptions about the LTTE’s support base also do not stand up to scrutiny. Support for the cause of Tamil political independence cannot be explained away as either the result of coercion by the LTTE or conversely the attractions of exclusivist Tamil ethnonationalism. Tamil political mobilisation behind the cause of independence has been too long lasting, varied and deep to be understood as either forced or irrational. Support for the cause of Tamil political rights arises not just from the LTTE controlled areas, but also from areas under Army control and, very importantly, from the Diaspora. Conversely, to suggest that Diaspora support is simply armchair nationalist indulgency ignores the fact that most Tamils in the Diaspora have extensive and close familial connections with the northeast - and that most are refugees or earlier migrants spurred by portends of troubles to come. Many Diaspora Tamils have taken advantage of the relative peace afforded by the ceasefire agreement to volunteer their time and skills for rehabilitation projects across the northeast.

It is also a misreading to understand Tamil politics as the result of a surrender to a charismatic ideology that implies ancient glory and promises utopia. Tamil nationalists themselves have rarely if every resorted to myth and history to justify their demands for Tamil political rights. The Federal Party leader SJV Chelvanayagam stated early on that he was not interested in history: “Solve a modern problem in a modern way. Do not solve a modern problem in a medieval way. Bring to bear towards the solution of a twentieth century problem, a twentieth century mind.” The demand for Tamil political autonomy is not the result of a misplaced belief in the need to protect some alleged ancient glory but on the need to secure a political present and future that is safe from the policies of governments elected on the rhetoric of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism. Tamils consistently supported the Federal party from the mid 1950s to the mid 1970s because they thought it provided the best means to secure their political autonomy. Tamil participation or abstention from the most recent elections has to be understood in the same terms.

The assertion that peace requires the urgent democratisation of the Northeast conceals an unwillingness to confront two unavoidable realities of Sri Lankan politics. The first is the uncompromising postures adopted by mainstream Sinhala Buddhist actors towards Tamil interests and rights. The fate of the PTOMS, a fairly banal administrative structure that had the sole purpose of alleviating the suffering caused by the December 2004 tsunami, exposes the extent to which even the most basic conditions of Tamil life are hostage to Sinhala Buddhist sentiment. Addressing this sentiment, however, poses a far more difficult and daunting challenge for indignant liberals in the south than lecturing the Tamils on their inadequate grasp of the principles of liberalism and democracy. Challenging the critics of the PTOMS and the Ceasefire Agreement means facing up to an ideology that is not only politically dominant but also socially deeply entrenched.

Calling for greater democratisation of the Northeast also conceals the far more acute need for military de-escalation and normalisation. These areas of the island have borne the brunt of the civil war many and Tamils are displaced and living in refugee camps where the normal processes of every day life are next to impossible. Under these conditions it is difficult to imagine the possibility of genuine democratic engagement and reflection on the choices offered. Similarly, while the Sri Lankan security forces and the LTTE are engaged in a ‘shadow’ war, the free movement of people, ideas and goods that is critical to democratic politics is impossible. The more banal, practical difficulties of democracy in militarised Sri Lanka are amply demonstrated by the activities of Army-backed paramilitaries this week.

A peace process that has democratic legitimacy is infinitely preferable to one that is unilaterally imposed or unacceptable to significant sections of the population. However, the political culture of the northeast is not the most challenging or even the most difficult obstacle to creating a negotiated solution with democratic legitimacy. It must be remembered that the most sustained support for the peace process has come from the Tamils, in the island and in the Diaspora. The uncompromising demands of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism have to be challenged. This is likely to be a difficult and long-term task. A more immediate objective is to work towards the de-escalation and normalisation of the northeast. The humanitarian interests of people who are displaced are beyond democratic debate. However, the uncomfortable reality is that even the most prosaic moves demilitarisation and normalisation will be hostage to the democratic legitimacy of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism.

Several political cadres of the Liberation Tigers were amongst those killed this week in the ongoing shadow war between Army-backed paramilitaries and the LTTE in Sri Lanka’s Northeast.

On Wednesday two LTTE cadres were killed in Valaichenai, 32 km north of Batticaloa. One had been arrested by Sri Lanka Army (SLA) troops at Chenkalady Black Bridge on Tuesday.

The bodies of two LTTE cadres were found Tuesday in SLA-controlled part of the Amparai district. The two cadres, who had come to Pallikudiyiruppu to purchase meat, had been abducted Monday. Both were found with their hands tied.

A former Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) member was found dead after being abducted in Valaichenai Wednesday afternoon.

The Batticaloa office of the Tamils Rehabilitation Office (TRO) was attacked early Wednesday morning. Grenades were thrown at the office, causing damage to their computer section and vehicles parked outside. This was the third attack on this office this year.

Two Home Guards, were shot at in Welikanda Wednesday morning. One was killed and the other hospitalized. Army-controlled Welikanda is known to be where Army-backed paramilitaries, including the Karuna Group maintain several camps.

A grenade blast wounded a Sri Lankan Army soldier and a police officer at Koolavady Junction in Batticaloa Wednesday evening. An hour later there was another grenade attack in Eravur, Batticaloa, but there were no casualties.

Two separate grenade attacks injured three SLA soldiers from the Kallady camp and 2 policemen in Manmunai.

In Kalmunai, 39 km south of Batticaloa, a policeman was shot dead by an unidentified gunman on motorbike. Later that evening, a Muslim businessman was shot and killed outside his house by men on motorbikes. 45 minutes later, another Muslim businessman was shot at and seriously wounded, but survived.

In Trincomalee, an unidentified Sinhalese person was shot and killed Tuesday afternoon. The motive for the attack is not clear.

In Jaffna, a partially clothed body was found in the temple well of Chuttipuram Amman Kovil in Varani. The SLA’s 52-4 Brigade Headquarters located in the vicinity, rousing suspicions and fear among local residents amid the parallels to the disappearances during the times of conflict.

In Kayts, Jaffna, an Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) cadre sustained head injuries after being shot at by unknown assailants while distributing pamphlets in support of Mahinda Rajapakse, Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) presidential candidate.

An EPDP cadre, was killed in Wellawatte, Colombo Sunday night by unidentified gunmen. He is alleged to have been a key intelligence operative and also involved in directing security for EPDP leader Douglas Devananda.

On Saturday a police constable died instantly after being accidentally electrocuted by a wire fence in Mannar. The previous Tuesday, eight SLA soldiers attached to the 512 brigade occupying hotels in Jaffna were electrocuted when their truck became entangled in the surrounding security fence.

Compiled from TamilNet reports

Sri Lankans go to the polls Thursday to pick a replacement for outgoing President Chandrika Kumaratunga. Despite the inevitable emphatic assertions of victory by the two leading contenders, most analysts suggest it will be a photo-finish.

This is not only because both candidates have different vote banks and policies, but because with the country’s most powerful office up for grabs, electoral fraud is feared, particularly in the restive Northeast.

Premier Mahinda Rajapakse, representing the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), and Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe of the United National Party (UNP) are relying on their parties’ respective party’s allies to deliver vote banks they don’t have access to.

Within days of the race to replace Kumaratunga being announced, Rajapakse, her party’s candidate, announced electoral pacts with the ultra Sinhala nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Perumana (JVP) and the hardline monks party, the Jeyatha Hela Urumaya (JHU) and got off to a flying start on the campaign trail.

Wickremesinghe was slow to announce his alliances, but the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC), representing a substantial section of the Estate Tamil vote, swung behind, as did the other Estate party, the Upcountry People’s Front (UPF).

Wickremesinghe also secured the support of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), the island’s largest Muslim party before it became beset by internal splits and controversies.

Rajapakse, however, has retained the support of another Muslim party, the National Unity Alliance (NUA).

Whilst Wickremesinghe is considered pro-market and an internationalist, Rajapakse is seen as a economic conservative and a traditionalist. These have resulted in them courting different vote banks: Wickremesinghe the urban, educated middle class and Rajapakse the rural poor.

Both candidates have pledged a raft of subsidies on goods, from milk powder to fertiliser for the rural poor and farmers, in a $20 billion economy whose biggest currency earners include foreign remittances, garment and tea exports and tourism.

As in all elections, Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, has entered the poll campaigns. Rajapkse was the first to embrace it, vowing to defend the unitary status of Sri Lanka – in other words, not conceding an inch to the minorities – and to address Wickremesinghe’s weakening, as he described it, of national security through the peace process with the Tamil Tigers.

Wickremesinghe was less overt in courting the Sinhala nationalist vote, titling his manifesto’s section on the peace process ‘Defeating Separatism.’ But in the past two weeks, as it has become clear the Tamil vote will not be coming his way, Wickremesinghe has also rushed to trumpet his nationalist credentials.

At one closing rally, for example, Wickremesinghe had held up the Lion flag and vowed to unite the island under it. A close confidante, Milinda Moragoda, boasted last week of how the UNP-led government of 2001-3 had trapped the LTTE in an international safety net, engineered a split within the organisation and sunk its ships.

The alliances with the Estate and Muslim and the division amongst the Sinhala voters has left analysts unsure as to who has the upper hand.

The Colombo Stock Market has for several weeks been rising in the anticipation of a Wickremesinghe victory, but has slid sharply in recent days, as it has become clear the Tamil vote may not being accruing to him.

In a clear signal to Tamil voters, the Liberation Tiger have expressed their disgust with both candidates and indirectly signalled a boycott would be preferable.

But while the LTTE says it will not intervene to prevent Tamils from voting, Army-backed Tamil paramilitary groups are expected to rig polls in some areas in favour of Rajapakse.

Two paramilitary groups, the Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) in Jaffna and the Karuna Group in Batticaloa, have urged people to vote for Rajapakse and throughout Wednesday there have been reports of gunmen seizing voter’s registration cards in parts of Jaffna.

Indicative of the prevailing uncertainty of the outcome, the Colombo Bourse rocketed 4% Wednesday on the back of an erroneous report in the Daily Mirror that the LTTE had reversed its stand and was urging Tamils to turn out and vote. The LTTE has flatly denied the report.

More than 13 million people are eligible to vote in the presidential election, Sri Lanka’s fourth national poll in six years. Many voters are said to be apathetic at the prospect of another election.

Ballot boxes have been taken to nearly 10,000 polling stations.

Tens of thousands of police and soldiers took up positions across Sri Lanka Wednesday – though the UNP fears some senior military officers are supporting those rigging in favour of Rajapakse.

Sri Lanka has a history of election bloodshed, but this campaign has been one of the most peaceful for years.

Nevertheless, foreign aid groups and diplomatic missions have ordered staff to stay indoors on election day and some have advised them to stockpile food, Reuters reported. Liquor sales have been banned over the election period to dampen partisan rivalry.

Intimidation in the Northeast [Nov. 16, 2005]
Editorial: Constant Factor [Nov. 16, 2005]
A deficit in Sri Lankan democracy? [Nov. 16, 2005]
The paradox of the Tamil vote [Nov. 16, 2005]

Musharraf: quake aid helps terror fight

Pakistan’s efforts to fight terrorism will be helped by the emergency aid operation mounted by the U.S. and relief agencies for survivors of last month’s earthquake in the Kashmir region, President Pervez Musharraf said.

“It will lend more credibility and strength to our decision that we took of backing the United States and being with the United States” in the fight against terrorism, Musharraf said in an interview with NBC’s ‘Today’ program.

``The people would understand that joining the coalition, fighting against terrorism joining, supporting the United States against terrorism, were all correct decisions,’’ Musharraf said.

The U.S. has 24 military helicopters and more than 1,100 service personnel in Pakistan helping with an airlift of supplies to the mountainous region in northern Pakistan where more than 73,000 people were killed by the Oct. 8 quake.

The Pakistani army has been fighting insurgents linked to the al-Qaeda network and Afghanistan’s ousted Taliban regime in the northwestern tribal region since October 2003. Pakistan has arrested more than 600 suspected terrorists since it joined the U.S.-led war on terror after 9/11.

International aid agencies are trying to supply an estimated 3.3 million people left homeless before winter sets in the mountains. At least 100,000 people in remote regions have yet to receive aid and snow is already falling.

The U.S. government so far has contributed about $156 million in aid for relief and recovery efforts.(Bloomberg).

Asia battles bird flu

Vietnam slaughtered thousands of birds in its two largest cities on Tuesday, while other Asian nations boosted efforts to halt the spread of deadly avian flu.

China vowed to vaccinate its entire stock of 14 billion poultry against bird flu, with the government promising to help pay for the process.

The deadly H5N1 strain of bird flu is endemic in poultry in parts of Asia and has killed more than 60 people in the region. Forty-two people have died in Vietnam.

The virus remains hard for people to catch, but experts fear it could mutate into a form which can be passed from person to person and trigger a pandemic in which millions could die.

Britain said it believed an outbreak of H5N1 in a quarantine center last month was introduced by birds imported from Taiwan.

Indonesia and Vietnam should be given more resources to help stamp out the spread of the virus, Bernard Vallat, director general of the World Organization for Animal Health, said, urging vaccination of poultry.

“Early detection is the first line of defense in defeating the virus but Indonesia and Vietnam, … were late in responding,” Vallat told Reuters. “They cannot manage this virus by just killing animals at this stage. It is too late. The solution is using vaccination.”

Migratory birds have carried the virus to eastern Europe and Kuwait and experts fear it will soon spread to Africa.(Reuters)

Iraq detainees ‘found starving’

Iraq’s government says it has begun an investigation into the alleged abuse of more than 170 detainees held by Iraqi security forces in Baghdad.

The prisoners, many malnourished and some showing signs of torture, were found when US troops took control of an interior ministry building on Sunday.

The US raid followed repeated enquiries by the parents of a missing teenager.

Iraq’s prime minister has promised to find those responsible for any abuse. Most of those held were Sunnis.

The BBC’s Caroline Hawley in Baghdad says the discovery will not come as a surprise to many Iraqis.

There have been persistent allegations of abuse by members of the Shia-dominated security forces, she says.

The head of Iraq’s largest Sunni political party said attempts to raise claims of torture in government detention centres had been rebuffed.

But Sunday’s discovery is hard evidence and officials believe it may be the tip of the iceberg.

Deputy interior minister Hussein Kamal, who saw some of the abuse victims personally, said: “I’ve never seen such a situation like this during the past two years in Baghdad, this is the worst.

“I saw signs of physical abuse by brutal beating, one or two detainees were paralysed and some had their skin peeled off various parts of their bodies.”(BBC)

India seeks ‘real cuts’ in farm subsidies

India on Wednesday demanded “real cuts” in farm subsidies by the US for creating a level-playing field in multilateral trade, but Washington put the ball in the European Union’s court saying the successful outcome of the Hong Kong WTO ministerial next month depended to a large extent on whether EU comes up with an improved offer.

“What the US had proposed last month are not real cuts, it would still allow them to raise trade-distorting subsidies to their farmers. The real cuts would be when there is decline in the support provided by the US Treasury,” Commerce Minister Kamal Nath said at the Indo-US Economic Summit in New Delhi.

He said the contentious issues in agricultural trade in WTO also included differences in perception of what India and US consider as trade-distorting support and what is allowed under the Green Box, which is not distorting trade.

However, the US maintained that its proposal presented to the WTO on October 10 offered “real cuts” in subsidies and talks are stuck because of the “disappointing” offer from EU.

J B Penn, under secretary, US department of agriculture, said the level of ambition in the EU proposal falls much short of Doha mandate and its market access cuts did not fall between the US and the G-20 proposals.(Rediff)

Iran-India-Pakistan pipeline unaffected

International political developments are unlikely to hit the $7.2 billion Iran-Pakistan-India natural gas pipeline project, a senior Iranian gas industry official said.

Managing Director of the National Iranian Gas Export Company Roknoddin Javadi said both India and Pakistan are badly in need of Iranian gas because it is uneconomical for them to acquire energy supplies from sources other than Iran.

He rejected reports that Pakistan is likely to pull out of the project if economic sanctions were to be imposed on Iran.

‘‘Once talks (between Iran and Pakistan) become conclusive, trilateral negotiations will begin with India,’’ Iran Daily quoted Mr Javadi as saying.

Pakistan gas officials are holding talks on a structural framework agreement, pipeline routine, gas quality, delivery points and tariff from November 16-17 in Tehran.

They said Pakistan would receive 2.5 billion cubic feet per day (bcfd) of gas while India 3.1 bcfd through the pipeline having a diameter of around 56 inches.

Work on the mega project will start by the middle of 2007 and will be completed by 2010, the officials added.(UNI)

Rehabilitation efforts in tsunami-struck Muttur East are stagnating amid an unofficial embargo imposed on the region by the Sri Lankan military in Trincomalee.

Efforts to revive the local economy are also foundering as transport of goods and people in and out of the Tamil-Tiger controlled enclave is disrupted.

Muttur East is a part of the Sri Lanka military-dominated Trincomalee district which is held by the Tamil Tigers. Residents, aid workers and government officials must pass through the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) checkpoint at Kaddaiparichchan to enter it.

Despite permits for aid organizations to transport building materials into the impoverished region supplied by the Government Agent (the most senior civil servant in the district), the SLA has prevented the entry of gravel and other such needed supplies, Tamil politicians protested to the government this week.

“I appeal to you to intervene and take appropriate steps to alleviate the sufferings of the civilians in the LTTE held areas in running their day to day lives and their agricultural and development activities without interruption,” the letter from TNA parliamentarian for Trincomalee, Mr. K Thurairatnasingham, said.

The letter cites instances in which approved projects for rehabilitation and reconstruction have stalled due to the SLA’s refusal to allow needed materials to enter.

The coastal geography means many residents in Muttur East are dependent on the ocean for their livelihood. The devastation caused by tsunami of December 2004 has since been compounded by Sri Lankan government and military regulation.

Fishing times, for example, have been arbitrarily curtailed as a result of new measures imposed in the High Security Zone fishermen must pass through. Many of these restrictions are prohibited by the February 2002 ceasefire agreement.

Agricultural work has also been halted: an acute fuel shortage means tractors and other farm machinery, much of donated by international NGOs cannot be used.

Residents are also decrying heightened restrictions on the transportation of goods such as eggs, meat and other foodstuffs into the region.

They are concerned at more invasive searches at the SLA checkpoint and the sheer arbitrariness of the restrictions. One youth was arrested for having three CDs with music supportive to the Tigers in his possession, for example.

Mr. S. Elilan, the LTTE’s Trincomalee district head, has brought these restrictions to the attention of the North East Provincial Council (NEPC) and appealed to the Sri Lankan government to ensure development in the region is allowed to progress without restriction.

Mr. Elilan asked the NEPC to give voice in Colombo to the difficulties of people in Muttur East in rebuilding their lives and communities.

The harassment of civilians at the SLA checkpoint is not limited to non-Sinhalese. Even Sri Lankan officials from the Education International (EI) enroute to a meeting in Muttur East were detained for hours at the checkpoint, and subject to interrogation.

They were then told that Sinhalese people will not be allowed entry into Muttur East without prior permission from senior Defense officials.

The EI workers had intended to begin work on two schools in Tamil villages which were destroyed by last December’s tsunami. After bringing the issue to the attention of the international ceasefire monitors, they were allowed entry by the soldiers.

This is only one of numerous incidents cited to the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) by residents of Muttur East.

The checkpoint at Kaddaiparichchan was once left open on a 24 hour basis, in the interests of promoting development throughout the war and tsunami-devastated region. However, these hours have been sharply cutback. Troops now refuse civilian entry after 7 pm and before 6 am.

These recent incidents are reminiscent of the decade-long embargo imposed on the LTTE-held areas in which food, medicine and almost all other supplies were refused entry, often despite permission being obtained by NGOs from the defence ministry in Colombo.

Compiled from TamilNet reports

To: the US Congress,

We would like to express our grave concerns regarding the stalled peace process in Sri Lanka. As Sri Lanka’s presidential elections approach this Thursday, both of the two main contenders are crudely marginalizing the interests of the Tamil minority.

Both candidates are playing to the forces of ethnic nationalism in their efforts to secure a political victory, with neither side pledging concrete support for the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) which the United States, as one of the Co-Chairs for Sri Lanka’s peace process, has backed and repeatedly called for implementation.The most crucial aspect of the CFA is Clause 1.8, which demands the disarmament of paramilitary groups currently engaged in a covert shadow war against the Tamil minority. The Norwegian-led peace monitors have documented over 190 deaths due to this subversive war, as local residents report paramilitaries being given arms from the Sri Lankan Army, and residing in camps well-fortified by the military.

We call upon you to ensure that whoever wins Friday’s election comes under immediate pressure from the United States government to fully disarm paramilitaries and stop those perpetuating violence against innocent civilians.

Both main presidential contenders, United National Party Opposition leader Ranil Wickremasinghe and Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse are essentially ignoring the eighteen-percent Tamil minority beyond superficial claims to “consider all communities’ interests”. Indeed, Rajapakse has secured nominations from both the Eelam People’s Democratic Party, a notorious armed political group, and Colonel Karuna, head of the faction of the Tamil Tigers that split from the organization in 2004. Officials from Wickremasinghe’s government, which was in power during the signing of the 2002 CFA, recently admitted they helped facilitate this split within the Tigers, which has directly led to a cycle of violence in a ‘shadow war’ and the deaths of hundreds of people. Paramilitaries operating under the umbrella label of Karuna’s forces have since terrorized Tamils throughout the region. This has caused unbearable tension among a population already devastated by last December’s tsunami.

It is within this bleak context that many Tamils are simply refusing to participate in the upcoming elections, to show the world that “the land of the Tamils will no more trust Sinhala leaders,” as the Jaffna Student Organization of Higher Education Institutions states. This provides a dangerous opportunity for ballot-stuffing and election fraud, which may involve violence against Tamils who do decide to vote. Given the history of election violence against minorities in Sri Lanka, seen in December 2001 and April 2004 parliamentary elections in which hundreds were massacred in party conflicts and indiscriminate bombings, there is a high likelihood for indiscriminate killings. Indeed, foreign election observers have reported that “systematic intimidation” is being carried out by government ministers, using state vehicles and people in STF-style uniforms to warn Tamils against voting. Additionally, government documents have been found describing a plan to send army deserters to Tamil regions to dilute their vote.

We call upon you to ensure that the next president of Sri Lanka implements the Ceasefire Agreement, particularly the Clause stipulating the disarming of Army-backed paramilitaries, to halt the violence that has daily plagued the Tamil people.

Thank you for your concern in preserving peace and democracy in Sri Lanka.

Even as the US approved the lease of naval reconnaissance aircraft and sales of F-16 fighters were mooted, India announced US$ 9bn worth of military are underway with Russia.

Maintaining that Russia will remain India’s ‘topmost’ defence partner in the years to come, Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee today said military deals worth USD 9 billion are currently underway with Moscow.

“I want to assure you that Russia has been and will remain India’s largest defence partner in the years to come,” Mukherjee said inaugurating the 5th session of the Indo-Russian Inter-Governmental Commission on Military Technical Cooperation (IRIGC-MTC) here.

“The work is currently underway on execution of military contracts worth 9 billion dollars, thus consolidating Russia as India’s topmost partner in the military-technical cooperation,” he said.

According to the Russian Defence Ministry, contracts worth USD 10 billion are to be executed within next four years including the delivery of Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier, deck-based MiG-29K fighters and Kamov helicopters.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon has approved the lease of two P-3C reconnaissance aircraft for India and notified the US Congress of a $ 133 million military sale to provide logistics support for the deal that includes training devices, test equipment and spare parts, The Hindu reported.

Announcing the deal, the Pentagon’s Defence Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) said the proposed sale would help “improve the security of an important ally and strengthen US-India strategic partnership”.

The P-3C aircraft, built by Lockheed Martin, will replace the Navy’s Soviet IL-38 May aircraft that are “quickly reaching the end of their fatigue and operational service life”.

This modernisation would enhance the capabilities of the Navy, support its regional influence and meet its legitimate needs of self-defence, said the DSCA, which is the US Defence Department’s nodal agency for foreign military sales.

It said India needed the advanced aircraft for land-based maritime patrol and reconnaissance to protect its economic exclusion zone and to guard against submarines and surface warfare ships.

The US’s strategic relationship with India “continues to be an important force for political stability, peace and economic progress in South Asia,” the DSCA said.

It emphasised that the proposed sale will not affect the basic military balance of the region; nor will it have any adverse impact on the US’s own defence readiness.

“India is capable of absorbing and maintaining these additional aircraft in its inventory,” it told Congress, which has 30 days for blocking the sale - a possibility regarded as most unlikely.

The deal comes in the wake of the broad Indo-US defence agreement to give a fillip to military cooperation between the two countries.

Implementation of the logistics support plan will be needed prior to the delivery of the first aircraft and continued involvement by the US and contractor representatives for three years.

Meanwhile, US defence major Lockheed Martin Corp. is optimistic it will win an order for F-16 jets from India’s air force, which plans to buy more than 120 new combat aircraft.

US defence major Lockheed Martin, which is in the race to supply some of the fighter planes sought by India, is eyeing other opportunities to sell aircraft and hardware worth billions of dollars to the Indian armed forces.

The company is also expected to bid for an Indian Navy proposal to acquire some 30 submarine hunter helicopters, the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) plan to buy 80 medium-lift helicopters and an Indian Army programme to acquire tactical missiles.

Lockheed also hopes to collaborate with India’s state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. on the development and co-production of fighter jets, Vice President Orville Prins said late Monday.

Prins said he is “cautiously optimistic” that India will order its F-16 jets. India’s air force currently has no American-made aircraft and uses mostly Russian-made MiG fighters, along with British Jaguars and French Mirage aircraft.

India has never bought American planes for its air force because of frosty relations with Washington during the Cold War period, when New Delhi was a close ally of the former Soviet Union.

But relations have rapidly warmed in recent years, and the two countries have expanded their strategic cooperation, including in civilian nuclear energy.

A key factor for India in choosing new planes is the supplier’s commitment to share technologies to make spare parts, and to develop and produce aircraft in India.

The Bush administration will provide up to $20 million this year to help Colombia disarm and re-train former members of groups on the State Department’s terrorism list, a move that could have implications for the broader U.S. war on terrorism.

Without fanfare or comment on the decision, President George W. Bush on Monday signed into law legislation allowing U.S. assistance in disarming and demobilizing former members of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, or AUC, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, and the National Liberation Army, or ELN.

All three are on the U.S. State Department’s list of “foreign terrorist organizations.” The AUC is in the process of demobilizing but the FARC and the ELN are not.

Under a little-noticed provision in the legislation, up to $20 million would be used to provide job training and education to ex-fighters, and to help verify that recipients of U.S. assistance have left the groups.

The U.S. Congress barred the Bush administration from making cash payments to individuals, and will require the administration to certify that Colombia is cooperating in the extradition of top drug traffickers who have been indicted in the United States.

The decision follows a more than two-year legal debate between the departments of State and Justice over whether U.S. taxpayer funding for the demobilization program would violate a U.S. ban on providing “material support” to groups on the terrorism list.

That ban was tightened after the September 11, 2001 attacks with the passage of the Patriot Act, and some American diplomats and State Department officials told lawmakers they feared they could face criminal charges for taking part in the Colombia program.

But a secret legal opinion issued by the Justice Department in June provided the administration with the legal cover it needed to proceed with the assistance, administration and congressional officials said.

The decision could have significance beyond Colombia, setting a precedent for the United States to participate in efforts to disarm groups in other parts of the world that the State Department has labeled “terrorist organizations.”

The Bush administration has called for disarming Hamas in the Palestinian territories and Hizbollah in Lebanon.

“It may make it easier to fund demobilization and re-integration programs elsewhere in the world,” said Adam Isacson, a Colombia expert with the Center for International Policy in Washington.

“Now you have a precedent of the United States actually helping these guys come in from the cold. There’s more flexibility,” Isacson added.