Diaspora

Taxonomy Color
red

  • Government sidelines Karuna, promotes new front in East

    Aug 28
    In a significant shift of strategy and political alliances in the east, the Sri Lankan Government is believed to have virtually dumped the anti-Tamil Tiger Karuna paramilitary Group and is supporting a new Tamil front for local elections in the volatile east later this year, The Sunday Times reported.
     
    The new front is led by the leader of the splinter Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), V. Anandasangaree and includes the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) and the Eelam People’s Liberation Front (EPRLF – Pathmanabha Wing)
     
    Currently the TULF, the PLOTE or the EPRLF’s Pathmanabha wing do not have any parliamentary representation.
     
    The trio are due to function as the Tamil Democratic Alliance (TDA) and is inviting other Tamil parties to join the alliance to contest local elections followed by provincial elections in the east, the Sunday Times said.
     
    The TDA is to begin its political activities in the east within the next few weeks, the paper said.
     
    Apparently as a sign of support, the Sri Lankan government this week provided a helicopter to Mr. Anandasangaree, PLOTE leader Dharmalingam Siddharthan and EPRLF-Pathmanabha Wing General Secretary T. Sridharan to visit Batticaloa and have a hurriedly summoned meeting with government officials and representatives of international and local non governmental organisations.
     
    The visiting delegation told the NGO community that the purpose of the visit was to listen to the problems of the people of the area and convey them to President Mahinda Rajapaksa to find solutions.
     
    Among the grievances which they listened to were issues about continued child recruitment by the Karuna group in the government-controlled areas and the difficulties in travelling to some of the areas newly regained from the LTTE.
     
    The delegation was later flown to Vakarai, where for months tens of thousands of Tamils were subject to indiscriminate Sri Lankan bombardment, before returning to Colombo.
     
    Last Friday night the visiting delegation met President Rajapaksa and briefed him about the visit as well as the problems in the area. Mr. Siddarthan who took part in the meeting told The Sunday Times said their plans were to contest the two upcoming elections and their visit was aimed at looking into the grievances of the people in the Eastern Province and the NGOs working in the region.
     
    During the meeting, he said the President had promised to expedite the ongoing relief and development activities in the cleared areas of the east. The fresh move has angered the Karuna faction which is claiming that the step was aimed at sidelining the group which was involved in assisting the security forces in the recent months.
     
    Ganesh Mahesh, spokesman for the Thamil Makkal Vidithalai Pulligal (TMVP) – the Karuna Group’s political wing — told The Sunday Times that the government was promoting groups which had never sighted the areas when the people were facing difficulties.
     
    Government’s plans to promote the new political front come amidst criticism that the Karuna group has been permitted to move about with weapons in government-controlled areas and no action was taken against them.
     
    The Nation reliably learns that Douglas Devananda, leader of the Eelam Peoples Democratic Party (EPDP), Sri Lanka’s largest Tamil paramilitary group cum political parry has urged the government to make sure that the Karuna faction conducts its political activities unarmed.
     
    There have been several clashes between EPDP and Karuna Group gunmen in the east in the past few weeks.
     
    For several weeks Sri Lankan press reports have been suggesting the TMVP will not be allowed to contest the Eastern Province elections to be held later this year.
     
    The TMVP initially submitted their application to the Department of Elections on October 12, 2004 to be a registered and a recognised political party in Sri Lanka.
     
    “However, it’s been nearly three years since the application was handed over to the department by TMVP Secretary General G. R. Gnanarajah, but the department is yet to recognize this party,” highly placed sources told The Nation newspaper.
     
    “Some parties who submitted their application seeking approval from the department many months after the TMVP handed over their application, have already received recognition from the department,” sources added.
     
    The latest list updated by the Elections Secretariat as of July 10, consists of 53 recognised political parties with each of these parties being granted a unique symbol, but the list does not include the TMVP.
     
  • Now What?

    The collapse of the All Party Representative Committee (APRC) earlier this month was an inevitability. The best that this sham at 'reaching a consensus on the ethnic question' could have ever done was to drift along indefinitely. That, in any case, was its real purpose. President Mahinda Rajapakse set up the APRC in early 2006, a few months before he resumed the war against the Liberation Tigers. Ideologically committed to Sinhala-hegemony, President Rajapakse and the southern majority that swept him to power are opposed to any sharing of power with the Tamils. Reviving the notion of an all party conclave was to forestall pressure for him to come up with a credible power-sharing proposal.

    Such a proposal is, after all, only necessary if there is strong LTTE - without the Tigers' military pressure, no Sinhala government would need to take Tamil political demands seriously. Even Sri Lanka's international allies are urging state to share power with the Tamils to end the conflict, not because they see the long-oppressed community as having a right to it. The APRC was thus a very thinly disguised delaying tactic, intended to buy Rajapakse enough time to smash the LTTE. And even though the leading international actors knew this, they have continued to back the APRC as some sort of panacea for Sri Lanka's now glaringly apparent ills. Meanwhile, they backed Rakapakse's war to the hilt.

    Things have not gone according to plan. For well over a year the Sri Lankan military has thrown itself into an all-out effort against the LTTE, but the movement remains a potent and latent challenge to Sinhala hegemonic ambitions. Rakapakse crowed about capturing the 'entire east' from the LTTE. The LTTE has certainly withdrawn the bulk of its forces - and redeployed them in the north where, if Sri Lanka wants to destroy the Tigers, the crucial battles will have to be fought. The east has meanwhile become a militarized wasteland where hundreds of thousands of people are engulfed in a humanitarian crisis as army-backed paramilitaries predate at will. As Sri Lanka struggles to find the extra troops it suddenly need to both hold the east and attack the north, there are efforts to raise Sinhala militia. All manner of officially-sanctioned gunmen prowl the 'liberated' east. Meanwhile, a massive effort is underway to eradicate Tamil and, to their consternation, even Muslim identity from the east. Tamil and Muslim places are being given Sinhala names. Tamil and Muslim areas are either being appropriated by the state - as 'High Security Zones' and 'Free Trade areas' - or are being colonized by Sinhala settlers.

    The international community is well informed on all these developments -as they have been from the time Rajapakse began his war. But instead of restraining him, they have encouraged and supported him. The EU and Canada banned the LTTE. Japan and multi-lateral donors like the ADB and World Bank continued to provide funds. The US and UK sold more weapons, while traditional arms suppliers Pakistan and China kept up their flow. They helped Colombo prepare the misery that has been visited on our people while telling us that they were for peace, for a negotiated solution 'acceptable to all', for Tamil grievances being redressed.

    The APRC was the fig leaf. Knowing full well the main Sinhala parties are united only on minimizing accommodation with the Tamils, international actors sustained Rajapakse's charade. Despite the pleas and protestations of the Tamils - articulated by the parliamentarians, civil society and other 'non-terrorist' folk - and even the Sinhala liberals terrified by the rabid chauvinism that has become the mainstream of southern politics, the international community has cynically continued to tell us to wait for the magic pill Rajapakse's APRC, they assured us, was bringing forth.

    The show is over. The main opposition UNP has seized an ideal opportunity and quit. The ultra-nationalist JVP left long ago - apparently it doesn't want to be part of anything that weakens the unitary state. International actors have been insisting for years that 'the majority of people in Sri Lanka want peace.' This is true - but they also want a very specific peace. The majority of Sinhalese want a unitary Sri Lanka with a Lion flag where Buddhism is the 'first and foremost' religion. None of the Tamils, despite the best will of the international community, want that.

    So the question is, now what? Is the international community going to act decisively to restrain the Sri Lankan state and ensure a just solution or is it, as it has been for a long time, going to continue to assist the Sinhala chauvinists in their efforts to retain power over the Tamils? We think we know.

  • Mistaking night for day in the new dawn of the east

    Reporter, Juliana Ruhfus, Director, Dom Rotheroe and Researcher, Aloke Devichand, have two films scheduled for broadcast on the al-Jazeera network which will be of interest to all those with an abiding interest in Sri Lanka both within and without the country. The first, “How the East Was Won” deals with the contemporary context and consequences of claimed military victory over the Eastern Province and the second, “Monks of War”, focuses on the political ascendancy of the JHU and the resurgence of the Sinhala Buddhist nationalism which has been the central ideological legitimation for the return to a military solution to the ethnic conflict.

    In that sense both documentaries are mutually illuminating of the political crossroads that Sri Lanka currently finds itself in but which is unfortunately also exemplary of the tragic and endless recurrence of attempts to pursue the same policies in the past albeit within the changed historical circumstances of the post-9/11 global dystopia. Despite the constraints of the brevity of the documentary, Ruhfus in ‘How the East was Won’ successfully counter-poses the justifications and claims of Sri Lankan governmental and military spokespeople she interviews with the realities facing those on the ground in the East. Realities, which clearly raises some fundamental questions as to the consequences and potential outcome of the present direction of governmental policy which has not only militarized Sri Lankan social space to an extent that the country did not even witness in the bishane period of 1987-1990 but has also securitised ‘development’ to levels witnessed in other contexts of militarised interventions in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq.

    For example, Ruhfus presents the claims of senior military commanders, who claim that the security forces have now reoccupied 95% of the land mass of the Eastern Province and that as a result, 178,000 civilians who were formerly in LTTE areas are “now with the government” and that the armed services are actively engaged in a programme to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people through redevelopment as a means of demonstrating the superiority and commitment of the government in comparison to the LTTE. She then contrasts this with the humanitarian “fall-out” that the pursuit of the military solution has created. Months of MBRL and aerial bombardment, 140,000 displaced, civilian killings, disappearances, abductions, ongoing child recruitment, fears of governmental surveillance in registration processes, forced and/or inadequate resettlement aid are all on-the ground experiences which Ruhfus uncovers in her investigative foray into the situation in the Eastern Province. All this is compounded by civilians’ memories of the suffering that has accompanied past experience of military control, of the destruction of villages and eviction as well as the inevitability that the LTTE, having engaged in a strategic withdrawal from overt control over territory, have merely returned to low-intensity warfare through cadres that have infiltrated the East in the course of recent cycles of conflict, forced migration, encampment and resettlement.

    Finally, Ruhfus poses the question that the greatest obstacle to the government claims to be asserting a new found legitimacy through territorial control is to be found in the political ascendancy of Karuna’s TMVP which effectively controls many areas of the Eastern province and is extremely powerful in the Batticaloa District through what she describes as a regime of “intimidation, extortion and murder”. This development evidently gives the lie to the claims by Sri Lankan Army commander, Prasad Samarasinghe, that the Sri Lankan military is not collaborating with the TMVP and, due to its superior strength, has no intention or need to permit the activities of a paramilitary group. Whilst, this clearly spurious claim might betray the long-term dilemmas of the Sri Lankan government vis a vis its paramilitary proxies in the East, it does not ring true to the current unchecked reign of the TMVP which the government is more than happy to use in the short term as an attempted surrogate for the political legitimacy that the military clearly lacks amongst the Tamil community. Yet this is a strategy that, evidently, will not only continue to foment divides between pro-LTTE and pro-Karuna factions amongst Eastern Tamils but will also alienate the sizeable Muslim populations in areas of TMVP activity and dominance as some Muslim spokespeople argue that the current context is one where the TMVP and government are also actively cooperating in the combined economic expropriation of Muslims in the East. As a result, we are left with a profound questioning of the extent to which peace and development can really be achieved in the NorthEast for as long as meaningful devolution and federalism remain a taboo subject in government circles, a myopia rather farcically borne out by the smokescreen of the APRC on constitutional reform and its recent abrupt euthanasia. The only alternatives to a devolved settlement acceptable to ‘minority’ interests are surely the continuing spectre of civil war of multi-polar dimensions and the balkanisation of the country. As such, the Rajapakses must surely be mistaking night for day when beholding their vision of the New Dawn in the East.

    The second of the documentaries, ‘Monks of War’, is the more ambitious of the two reports and, as such, does suffer more heavily due to brevity. Yet, despite the fact that an in-depth understanding of something as complex as Sinhala Buddhist nationalist ideology deserves more than a 21 minute time frame, the focus benefits from its willingness to engage across a broad spectrum from the more extreme proponents of Sinhala nationalism in the JHU, to secular critics and with those Buddhists who contest the right of the JHU and ‘just war’ monks to define the contours of the Buddhist tradition in Sri Lanka. It might be argued that allowing the JHU to voice their exclusivist nationalist platform is unwelcome when what was considered a fringe ideological chauvinism just a few years ago in the context of the CFA has now assumed hegemonic status. For, it has acted as one of the central legitimating motors to the current regime’s rise to power and in their pursuit of a military solution to the ethnic conflict. Political and ideological loyalty to the Rajapakses on the part of the JHU has also been rewarded by a fulfilment of many of their nationalist projects as well as the staple ministerial portfolio and, more significantly, powerful influence in the inner circles of the Rajapakse regime. Yet understandings of the Sinhala nationalist position in the English language visual media that have not resorted to external didactic critiques rather than from-the-horse’s-mouth perspectives are few and far between and it is therefore refreshing that the likes of Champika Ranawaka and Narendra Gunatillaka are allowed free reign to indulge in the enjoyment of nationalist fantasies however galling that may be to cosmopolitan sensibilities. I use the term fantasy not so much to disqualify the nationalist project as irrational but rather to point to the manner in which, as both the JHU as well as their detractors, notably, Professor Uyangoda demonstrate, nationalism to differing degrees is grounded in a politics of fear, distrust and, of course, at some level, exclusion and in the Sinhala nationalist case the political ascendancy of Sinhala nationalism has always thrived on the exclusionary othering of internal ‘minorities’, particularly Tamil and Muslim.

    The documentary goes on to examine how Buddhism has come to be the moral core of the Sinhalese and their identity and how this identity has come to dominate the postcolonial majoritarian state and the way in which the sangha act as the guardians of just kingship (which must protect Buddhism and the Sinhala Buddhist identity), facets of nationalist identity which achieve potent articulation in the politics of the JHU. Ruhfus achieves this through a series of interviews in which the talking heads of academics, monks, lay activists as well as political posters attest to the potency of the relationship between religion, the sangha and governance in Sri Lankan political culture. Consequently, Ruhfus manages to distil, in crude terms, some of the anthropological perspectives that have stressed the need to understand the cultural significance of the interplay between religion, identity, statehood, political leadership, patronage and centre-oriented political culture in Sri Lanka, including the work of Tambiah, Kapferer and Roberts; perspectives which have been criticised by detractors as excessively structuralist or culturalist but which are achieving a new-found relevance in the current resurgence of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism.

    The report also achieves its central strength from the presentation of the fervent faith of the JHU leadership in the success of the military defeat of the LTTE, in their conspiracy theories that the LTTE’s ultimate aim is to capture the whole of Sri Lanka by linking up the North, East, the Hill Country and Western Province or that Tamil Nadu is intent upon invading Sri Lanka and the destruction of the Sinhala people and their civilizational ‘heritage’. The documentary also reflects upon the way in which such nationalist yearnings also reflect an intrinsic fear about the impact and spread of globalization and the hegemony of western culture, politics, philosophy, ethics and economics. A retreat in the storm of modernity to the anchor and safety of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism which is nothing other than the attempted reterritorialisation of sovereign control over culture and the political in the face of a world increasingly subject to deterritorialising dynamics including the role of the dominant donor states, global economics, IFIs and INGOs. That is why Sinhala nationalism so frequently falls into a discourse of loss, of the desperate aim to recapture or reinvent a past that is irrevocably displaced by the fluid mobility and contaminations of modernity but which at the same time reproduces these reactive tendencies towards territorialisation, fixity and purity. Yet it is exactly this desperation which also drives the desire to preserve the unitary boundaries of the Sinhala nation and state and hence the recurrent dynamics towards the eradication of any Tamil movement that threatens this unitarism and, which, is at work in the legitimation of the current military strategy, a desperation which is repeated in the JHU discourse of necessary blood sacrifice that must accompany victory in national preservation. Hence, the inter-significance of both these documentaries and in a sense, it is a shame that they were not woven together but again, presumably, the end-product is constrained by the schedule frameworks.

    Additionally, whether it was a matter of time constraints or access, whilst the documentary recognises that many of these aspects of Sinhala nationalist ideology are also shared by the JVP, which evidently has a much larger grass-roots constituency base, the documentary misses the opportunity to explore the dynamics of the JVP at greater length including the social and economic differences and rivalry that exist between this party and the JHU. Such a focus would have demonstrated the extent to which nationalism is obviously riven by heterogeneous social, cultural, economic and hence political differences and demands which the process of the production of nationalist subjectivity is constantly attempting to meld together but which are also persistently ruptured, revealing the very constructed and fragile nature of the claims to national coherence and unity.

    Yet, if there is one thread of hope that the documentary leaves the viewer with, it is that social heterogeneity and difference is also expressed in the resistance to the complete capture and definition of socio-cultural and political tradition that nationalist movements such as the JHU attempt to establish. This is seen in the testimony of those members of the sangha and the laity Ruhfus interviews who are attempting to articulate a Buddhism free of the will to war. What should also perhaps have been expressed in the documentary is the still dire need to separate Buddhism from State as the latter continues to use the former to legitimate its political, social and developmental policies and practices and this continues to feed the distrust and fear that inhibits dialogue and drives conflict and the delusions of a military solution despite the lessons of history.

  • Remembering another massacre

    The first anniversary of the massacre of fifty three school girls by Sri Lankan Air Force jets was marked in Tamil Tiger-controlled Vanni last week. The school girls were killed on August 14, 2006 when four SLAF jets dropped sixteen bombs in repeated passes over the Sencholai-run children’s home.

    Some 100 children were wounded, many critically. Girls from various schools in the nearby district of  Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi were staying overnight at the compound, attending a two-day course in first-aid.

    Four staff at the institution were also killed.

    "These children are innocent victims of violence," said Ann M. Veneman, Executive Director of the UN children’s agency, UNICEF, said in a statement. The site of the building had been designated a humanitarian zone and the LTTE had passed its coordinates on to the Sri Lankan military via the UNICEF and the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC).

    The Sri Lankan government said it targeted an LTTE training camp, killing "50-60 terrorists" and showed journalists what if claimed was footage of the attack. But UNICEF’s Colombo chief, JoAnna VanGerpen told reporters: "we don't have any evidence that they are LTTE cadres."

    However, apart from the lone protest by UNICEF, the Sri Lankan air strike on the schoolgirls did not draw any international condemnation .

  • The hunted soul of the Tamil Diaspora
    I start with an admission. For many years, I have been a British Tamil. Britain has been good to me, I had taken on the citizenship of this country and I thought the matter ended there. One could say, broadly, the moral choices of Karna, having eaten of the bread of the Kauravas.
     
    But last year has shaken the foundations of this identity. And it must do so for the tens of thousands of others who, by some accident of birth and luck are, like me, part of the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora. For now as never before the words of the anti Nazi poem, attributed to the Rev. Martin Niemoller come to mind:
     
    First they came for the Communists,
    and I didn't speak up,
    because I wasn't a Communist.
    Then they came for the Jews,
    and I didn't speak up,
    because I wasn't a Jew.
    Then they came for the Catholics,
    and I didn't speak up,
    because I was a Protestant.
    Then they came for me,
    and by that time there was no one
    left to speak up for me.
     
    For the Diaspora, there is a version of the Niemoller poem:
     
    "First they came for the plantation Tamils
    I didn’t speak up because I am not a plantation Tamil
    Then they came for the Colombo Tamils
    I didn’t speak up because I am not a Colombo Tamil
    Then they came for the Eastern Tamils...
    I didn’t speak up because I am not an Eastern Tamil
    Then they came for the Jaffna Tamils...
    I emigrated, I am no longer a Jaffna Tamil..."
     
    By definition the Diaspora are those who have at some point chosen to walk away. To walk away from the conflict of Sri Lanka, seeking for themselves and their children, safety, stability, prosperity and even happiness.
     
    But this year, we need to ask - what sacrifices did they intend to make, what did they believe they could take with them, and what leave behind?
     
    As for the homes and land that has almost invariably been in families for generations, did they intend to never return, or if to return, under what conditions? 
     
    For those who walked away from the violence, did they intend to leave behind their hope and dream of Eelam? If they walked away from politics, did they intend to repudiate their friends, relatives, and colleagues who still believed in Eelam?
     
    Did they intend, in the event that the international political process has failed, as it was perhaps it was doomed to do, that they would say to their children – now you are British, Australian, American, German, Norwegian, Swiss – forget that there is a place for which people are dying, and for which many thousands have died already, called Eelam.
     
    Did they intend to say to their children – “Well Uncle Bush/Uncle Blair (delete as applicable) knows best … and as for cousin Krishna who died in the battle for Jaffna in 1995, forget him, because Uncle Bush/Uncle Blair says he is a terrorist”, “And remember not to leave a SIM card in any of your cousins houses since who knows what could happen”, “And that tee-shirt .. didn’t I buy you one with a Panda on it ?.. no I know it’s the Chola emblem, dear, but these are difficult times.”
     
    This year has seen the arrests of Tamil activists all over the world, from every walk of life, every religion.
     
    It coincides with the failure of the internationally backed negotiations, and the new war of aggression of the Sinhala government against the Tamil North and East of Sri Lanka. The timing of these arrests have been nothing short of political.
     
    And so we come to the heart of the dilemma. How far away from Eelam will you walk and where will you find your place of safety?
     
    But this international environment has been made possible by legislation. And we come back to the root of the dilemma.
     
    How will you accept for yourself and the generations to come the legislation of the British (substitute Australian, French, American, etc.) state in relation to issues that are essentially Tamil, in relation also to Eelam?
     
    And so let us look at this legislation. It is an offence under the British Terrorism Act of 2006 to glorify terrorism (whether past, present or future). The praise of the activities of the South African ANC would be conceivably caught under this section. So too any statement in support of Subhas Chandra Bose. Or for that matter, the founding American fathers.
    When the House of Lords debated the Act, Lord Thomas of Gresford questioned the legislation's definition of 'glorification' as "includes any form of praise or celebration."
    He protested: "The word is used to refer to acts committed at any time and in any place in the world, whether going back 2,000 years or moving 2,000 years into the future, and 'any form of praise'. Nothing could be vaguer than that."
     
    Lord Thomas went on to say: “My Lords, I have made the point before that it refers to William Wallace in Scotland, to the Welsh nationalists in 1937 .., to the Easter rebellion, and to any movement throughout the world — as I said, this applies to the whole world — where a movement or organisation takes up arms against the recognised government. We may support that movement, but in these terms we would still be glorifying it.”
     
    The government replied that glorification was only an offence if it is about encouraging others to emulate terrorist acts "in existing circumstances".
     
    So battles that are in the past, which are considered irrelevant to the present – such as the struggle of the ANC or William Wallace (better known as “Braveheart” of the Mel Gibson movie fame) – might be exempt. Baronness Ramsay of Scotland, speaking in support of the government said: “That (its bearing on “existing circumstance”) is what makes the difference; it is not about the ANC, William Wallace or any of the other examples given by the noble Lord.”
     
    Which is lucky for the South Africans - they may praise Mandela for the activities that led him to a South African jail, but only because their struggle may be deemed by the British government t be irrelevant to present circumstance - and for Mel Gibson, who glorified Braveheart, but not so lucky for the Tamils who are living with the present.
     
    While there are over 150, 000 Tamil British citizens in London, there were none present in the commons or the Lords to debate this point. Not surprisingly, for as in Sri Lanka, the Tamils are a minority in the UK, as they are worldwide. And they will continue to be.
     
    The definition of terrorism has now been broadened. It means the use or threat of action, for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause, or to influence a government, which involves serious damage to a person or property, endangers a person’s life, or create a serious risk to the health and safety of a section of the public, seriously disrupts an electronic system.
     
    So for example one may not use or threaten violence to a person or property or an electronic system – to influence any government in the world. Nor may one support, or praise a person who does this or who has done this in the past several thousand years (unless their political circumstances are utterly irrelevant to the present circumstances).
     
    Did Gandhi 's effort to take over the salt works at Dharsana threaten damage to the property of British India? Did he cause a serious risk to the health or safety of any section of the public during his marches? What of other political struggles?
     
    The government had initially wished to make it an offense to ‘condone’ such a past or present person, but the word condone was deleted after parliamentary and Lords debate and we are left with glorification (which means here praise or celebration).
     
    So what does this mean for the Tamil Diaspora? It means that one may not use or threaten violence against the government of Sri Lanka. Nor praise any person who does this.
     
    Whereas the government of Sri Lanka may use and threaten violence against the Tamil people. And one may praise it for this. Some kinds of violence – such as the bombing of the school children at Sencholai may be war crimes. But the praise of war crimes is not an offence in UK legislation. Violence and the praise and support of it, is the monopoly of the state.
     
    One may support the idea of Eelam (and even this right is now open to question) but not support or praise the right to take up arms to achieve it. One may not praise or celebrate any of the rows and rows of dead in the Tamil homeland who have so taken up arms. But one may applaud Jack Straw praising (as he did in a recent Tamil gathering) the rows upon rows of tombstones of soldiers of the British empire from India and Tamil Nadu who fought for the British against the Germans in the first world war.
     
    It is also an offence to support a proscribed organisation. And British Parliamentarians, among whom the British Tamils have until recently had zero representation will decide who is proscribed.
     
    And what does support mean? It means to further the activities of a proscribed organisation. It includes addressing a meeting to encourage support for a proscribed organisation or to further its activities.
     
    But what activities might this include? The legislation does not say. If the LTTE runs the de facto state in the Vanni, would this include all the activities of this Tamil state – the building of roads, the operation of traffic police and the local courts, the Tsunami relief, the provision of medicine at a time when the government is embargoing the North and East?
     
    If one may not further the activities of a proscribed organisation, but the sole purpose of this organisation’s activities is to achieve independent Eelam, then may one conduct any activities in support of Eelam? Presumably one could, as long as these activities in support of Eelam were carried out by some other organisation.
     
    But how long before the British state, for reasons of geopolitical interests, decides to proscribe the new organisation? What would an organisation in Sri Lanka have to do to avoid proscription? It would have to give up arms and, with them, the possibility of self-defence.
     
    Herein is the Kafkaesque dilemma that tears the soul of the Diaspora. As in Sri Lanka, so it is world wide, that the Tamils will never have a voice in legislation that threatens their physical and political safety. For everywhere except in Eelam, they are a minority.
     
    So how far will you walk away from Eelam, and for how many generations to come?
  • East continues to be volatile as Army, LTTE gears for war in the north.
    Following the capture of Thoppigala in the East, the Police and more largely the Special Task Force (STF), is taking over responsibilities from the Security Forces. Thus, the Army will be relieved for deployment in areas in the Wanni. Contrary to Government claims that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) fighters have been driven away, groups do operate in the East. Whilst some had moved out to areas in the Trincomalee district, others have taken up position in the Ampara district expanding their operations there. They had in fact shifted their intelligence base from Batticaloa to Ampara.
     
    At the height of the military campaign to re-capture Toppigala, Military Intelligence (MI) reported that groups were making a gradual withdrawal from the area. They said the process was slow for two reasons - to allow cadres to exit with their military hardware and the need to inflict more damage to the advancing troops. LTTE cadres who fled from Toppigala, MI sources say, moved into villages of Kumburupiddy, Kandalkadu, Kadawana and Peraru, all in the Trincomalee district. "Some have returned to Wanni whilst the other groups are still hovering around. Small group military operations are under way to smoke them out," one MI source said.
     
    The fact that groups of LTTE fighters have shifted to Ampara and even set up an intelligence base there has raised concerns for the Military Intelligence. They said two LTTE intelligence leaders who operated from Batticaloa, Throwner and Keerthie, have now moved to this new base. The loss of Toppigala, Vakarai and immediate environs, they fear, would lead to the LTTE once again trying to resume operations in the deep South. This is particularly by using Block II of the Yala national park as a staging area to re-supply their cadres in the Ampara district. Since LTTE activity in these areas receded some years ago, there has been lesser regular maritime surveillance in the deep seas off Yala. This is with the exception of Navy's interception of LTTE military hardware in the high seas upon receipt of credible information.
     
    Thus, small groups of LTTE linger around in the East trying to attack vital targets including senior Government, military and Police officials among others. This is whilst the Government has drawn in both the Army and the Police to get directly involved in development activity at the grassroots level.
     
    This shifts the main military focus to the North. Interesting enough, both the Security Forces and the LTTE are engaged in preparations for battles. The Army has stepped up its recruitment drive.
     
    Army Headquarters launched a recruitment drive on July 1 to enlist 7500 soldiers to the regular force. This was part of the overall plan to enhance the Army strength by a further 25,000. By early this week, sources at Army Headquarters said only a total of 1800 had been enlisted. This is after recruitment procedures were relaxed. Earlier, regiments were allowed to recruit personnel only from locations where their headquarters were positioned. For example, the Sinha Regiment recruitment was from the Kegalle or the Gemunu Watch Regiment from Ratnapura. This time, however, they were allowed to recruit from any area in the country. Besides the 1,800 enlisted to the regular force, a further 950 have been enlisted for volunteer units. The recruitment drive will end on August 15.
     
    Though a major Security Forces offensive in the North is yet to start, troops have been engaged in limited offensives in the Wanni sector. Three different attempts to seize LTTE held areas in the past weeks have met with stiff resistance. On Tuesday, a LTTE claymore mine hit a bus carrying troops killing 11 soldiers. Six others were seriously injured. The Air Force has been conducting several sorties with the Kfir and MiG-27 bombers in the North.
     
    Still unaware from where the main thrust of the Security Forces would come, Tiger LTTE have been fortifying their defended localities in a number of sectors. According to NGO workers and civilians who returned from the North this week, the Tiger LTTE  military leadership in Kilinochchi was busy intensifying security measures in the wake of feared offensives. From the accounts they gave, a picture of how such measures were falling into place emerged.
     
    In the Government controlled-Jaffna peninsula, LTTE was stepping up its small group operations. Cadres were infiltrating the peninsula from the outlying islands and from the vast stretches at Ariyalai and Thannankilappu. They have been tasked to carry out IED (Improvised Explosive Devices) attacks on targets that include troops deployed at strategic locations. Intelligence groups had slipped in to obtain information on civilians who are helping the Security Forces by providing information. LTTE defences at Muhamalai and Nagar kovil were being strengthened. Additional cadres and weaponry were being moved in.
     
    In the Wanni, east of the defended localities at the Omanthai Entry-Exit point, the stretch of "no man's land" before Security Forces defences, had been heavily mined. IEDs have also been placed at various points. Intelligence cadres have also infiltrated controlled areas, particularly in and around Vavuniya, to gather intelligence.
     
    One of the biggest LTTE build-ups is in the Weli Oya sector. Some of the cadres who had returned from Toppigala are being positioned there. LTTE mortar positions have increased posing threats to Security Forces locations. In addition, a Military Intelligence source said LTTE recruitment teams have forcibly inducted school children in the area, mostly over 15 years, to undergo military training. The intention is to supplement them with LTTE cadres to strengthen their vulnerable points.
     
    In addition, reports say, the Sea Tigers are also enhancing preparations. The western seaboard has seen enhanced Sea Tiger activity which senior security officials believe related to smuggling in military hardware, some of them from the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Radio intercepts have revealed that Sea Tiger leader Soosai (Thillaiampalam Sivanesan) who was operating from his "headquarters" somewhere near Kilinochchi had been speaking to installations of his sea going arm at Pooneryn and to boats operating in the Gulf of Mannar regularly in the past week. Similar radio conversations had also gone on this week.
     
    The Government now has a two fold responsibility in the East - firstly it would be to carry out the development work, most of it within 180 days. Secondly, it has to ensure the security situation remains favourable by preventing any attacks by the LTTE.
    In the North, the military and the LTTE are gearing themselves for major battles. The coming weeks will show how the undeclared Eelam War IV will guide the destinies of a nation already rocked by an economic and political crisis.
     
    [Edited]
  • Sri Lanka off the hook as violations ignored
    As the international community eased off the limited constraints it had placed on Sri Lanka over its human rights abuses, analysts speculate that this, especially in the light of the government’s recent military successes, is an indication of not so covert support for the ongoing military effort.
     
    Acknowledging the increasing human rights violations in Sri Lanka, the US Human Rights, Democracy and Labour Assistant Secretary nevertheless merely urged both sides to uphold the 2002 Norwegian brokered ceasefire agreement.
     
    “Together with our allies, we will continue to work towards brokering a lasting peace agreement between the government and the LTTE and urge both sides to uphold the cease-fire and eliminate human rights abuses,” Mr. Krilla said while participating in an online web chat organised by the US State department.
     
    “We are aware that the return to conflict in Sri Lanka has contributed to a deterioration of human rights conditions in the country. Reports of torture, extra-judicial killings, and curtailment of media freedom are on the rise,” he noted.
     
    But there was no condemnation of this, except to note that “The US government is also concerned about reports of disappearances and the large number of internally displaced persons.”
     
    “Human rights monitors also report arbitrary arrests and detention, denial of fair public trial, government corruption and lack of transparency, infringement of freedom of movement, and discrimination against minorities,” he added.
     
    “The LTTE engage in politically motivated killings; suicide attacks; disappearances; torture; arbitrary arrest and detention; denial of freedom of speech, media and of assembly and association; and the recruitment of child soldiers,” he said.
     
    Mr. Krilla also noted that there were numerous reports that paramilitary groups linked to government security forces participated in armed attacks, some against civilians.
     
    However analysts observe that after the Thoppigala victory the Sri Lankan government is in no mood to listen to International Community’s calls for peace.
     
    Speaking at the 'Dawn of the East' ceremony held to mark the capture of Thoppigala jungles by the Sri Lankan army in the eastern province at the Independent Square in Colombo on July 19, Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse warned the International Community "not to obstruct this New Dawn of the East by raising false slogans, and not engage in globe-trotting to betray the Sri Lankan State."
     
    "I wish to ask the international community and even some of our own politicians, not to obstruct this New Dawn of the East by raising false slogans, and not engage in globe-trotting to betray the Sri Lankan State.” Rajapakse said.
     
    The president’s defiant speech followed a decision by the co-chairs of the Sri Lankan peace process not to get actively involved in Sri Lanka’s conflict until the country finds a lasting solution through the All Party Representatives Committee (APRC).
     
    The US, EU, Japan and Norway had taken this stance to enable Sri Lanka to decide by itself, the Daily Mirror newspaper reported, quoting a top Western diplomat.
     
    “Once the parties find a common solution, then the co-chairs can actively involve in helping the country to implement it,” the diplomat told the paper.
     
    At the time of the co-chairs meeting the Sri Lankan government was considering putting on hold a donor forum on funding development projects in the Eastern province as donors, specifically the European Union, were reluctant to provide new aid.
     
    However the EU this week said it would provide €15 million in humanitarian aid to victims of the conflict in Sri Lanka.
     
    The aid will help provide access to clean water, shelter, food, basic health care, education and sanitation for refugees living in Tamil Nadu and in Sri Lanka.
     
    Commenting on the current situation in Sri Lanka, EU Development Aid Commissioner Louis Michel said the European Commission was "extremely worried by the increase in violence" in Sri Lanka, which has put thousands of civilians and international aid workers at risk.”
     
    She described the lack of accessibility and safety of aid workers in the conflict zones as “totally unacceptable.”
     
    “Aid agencies need to have access to victims with full security and protection for their personnel. I urge all parties to respect international humanitarian law and condemn any attack against humanitarian operations and workers,” she added.
     
    Prior to last co-chairs meeting there were signs of a concerted effort on the part of the International Community to apply pressure on the Rajapakse administration.
     
    There was increased focus on the human rights violations of the Sri Lankan government, with international media and governments criticising the government.
     
    In June this year, the Sri Lankan government came under severe criticism for human rights and humanitarian abuses at a public hearing in Brussels in the European Parliamentary Development Committee.
     
    Whilst representatives of the European Commission and Council of External Affairs slammed the lack of respect for international humanitarian laws in Sri Lanka, NGOs, including Human Rights Watch (HRW) and aid agency Action Contre la Faim (ACF), decried the continuing abuses of human rights.
     
    Also in June a resolution was tabled before the US Congress calling on all parties to the Sri Lankan conflict to negotiate a political solution that will be fair to all ethnic communities whilst ruling out a military solution to the conflict.
     
    The were also small scale aid freezes with Germany leading the effort by announcing an aid freeze on all new projects in October 2006.
     
    “For weeks we have been demanding an immediate return to the negotiating table and a shaping of a common future,” Minister Heidi Wieczorek-Zeul said in a statement at the time.
     
    As long as both sides engage in intensive conflict, “it is not meaningful for the German government to commit additional funding that cannot reach the people of Sri Lanka,” the statement added.
     
    The UK followed suit in May 2007 by freezing £ 6 million in aid citing concern that government forces have been responsible for violence against civilians in government-controlled territory.
     
    The US also put tangible pressure on Sri Lanka by suspending some, though not all, development aid it provided Sri Lanka through the Millennium Challenge account. Citing “a deterioration of human rights on the island”, the US government stressed that the government must rein in paramilitary forces, which are fighting the LTTE alongside security forces. 
     
    However all these efforts came to abrupt end following the co-chairs meeting in Oslo on June 25.
     
    According to reports, at the meeting the possibility of further sanctions against Sri Lanka was discussed. However, Japan and the United States had argued strongly against such a move. And as a result, the co-chairs agreed to give Sri Lanka more time.
     
    The co-chairs decisions to not take punitive measures against the government and to keep off the peace process is sending a signal to the
    Rajapakse administration to continue on the war path, Sri Lankan analysts speculated.
     
    The government has no need to rein in the daily abductions, extrajudicial killings and discriminate bombings, because there is no pressure to do so, one analyst said.
     
    “The international community is certainly no longer sending the message that this is unacceptable.”
  • Violence increases in north as focus shifts
    Following the Sri Lankan government’s announcement of the ‘liberation’ of the east from the LTTE, the military activity and violence have intensified in the north.
     
    The Sri Lankan military stepped up its operations, with direct offensives and Deep Penetration Unit (DPU) missions into LTTE controlled territory along the Mannar-Vavuniya border.
     
    Attacks against the Sri Lankan forces also intensified, with over 30 Sri Lankan soldiers killed in fighting and ambushes in the last two weeks alone.
     
    On July 24, a bus transporting military personnel from Mannar to Mathavachi was ambushed by attackers who triggered a claymore mine, killing at least 10 Sri Lanka Army (SLA) soldiers on the spot and wounding more than 8 soldiers.
     
    On the same day four home-guards were killed in a pre-dawn attack by the LTTE on a security post in Aluthgama, Vavuniya.
     
    Three days earlier two SLA troopers on road patrol were seriously injured when attackers triggered a claymore mine on the Vavuniya-Mannar Road.
     
    And on July 20, the LTTE launched a pre-dawn raid on a SLA mini-camp near Uyilangkulam entry/exit point in Mannar, killing 10 soldiers and seizing all the weapons from the camp.
     
    The LTTE seized military hardware including a Medium Machine Gun (MMG), a Light Machine Gun (LMG), a 60 mm mortar, four automatic rifles, 25 hand grenades and an ammunition cache.
     
    The LTTE fighters returned to their positions after “succesfully neutralizing the threat posed by the hostile enemy camp from which infiltration units were operating,” LTTE military spokesman Rasaiah Ilanthiryan said commenting on the mission.
     
    Earlier this year the Sri Lankan military made public its intention of capturing the Northern LTTE stronghold of Vanni.
     
    “After eradicating the Tigers from the East, [the military’s] full strength will be used to rescue the North,” SLA Commander Gen. Sarath Fonseaka declared at the time.
     
    Before and after the public declaration by Gen. Fonseka, the Sri Lankan military made several intermittent attempts to breakthrough the LTTE Forward Defence Lines (FDL) and into Vanni.
     
    Initially the SLA attempted to enter Vanni by breaching the LTTE  FDL in Jaffna. As part of this plan the military carried out two massive onslaughts on the LTTE defence positions in Jaffna last year.
     
    In the first offensive, on September 9, hundreds of SLA troops launched an offensive from three locations along the front lines against the LTTE territory in the northern Jaffna peninsula. On the ensuing battle at least 25 Sri Lankan soldiers were killed and around 125 wounded.
     
    In the second offensive on October 11, SLA troopers launched a large scale ground troop-movement into LTTE administered territory with heavy artillery and MBRL rocket fire.
     
    SLA troopers who broke through the LTTE FDL positions in Kilali and Muhamalai were defeated, leaving around 75 dead bodies of Sri Lankan soldiers inside the LTTE territory in Kilali. Three tanks were damaged and one destroyed.
     
    SLA sources in Colombo confirmed that more than 300 troopers were wounded in the offensive.
     
    Following the heavy defeats in the Jaffna offensives, this year the military shifted its focus onto the Southern Vanni FDL that run along the Vavuniya-Mannar road.
     
    In past three months the SLA has tried number of times to enter LTTE controlled territory in Mannar and Vavuniya regions with no success.
     
    In the latest of a series of attempts by the Sri Lankan forces to capture LTTE administered areas in Vanni, a team of the SLA Special Forces attempted to breach into LTTE territory in Palamoddai on the Mannar-Vavuniya border on July 16.
     
    LTTE forces retaliated by killing four and wounding 6 troopers and recovering 3 T-56 rifles, explosives and military hardware including night-vision equipment.
     
    The operation came to an end with the SLA withdrawing the Special Forces team, which had sustained heavy casualties, back to its original positions.
     
    The SLA first launched an offensive to into Vanni on March 16 with the aim of capturing Palamoddai, northwest of Vavuniya but retreated following 3 hours of heavy fighting.

    On March 23 the army tried to advance into LTTE territory using 120 villagers as human shields, but in 15 hours of fierce fighting the LTTE rescued the hostages and pushed the troops back to their original positions in Thampanai and Chinna Pandivirichan. The army lost 60 soldiers in this operation.

    Two weeks later on April 11 another attempt by the army to move towards Palamoddai was thwarted by the LTTE forces.
     
    Retreating SLA troopers left behind their dead soldiers, arms and ammunition, including a Rocket Propelled Grenade Launcher and 15 automatic guns.
     
    Following the fighting LTTE forces clearing the area located eight bodies of SLA troopers which were later handed over to the ICRC.
     
    Again on April 25, the LTTE repulsed another ground offensive by the SLA at Parisankulam inside LTTE administered Madu division in Mannar. More than 10 Sri Lankan soldiers were killed and around 50 sustained injuries, Ilanthirayan told reporters afterwards.
     
    SLA troopers who moved from Iranai Iluppaikkulam camp were locked in a five-hour jungle clash where Tigers engaged sniper units inflicting casualties on the SLA troopers, Ilanthirayan added.
     
    Since then a number of SLA pushes into LTTE-held areas of Mannar district, including the Madu region, have failed.
     
    Following the failed attempts the frustrated military had resorted to indiscriminate artillery barrage on civilian targets.
     
    On July 15 the SLA launched sustained rocket fire on Puliyangkulam hospital, severely damaging the hospital buildings and completely destroying the electricity generator and the transformer located in the hospital.
     
    Patients and staff of Puliyangkulam hospital in LTTE held area in Vavuniya fled to save their lives, press reports said.
     
    The next day the SLA resumed its heavy artillery and rocket fire targeting civilian villages of Puliyangkulam, Palamoddai, Kunchukulam, and Navi in LTTE administered Vanni.
     
    A fortnight ago, whilst the Sri Lankan administration celebrated the capture of Thoppigala, a hat shaped hill in the middle of the Vadamunai region in Batticaloa and surrounded by large swathes of forest, with a ceremonies across the Sinhala south, the Sri Lankan military directed artillery fire at the only civilian entry point to Vanni at Pulyangkulam, destroying it.
     
  • Government to further militarize the East it ‘liberated’
    The administration of President Mahinda Rajapakse has moved to stamp its authority in the Eastern province through the implementation of a stringent military administration.
     
    The militarization is compounded by the increasing activities of paramilitary groups working with the government.
     
    In recent days, the Sri Lankan government announced several initiatives for the Eastern province, including plans to disarm paramilitaries, conduct elections and fast track development activities in the eastern districts.
     
    The government has also sought foreign aid citing its development plans for the province.
     
    But the militarization of the east will also continue.
     
    “Both the Army and the Police will be involved at the grassroots level in all projects and programmes,” the Sunday Times newspaper reported.
     
    “One of them is to head Committees tasked with development work.”
     
    Last week, the Eastern military commander called for close monitoring and control of the activities on non-government organizations (NGOs).
     
    Commander Major General Parakrama Pannipitiya issued a circular to security chiefs and civil administrators ordering them not to allow any NGO to start projects "according to their will" in the region.
     
    “Rural development of areas liberated by the forces after the humanitarian operations, where there is a civil population must be done under the supervision of the Police stationed in the area as well as the Armed Forces,” the statement read.
     
    “As the initial step, village level Committees must be established in each village for its development, and the membership of these Committees must be chosen from among the villagers. It will be mandatory to include in these Committees a member of the Armed Forces/STF, a Police officer, and Grama Niladhari serving in the respective village.” the statement continued.
     
    According to the circular, the president of the committee would be a member of the Police or Security Forces and all committee meeting minutes would be sent to the military head quarters.
     
    “Since the liberation of eastern province it is the responsibility of military and police to provide security to the resettled people,” Sri Lankan military spokesman Brigadier Prasad Samarasinghe told the BBC World Service’s Sinhala language Sandeshaya program.
     
    “Now we have a proper supervision on NGO projects and they have to get the approval from the district secretariat to operate in the area and the local area commander must be acknowledged about the project” he added.
     
    Some NGOs questioned the circular.
     
    “Out of five ministers for Nation Building, two work for the development in the east. Why do we need special committees?” the Executive Director of the Human Rights Consortium and director of Eastern Development, Authority Jeevan Thyagarajah, asked in an interview with Sandeshaya.
     
    “Is there going to be a civil administration in the east or a military administration? People are already suspicious about government plans,” he queried.
     
    Whilst some humanitarian agencies are concerned with the military interference some, like US military medics, have already started working under the plans announced by the military.
     
    A US Marines team is now in the east to carry out a fact-finding mission in preparation for an upcoming visit by high level US military medics as part of a humanitarian assistance programme, the Daily Mirror reported.
     
    “A high-level medical team will be here in September for one week to conduct a series of medical assistance programmes for the eastern people, especially in the newly captured areas,” a senior defence official told the Daily Mirror.
     
    This assistance is to be given to eastern people in consultation with the Army, Navy and the Air Force, the paper quoted him as saying.
     
    “Medical camps would be set up in several areas including Sampur and Vakarai,” the official said.
     
    A visiting four-member medical team from the US Marines led by a Colonel is now in Trincomalee monitoring the area to set up medical camps and find out other requirements for the scheduled programme, the official said.
     
    In addition to military intervention in development and humanitarian operations, paramilitary activities too have intensified in the eastern province, fuelled by speculation of polls.
     
    The government is planning to conduct local government elections in the east later this year, analysts note, pointing to a bill to conduct local government elections in East passed in the Sri Lankan Parliament on July 19.
     
    This has created tension between two paramilitary groups that operate along side the Sri Lankan Army, reports said, as the Karuna Group, headed by former LTTE Eastern Commander Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan (alias Karuna), pits itself against the Eelam People Democratic Party (EPDP), another paramilitary group, headed by Minister Douglas Devanada, for power in the east.
     
    The turf war between the two groups surfaced when armed Karuna Group cadres attacked an EPDP camp in Chenkaladi, Batticalo.
     
    A Karuna Group cadre was killed in the gunfight, which lasted for an hour and only ceased when the local police intervened. Both groups were warned to refrain from further violence.
     
    However, hours later the Karuna Group issued notices banning the EPDP from operating in Batticaloa.
     
    But Mr. Devananda dismissed the Karuna Group threat and said his party was going ahead with plans to contest the local elections.
     
    The Karna Group is also considered to have assisted the military in capturing the East by providing valuable intelligence, ground knowledge and taking part in offensives, Colombo press reports said.
     
    The group is also suspected to behind a series of intimidations and abductions against the local population.
     
    Following the announcement by the government that the east was “free of the LTTE”, international governments, opposition parties and civic groups have begun to pressure the government to disarm the paramilitary groups, especially the Karuna Group.
     
    Even the pro-war Wimal Weeranwansa, the parliamentary group leader of Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) said he felt there is no longer a role to play by an armed Tamil group and is calling for the disarmament of Karuna Group.
     
    Mr. Weerawansa said the paramilitary forces had to take up arms because of the LTTE and if they continued to operate in the East even after the Tigers were no longer in existence, it would create other problems.
     
    “We call on the government do dismantle these groups gradually because we understand that such a process cannot be done overnight,” he said.
     
    However, in an interview with the BBC Tamil service Karuna refused to disarm.
     
    The paramilitary group leader said LTTE intelligence personnel were still operating in the east of the island, even though it had been taken by government forces.
     
    “If we disarm now, it will be dangerous for us. We want to carry arms for self-protection," he told the BBC.
     
    In the interview Karuna contradicted himself by first rejecting claims that his forces and government troops have co-operated in the fight against the Tigers and then saying his fighters had taken part in the battle for the former LTTE eastern stronghold of Thopigalla, which the army captured last week.
     
    Commenting on the disarmament of Karuna Group, Douglas Devanada Mister for Social Services told a website “all leaders, including Karuna, are given security by the armed forces of Sri Lanka. Karuna is being secured in his residence as well as wherever he moves by the Security Forces of Sri Lanka. All his offices are provided security by the Sri Lankan police.”
     
    “What else does he wants?” he further queried.
     
    Analysts note that comments by Karuna and Devananda shows the close ties between the military and Karuna Group and do not anticipate a move by the military in the near future to disarm the group.
     
    On the contrary, they expect the militarization to continue as the government sees it as the easiest way to control the territory – by ruling it as enemy ground.
     
  • Remember those who fled within
    Tamils displaced within the country are dependent on the ‘goodwill’ of the Sri Lankan government,even as it continues to displace more Tamils. Photo TRO
    As we honor the 14 million refugees on World Refugee Day, 20 June 2007, TRO would also like to highlight the plight of the world's Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). According to UNHCR figures there are currently 24.5 million IDPs worldwide, who have been displaced by conflict.
     
    The conflict in Sri Lanka has resulted in over one million Tamil refugees leaving the island to Canada, Western Europe and other parts of the world. Currently, approximately 100,000 Tamils live in camps in the South of India.
     
    Those that have left the island of Sri Lanka and found refuge in other countries are protected by the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, but there is no similar convention or system of international protection for IDPs.
     
    As a result the plight of the IDPs in the NorthEast is left to the "goodwill" of the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL). Military offensives over the past 18 months by the GoSL have been the primary cause of the displacement of 300,000 IDPs.
     
    Currently there are approximately 750,000 IDPs in Sri Lanka.
     
    These include:
     
    - 300,000 IDPs displaced over the last 18 months as a result of military offensives by the GoSL
     
    - 350,000 IDPs from the pre-2002 Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) who have not been able to return to their homes due to a variety of reasons, which include the designation of their former towns and villages as High Security Zones (HSZ)
     
    - 100,000 Tsunami IDPs who still live in temporary shelters or have been displaced once again due to the conflict
     
    These IDPs have been subject to multiple displacements (some have been displaced up to 10 times) shelling, bombing, murder, rape, torture, and loss of livelihood.
     
    The children have been deprived of access to education and fear abduction and harassment by paramilitaries affiliated to the GoSL.
     
    Some IDPs, as witnessed by the UN and other international organizations, have also been forced by the GoSL and its security forces to return to areas from which they were displaced.
     
    TRO and TRO supported Community Based Organizations (CBOs) currently care for or provide humanitarian assistance for 85,000 of these IDPs despite the obstacles, restrictions and embargoes imposed by the GoSL.
     
    TRO wishes to raise awareness of the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Sri Lanka. The situation is critical and worsening by the hour.
     
    TRO would like to emphasize that it is the responsibility of the Government of Sri Lanka to protect, uphold and enforce the national and international humanitarian standards and International Humanitarian Law. These include not using food and medicine as a weapon of war.
     
    TRO petitions the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the International Community to address the Humanitarian issues affecting IDPs in Sri Lanka:
     
    1. End all embargos, restrictions and other impediments to the flow of humanitarian relief items and construction materials (for temporary shelters for IDPs) to the NorthEast
     
    2. Allow local and International NGOs to freely access areas affected by the conflict in a timely manner
     
    3. End restrictions on international humanitarian agencies and their international staff: denial of visa renewals, refusal of visas, the controversial work permits and limiting the mandates of iNGOs
     
    4. Adhere to the international Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement – GoSL should stop forced eviction of civilians by targeted shelling / bombing of villages
     
    5. Ensure that the prior incidents of "Forced resettlement" (as verified by the UN and others) do not recur and that human rights and human dignity are respected.
     
    (a) Ensure that IDPs are informed of their rights and that there is transparency regarding the development and implementation of humanitarian policies
     
    (b) Ensure that all affected communities are consulted at all stages from initial displacement to resettlement
     
    (c) IDPs have a right to choose when to return and should be allowed to visit the areas of return prior to return
     
    (d) Ensure that resettled IDPs receive compensation and assistance to restart their livelihoods and have access to their properties in the High Security Zones (HSZ)
     
    6.Ensure free access to education for IDP children
     
    Thousands of children, some as young as 6 year old, have to pass through numerous checkpoints close to their camps and schools on their way to school everyday.
     
    7. IDP Camp management
     
    (a) Most camps in the East do not currently meet internationally accepted SPHERE minimum standards. The GoSL and the international community must ensure that these standards are maintained
     
    (b) Camp Security in the East – ensure that the abductions and harassment of youth and children by paramilitaries and security forces are stopped
     
    8. Decentralize the decision making and bureaucracy to the ground level and away from Colombo. Currently, there is a lack of coordination and a confusing number of governmental ministries and authorities mandated to work with IDPs.
     
    9. Ensure that IDP camps are not attacked by armed forces as happened in November and December 2006 when IDP camps in Vaharai were shelled and 86 IDPs killed
     
    10. Ensure that all affected communities are treated equally and that there is not discrimination   in the disbursement of relief assistance and compensation
     
    11. Remove the GoSL freeze on TRO bank accounts. TRO is the largest local NGO in the NorthEast and has access, staff and volunteers to areas that iNGOs and the GoSL have limited access.
     
    12. Ensure the safety of local and international humanitarian workers so that they may better serve the needs of the IDPs and other war and tsunami affected persons. In the last 18 months 33 humanitarian workers have been killed: This includes 7 TRO, 17 ACF, and 2 SLRC humanitarian workers. NGOs are also maligned in the state and private media and by the political parties. This reduces the space available for them to operate and restricts their ability to deliver humanitarian relief to the affected communities.
     
    Further details are on www.troonline.org
  • Cafe d’ APRC - exclusively for foreigners
    There is no evidence that the government or its ministers are enthusiastic about the APRC and its recommendations. Photo TamilNet
    The All Party Representative Committee (APRC) reminds one of a sunny Parisian cafe where a bunch of retired bored men and women gather to engage in casual deliberations about various political issues, and, in the meantime, enjoy a good cup of coffee.
     
    President Mahinda Rajapaksa set up the APRC six months after assuming power with the express wish of finding a political solution to the decade old ethnic problem. Irrespective of whether it is a Trojan horse or a genuine one, the president’s choice of the jockey, Prof. Vitharana, is commendable.
     
    Though the APRC was set up by the Government with the participation of other political parties, there is hardly any evidence to prove that the government or its ministers are enthusiastic about it - with the exception, of course, of the leader of the Lanka Samasamaja Party, Prof. Tissa Vitharana.
     
    And the members of the international community.
     
    Despite endless criticism, some analysts tend to believe that the APRC is perhaps the final glimmer of hope for the desperate situation in the country. It may not be the most desired route to take but surely it is the only presently available one. Speaking at the “Nagenahira Navodaya”, a function organised by the Government to celebrate the recapturing of Eastern province, President Rajapaksa reminded us that he established the APRC so that all parties could come together to formulate a political solution to the burning ethnic problem.
     
    In this context, it is interesting to examine the probability of the APRC being able to deliver. Providing a political solution to the Sri Lanka’s ethnic problem is a formidable task.
     
    The APRC has a much greater battle than simply working with the LTTE. This is because; in order to find a permanent solution one cannot simply satisfy the needs of the LTTE- what is more important is the inclusion and consideration of Sri Lanka’s many and varied ethnic groups.
     
    The only pragmatic answer is to draft an entirely new constitution. Constitutions are made through both constitutional and non-constitutional means. According to the second republican constitution of 1978, to change the present constitution, one needs to have a two-thirds majority in parliament and a simple majority from a referendum.
     
    Winning the support of a parliamentarian is more a matter of rupees and cents rather than convincing him or her of the rationale and desirability of the issue.
     
    Of course, President Rajapaksa will find less trouble than the opposition leader, Mr. Wickremesinghe in advocating a meaningful proposal that is appealing to the minority communities if he (Rajapakse) is already enjoying the favour of 53% of the opposition UNP’s MPs- as Minister Fernandopulle claims.
     
    On the other hand, the Rajapaksa regime will have to employ many resources if it is serious about creating any progressive proposal through the APRC.
     
    Prof. G. L. Peiris, one of the architects of the political package put forward by President Chandrika Kumaratunga in 2000 and the government’s chief negotiator of 2002 - 3 peace talks who agreed to explore a solution within a federal structure is a member of the Rajapaksa camp now.
     
    Interestingly, the biggest critics for any power sharing arrangement with minority communities, the NMAT (National Movement Against Terrorism) and JHU (the Buddhist monks’ party) are with the Government and will certainly give Rajapaksa their unconditional support so long as they are able to retain their Ministerial portfolios.
     
    However, what we are interested in and would like to discuss in this article is to inquire into the possibility of receiving mass support for a constitutional change that would give equality and justice to everyone irrespective of their ethnicity, religion and region.
     
    In order to make this inquiry into such public attitudes on the APRC and the other related issues, the authors used data from the latest Peace Confidence Index (PCI), publish by Social Indicator, the survey research unit of the Centre for Policy Alternatives.
     
    President Rajapaksa’s professed reason for setting up the APRC was to craft a proposal on southern consensus that one would then present to the LTTE. Therefore, it is vital that the two main political parties and all members of the Sinhala community are able to first come to perfect accord with each other, else, the peace process cannot continue.
     
    The results of the PCI survey of February 2007 show that it is only 14% of the Sinhala community who are aware about the APRC even after six months of its existence. Levels of awareness amongst the same group regarding the APRC’s majority and minority reports were even lower.
     
    We are certain that if one conducted a survey awareness of the happenings of some of the Sinhala dubbed Indian teledramas, one would see two to three times the amount of awareness than the APRC, a mechanism that has been setup to design the future of the country.
     
    It is hard not to believe that this is what the Government wants. If one analyses most of the speeches of Rajapaksa and his ministers, it is quite clear that war and military victory is the message for the local audience while peace process, APRC and political solution are is just the window display for the international audiences.
     
    As it shown in the latest PCI (PCI – June 2007) 51% of the Sinhala community do not know or cannot decide what type of constitution they prefer.
     
    In point of fact, they could not make a decision regarding this matter even after they were provided with different options such as retaining the present state of the constitution, changing the present constitution without changing the unitary structure and the position given to Buddhism, decentralizing of power within a unitary state structure or establishing a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka.
     
    It is interesting to note that 13% of the Sinhalese do not want to change the present constitution while 25% agree to amending the present constitution without changing the state’s unitary nature and the supreme position given to Buddhism.
     
    Regretfully, Professor Vitharana, only 5% of the Sinhala community would agree to a federal state within a united constitution- a proposal that you made in order to combine the majority and the minority reports presented to the APRC.
     
    Not only that, only 6% of Sinhala community are willing to consider a decentralised power even within a unitary structure.
     
    So, it is clear that if the Government decides to hold a referendum to consult citizens on their choice of constitution the result would not show any progress from the present one- a unitary structure where Buddhism is constitutionally recognized as the preeminent religion and a central power that decides what other regions need and what is good for the rest of the country.
     
    Does this mean that over 50 years of democratic struggle of the minority communities which has now evolved into a military struggle has completely been wasted? What happened to the good work of some of the politicians who strived to advance the constitution? What happened to the countless seminars and advocacy meeting of the NGOs?
     
    A majority of the people who identify themselves with specific political parties are not sure about what their choice is for a new constitution. However, self-identified JVPers want the present constitution to be amended while retaining the unitary chaacter of it and preserving the status given to Buddhism.
     
    Since independence it has always been the UNP or the SLFP that headed the country’s governments.
     
    During President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s regime, the SLFP created a political proposal that has been commended by many scholars as the most progressive we ever had.
     
    Under the leadership of Ranil Wickremesinghe the UNP agreed to explore a political solution within a frame of federal structure.
     
    But, majorities of the people who identify themselves with either party were unable to state what their desired constitution is. Ironically, 36% of the SLFPers and 45% of the UNPers, under the present political context, prefer either a continuation of the present constitution or amending it without changing the Unitary structure and Buddhism’s prime position.
     
    What happened to the devolution and federal debates that were initiated years ago by the leadership of SLFP and UNP? Only 9% of the UNPers support a federal type of constitution while 7% want to decentralize power under a unitary structure.
     
    Choice for the SLFPers - whose leadership once claim that 76% of Sri Lankans support federal constitution – brings further disappointment to someone like Prof. Vitharana as only 4% support a federal type of constitution and 5% agree to decentralization within a unitary state.
     
    The attitudes and perception we see amongst the Sinhala community might cause a degree of cynicism amongst those who attempt to bring about a new constitution and thereby to restructure the Sri Lankan state and find a solution to the protracted ethnic issue.
     
    This is because it clearly articulates the fact that the country has not been able to progress, instead it had actually regressed alarmingly.
     
    The latest PCI shows the perceptions of the Sinhalese on federalism in terms of some of the criticism.
     
    Addressing the party leaders of his coalition government in Kandy, President Rajapaksa rejected a federal solution. His rationale was that people voted him in for the preservation of a ‘nobeduna ratak” (undivided country). Therefore, he will not explore the idea of a federal solution.
     
    It seems he has indirectly acknowledged that he too shares the anxiety of nationalist political parties i.e. federalism will lead to secession.
     
    However, according to the opinion poll, one fifth of Sinhalese think federalism would lead to secession and 10% think it will ensure the unity of the country. Nevertheless, 65% says that they do not know whether federalism will lead to secession or create unity.
     
    Further, amongst the Sinhala community 19% believe a federal solution would be disadvantageous to their community; 17% believe it will threaten the status quo of the Buddhist community; 10% think federalism will impact the economy negatively.
     
    Interestingly, that for all these anti-federal arguments more than over two third of the Sinhala community do not which is the correct one.
     
    Therefore, Prof. Vitharana, we must tell you that, at present, there is no clear support base for you to support your opinion that the future constitution will be some form of federal constitution. None the less, take heart in the fact that the Sinhala community does not reject your idea outright.
     
    One should not ignore the substantial degree of unawareness and the indecisive nature of the Sinhalese with regards to constitutional choice. The degree of ignorance and confusion on the issue of constitution is crucial as it provides space for supporters of progressive constitutional reforms as well as the advocates of such constitutions to win their support base.
     
    The present media campaign that followed the military campaign will certainly dim the enthusiasm amongst the Sinhalese for finding a political solution.
     
    The present speechifying of the ruling party on the military’s might will certainly undermine the communication of the APRC’s proposed political solutions to the Sinhalese.
     
    Therefore, the undecided are more likely to lean towards war than peace.
     
    And Professor Vitharana will then have no other employment but playing maitre d’ at the “Café d’ APRC – exclusively for foreigners”.
  • Rajapaksa the liberator?

    Tamils are ignored as Sinhalese celebrations mark the ‘liberation’
    THE victory at Thoppigala brought the Eastern Province, one of Sri Lanka’s nine administrative provinces, under the control of the government. The defeat of the LTTE in the east is, no doubt, a victory for the security forces.
     
    But the ultimate victory is not nigh. The path to that elusive victory is strewn with many an obstacle. The journey along that path requires courage and sacrifice, both at military and political level. Whether we will see that victory during the present regime of President Mahinda Rajapaksa is a big question now.
     
    The victory in the east has hardened the ultranationalists’ resolve to continue the fight and conquer the north. Yes, conquest is the goal of these ultranationalists whose ideology has fuelled the ethnic flames and driven the country towards destruction and the disgruntled Tamil youths towards violence.
     
    On the eve of the Thoppigala victory, I had a casual conversation with a few senior military officers at a defence academy. One senior officer told me that the real victory could come only when the Tamils in the east also join with the rest of the country to celebrate the military’s feat.
     
    He was talking like a liberator – not a conqueror. “The more we harp on our victory, the more hurt we will be heaping on the Tamils,” the Sinhala said.
     
    Yes, the Tamils are hurt. Not because the LTTE, which is claiming to be the sole representative of the Tamils, has been driven out of the Eastern Province. But because the victory is being projected as a conquest by the government and its ultranationalist allies.
     
    And no one in the government has thought it fit to look at the victory from the Tamils’ point of view. There is none in the government to drive the point that one has to be humble and magnanimous in victory.
     
    But our government is planning grand-scale celebrations throughout the country, except in the LTTE-controlled areas in the north. The functional value of these celebrations in promoting national harmony is a big zero.
     
    Of course, they will help President Rajapaksa to salvage his slumping popularity.
     
    The LTTE, I am sure, won’t be displeased with the celebrations, either. The victory celebrations with pomp and pageantry are contributing towards the further polarisation of society along ethnic lines, for they bring out Sinhala nationalism, which is like oxygen to the LTTE, rather than Sri Lanka nationalism, which is like cyanide to the Tigers.
     
    The posters of ultranationalists and the government proclaim that the LTTE’s dream of setting up of a separate state in the north and the east of Sri Lanka has been dealt a deadly blow by the security forces. The posters also urge the army to conquer the north as well.
     
    The propaganda campaign by the government and the nationalists is so effective that people are unwilling to believe the allegations made by the opposition United National Party and two sacked ministers that Rajapaksa paid millions to the LTTE before the presidential elections in return for a boycott call that prevented the Tamil from voting and eventually cost UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe the presidency.
     
    The allegations have become a damp squib in the Thoppigala euphoria.
     
    Rajapaksa is a hero today – a leader who has liberated/conquered the east. The Rajapaksa campaign is so effective that people in the south believe that it is he who, for the first time in the 25-year history of the ethnic conflict, has liberated the east.
     
    But the fact is that the armed forces took the entire Eastern Province, including Thoppigala, under their control in 1992 and the then government successfully held elections to the local council.
     
    The east became once again a stronghold of the LTTE during the Chandrika Kumaratunga regime, in which Mahinda Rajapaksa was a minister.
     
    The Thoppigala euphoria has infected the people in the south with myopia. For them, it does not matter how the east was won. The armed forces moved into Tiger-controlled areas in the east — Mavil Aru, Mutur, Sampur and Manirasakualm and eventually Thoppigala — first launching aerial attacks on LTTE targets which incidentally were located in civilian areas.
     
    As a result 300,000 civilians were displaced. Hundreds were killed. The subsequent exchange of fire, artillery and multi-barrel rockets, destroyed their houses, fields and whatever facilities that sustained their livelihood.
     
    As area after area was liberated, some internally displaced were resettled. But thousands of them found to their horror that they could not enter their villages that had become part of a high security zone while they were away in refugee camps.
     
    Since the victims were largely Tamils, the pain is less in the south. Coinciding with the celebrations, the government is launching a development programme called Neganahira Navodaya. The English translation of the Sinhala phrase means New Dawn of the East.
     
    East is a predominantly a Tamil-speaking province with Muslims and the Tamils constituting more than 70 per cent of its population.
     
    There is no attempt to name the programme in Tamil and to dismiss charges of racism.
     
    Ameen Izzadeen is a Sri Lankan journalist based in Colombo. This comment for the Khaleej Times was published on 17 July 2007
  • Diaspora Tamils commemorate Black July, support struggle
    Tamils commemorate Black July in Melbourne
    Thousands of diaspora Tamils joined protests in several world capitals to commemorate 24th anniversary of Black July and to express support and to continue the struggle "to establish self-rule in the territories Tamil people have made their home for centuries … until the goal is achieved."
     
    Diaspora Tamils join demonstrations and protests in numbers despite coordinated crackdown on Tamil activists by Western states
     
    American Tamils in front of Capitol Building, Washington D.C
    In the peace rally attended by nearly one thousand American Tamils from several states across the United States in front of the Capitol Building, in Washington D.C. on July 24 from 12:00 noon to 3:00 p.m. The participants said: "We, the Tamil Americans, hereby proclaim that Eelam Tamils constitute a Nation. We resolve that our struggle to establish the right of Tamil people to Self-Determination, and to establish self-rule in the territories Tamil people have made their home for centuries will continue until our goal is achieved," in a declaration released to the press at the conclusion of the rally.
     
    British Tamils in Trafalgar Square call on UK to recognize the right to self-determination of the Tamil people
    Nearly five thousand British Tamils demonstrated on July 15 in central London calling on the UK to apply pressure to halt human rights abuses by Sri Lanka’s security forces and to recognize the right to self-determination of the Tamil people. The rally in Trafalgar square was organized by councilors of Tamil origin in the London area.
     
    More than 5000 Tamils attended the Markham Civic Centre, July 27 evening at 6:00 p.m. to attend a rally to commemorate the pogrom of July 1983 and to pay homage to the hundreds of Tamils who lost their lives during the state sponsored violence. Mr.Anton Philip Sinnarasa, a survivor of the 1983 Welikada prison massacre, said that 53 Tamils killed during orgies of violence on 25th and 27th of July, lived for their conviction and their dream, and died in pursuit of a just cause.
     
    Tamils attended the Black July event in Markham Civic Centre, Toronto.
    Several hundred South African Tamils filled the Bayview Arutpa Kazhagam Hall in Chatsworth in Durban July 28 evening to express solidarity with the NorthEast Tamils, and to pay respect for the victims of the pogroms against Tamils in Sri Lanka in July 1983.
     
    Belgian, Australian, and Swiss Tamils also joined other expatriate Tamil communities worldwide in remembering the Black July event.
     
    South African Tamils express their solidarity with the Tamils in NorthEast of Sri Lanka at an event to mark the Black July pogroms.
    On July 25, Swiss Tamils assembled in front of the United Nations Building in Geneva, Australian Tamils in Melbourne convened in Melbourne City Square and Belgian Tamils assembled in front of the European Parliament in Brussels between 2:00 p.m and 5:00 p.m to pay respect for the Tamils who perished during the 1983 July state sponsored violence and to highlight the current human right abuses against Tamils in Colombo and across NorthEast.
     
     
  • Soccer, shells: Life in Sri Lanka rebel north surreal
    Soccer spectators roar with excitement as a goal is scored, children play in a nearby park as adults drink tea and an old man cycles slowly along the road. Artillery shells thunder in the distance.
     
    With the front line of renewed civil war just 20 miles (30 km) up the road, residents here in the Tamil Tigers' stronghold in Sri Lanka's far north live a surreal daily diet of fear, desperation and hope.
     
    On closer inspection, some of the soccer spectators are wearing the rebels' characteristic striped fatigues and carrying assault rifles. Cyanide capsules hang around their necks in case of capture. Red flags emblazoned with roaring golden Tigers and crossed rifles flap in the wind.
     
    Some of the players are Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam fighters too.
     
    "During the war, we must have a life too," said Anton Anpalagan, a physical education teacher and secretary of the Tamil Eelam Sports Council of the de facto state the Tigers want recognized as independent.
     
    "While the war is going on, at the same time we are looking after the needs of the people and after sports development," he added. "Football is the best kind of counseling for those traumatized by the war."
     
    Residents have had to adapt to a two-decade war that has killed nearly 70,000 people. The sound of war is never far away. Ruins of shelled buildings stand testament to past fighting, sections of wall still pockmarked by bullets and shrapnel.
     
    But a near four-year stint of peace before a 2002 ceasefire broke down last year has given civilians a taste of what life could be like, and they long for the conflict to end.
     
    New buildings have sprouted up housing shops and trappings of the Tigers' de facto state - a law court, customs house and even a consumer price control department.
     
    A government embargo on a host of goods from gasoline to cement coupled with disrupted trade due to the partial closure of the 'border' that separates government and Tiger-held territory is making life a misery for many.
     
    Some have improvised as in earlier stages of the conflict, running their mopeds or cars on a mixture of kerosene and gasoline. Civilians cook with firewood because cooking gas canisters are also barred. Drinkable beer is another casualty.
     
    Prices have sky-rocketed. Petrol costs 550 rupees ($4.90) a liter on the black market in a district where 70 percent of the population earns less than $1 a day. The same liter of petrol costs around 110 rupees in the government-held south.
     
    FED UP WITH WAR
     
    "Business is down because the road is closed," said 57-year-old fruit seller Subramaniam Rajeshwari, tending her stall in Kilinochchi market. "People here are living in fear. Everyone here wants peace. That's what they're hoping for."
     
    Some traders now make just 50 to 60 rupees profit a day, and complain turnover has fallen by more than 70 percent.
     
    The focus of renewed fighting that has killed an estimated 4,500 people since last year has shifted to the north after the military captured vast swathes of territory from the Tigers in the east.
     
    With daily artillery duels across defense lines that sandwich the roughly seven percent of Sri Lanka the Tigers control in the far north, and sporadic air strikes on rebel territory, residents repeatedly displaced by the conflict are bracing for more pain.
     
    "Life is very difficult. It is a very bad situation," said 57-year-old father of four Perumal Kumaravel, a translator who works for one of the handful of aid agencies still operating in Tiger areas.
     
    "I am very worried about the war, the shelling. Kfir (jets) sometimes attack," he said, as he took one of his daughters to watch a musical show planned after the soccer match. "This is not a normal life. Every day I live in fear."
     
    Behind him, LTTE police marshal traffic along the main north-south A9 artery - nicknamed the highway of death because of the deadly battles that have been fought along it.
     
    Posters on a nearby bus stand depict the silhouette of an elite Black Tiger suicide bomber, revered by the secular Tigers as their most powerful weapon. A Toyota pick-up truck in army camouflage colors whizzes past, bristling with rifle barrels.
     
    Some would like to leave but say the Tigers impose restrictions. But still many minority Tamils say they prefer to stay put in rebel areas, fearing persecution if they move to the Sinhalese-majority south.
     
    Some families also fear their relatives will be forced to join the Tigers' war effort as the LTTE seek to boost their numbers by recruiting civilians, some of them against their will.
     
    The Tigers, who have been fighting troops in the north like a conventional army with artillery guns and rocket launchers, have threatened to switch to guerrilla tactics and strike major economic and military targets.
     
    They say peace is impossible with President Mahinda Rajapaksa, who has vowed to wrest control of all LTTE-held territory. Analysts say that sets the stage for a bloody fight for the north, where an estimated 350,000 people live inside LTTE-held terrain, and see no clear winner.
     
    "Let the Tamil people live in their traditional homeland," S.P. Thamilselvan, head of the Tigers' political wing, said in an interview. "Leave the Tamil people without any military occupation or persecution. That will be the day there is no war."
     
     
  • British deportations continue as hunger strikers weaken
    Guards stand outside a Birtish immigration detention centre where Tamil refugees on a hunger strikeare asking the authorities to consider the dangers they face in Colombo before deporting them.
    The health of several of the dozens of Tamil asylum seekers on hunger strike at British detention centers is deteriorating rapidly with some being rushed to hospital, detainees and lawyers said Friday.
     
    However, enforced deportations from the centers are continuing regardless of the now weeklong protest, they said.
     
    Pointing out that Britain has cautioned her citizens against traveling to Sri Lanka, the hunger strikers want the authorities to halt forcible returns of asylum applicants. They also want Tamils to be taken off Britain’s asylum processing ‘fast track’ so as to allow sufficient time for appeals against deportations to be conducted.
     
    A hunger strike against enforced removal to Sri Lanka begun earlier this month by Tamil asylum seekers at one British holding centre has spread to other locations.
     
    There have been isolated protests in the past, but not on this scale. At least one asylum seeker has attempted suicide.
     
    The first recent hunger strike began on July 9 when two Tamils at one location refused to eat unless deportations are stopped.
     
    But there are over seventy people on hunger strike now at seven locations.
     
    28 people are on hunger strike at the Harmonsworth Immigration Removal Centre in London along with 23 others at Oakington in Cambridgeshire and 10 at Haslar, Hampshire.
     
    Small groups of Tamils are on hunger strike at other locations, detainees say.
     
    Pointing out that Britain has cautioned her citizens against traveling to Sri Lanka, the hunger strikers and immigration lawyers want authorities to halt the forcible deportations of asylum applicants to Sri Lanka.
     
    The protestors also want Tamil applicants to be taken off Britain’s asylum processing ‘fast track’ so as to allow sufficient time for appeals against deportations to be conducted.
     
    They cite the cases of several Tamils who had either been arrested or ‘disappeared’ after being forcibly deported.
     
    One youth, Sivaruben, who was deported on July 18, was arrested at Colombo airport. His parents are being refused access to the prison.
     
    Sivaruben’s case spurred other inmates at Harmonsworth to join Tamil protestors elsewhere on hunger strike.
     
    Two other Tamils deported recently are known to gone missing from their residences in Colombo within weeks of arriving back in Sri Lanka, inmates quoted relatives there as saying.
     
    Inmates say the fate of several others is unknown as they (inmates) do not know their relatives to contact.
     
    Despite the hunger strikes, the deportations from Britain are continuing, protestors and immigration lawyers said Friday.
     
    People are being taken to planes in handcuffs screaming, an inmate on hunger strike told TamilNet Friday. Three people from one location were deported last week.
     
    One Tamil man seeking asylum was deported Thursday, even though his wife and 4 year old child are in UK (not in detention), others said.
     
    Several others are being prepared for deportation as scheduled and have been told to make arrangements with their lawyers.
     
    At one location, Harmonsworth, immigration offices have warned asylum seekers they would be put on planes regardless of their protest.
     
    “They tell as we will be sent back regardless of whether we eat or not,” an inmate at Oakington Reception Centre said.
     
    “The doctors who check our health are also telling us to give up and return to Sri Lanka,” he said.
     
    “There is simply no human sympathy in these places,” he said. “We are kept like criminals. What have we done wrong in this country to be locked up like this?”
     
    At another location, Haslar, the immigration officers are simply ignoring the hunger strikers, inmates said.
     
    Doctors are checking the protestors’ condition and urging them to abandon their protest and return peaceably.
     
    “Many of us have been held here for a long time. They won’t tell us the status of our applications, but we are locked up,” one inmate said.
     
    “Sometimes we get letters about our cases that won’t make clear what will happen to us. They refuse appeal after appeal, telling us all the time we will soon be sent back.”
     
    “We are in a constant state of tension and anxiety. It is a form of mental torture,” he said.
     
    One youth, Sujeevan, attempted suicide this week soon after receiving his latest monthly status report, fellow inmates said. He was taken to hospital and is being held in isolation, they said.
     
    They said following weeks of anxiety, the report simply didn’t indicate whether he would be sent back or allowed to remain.
     
    Protestors interviewed by local media say they are seeking asylum in UK to escape the killings and human rights abuses in Sri Lanka that Britain and other Western countries have condemned.
     
    Pointing out that Britain is amongst the countries that have recently cut aid to Sri Lanka in protest at rights abuses by the security forces, the asylum seekers say they are seeking sanctuary in Britain only until the island’s conflict is resolved.
     
    “We are not fortune seekers. Tamils are being killed every day there. We will definitely go back home if there is peace, we want to be allowed to stay till it is safe,” one asylum seeker told local radio.
     
    The Tamil Lawyers’ Association (UK) has urged the British authorities “to suspend all deportations of Tamil asylum seekers to Sri Lanka and give primacy to safety of asylum seekers.”
     
    In a press release issued this week, the Association pointed out that Britain has cautioned against travel to Sri Lanka.
     
    The Association also quoted the United Nations refugee agency, UNHCR, as urging that all asylum claims of Tamils from the North or East should be favourably considered.
     
    They also cite the UNHCR as arguing that where the individual does not fulfil the refugee criteria under the 1951 Convention, “a complementary form of protection should be granted in light of the prevailing situation of armed conflict and generalised violence in the north and east.”
     
    Meanwhile the protestors say they will continue their hunger strike until the Home Office (Britain’s Interior Ministry) changes its policy on ‘fast tracking’ and deporting Tamils to Sri Lanka.
     
    “Those of us in here will not give up our hunger strike,” an inmate at Harmonsworth said.
     
    “People who return [to Sri Lanka] are being killed like animals there, they are being killed on the roadside. It is better to die with dignity here.”
     
Subscribe to Diaspora