Sri Lanka

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  • The duplicity in admitting Tamil ‘grievances’

    Jun 16
    One of the common threads of policy articulated by the United States and the European Union is to distinguish the Tamil people fr-om the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) when it comes to resolving Sri Lanka''s conflict. International statements recognising the ''genuine grievances'' of the Tamils often accompany harsh denouncements of the LTTE''s use of armed violence. This separation has been prominent in EU comments accompanying its proscription of the LTTE and in recent comments by US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia, Richard Boucher.

    The message from these key members of the international community to the Tamils is they should reconsider who should front their efforts to seek redress for their grievances. To help them decide, the international community has systematically criminalized the LTTE. This is even though it is only because of the Tigers that a peace process in which these grievances can be taken up has been precipitated (there have, after all, been three decades of Tamil pleading before the war started in 1983).

    Contradiction

    The international community''s position that the Tamils and the LTTE are different entities with separate interests, however, appea-rs fragile under close scrutiny. Not only is there a case that the LTTE is pursuing Tamil interests, the international community, particularly when imposing or encouraging sanctions on the Tamils, seem to accept, in fact, that it does.

    To begin with, in any democratic forum the Tamils have consistently backed policies that are synonymous with LTTE policy. The most recent example is the overwhelming victory of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) in the parliamentary polls of 2001 and 2004. The coalition of Tamil parties had run on an election manifesto nominated the LTTE as the sole representatives of the Tamil speaking people.

    Other demands included the creation of the LTTE''s Interim Self-Governing Administration (ISGA). In 1977, prior to the ascendancy of the LTTE, the Tamils voted for the notion of an independent state, backing the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) to pursue it. The demands of the Tamils have not deviated over the past three decades, despite the ravages of war. If anything, they''ve become more resolved.

    The assertion by the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA), an internationally funded Colombo based think-tank, citing evidence that over 90% of Tamils in the Northeast support the LTTE and at least 50% of Muslims in the Northeast would live under an LTTE administration should give the doubters pause for thought.

    Funding

    Aside from their political support within any available democratic space, the Tamil people have also backed the organisation financially. The refugees of the 1983 pogrom have succeeded in rebuilding their lives across the globe. Ironically the Sri Lankan state''s violent methods of suppressing Tamil protests directly resulted in a global Diaspora with adequate financial muscle back a robust challenge the dominance of the Sri Lankan state.

    Some international voices, most notably Human Rights Watch (HRW), have explained away the financial backing the LTTE enjoys from its Diaspora as a function of coercion - a theory that the Sri Lankan state also attempts to perpetuate, whilst simultaneously grumbling that not enough is being done by host countries to curb Tamil Diaspora support for the Tigers. The backlash from the Tamil community to the HRW report resulted in a retreat by the organisation to the position that they recognised that a large number of Tamils give support willingly, and that ''some'' do so against their will. The recent angry demonstrations by thousands of Tamils in Europe and Canada against the proscriptions of the LTTE is another challenge to the claim.

    Questioning support

    The extent of Tamil support for the LTTE have been debated since the inception of the organisation. It has suited the Sri Lankan state to propagate the idea that while it is a vibrant multi-ethnic democracy, the LTTE are a terrorist organisation which does not have the support of the Tamil people and, ther-efore, successfully destroying it will resolve the problems plaguing the island. Sections of the international community echo this claim.

    However, the actual conduct of the Sri Lankan state and that of the international community are clearly not formulated on this basis. Quite the reverse. The Tamils and the LTTE are treated as one and the same in a number of unstated, but visible ways. The most glaring sign of this contradiction are the draconian methods used by the Sri Lankan armed forces to terrorise Tamil civilians in the Northeast during times of war to deny the LTTE their support. More recently, the racial riots against Tamils in Trincomalee and the Air Force bombardment of civilian areas in Muttur carried out in retaliation for attacks on security forces by the LTTE are also based on the logic of collective punishment.

    One and the same

    Even in its own actions and de-spite its rhetoric, the international community also treats the LTTE and the Tamil people as one and the same. The decision to conditi-onally tie rehabilitation and reconstruction aid for the North-east to progress in the peace talks betw-een the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government is a clear example of this. In short, the Tamils get relief if the Tigers make concessions.

    The international community appears to sanction Sri Lanka''s collective punishment - backing Colombo during the ''war for pea-ce'' and by consistently commending Colombo for its ''restraint'' in the face of LTTE provocations. The international community supported President Chandrika Kum-aratunga''s draconian embargo on food and medical aid during the last round of fighting. It agreed with President Kumaratunga''s logic that essentials could be blocked from hundreds of thousands of people ''lest it get into the hands of the LTTE fighters'' - who numbered just thousands.

    More recently, President Mahinda Rajapakse, then Premier, argued in favour of blocking international tsunami-relief aid from the Northeast for the same reason. Later, after the joint mechanism for tsunami relief was signed by the LTTE and the Sri Lankan state, the international community stood by as the deal was smashed in the courts.

    Inconsistency

    International aid, however, flowed to Sri Lanka anyway. Just not to the Tamils. To intervene and save the deal would be to undermine the constitution of a democratic state, the argument went. That the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) and the entire peace process itself are contraventions of the Sri Lankan constitution do not seem to matter however.

    Were the Tamils to follow the advice of the international community and indeed seek alternative means of redress for their ''legitimate grievances'' other than backing the LTTE, there appear to be few viable avenues. Democrati-cally elected Tamil politicians who effectively promote the demands of the Tamils have been assassinated by the state''s armed forces or associated paramilitary organisations. Journalists and civil society activists sympathetic to the Tamil case have also been targeted by the Sri Lankan military. All this with international impunity.

    At odds

    The failure by the international community to take tangible measures to deter the Sri Lankan state from crushing Tamils'' efforts to peacefully seek a solution to the ethnic question is at odds with the oft stated position that the international community is sympathetic to Tamil grievances but objects only to the LTTE''s violence.

    The international political space for Tamils to argue their case for an autonomous state to resolve their problems is also being systematically closed. The draconian anti-terrorism legislation which been implemented in many Western democracies and the proscription of the LTTE in most of these jurisdictions has made promoting greater Tamil autonomy, and certainly any identification with the objectives of the LTTE, an unlawful act.

    Disconcerting

    And whilst domestic and international avenues for articulating Tamil demands and sentiments are obstructed there is no suggestion from the international community as to how precisely the Tamils are meant to peacefully pursue their demands.

    Perhaps the most disconcerting aspect of the counsel being offered to the Tamil people by the international community is the repeated reference to abstract ''legitimate grievances.'' There is no sense, however, that the international community actually understands what the Tamils themselves want. When pushed for a response, some international officials suggest the Tamils simply need more jobs and greater equality in Sri Lanka''s polity.

    Such opinions display a shocking lack of understanding as to what drives Tamil support for the LTTE. Tamil grievances existed long before the LTTE. It is correct that these initially stemmed from obstacles to higher education and economic opportunities. However, the Tamil community largely overcame these obstructions and carried on whilst agitating for their removals.

    Trigger

    However, widespread support for armed struggle resulted directly as a reaction to state sponsored violence against the Tamils. It is no coincidence that a smouldering Tamil militancy exploded in the wake of the infamous July 1983 pogrom.

    During the conflict, the state implemented brutal ethnic cleansing programmes that sought to change the demographics of the Northeast, destroyed Tamil cultural treasures (for example the Jaffna library, numerous temples and churches), imposed the embargo and routinely used indiscriminate bombing and shelling. (It is these factors which have served to united the full spectrum of Tamils, from academics to unemployed youths, behind the concept of an independent state.)

    Therefore, addressing Tamil grievances primarily means addressing their security concerns. And it is at this point that the interests of the Tamil people and those of the international community abruptly diverge.

    Weak constitution

    To begin with, solutions such as rewriting Sri Lanka''s constitution are not credible forms of security for the Tamils. The original British-supplied constitution offered some protections to minorities. But these were overturned with hardly any effort by the Sinhala polity. The present constitution was introduced without the approval of the Tamils. And, in any case, Sri Lankan leaders regularly violate the constitution for their personal ends with impunity. What protection can a constitution be, especially against majoritarian communalism, under these circumstances?

    This, not some romantic longing, is the Tamil drive for independent statehood.

    Power

    Moreover, there appears to be a direct correlation between international ''recognition'' of the need to address ''Tamil grievances'' and military strength of Tamil militancy. Throughout the conflict, the international community has offered substantial financial and military backing to every administration in Colombo with little regard for its invariably inhumane approach to the Tamil problem. It is Colombo''s military inadequacy which has led to this sudden recognition of Tamil ''grievances'' and, therefore, a peace process.

    The addressing of Tamil security concerns is the point at which all pragmatic and progressive political discussions on resolving the conflict cease and the international community''s focus on coercively subduing Tamil ambitions commence. The irony of demands by the EU and the US that the LTTE ''be prepared to decommission'' and ''renounce terrorism'' respectively coming amid the widespread killings of civilians by state forces seems lost.

    One constant

    The one constant of the Sri Lankan conflict has been the unwavering support offered to the Sri Lankan state regardless of which party or individual is in power. From President JR Jayawerdene who unleashed the 1983 pogrom to President Mahi-nda Rajapakse, whose government has demonstrated it will use vicious violence to subdue the rebellious Tamils, the international community has sanctioned and colluded with Sinhala leaders whose actions, by the very liberal standards preached to the LTTE, morally reprehensible.

    As an aside, while it is the Tigers'' past violence (terrorism) which is apparently a bar to their legitimacy, at the same time few international diplomats dare criticise the Janatha Vimukthi Peram-una (JVP), despite its proud annual celebrations of its bloody past. A disturbing but not inconceivable thought is that even the JVP would enjoy international support should it come to power in Sri Lanka, irrespective of its policies.

    Throughout the conflict numerous determined international efforts have been made to curb Tamil ambitions for freedom; from the restriction of political space abroad for the LTTE and the articulation of Tamil demands to the provision of substantial weaponry to the Sri Lankan state and, of course, vast financial support. These efforts have frequently included attempting to split the Tamil militancy from its support base. Methods have ranged from the targeted disbursement of aid to areas only government controlled areas (to draw Tamils away from the LTTE areas), to proscribing the LTTE as a terrorist organisation (and frightening the Tamil Diaspora into not funding it).

    Nothing doing

    By contrast, the international community has done nothing to force the Sri Lankan state to seriously address Tamil ''grievances.'' None of the pressures (including a range of sanctions easily deployed against a weak state like Sri Lanka) deployed against other errant states have been used. Economic sanctions or restrictions on the purchase of military equipment or even limited isolation have not even been threatened. Instead, some of Sri Lanka''s most vicious military commanders have been accepted as ambassadors to Western countries.

    International policy makers appear to believe that defeating the LTTE, and with it any hopes of addressing Tamil security concerns, should be their primary objective in the region. Perhaps these are based upon some abstract analysis of the strategic value of the island and the greater good it serves despite the repercussions for this abused minority. The circumstances of the Tamils is one of the most glaring examples of the moral bankruptcy of the contemporary international system. Having embarked upon this path of siding with the morally reprehensible, the international community has betrayed the values they claim to uphold.

    We cannot expect this situation to change. The only hope for the Tamils is that the strategic balance underpinning the peace process is restored or even titled in their favour. Only this will compel a rethink in the capitals of the states backing the peace process and make resolving ''Tamil grievances'' integral to their own
  • Legitimacy can only flow from power
    When the Norwegian sponsored peace process began more than four years ago, there were many in the Tamil community who asked why the LTTE was stopping its armed struggle when it seemed to be in a position of strength, having only just recaptured huge swathes of territory and inflicted heavy losses on the Sri Lankan military.

    It became clear, particularly as the peace process unfolded, that the LTTE was seeking to gain a measure of legitimacy in the eyes of the international community (the LTTE maintains that it has already established its legitimacy amongst the Tamils, who continue to provide recruits and support, by fighting the Sri Lankan state to a standstill and precipitating the conditions in which Colombo and, for that matter, the international community, had to engage seriously with their political demands).

    Beginning

    In 2002, therefore, the LTTE expected its participation in the internationally monitored ceasefire and associated Norwegian peace process to enable the international community to engage with itself and the Tamils and to ascertain for themselves the extent of the support the organization enjoyed on the ground. Secondly, and consequently, it expected the international community to help establish a peaceful transition to Tamil-self rule (whatever form that would ultimately take).

    The LTTE attempted through numerous means to establish this legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. It used the ballot box, the backing the Tamil National Alliance, which, having on the basis of ''LTTE as sole representatives of the Tamils'' swept the polls in the Northeast. The LTTE''s support organisations staged a series of massive public rallies drawing hundreds of thousands of people across the Northeast and the Diaspora.

    To no avail

    The LTTE also attempted to establish a temporary governance mechanism (the Interim Self Governing Authority) incorporating many of the values demanded of the international community and when that was thwarted, a multi-ethnic power-sharing mechanism of limited scope and duration to meet the desperate needs of the people in its controlled areas (the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure).

    All to no avail. Perhaps convinced the LTTE''s participation in the peace process stemmed from military weakness, the international community refused to acknowledge the LTTE''s numerous attempts at legitimising itself. But the international community did more than ignore the LTTE''s effor-ts. In some cases, it worked actively to undermine and thwart them.

    Pullback

    No sooner had the P-TOMS been signed, the United States announced it not would not contribute any funds through the agreed mechanism. Whilst unwilling to fund the joint mechanism even though, as US embassy spokesman Philip Frayne said, "[it] holds the prospect for efficient and equitable reconstruction assistance to those affected by the tsunami," the United States insisted on continuing to fund the Sri Lankan state. This was even though the state had been criticised by donors for its inequitable distribution of aid in the wake of the tsunami.

    Another example of the inherent anti-LTTE, pro-state bias of the international community is its unabashed lack of commitment to the conditions attacked to the aid pledged in Tokyo three years ago this month. The 2003 Tokyo Declaration states: "assistance by the donor community must be closely linked to substantial and parallel progress in the peace process towards fulfilment of the objectives agreed upon by the parties in Oslo".

    Weak link

    The donors made much of the US$ 4.8b pledge, asserting that a carrot was being dangled for both sides to get them to stay the course to peace. The reality is that, whilst the conditionality on the LTTE (and thus its controlled areas) remained, around 75% of the aid (over US$ 3.5b) was released anyway to the government (a quarter apparently went to the ''Northeast'' - in other words, to government controlled areas there).

    In effect, the international community continues to fund the Sri Lankan state despite the lack of progress in the peace process and this has continued even when the state is deliberately steering the island back to war.

    At the start of the Norwegian initiative in 2002, the international community asserted that ''a hurting stalemate'' - i.e. a balance of forces - had precipitated the peace process. This month the Sri Lankan government agreed to purchase $250 million worth of arms from Pakistan. But this, according to the logic of the international community, is acceptable because the state is fighting against the Liberation Tigers and therefore needs to be armed. The LTTE, however, has been criticised for shipping in arms, even though these could not amount to more than a fraction of the state''s purchases - and that was before this month''s orders to Pakistan.

    The problem

    In the eyes of the international community, any cycle of action and reaction always starts with the Tigers making the first negative move. The LTTE, not the state, is to blame for the war in the first place, the failure of the peace process and, ultimately, the present state of affairs.

    Throughout the peace process, any request by the LTTE (regardless of how reasonable it was or not) was always viewed through the lens of "what do the Tigers ga-in from this?" For example, when the LTTE called for the disbanding of the high security zones in the Tamil areas, the response of the Sri Lankan government - echoed by the international community - was that the LTTE was looking to move into those areas itself. There was no consideration of the 800,000 Tamil internally displaced people and refugees who still live in camps, unable to return to their homes inside the sprawling network of military bases.

    Double standards

    Similarly, the demand that Army-backed paramilitaries be disarmed - a call echoed from the outset by many Tamils, including the editorial column of this newspaper - was seen purely as an LTTE objective of weakening its opponents. But Sri Lanka has been brought to the brink of war precisely because the paramilitaries, secure the international community shared this view, were able to continue the Army''s shadow war against the Tigers.

    While the Tigers have been criticised, sometimes rightly, for their failure to live up to the very high expectations of a legitimate government, the same international community which has judged the LTTE wanting has refused to hold the Sri Lankan state to the sa-me standard. On the contrary, the Sri Lankan government has been praised for its military''s ''restraint'' at the same time that civilians were fleeing government-controlled territory (for LTTE areas or to India) and atrocities were being reported every day.

    Mechanics

    That Sri Lanka holds elections is enough to deem it a democracy in international eyes. It matters not that Sri Lanka is also a country where those targeting and killing Tamil civilians not only continue to enjoy impunity, but often rise in establishment ranks. To quote Am-nesty International, "there is a disturbing pattern of incomplete or ineffective investigations by the government, with the result that perpetrators of such violence generally operate with impunity." But the international community''s consideration for Tamils'' rights has been amply demonstrated by the lack of a single government willing to condemn the attacks on civilians by Sri Lankan military personnel.

    Consider, the massacre of 13 civilians in the islets off the coast of Jaffna, of which Amnesty said it has received: "credible reports that Sri Lanka Navy personnel and armed cadres affiliated with the Eelam People''s Democratic Party, a Tamil political party that is opposed to the LTTE, were present at the scene of the killings." But just two weeks after these killings, the US Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs, Richard Boucher, was praising the government, saying: "I told the President that we welcome the restraint that the government has shown in the face of many provocations by the Tamil Tigers."

    Hypocrisy

    In the face of international community''s hypocrisy - high standards for the non-state actor and seemingly non-existent standards for the state- what, if anything, does the LTTE gain by continuing to attempt to satisfy the demands of the international community? Indeed, it can be argued that rather than gaining, the LTTE - and, therefore, the Tamils - currently stand to lose more if they continue to blindly pursue an ever-denied international legitimacy.

    For example, if the Tigers fall in line with international - especially US - demands and disarm while Tamils are clearly without security, the LTTE will lose its legitimacy in the eyes of the Tamils (not to mention be wiped out by the security forces). From the Tamil perspective, when physical security is at stake, of what use is an organisation that cannot protect them?

    While recognising the LTTE to the extent that it has been included as a party at the negotiating table, the international community has worked hard during that process to weaken the organisation''s claim to legitimacy. This has been through repeated calls for additional (i.e. opposing) actors at the negotiating table, strengthening other organisations whose sole raison d''etre is their opposition to the Tigers, repeatedly condemning actions of the LTTE while keeping silent on the actions of the Sri Lankan government, and so on.

    Unheard

    It has also become clear the international community will not recognise the legitimate calls of the Tamil Tigers on behalf of the Tamil people. Instead the LTTE will perversely be blamed for their continued hardships.

    And legitimacy in the eyes of the international community might not be possible for the LTTE anyway - if the EU statement at the time of proscribing the Tiger is any indication, legitimacy seems to be awarded only to those who in fact oppose the Tigers.

    Little wonder then that after more than four years of engaging with the international community and attempting to demonstrate to the world their earned right to represent the Tamil people, the Tigers have now begun the process of reconsidering the efficacy of this approach.

    Fundamentals

    The Tamils have to consider the fundamentals of the present situation, to look at the cards they hold, as opposed to the cards they should have been dealt. Sri Lanka''s conflict went from a ''civil war'' somewhere in South Asia to an issue that necessitated Japan, US and EU as ''Co-chairs'' because of a dramatic change in the ground situation within Sri Lanka.

    As has often been argued, the actions of the international community have, if anything, hastened the slide towards another war. Now war is advocated not only by the nationalists of the south, but also by many Tamils who see power as the only currency that might bring the international community around to viewing their grievances as being genuine.

    And given that one interpretation of recent actions and statement by the European Union and the United States is that the LTTE have only been demonised to the extent they have because they are a non-state actor, if ever there was an argument for pursuing statehood, the international community has, over the past few weeks, convincingly made it.
  • Army steps up raids
    Sri Lanka’s military last week stepped up deep-penetration raids into Tamil-Tiger controlled territory, killing several civilians and a senior LTTE officer. The attacks come amid continuing daily violence in government-controlled parts of the Northeast.

    On one hand there are daily gun and grenade attacks on Sri Lankan security forces and on the other, Sri Lankan security forces have fired at and shelled LTTE positions. Meanwhile Army-backed paramilitaries and troops continued what international monitors have described as a ‘campaign of targeted killings.’

    Last week the Sri Lanka Army stepped up deep penetration raids into LTTE-controlled Vanni, launching them out of government controlled areas to the south of the Vanni region. There were also raids into LTTE controlled regions of the Batticaloa district from the government controlled ones.

    Sri Lankan commandos conducted both targeted killings of LTTE members and employees of LTTE administration services, but also conducted random attacks on civilians traveling in bullock carts and bicycles.

    The Sri Lankan troops are drawn from the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) unit also known as Deep Penetration Unit (DPU).

    Lieutenant Colonel Mahenthi, an LTTE Commander in the Mannar district, was killed along with three LTTE cadres in a claymore attack carried out by SLA soldiers on Saturday.

    On Monday, pilgrims going to the Vatrapalai temple festival narrowly escaped a claymore mine blast on the Nedunkerny-Mulliavalai road.

    Four health officials of the Tamil Eelam Health Service Mobile Medical Service were wounded when LRRP commandos triggered a claymore on Thursday at Akkarayan, 20 km from Kilinochchi.

    On Tuesday this week, members of a Tamil auxiliary brigade surprised LRRP commandos planting mines on the Nedunkerni road between Nainamadu and Puliyankulam. One LRRP soldier and two auxiliary fighters were killed in the ensuing firefight.

    The LRRP team withdrew, leaving behind the body of their dead comrade. The LTTE recovered the equipment packs, communication sets after the battle.

    The escalation of violence comes amid heightened fears of renewed conflict. About 500 people have been killed since early April, raising fears that a 2002 cease-fire between the LTTE and the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) might collapse.

    Amid the violence, the European Union’s decision to proscribe the LTTE as a terrorist group has outraged the Tigers who have demanded that EU countries remove their nationals from the Nordic group of monitors overseesing the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA).

    Last week an LTTE delegation met with the heads of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) and Norwegian facilitators to state the demand and to discuss the ongoing violence and the dispute over the sea movements by the Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) and the Sea Tigers.

    LTTE officials said the SLMM had agreed to desist from traveling on SLN vessels after the LTTE insisted they must either travel on both sides’ craft or neither’s. In recent months, SLMM monitors on SLN vessels have had narrow escapes when clashes erupted between the two sides.

    The government has recently also clashed with the monitoring mission after truce monitors said troops appeared to be involved in extrajudicial killings and the government appeared to be supporting anti-Tiger Tamil armed groups despite denials.

    Reuters this week quoted analysts say that without talks, it may be almost impossible to stop an escalation in violence and a return to civil war.

    Security has been stepped up in Colombo to levels before the Frbaury 2002 truce with increased numbers of road blocks and check points.

    Last week the LTTE delegation in Oslo refused to meet a Sri Lankan delegation invited simultaneously by the Norwegian facilitators as Colombo had dispatched a low-level delegation.

    The LTTE said it was prepared to allow the head of its Peace Secretariat, S. Puleedevan meet his Sri Lankan counterpart, Palitha Kohana, who was heading the GoSL delegation, but the latter refused.

    Before leaving Oslo, the LTTE issued a statement saying the Tigers would continue to press their goal of self-determination for the Tamils.

    Meanwhile, Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse has appointed a think tank to assist him in formulating a draft framework towards a final solution to the long drawn-out armed conflict.

    It is headed by the ultra-Sinhala nationalist constitutional lawyer H. L. De Silva who at talks held in Geneva in February spearheaded GoSL’s efforts to have the CFA declared unconstitutional and void.
  • Sri Lanka reason for offensive ‘spurious, deceptive’
    Dismissing the Sri Lankan military’s justification for its latest major offensive against the LTTE in Sampur as “spurious” and “deceptive,” the Tigers’ political representative in the area said the LTTE first fired on the naval base in Trincomalee when resisting the SLA’s initial offensive in late July.

    Sri Lanka’s military has justified a major offensive launched Monday against the LTTE in Sampur as necessary to safeguard the Trincomalee naval base from LTTE artillery based in the enclave.

    However, the LTTE’s Trincomalee district head, Mr. S. Elilan, said Friday that the LTTE first fired on the base to fend off a major ground offensive launched in July by the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) against the LTTE in the Maavil Aru area.

    “Since April this year the Sri Lanka military has conducted several bouts of sustained air and artillery bombardment against our controlled areas in Trincomalee,” Mr. Elilan told reporters Sunday.

    “In April, several villages in LTTE-controlled areas were flattened by artillery and multi-barrel rocket launchers. Fifteen civilians were killed. Yet [even then] we did not fire on the Trincomalee naval base,” he said.

    “Since then the Sri Lanka Air Force has repeatedly bombed our areas and the Sri Lanka Army has repeatedly shelled and rocketed our areas. Yet we did not fire on the base,” he said.

    “It was only when Sri Lanka’s military launched a deliberate offensive in the Maavil Aru region with the intention of invading and occupying LTTE-controlled territory that we were compelled to fire on the base as part of a wider defensive counter-offensive,” he said.

    “In particular, it was the deliberate targeting and destruction of civilian settlements in our controlled areas which killed and wounded many people and displaced tens of thousands that necessitated a major defensive operation,” Mr. Elilan said.

    “But as part of our counter-attack, we were careful to minimise civilian casualties – LTTE artillery was precisely directed at selected military targets in the Trincomalee base,” he said.

    “Sri Lanka’s military is continuing to wage a campaign of deliberate displacement against the Tamils,” Mr. Elilan charged.

    40,000 Tamil civilians from Trincomalee have fled their homes and sought safety in southern Tricnomalee/northern Batticaloa, and now the Sri Lankan military was blocking international and local aid agencies from accessing the displaced to help, he said.

    The World Food Program (WFP) has material for only half the displaced people and that, moreover, for a very short time, he said.

    Mr. Elilan said he had met with the officials of the UN refugee agency, UNHCR, who have ascertained the extent of the humanitarian crisis in the Vergual/Vaharai area.

    Although the vast numbers of displaced are known to the international agencies, including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Sri Lankan government is justifying the blocking of aid on the basis it is not needed.

    The Government Agent (GA) for Trincomalee, a retired Sri Lanka Army Major General, is refusing to approve aid supplies also, Mr. Elilan told reporters.

    The GA is justifies the blocking of aid to where the displaced have taken shelter by simply claiming everybody in that area has fled and no one is left to feed.
  • Villages destroyed in ‘scorched earth’ advance
    The Sri Lanka Army (SLA) is deliberately razing Tamil villages to the ground as part of its military offensive against the LTTE in Muthur East region of Trincomalee, LTTE officials said last week.

    Through Norwegian facilitators, the LTTE has condemned in the “strongest possible terms Sri Lanka’s ‘scorched earth’ policy of occupying Tamil civilian centers and rendering them uninhabitable,” the LTTE’s military spokesman, I. Ilanthirayan, said Friday.

    A scorched earth policy is a military tactic which involves destroying anything that might be useful to the enemy while advancing through or withdrawing from an area.

    The SLA offensive, launched Monday was being directed through civilian settlements of the region, he said last Friday.

    Sri Lanka’s army says it is targeting LTTE camps and artillery bases, justifying its offensive as necessary to safeguard the Trincomalee navy base.

    More than 1,200 Tamil families have been evacuated to safety in the past week, Mr. Ianthirayan said mid-last week.

    The SLA has occupied and destroyed the Tamil villages of Kaddaiparichchan, Senaiyoor, Kaneshapuram and Ambalnagar, Mr. Ilanthirayan said.

    The villages were bombarded with heavy artillery and multi-barrel rocket launchers before ground troops occupied them, LTTE officials in Sampur said.

    Subsequently cultivated fields and livestock were destroyed, they added.

    As thousands more Tamil civilians join the two hundred thousand people displaced this year in Sri Lanka military air and artillery bombardments and ground offensives, the Sri Lankan government is deliberately compounding the displaced people’s difficulties, they said.

    “Sri Lanka’s renewed military aggression has aggravated the deep humanitarian crisis [in the region],” Mr. Ianthirayan said. “The Sri Lankan military is maintaining a blockade on international and local NGOs providing emergency supplies for the displaced.”
  • Rajapakse hails Sampoor ‘capture’
    Sri Lanka Army (SLA) troops have advanced into Sampoor village in the LTTE-controlled part of the eastern Trincomalee district and are consolidating their positions, the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) said Monday.

    LTTE political officials slammed the invasion as a severe breach of the February 2002 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) said further fighting was ongoing in the Sampoor region.

    “This is a severe breach of the ceasefire agreement with the Sri Lankan military taking LTTE-controlled areas,” S. Puleedevan, head of the LTTE peace secretariat, told Reuters.

    “They (GoSL) are not honoring the ceasefire agreement. They are forcing it to the brink of collapse,” he added.

    “On our side we are fully committed to it,” Mr. Puleedevan said.

    “Our troops have captured Sampoor,” a jubilant President Mahinda Rajapakse said to thunderous applause at a rally to mark the 55th anniversary of the founding of his Sri Lanka Freedom Party, AFP reported.

    President Rajapakse defended the latest military offensive and praised Sri Lanka Army (SLA) chief Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka.

    President Rajapakse’s announcement comes a week after the military launched a major ground, air and sea offensive towards LTTE-held Sampoor, sparking heavy fighting.

    Reuters quoted analysts as saying the Tigers appeared to have pulled out of Sampoor, a tiny settlement containing a handful of rough houses and shops, a Sea Tiger memorial and an LTTE political office.

    “It looks as though the LTTE pulled out without any direct confrontation because of the artillery fire from the armed forces,” Sri Lankan military analyst Iqbal Athas told Reuters Monday.

    Most of the civilian population had already fled south, amid heavy Sri Lankan air and artillery bombardments.

    The government said Sunday 14 soldiers had been killed and 92 wounded since the Sampoor offensive began a week earlier and estimates around 120 Tigers were killed there by the weekend.

    But on the first day off the offensive alone, AFP reporting from Trincomalee said 11 soldiers had been killed and 79 wounded, mainly by LTTE artillery and mortars.

    And the Tigers said they early last week they had lost 12 fighters defending Sampoor and had killed around 50 SLA soldiers.

    Tamil television footage Friday showed LTTE cadres moving around burning SLA APCs after one battle which left 10 soldiers dead.

    The Tigers in the Sampoor region were continuing to put up resistance that had slowed the SLA advance, LTTE officials said Monday.

    It has taken over a week for the thousands of Sri Lankan troops to move the 3.5 kms from its Kaddaiparichchan base to Sampoor village, they said.

    Last Monday, troops from Pachchanoor and Pallimunai SLA camps attempted to advance into Sampoor via Thoppur and Kilathimunai, Trincomalee

    The initial two-pronged offensive was later changed amid stiff LTTE resistance, with one line of advance, through Thoppur, being abandoned, Tamil press reports said.

    SLA troops were instead diverted to the advance through Kaddaiparichchan, a move which allowed LTTE forces in the Sampoor area to conduct an orderly withdrawal past Thoppur.

    The Sri Lanka military had virtually suspended the ground advance through Kaddaiparichchan at the weekend, following intense LTTE resistance there, AFP reported.

    SLA troops advanced when the Tigers moved out of Sampoor to avoid heavy Sri Lankan bombardment, analysts said.

    “The only resistance we encountered was mines and booby-trapped devices.” Government spokesman Minister Keheliya Rambukwella told AFP.

    “We captured the main Sampoor artillery position of the Tigers. We suspect they dismantled the guns or pulled them back. We are now in Sampoor,” he said.

    The government had justified its offensive against LTTE-held Sampoor on the basis LTTE artillery there was threatening the Navy base at Trincomalee harbour, 10km across the Koddiya Bay.

    “This is not war, we are only responding to an attack on us,” President Rajapakse told the SLFP rally.

    However the LTTE says it was compelled to fire on the base to defend against a major Sri Lankan offensive launched July 21 against its positions in Maavil Aru, Trincomalee on the pretext of opening a disputed water channel.

    Speaking to TamilNet Monday, Head of the LTTE Political Wing in Sampoor, Mr. S. Elilan, said that Sri Lanka government’s “undeclared aggression” began in April.

    From the outset, the Sri Lankan strategy has centred around the targetting of civilian centres and the creation of a humanitarian crisis, he said. “Since April 97 civilians have been killed, 215 wounded and 46,000 displaced.”

    Aid workers say the government is hampering access to Tiger-held territory, and obstructing their operations by insisting staff obtain special work permits to go to the north and east, Reuters reported Monday.

    “I think the idea is try and stop aid reaching LTTE areas,” an aid worker told Reuters on condition of anonymity.
  • WFP says food situation ‘critical’ amid MoD embargo
    The food situation in LTTE-controlled areas is becoming ‘critical’ the World Food Program (WFP) announced last week as Sri Lanka’s Defence Ministry maintained its blockade on the regions.

    “ In spite of high-level negotiations between the UN and the Government, the issue of access to areas not under Government control has not been resolved,” the WFP said.

    WFP said its staff “are [still] operating inside both the Vanni and Jaffna, but all supplies are running low in these areas due to the closing of the access roads by the Ministry of Defence.”

    According to the UN refugee agency, UNHCR, the number of displaced people has risen to 204,000 persons in both LTTE-controlled and Government-controlled areas. The vast majority are Tamils. Tens of thousands are Muslims in the eastern province.

    “The food situation in the LTTE-controlled Vanni is becoming critical as food stocks are being depleted,” the WFP said, adding that shelling by Sri Lanka’s armed forces had sparked major displacement of people.

    “One of the major constraints in the implementation [of WFP duties] is the lack of access to LTTE-controlled areas where an estimated 60,000 IDPs are located.”

    “IDPs in the Vanni are also receiving WFP rations from the local authorities but the numbers will soon surpass the [available] food stock levels.”

    In the period the WFP ‘Emergency Report’ covered, 10-23 August, “[Sri Lanka Army] artillery shelling by night continued in Kilinochchi, Trincomalee and Jaffna with aerial bombing in Pallai and Pachchilaipalli.”

    “Trenches are being dug in Government offices, NGO offices and internally displaced peoples’ camps in Kilinochchi to mitigate the damage of aerial bombing,” WFP said.

    “[In Vanni] there is a severe shortage of food, water and medical supplies/equipment in hospitals. Fuel is in short supply and sold at 400% its normal price. Pipe borne water is available only for 4 hours per day.”

    “Restrictions on the import of fuel into the Vanni and Jaffna and the lack of cash availability inside the Vanni and Jaffna are continuing.”

    40,000 other Tamils are displaced in the northern Jaffna peninsula.

    “Overall the number of internally displaced has risen to 204, 000 persons in both LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) controlled and government controlled areas including many persons whom WFP must feed from declining levels of available food stocks.”

    “Supply of commodities to the districts affected by the recent conflict and security situations is not moving as desired,” the WFP said.

    WFP’s Country Director in Sri Lanka Jeff Taft-Dick was quoted in press reports as saying that, “without better access, WFP will not be able to continue feeding displaced persons living in the areas outside of government control.”

    The Sunday Leader newspaper reported Sunday that Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Ministry, officially tasked with addressing the humanitarian crisis has not done so, despite the urging of the international community due to restrictions on movements [of aid and aid workers] imposed by the Defence Ministry.
  • 11,000 refugee arrivals in India
    MORE than 11,000 Tamil refugees have fled to India since January to escape renewed fighting between the Sri Lankan army and Tamil Tigers and more are likely to come, officials said Thursday.

    The figure includes a batch of about 500 refugees who travelled by boat to reach Mandapam camp in southern India`s Tamil Nadu state late Wednesday, said a senior government administrator from Ramanathapuram district.

    Ramanathapuram, 700 kilometres (434 miles) from Chennai, capital of Tamil Nadu state, is the district nearest to Sri Lanka, ravaged by ethnic conflict since the early 1980s.

    “So far 3,310 (Tamil) families have crossed over since January this year,” said the Ramanathapuram official who asked to remain anonymous.

    “In figures, we are talking of 11,193 refugees,” he said.

    India, whose Tamil population totals 62.2 million, shares close ethnic and cultural links with the Tamil community in Sri Lanka, who living mainly in the island`s north and the east.

    The refugee tally was confirmed by C P Chandrahasan, who heads the Organisation of Eelam Refugees Rehabilitation, a non-government organisation in Chennai.

    “With the new refugees, we have more than 70,000 displaced Sri Lankan Tamils who have sheltered in India since the early 1990s,” said Chandrahasan, a Sri Lankan Tamil living in India since 1983.

    Chandrahasan warned of more refugees streaming into India because of the escalating violence in Sri Lanka.

    “People are obviously feeling threatened they feel there is no one to protect them. Naturally they want to flee to India,” he said.

    The latest exodus of refugees has come amid a bloody new phase in the three-decade ethnic conflict that has left a February 2002 truce in tatters.
  • Sri Lanka seizes TRO funds
    Amid a deepening humanitarian crisis in the Northeast, the Sri Lankan government last week froze the funds of the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO).

    The Central Bank said it had issued the directive on the basis of combating the financing of terrorism.

    The move has blocked $750,000 of TRO funds, raised by international donors and Tamil expatriates, primarily for tsunami-related rehabilitation and development.

    The TRO protested the freezing of its accounts, saying the Colombo government had made no communication with the NGO, which has been registered as a charity there since 1985.

    TRO appealed to international institutions, human right bodies and humanitarian organizations to make representations to the Sri Lanka Government and intimate the importance the continued functioning of TRO.

    “[We] also seek information and official notification from the Central Bank on the nature of its action and the reasons for such action with clear and precise details enabling TRO to respond adequately,” the charity said.

    “The Central Bank’s actions [to block TRO funds] will lead to further deprivation and suffering for the tsunami and war affected populations of the NorthEast. The people of the NorthEast will again be denied much needed relief, rehabilitation and development,” the TRO said in a statement.

    “The timing of this action by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka with callous disregard to its consequences truly shocks not only the TRO staff but also the Tamil Diaspora community,” the TRO said.

    “Since registering with the Government of Sri Lanka as a Charity TRO has responded to all requests for financial and project information from the Ministry of Social Services, the Ministry of Foreign Resources, and the Parliamentary Select Committee on NGOs promptly and exhaustively. There have never been any follow up questions or requests to testify before any committees or courts,” the TRO said.

    “TRO as always will assist and fully support any enquiry or investigation into any aspects of its operation, however, this action by the central bank exerts extreme pressure on its ability to operate and will negatively impact the tsunami and war affected populations.”

    The TRO said that the move to block its funds comes after a concerted campaign of intimidation and obstruction against its operations.

    “There had been a concerted, malicious campaign against TRO in the recent past.

    “Beginning with the attacks on TRO offices and continuing with the abduction and disappearance of 7 TRO staff members by paramilitaries, some members of the Government of Sri Lanka have sought to intimidate TRO staff and restrict the delivery of humanitarian relief and development to the war and tsunami affected communities of the NorthEast,”

    The Sunday Times reported the freezing of TRO funds was made known to TRO officials only when they sought to make a withdrawal from their accounts in Kilinochchi and in Colombo.

    TRO officials who went to the banks were told about the order and their cheques were not accepted.

    TRO Administration Director Lawrance Thilakar, said that no prior notice had been given to the organization though it was registered as a charity with the Sri Lankan government and has been functioning since 1985.

    Mr. Thilakar said relief work of the TRO would be affected as they are currently looking after persons displaced by the conflict as well as carrying out tsunami relief operations.

    TRO has thus far implemented over US$ 20 million in tsunami related projects benefiting all three ethnic communities in the island, using money donated by international donors and Tamil expatriates.

    60% of the $750,000 frozen last week were project funds for contractual obligations under the Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) TRO has signed with international NGOs and UN Agencies (UNICEF, Save the Children, Operation USA and the Nippon Foundation amongst others).

    40% of the funds were donated by the Tamil Diaspora to the TRO.

    In January this year the Sri Lankan government called on the US government to ban the TRO operations in that country. The matter was raised by Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera during his visit to the US.

    The TRO is registered as a charity organization in the US and functions in 28 other countries. In Britain, the Charity Commission examined the TRO after complaints by Colombo and subsequently a new charitable company known as the Tamil Support Foundation (TSF) was set up with TRO funds being transferred to the new trust and with the same staff.
  • British Tamils join global protest against EU ban

    Thousands of Tamils in Toronto
























    TNA parliamentarian Mrs Pathmini Sithamparanathan in London


























    Mr Yogan (right), a councillor for Royal Borough of Kingston with TYO officials inside UNICEF office - London

















    More than 3000 Tamils protested outside the UNICEF office in London
  • ‘Nobody can defeat us now’
    The Sri Lankan government and its forces, obsessed with the idea of destroying our movement, has, without realising the strategic advantages of making peace, used various counter insurgency tactics throughout the peace process to kill our cadres.

    Ramanan was a great inspiration for the LTTE fighters in the east of the island. He skilfully liberated our territories from Karuna when he defected to the enemy. Ramanan then went on to build up a strong force there under Commander Bhanu.

    We remember how in 1987 we lost two of our District Commanders, Pulendran and Kumarappa, when the Indians, mediating between the Sri Lankans and us, failed to save the lives of our commanders who were abducted by the Sri Lanka Navy in the seas during that peace engagement.”

    That tactic didn''t help the enemy quell our movement. In fact, few believed that we could resist the world’s fourth largest military might. But we did. We did so under the strategic guidance of our leadership and with the support base of our people. Even when we were forced to withdraw from Jaffna, the urban base, and lead the Tamil struggle from the remote jungles of Manal Aru, we achieved the unthinkable this way.

    We have shaken hands with the enemy on four different occasions in a bid to resolve the conflict peacefully. During this latest internationally assisted four-year peace engagement, our representatives have gone around and shook hands with many diplomats in Europe.

    The whole world has had the opportunity to come here during the peace process, if they truly wanted to understand our situation. Can we expect those who failed to understand our political plight during the last four years of peaceful engagement to ever be able to understand it?

    I can see the people of Tamil Eelam getting ready for the war. We know where we should stand –on the power of our people’s support, the guidance of our leader, on the sacrifices we have made for freedom in our own territory, be it Vavuniya, Jaffna, Mannar, Manal Aru Batticaloa, or Amparai.

    Nobody can defeat us now when the Tamil people have resolved to decide our own destiny.

    Funeral Photos
  • Colonel Ramanan mourned
    The remains of Colonel Ramanan, the most senior Tamil Tiger officer killed by Sri Lanka’s military since the February 2002, were buried with full military honour at the Thandiyady military cemetery last Wednesday.

    Col. Ramanan, deputy head of the LTTE military forces in Batticaloa district, was shot and killed by a Sri Lanka Army (SLA) sniper whilst he was inspecting LTTE positions at the Vavunativu Forward Defence Line (FDL) on Sunday May 21.

    Whilst several hundred people, including leading citizens, LTTE cadres and residents of Amparai and Batticaloa districts attended the military funeral, in Vanni, northern Sri Lanka, senior LTTE officers addressed memorials at Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi.

    Tamil National Alliance (TNA) parliamentarian Mr. P. Ariyanenthiran, LTTE Batticaloa district Commander Colonel Banu, Batticaloa Political Head Thayamohan, Women Political Head Kuveni, Commander Piraba, Chief of Head Office Amuthan, Head of Rajan College Keethan, LTTE Division Commanders, Tiger soldiers and several hundred civilians watched the final rites.

    Black flags were flown along streets, and shops, schools, offices and other institutions in Batticaloa Amparai districts were closed as the districts residents paid respects to the senior Commander Ramanan, a native Pallukamam in Batticaloa.

    The events in Vanni paying homage to Colonel Ramanan were held at in Kilinochchi and Puthukudiruppu.

    At both events, Thamilarasan, Col. Ramanan’s brother and Odduchuddan Regional Head of the LTTE, lit the lamp before the late officer’s portrait while another brother, Parathan, an LTTE cadre, garlanded it.

    Colonel Ramesh lit the flame of sacrifice at the Puthukudiruppu event and garlanded Col. Ramanan’s portrait. He was joined by Colonel Jeyam, senior LTTE member Mr. K. V. Balakumaran, Peace Secretariat Director, Mr. S. Pulidevan, Mr. Illanthirayan (Marshall) of the Peace Secretariat, Mr. Seeralan, Deputy Head of the political wing in Batticaloa District and Mr. S. Selvanayagam, the principal of the Maha Vidyalam.

    Colonel Jeyam addressed the event (see separate story), along with the other senior officials.

    Mr. Illanthirayan, former head of the LTTE Political Wing in Batticaloa, following Col. Jeyam, hailed the personal qualities of Col. Ramanan

    “Martyr Ramanan, knew every one in the southern Tamil Eelam and everyone there knew him. He was a master in translating our movement’s leader’s political and military strategies into skilful techniques in practice,” Mr. Illanthirayan said.

    “It was Colonel Ramanan who surmounted the efforts by the traitor Karuna to split the LTTE through the wedge of regionalism. Though he is no more with us, the techniques and tactics Colonel Ramanan developed will be with us in our struggle to achieve our desired goal,” said Mr. Ilanthirayan.

    Colonel Ramesh said: “All his feats in the struggle are not known because the victories he reaped and the way in which he achieved them cannot be openly revealed now. He was a great source of strength and a talented fighter in southern Tamil Eelam and he was killed precisely for these incredible qualities.”

    In Kilinochchi, Colonel Balraj, addressing the people gathered to pay respects to Ramanan said the late officer was a gifted planning officer skilled in handling information.

    Meanwhile, the LTTE Intelligence Chief Pottu Amman, in an interview to National Television of Tamil Eelam (NTT) Wednesday revealed that Ramanan was a key strategist behind the weakening of the Razeek paramilitary group in Batticaloa.

    Ms. Thamilini Head of the LTTE Women political wing said: “Each tragic loss in our struggle for liberation leaves us injected with fresh vigour and determination. Col. Ramanan is not dead. He is here with us in the numerous combatants in whom he had instilled all his talents and tactics.”

    Kandiah Ulaganathan, alias Ramanan, born in 1966, is from Palukamam, 21 km south of Batticaloa. He was enrolled for training in LTTE in 1986 after completing GCE (A/L) at Palukamam Kandumani Maha Vidyalayam.

    Ramanan emerged as a talented military leader during the LTTE’s war with the Indian Army. He served in Jeyanthan Brigade, one of the most feared infantry formations of the Liberation Tigers. His contribution was high in the Unceasing Waves operations against the Sri Lanka Army launched Jeyasikurui operation that was routed by the Tigers in Vanni.

    He was appointment as Chief of Intelligence Wing in Batticaloa and Amparai districts after Lt. Col. Nizam was killed in a Claymore attack.

    Commander Ramanan’s decision to leave the renegade LTTE commander Karuna was a major setback for the renegade’s plans to hold his ground in the east.

    He was appointed the Commander of Mavadimunmari division and later as Deputy Head of Batticaloa Amparai Military Wing of the LTTE under Special Commander Col. Bhanu.

    The day after the funeral, Sri Lankan commandos of the Special Task Force (STF) troopers went around the markets in Arayampathy and Kalavanchikudy areas in Batticaloa district assaulting many traders and forcing them to close their shops for five additional days, as punishment for their current two day voluntary shop shut down as a mark of respect for Col. Ramanan.

    The STF soldiers who regularly harass and attack Tamils civilians in the Batticaloa district had been infuriated by the successful hartal and the respect shown by local residents to the late Col. Ramanan, reports said.

    International ceasefire monitors of the SLMM who went to Arayampathy and Kalavanchchikudy regional markets following the complaints, subsequently inquired the STF, who denied any wrong doing. The SLMM has asked the traders to resume their usual business activities from Friday.


  • Senior LTTE commanders attend Col Veeramani's funeral

    Col.Veeramani






















    Col. Thurga, Col. Theepan and Col. Balraj, (the three officers are pictured (l-r) preparing to placing flowers on Lt. Col. Veeramani’s casket






















    Some of the public who came to pay their respect to Col Veeramani

  • Kohona: paramilitary links with ‘lowest rank’ of military
    Amidst increasing accusations against Colombo of Sri Lankan troopers alleged involvement in extra-judicial killings and the terror-campaign let loose on Jaffna islets, Dr. Palitha Kohona, the Head of Sri Lanka Peace Secretariat, said last week that he suspects there might be contacts with the paramilitary cadres and the lower rank Sri Lankan troops.

    Dr. Kohona, who, in keeping with the position of the Sri Lankan government, had been denying any link between anti-LTTE Tamil paramilitary groups and the Sri Lankan military, changed his position, in an exclusive interview to the Reuters.

    “[...] human contacts that were established during the three years of ceasefire may have continued. I don’t have any evidence as to whether they are continuing or not, but we suspect there might be,” the Head of Sri Lankan Peace Secretariat was quoted by the Reuters.

    “It is not going to be an easy task to ensure that government soldiers break off all their contacts that existed previously with the now Karuna’s men,” Kohona further said.

    He continued: “...given human nature, I wouldn’t be surprised that people fraternise with each other ... They fraternise, they drink with each other, they visit each others’ homes. As to what happens beyond that I do not know.”

    This is the first time, however, a Sri Lankan official has attempted to provide an explanation to the charges of paramilitary - military links.

    The Liberation Tigers have been accusing Colombo of violating a crucial clause of the Ceasefire Agreement. The clause 1.8 of the February 2002 agreement states that the Sri Lankan military should disarm the Tamil paramilitary groups within thirty days of signing..

    Although the Government of Sri Lanka again agreed to disarm the armed groups at the Geneva talks in February this year, paramilitary violence resumed within three days of the negotiations ending.

    The paramilitary violence, primarily located in the eastern province later spread to Vavuniya and Jaffna and, amidst counter attacks by the LTTE, has spiralled into a ‘low intensity war’ according to international ceasefire monitors.

    It has also derailed Norwegian-brokered peace talks between the LTTE and the government.

    “With the escalating paramilitary violence in the form of regular attacks on LTTE cadres and Tamil civilians ... I gravely doubt whether the Norwegians can perform any miracle to persuade the Tamil Tigers to participate in the peace talks,” LTTE chief negotiator Anton Balasingham told Reuters.

    The Tigers say talks are out until attacks on their fighters stop and the government creates a “conducive atmosphere”.

    “This [Kohona’s] confession clearly indicates the reluctance on the part of the government to sever relations with renegades or to contain their criminal violence,” Balasingham said.

    On April 30, an elite commando unit of the LTTE launched a surprise attack inside the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) controlled Welikanda in Batticaloa- Polonnaruwa border, killing at least 18 cadres of the paramilitary Karuna Group. Tigers also said they killed five Sri Lankan soldiers, including a Captain rank officer, who took part in a paramilitary rescue operation.

    Since the defection in April 2004 to the Sri Lanka Army of the renegade LTTE commander, Karuna, following the crushing of his rebellion against the LTTE leadership the violence against LTTE cadres and supporters has escalated sharply.

    Apart from prominent academics, journalists and political activists supportive of the Tamil nationalist struggle, many ordinary civilians suspected of sympathy for the Tigers and some with relatives in the LTTE have been murdered.

    Following the collapse of his rebellion in the face of a lightning offensive by the LTTE over the Easter 2004 weekend, Karuna escaped to Army-controlled territory with a handful of loyalists. They were given safe escort to Colombo by the Sri Lanka armed forces.

    Kaunra cadres have been operating out of safehouses in Colombo provided by Sri Lankan Military Intelligence (MI), deserters from his ranks say. At least one Colombo safehouse was attacked by suspected LTTE commanders in late 2004, resulting in the deaths of eight paramilitaries and their MI handler.

    Karuna himself established a close relationship with the one-time head of Military Intelligence, Sri Lanka Army Major General Shantha Kottegoda. It was during Kottegoda’s - then promoted to Lt. Gen. - tenure as head of the SLA that paramilitary violence against LTTE cadres and, primarily, supporters became widespread.
  • Who decides Tamils’ representatives?
    The European Union resolution on May 18, the first step towards proscribing the Liberation Tigers, also marked the EU’s transition from observer to a partisan participant in Sri Lanka’s conflict. There are a number of controversial aspects to the resolution, including, for example, the directive to the LTTE to go for talks with the Sri Lankan government “without delay” and “be prepared to decommission weapons.”

    But from a Tamil perspective, these need to be considered in the light of another controversial assertion in the resolution: that the EU does not recognise the LTTE as the “sole representative” of the Tamils. The resolution states that the EU “recognise that the LTTE does not represent all the Tamil peoples of Sri Lanka and calls on the LTTE to allow for political pluralisms and alternative democratic voices in the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka which would secure the interest of all peoples and communities.”

    Representational legitimacy is a much-debated and contested topic, one that has invoked considerable academic and lay discussion. But there are two related aspects of interest here – firstly, the impact of the EU statement on the ongoing internationally facilitated peace process, and secondly, whether the fact that this position has been expressed matters from a Tamil perspective.

    To begin with, it can be argued that one of the key drivers for the LTTE to involve itself in the Norwegian facilitated peace process was the opportunity it provided to improve its image abroad. The Norwegian initiative paved the way for the international community to examine the legitimacy of the LTTE’s claim to be the sole representatives of the Tamils. Indeed, this was the basis on which the Norwegian initiative began in 2002, with the LTTE demanding Sri Lanka’s proscription be lifted as a pre-condition and that it be treated with parity during the peace process.

    In short, the LTTE expected the internationally monitored ceasefire and associated peace process to enable the international community to engage with itself and the Tamils and to ascertain for itself the support the organisation enjoyed on the ground. It should be noted that the LTTE has always argued that its very existence and growth (argued to be predicated on the public’s willingness under conditions of war to supply both recruits and succour) is implicit evidence of broad-based support. In keeping with the expectations of the international community, there were two ways by which the LTTE could demonstrate the extent of its support base – through the ballot box and by its governance.

    Though not willing to participate directly in the Sri Lankan political arena, not least given the LTTE’s rejection of Sri Lanka’s Sinhala-Buddhist constitution, the LTTE backed the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), a coalition representing the four largest Tamil political parties, which in turn endorsed the LTTE as ‘sole representatives.’ It is notable that the TNA has been comprehensively successful at each election at which it has completed, sweeping not only the vast majority of the parliamentary polls in the Northeast, but also recently winning convincingly local government polls. Given that the TNA has always stood on a platform recognising the LTTE as sole representatives of the Tamils, its success at the polls can only be construed as political support for the Tigers amongst the Tamil population. In short, the Tamils voted for the LTTE by proxy.

    There is an important point here. The LTTE was not demonstrating its support base to the Tamils – having defeated the indiscriminate onslaught of the Sri Lankan armed forces, the LTTE had already achieved a near hegemonic position as the primary actor representing Tamil interests vis-à-vis the state. Therefore, the efforts at the ballot box were meant to underline to the international community the popular support the organization enjoyed.

    While legitimacy, particularly political legitimacy, is most easily proven through the ballot box, it can be reflected in other ways too, including popular demonstrations of support and solidarity. Even before the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement, the Tigers were able to mobilise mass rallies, both in the Army-controlled parts of the Northeast and across the Diaspora, expressing support for its leadership role. The mass attendances at the ‘Pongu Thamil’ rallies were meant – in time honoured tradition – as demonstrations of mass support for the LTTE. No other Tamil group, except the TULF before the armed struggle began, has come close to the numbers the pro-LTTE activists drew to the Pongu Thamil rallies.

    Moreover, despite threats and violence by Sri Lankan security forces and, especially, paramilitaries, the Tamil media, both in Sri Lanka and amongst the Diaspora, have become more vociferous during the peace process in their vocal support for the LTTE. Whether the media shapes popular opinion, or reflect it, it cannot be denied that the majority of the mainstream Tamil media are firmly supportive of the LTTE as the representatives of the Tamil people. Those formerly coy on the question the legitimacy of the LTTE now sometimes question the movement’s policies, but not its right to speak on behalf of the Tamil people on the political question.

    But with the EU ban coming at this historic juncture, the international community has effectively indicated that it neither wants to know nor cares as to whether the Tamils back the LTTE or not. In short, the EU has opted to declare itself what the Tamils ought to think. This has led many amongst the LTTE and the Tamils to question the point of the Norwegian peace process - of which the EU is a Co-Chair (along with Norway, Japan and the United States).

    Amid the frustration over the EU’s single-minded decision, there is quiet support amongst Tamils for the understated firmness in the statement by the LTTE’s chief negotiator, Mr Anton Balasingham: “the more the international community alienates the LTTE, the more the LTTE will be compelled to tread a hardline individualist path.” Amid rising violence and brutality against Tamil civilians by the Sri Lankan armed forces, some go further, querying why the LTTE still remains in a peace process that has now been proven to have delivered no benefits and is even devoid of a functioning ceasefire.

    Some members of the international community have questioned the LTTE’s legitimacy on the grounds that it has been accused of killing Tamil opponents. But for the past decade, these opponents are less political rivals than paramilitaries fronting a counter-insurgency campaign for the Sri Lankan state. Even the US State Department this year finally admitted the EPDP, et al are paramilitaries engaged in violence against the LTTE. In an unavoidable parallel, even the leading Western democracies have all now implemented draconian restrictions as part of the ‘war on terror.’ The LTTE’s security environment and policing requirements are no less complex.

    Others seeking to deny the LTTE’s legitimacy have done so on the grounds that the organisation is autocratic and therefore does not have the moral grounds on which to claim representative status. But this is to ignore the extensive administrative, judicial and legislative structures the LTTE has built up in areas under its control. The scale and nature of the decade-old civil administration, constituting a de facto state, in the LTTE controlled areas, are demonstrative of the organisation’s ability to meet the governing expectations of Western liberal norms. The point here is that the LTTE is not a political party – it is a de-facto state.

    But all the objections above precipitate an unavoidable question: if the LTTE are not sole representatives of the Tamils, who else represents them? All the other Tamil actors putting themselves forward have been comprehensively defeated at successive elections (ever since the oppressive conditions of war were lifted, allowing the Tamils to express their electoral preferences). Almost all the non-TNA political parties are paramilitary groups operating in the Northeast with the Sri Lanka armed forces. If the press reports are true, some attempt has been made to unify these paramilitary groups under one banner, but even this has proven a failure, with no support forthcoming from the people. And no wonder - the only reason these groups have been given any prominence by the internatonal community is solely because of their opposition to the LTTE – it is not as if they have any alternative platform to offer the Tamils.

    With regards the peace process, if the LTTE are not the sole representatives of the Tamil people, who else is to represent them at the table? Unsurprisingly, the EU certainly makes no attempt to answer that question. But in any case, on what basis is the EU attempting to tell the Tamil people that someone else (other than the organisation they electorally selected, not once, but thrice) should speak on their behalf? That the European Union has decided it won’t recognise the LTTE as the sole representatives of the Tamils does not take away the mandate the Tamil people have given them.

    The efforts of the European Union to deny the Tamil people their right to choose their own representatives and instead impose others on them will not lead to peace or even a peace process. Indeed all it will have achieved is to compel the LTTE to question the international community’s ability and willingness to resolve the real problems confronting the Tamils in Sri Lanka.

    The matter has assumed critical importance as Sri Lanka slides inexorably towards the brink. The Tamil perspective was raised succinctly last week by an LTTE commander, speaking at the funeral of a colleague shot dead by Army snipers. “The whole world has had the opportunity to come here during the peace process, if they truly wanted to understand our situation,” noted Colonel Jeyam. “Can we expect those who failed to understand our political plight during the last four years of peaceful engagement to ever be able to understand it?”
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