• Early lessons from S Ossetia conflict

    Although the fighting over South Ossetia is not over, and fighting for another Georgian enclave, Abkhazia, looks like developing, it is perhaps not too early to learn some tentative lessons from the crisis.

    1. Do not punch a bear on the nose unless it is tied down.

    Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili must have thought that Russia would not react strongly when he sent his forces in on the eve of the Olympic games to regain control of a territory he had insisted must remain part of Georgia, albeit with some form of autonomy.

    Yet Russia was always likely to respond. It already had forces there, leading the peacekeeping force agreed back in the easier days of 1992 between President Boris Yeltsin of Russia and President Edward Shevardnadze of Georgia, himself the former Soviet foreign minister who helped bring the Cold War to an end.

    Russia has been supporting the separatists in South Ossetia and handed out Russian passports to the population, thereby enabling it to claim that it was defending its own citizens.

    The result of what many see as his miscalculation is that President Saakashvili might well lose any hope of reasserting Georgian power in the enclave.

    2. Russia is in a determined mood, to say the least.

    Russia, as it has so often done in the past, sees itself being encircled.

    In a revealing interview with former BBC Moscow correspondent Tim Whewell earlier this year, an adviser to the then President Vladimir Putin, Gleb Pavlosky, said that the Russian leadership had concluded after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine that "this is what we faced in Moscow, that they would try to export this to us, that we should prepare for this situation and very quickly strengthen our political system..."

    What applied after Ukraine moved towards the West also applied as Georgia did the same. Moscow wanted to prevent any such internal revolution in Russia itself and therefore saw Ukraine and Georgia as hostile influences.

    It is not clear how far Russia wants to push this, but given that it says it wants to re-establish order in South Ossetia, that probably means a permanent presence, with no return to a Georgian government role. Diplomats think it unlikely that Russia will invade Georgia 'proper'.

    3. Remember Kosovo.

    Russia was mightily displeased when the West supported the separation of Kosovo from Serbia and warned of consequences. This might be one of them. Of course, Russia has not argued in this crisis that it is simply doing what the West did in Kosovo - that would undermine its own argument that states should not be broken up without agreement. But everyone knows that underneath, Kosovo is not far from its mind.

    4. Georgia is unlikely to join Nato anytime soon.

    Georgia and Ukraine were denied membership of Nato in April, although they were allowed to develop an action plan that could lead to membership one day.

    The Americans argued for both countries to be accepted, but the Germans and others countered that the region was too unstable for these countries to join at the moment and that in particular Georgia, a state with a border dispute, should not be given formal Nato support.

    5. Vladmir Putin is still in charge.

    It was Mr Putin, prime minister not president these days, who went to Beijing for the Olympic opening ceremony and who then rushed to the crisis region to take control of the Russian response. His language was uncompromising - Russia was right to intervene, he stated.

    6. Do not allow a cuckoo to police the nest.

    Mr Shevardnadze's decision in 1992 to allow Russia into South Ossetia as part of the peacekeeping force enabled a later and very different Russian government from the one led by Boris Yeltsin to gradually extend its influence and control. It was not hard for Russia to justify its intervention. It simply stated that its citizens were not only at risk but under attack.

    7. The West still does not know how to deal with Russia.

    Some of the old Cold War arguments are resurfacing, with no consensus about what to do. There are the neo-conservatives, led by US Vice-President Dick Cheney (and supported by Republican presidential candidate John McCain) who see Georgia (and Ukraine) as flag bearers for freedom which must be supported. In due course, they argue, Russia will be forced to change, just as the old Soviet Union was.

    Against that is the argument, expressed to the BBC for example on Sunday by the former British Foreign Secretary Lord Owen, that it is "absurd" to treat Russia like the Soviet Union and that Georgia made a miscalculation in South Ossetia for which it is now paying.

    8. Are borders in Europe to be sacrosanct for ever?

    It has been one of the rules of post-war Europe - borders cannot be changed except by agreement, as say in Czechoslovakia. Perhaps this rule has been applied too inflexibly. Yet governments like that of Georgia are reluctant to give up any territory, even when the local population is so clearly hostile and might be in that state simply as a result of some past arbitrary decision. It was the Soviet Union that created a semi-autonomous region of South Ossetia in Georgia in 1922. Nikita Khrushchev gave Crimea to Ukraine in 1954. Will this lead to trouble one day?

    9. August is good month in which to reflect on alliances.

    In August 1914, the First World War broke out following the assassination in June of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo. It did so because alliances had been formed in Europe which came into play inexorably. Russia supported Serbia, Germany supported Austria, France supported Russia and Britain came in when Belgium was invaded.

    Alliances must not be entered into lightly or unadvisedly. If Georgia had been in Nato, what would have happened?

  • Legal furore over Kosovo recognition
    The recognition of independence for Kosovo raises serious questions of international law as well as sensitive diplomatic difficulties.

    The United States and many European Union countries accept that Kosovo should no longer be formally part of Serbia.

    They will recognise a limited form of independence for Kosovo, as recommended in a report drawn up for the UN by the former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari.

    The EU is sending a major law and order mission to Kosovo, made up of 1,800 police and justice officials, including judges, in effect taking over from the current UN presence.

    Serbia itself, supported strongly by Russia, rejects independence for Kosovo. Serbia and Russia argue that there is no UN Security Council approval for the move and that the parties should continue negotiating until an agreement is reached.

    Serbia offered Kosovo autonomy but not independence.

    So what are the legal arguments for and against recognition?

    The arguments for

    After the war over Kosovo in 1999, the UN Security Council took control. In resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, it ordered the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (as it then was) to withdraw all its forces from Kosovo and hand Kosovo over to the UN.

    The problem is that although the resolution called for a "political solution to the Kosovo crisis", it did not specify what that solution should be.

    And there has not been any further Security Council resolution mandating independence for Kosovo.

    Many Western governments argue that because 1244 does refer to general principles that G8 foreign ministers had agreed in advance of the resolution, these should be used as the basis for the acceptance of independence now.

    These principles include the deployment in Kosovo of "international civil and security presences" and "facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status".

    EU legal opinion

    The European Union has drawn up, as it is required to do by EU procedures, a document to justify its own mission to Kosovo and the arguments deployed are the same as the ones used to justify recognition.

    The document basically argues that independence for Kosovo is within the spirit of 1244, if not strictly within the letter.

    The 1244 resolution also envisaged a final status process and did not constrain or pre-determine its outcome.

    "Acting to implement the final status outcome in such a situation is more compatible with the intentions of 1244 than continuing to work to block any outcome in a situation where everyone agrees that the status quo is unsustainable," it says.

    The document adds that this approach "will enable, rather than frustrate, the conclusion of the final status process envisaged in resolution 1244".

    And it gives approval to international recognition: "Generally, once a entity has emerged as a state in the sense of international law, a political decision can be taken to recognise it."

    Nato troops under the Kosovo Force (K-For) continue to be mandated by 1244, the opinion holds.

    As for the legality of the EU mission, the argument is that there is nothing to stop the EU from taking over from the UN, as 1244 simply refers to "international civil and security presences". In addition, it suggests that Kosovo could invite the EU to undertake this role.

    The document interprets references in the 1244 preamble to Kosovo being part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and to the "territorial integrity" of Yugoslavia as being non-binding.

    The arguments against

    The counter-argument by Serbia and Russia is simpler. It is that Serbia, the sovereign state, has not agreed to independence for Kosovo, that there is no Security Council resolution authorising the detachment of Kosovo from Serbia and that therefore its independence is illegal.

    Some European Union members - Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania - agree, though they have not blocked the EU mission.

    Serbia and Russia also say that 1244 itself gives no authority for independence. They point to article 10 of 1244 which authorises "substantial autonomy with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" for Kosovo, meaning, in their view, that 1244 blocks independence.

    And they argue that 1244 talks about international organisations being deployed in Kosovo "under United Nations auspices", which an EU mission would lack.

    Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had this to say on 12 February, in a translation by the RIA Novosti news agency in Moscow: "We are speaking here about the subversion of all the foundations of international law, about the subversion of those principles which, at huge effort, and at the cost of Europe's pain, sacrifice and bloodletting have been earned and laid down as a basis of its existence.

    "We are speaking about a subversion of those principles on which the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe rests, those [principles] laid down in the fundamental documents of the UN."

    The main principle he refers to is that borders should be changed only by agreement.

    In Russia and Serbia's view, since there is no agreement, there should be no recognition.


    Paul Reynolds is the BBC News website World affairs correspondent. He can be contacted at [email protected]


  • The defining of torture in a new world war
    The US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s defence of the practice of transferring prisoners around the world for interrogation relies a great deal on a definition of torture.

    In the US view, torture has to involve "severe pain" and harsh interrogations do not necessarily amount to torture.

    Ms Rice accepted that prisoner transfers, known as "renditions", take place and said they were not unusual. The French had moved Carlos the Jackal directly from Sudan that way in 1994, she pointed out.

    She did not adddress the issue of where these prisoners, thought to be senior al-Qaeda suspects like Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, the man who thought up the attacks of 9/11, end up.

    The Washington Post has alleged that there are or have been secret CIA prisons in Eastern Europe, Afghanistan and Thailand. By being located outside the US, they would avoid coming under the scrutiny of US courts.

    But as she set off a European visit during which the rendition flights and the ultimate aim of such flights will be a key issue, the Secretary of State stressed several times that the United States did not engage in torture.

    And it is really the torture issue which is the key. If the flights were simply for the purpose of moving prisoners between open court systems, nobody would complain.

    It is the idea that they are tortured in secret detention camps that has concerned critics and has forced Ms Rice to issue her statement.

    The United States acted, she said, in accordance with its legal obligations, among which is the 1984 UN "Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

    This defines torture as follows: "Torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind..."

    It will be seen that a lot depends on the definition of "severe."

    In a memorandum on 1 August 2002, the then Assistant US Attorney General Jay Bybee said that "the adjective severe conveys that the pain or suffering must be of such a high level of intensity that the pain is difficult for the subject to endure."

    He even suggested that "severe pain" must be severe enough to result in organ failure death.

    Such an interpretation would obviously leave an interrogator a great deal of latitude, and that memo was subsequently disowned by the Bush administration.

    What seems to have evolved is a series of interrogation techniques which in the US view do not amount to torture as defined by the UN Convention but which go beyond the simple business of asking questions.

    Recent reports on the American ABC News network, quoting CIA sources, listed six so-called "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques."

    1. Grab: the interrogator grabs a suspect’s shirt front and shakes him.

    2. Slap: an open-handed slap to produce fear and some pain.

    3. Belly Slap: a hard slap to the stomach with an open hand. This is designed to be painful but not to cause injury. A punch is said to have been ruled out by doctors.

    4. Standing: Prisoners stand for 40 hours and more, shackled to the floor. Said to be effective, it also denies them sleep and is part of a process known as sensory deprivation ( this was a technique used by British forces in Northern Ireland for a time until it was stopped).

    5. Cold Cell: a prisoner is made to stand naked in a cold, though not freezing, cell and doused with water.

    6. Water Boarding: the prisoner is bound to a board with feet raised, and cellophane wrapped round his head. Water is poured onto his face and is said to produce a fear of drowning which leads to a rapid demand for the suffering to end.

    Some or all of these techniques might be outlawed if the US Senate has its way. The Senate has approved by 90 to 9 a measure outlawing "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment."

    Again, much depends on definitions but President Bush apparently feels that McCain’s amendment would prevent the CIA from carrying out "enhanced" interrogation. He is threatening to veto the Bill onto which this prohibition has been tacked as an amendment. The White House and McCain, a former pilot who was himself tortured by the North Vietnamese, are trying to reach a compromise.

    Senator McCain has written against any ill-treatment of prisoners: "We should not torture or treat inhumanely terrorists we have captured. The abuse of prisoners harms, not helps, our war effort. In my experience, abuse of prisoners often produces bad intelligence because under torture a person will say anything he thinks his captors want to hear - whether it is true or false - if he believes it will relieve his suffering," he said in an article in Newsweek.

    He is particularly against "waterboarding". "I believe that it is torture, very exquisite torture," he said.

    But the administration clearly feels that the CIA’s hands should not be tied too tightly.

    Stephen Hadley, the US National Security Adviser, has spoken of the dilemma faced by governments which say they abide by the rule of law yet which need to get information to save lives.

    "The president has said that we are going to do whatever we do in accordance with the law. But you see the dilemma. What happens if on September 7th 2001, we had gotten one of the hijackers and based on information associated with that arrest, believed that within four days, there’s going to be a devastating attack on the United States?"

    One very grey area of the rendition policy is that sometimes a prisoner is handed over secretly to a country which itself carries out the interrogation. Such a country might not be so particular as to the methods used.

    There is a view among some lawyers that the US would violate international law if it knew of such practices by governments to which it hands over suspects.
Subscribe to Paul Reynolds