The continuing ‘shadow’ war between Sri Lanka’s security and paramilitary forces and the Liberation Tigers claimed scores of lives over the past two weeks amid widespread violence across the Northeast and also in Colombo.

Apart from a suicide bombing inside the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) headquarters in Colombo that claimed 11 lives and the subsequent government air strikes against Tamil villages in the east that claimed 18 lives, the shadow war claimed at least 90 lives over the past two weeks whilst many others were wounded.

These include several paramilitaries killed by LTTE commandos who overran their camps in government controlled part of the eastern province.

Additional several hundred Tamils have been arrested as the Sri Lanka military stepped up mass cordon, search and detention activities both in the Northeast and in Colombo.

May 1

Two Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) soldiers and four Tamil civilians were killed when a claymore fragmentation mine attached to a bicycle was detonated in Trincomalee town. Three SLN personnel and two civilians were wounded.

April 30

On Sunday evening, a 29-year old woman, who was shot and seriously injured by unknown gunmen near the old bus-stand in the Jaffna Islet of Velanai, succumbed to her injuries at the Jaffna Teaching Hospital. Two gunmen riding in a motorbike had fired at the woman as she was walking along the main road in the Army-controlled town.

Two SLN personnel were seriously injured in a claymore attack near Allaipitti in Kayts, within the SLN’s High Security Zone (HSZ). The injured soldiers were airlifted to Palaly military hospital.

The conductor of a private bus was shot dead at Power House road in Jaffna town, about 100 metres from SLA’s 51-2 Brigade HQ. The dead man was identified as M. Prakash, 25, of Columbuthurai who plied a bus between Muhamalai and Jaffna town.

Also on Sunday, a claymore mine was recovered by Valaichenai Police in Kiran, Batticaloa. Meanwhile, unconfirmed reports said that a high level Sri Lanka Army (SLA) officer and an SLA trooper were killed when their vehicle hit a mine after the pre-dawn attack on paramilitary camp in nearby Welikande.

Meanwhile, unidentified attackers lobbed a grenade at a check post located inside the high security area of the SLA’s 22-3 Brigade headquarters in Batticaloa Sunday, wounding a soldier. A cordon and search operation was launched following the attack, but there were no reports about arrests.

But in the island’s west, seven Tamil youths staying in Pesalai refugee camp, located along Talaimannar and Mannar road, were taken into custody by the SLN Sunday in a cordon and search operation. Pesalai refugee camp provides shelter to displaced villagers in 1990 violence from the districts of Mullaitivu and Killinochchi.

April 29

On Saturday a civilian injured in a claymore attack by an SLA Deep Penetration Unit in Thetchanamadu area of LTTE controlled Madhu area succumbed to his injuries. Mr. M. Jeevananthan, 24, was injured during the attack on Thursday and was transferred to the Jaffna Teaching Hospital Saturday morning for urgent surgery, but died during the operation.

Meanwhile, the SLA fired mortar shells towards LTTE-controlled Vavunathivu on Saturday, Daya Mohan, Head of Batticaloa district LTTE Political Wing told reporters. Several homes of residents of Mankikattu, Navatkudi and Puliyadikuda villages have been damaged but no one received any serious injuries, he said.

The attacks started when residents displaced by the earlier artillery shelling were returning to their residences, the LTTE district political had said. The mortar attacks continued for more than two hours and stopped only when members of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) visited the areas attacked, he added.

In another incident, two cadres of the Tamileelam Auxiliary Force were killed in a claymore attack carried out by a DPU of the SLA on Saturday in an LTTE-controlled part of the Manalaru region in the Mullaitivu district.

April 28

On Friday, gunmen on a motorbike shot and killed a Tamil youth at Urelu in Valikamam, Jaffna, and then rushed into the SLA camp in the area, villagers who chased the gunmen said. More than a hundred enraged villagers surrounded the SLA camp Friday night and Urelu was shut down in protest Saturday as the villagers launched a protest hartal against the killings. Protesting villagers say that the Urelu SLA intelligence camp is behind the killings in a terror-campaign targeting auto rickshaw drivers and traders.

Meanwhile, Sellathurai Asokan, 36, alias Asok, a former member of the LTTE, was shot dead by SLA commandos Friday at Mandur in the Wellaveli police division in Batticaloa. Asokan, a father one who had lost a leg in a battle during his seven year membership with the LTTE, was shot dead while he was riding his bicycle.

Separately, suspected Army-backed paramilitaries shot and killed two Tamil youths Friday near Kinnayadi Nagathambiran temple, Valaichenai. Two motorbike riding gunmen had killed the victims while they were crossing the river near the SLA camp in Kinnayadi.

In another incident, two men entering into the market on the Valaichenai-Kalkuda road on a motorcycle were shot at Friday by suspected paramilitaries travelling in a white van, residents in Kalkuda said. No one was injured and the gunmen sped away. The fleeing gunmen dragged in a youth into their white van, in front of the Valaichenai Annur National school and assaulted him. They fired shots into the sky before leaving the scene, said eyewitnesses.

Mr. A. G. Hussain Ismail, Vice Chancellor of the South Eastern University located in Oluvil in Amparai district, escaped an assassination attempt Friday, during which unidentified gunmen on a motorbike fired at his car four times when he was on his way to the varsity from his official guesthouse. Three bodyguards and another person travelling with the Vice Chancellor also escaped unhurt.

In a separate incident, two civilians were wounded when their water bowser was attacked by a claymore mine inside the LTTE controlled area at Madhu junction Friday. The bowser was returning after supplying water to personnel at the LTTE Forward Defence Line in Madhu.

Separately, unidentified attackers lobbed a grenade and shot at an SLA unit in Nanattan, 20 km south of Mannar town, wounding four soldiers on Friday. The soldiers opened fire for 15 minutes following the attack. More than 50 families fled into the nearest church.

Unidentified gunmen also shot dead a Tamil civilian Friday at Kallaikaadu in Mannar. SLMM monitors visited the scene and conducted an inquiry. About fifty-five families residing in the village are about to leave due to fear following the killing, press reports said.

April 27

In Jaffna, auto rickshaw driver Suresh Fernando, 35, was found shot dead Friday morning in Urkavathurai (Kayts). Shots were heard after he left home Thursday night, his relatives said. Fernando’s killing is the fourth murder of rickshaw drivers in Jaffna in the past few days - the first in Nelliyady, killing two and the second in Irrupalai, killing another.

Meanwhile, eleven youths arrested by Eravur police in the roundup of the Eravur public market Thursday remained under police detention and are yet to be produced at the Courts. More than 70 Tamils had been taken into custody for investigations by Eravur police in a cordon and search of the Eravur Muslim Public market. 21 Tamil youths were detained for further inquiries, including the 11.

Separately on Thursday, two men on a motorcycle lobbed a hand grenade into the SLA sentry point at the Thadatheru junction on the Kankesanturai road in Jaffna, seriously injuring two troopers. The soldiers fired at the attackers who escaped in their motorcycle. A Tamil youth passing by the place of the grenade attack after the roadblock was arrested by the SLA. His parents have registered a complaint with the Human Rights Commission office in Jaffna.

Two SLN troopers on a road clearing patrol in Urkavathurai, Jaffna, were killed in a claymore ambush Thursday.

In another incident, three SLA soldiers travelling to Vallakkulam near Vankalai in Mannar district were killed and three others seriously wounded in a claymore ambush Thursday. Two civilians bathing in Vallakkulam, including a 40 year-old woman, are missing.

Three Special Task Force (STF) elite troopers were injured in a claymore blast that targeted a road patrol at Kaddukarai kulam in Mannar Thursday. The STF is the elite counter insurgency arm of the Sri Lankan armed forces.

April 26

In Colombo, SLA soldiers and police arrested 97 Tamils from residences in the suburbs of Bambalapitiya, Collpetty, Dehiwela and others last Wednesday night through Thursday morning, and have detained them in Police stations across Colombo. The security forces and police conducted thorough search of several residences and lodges.

Meanwhile, SLA soldiers arrested Ms Bhavani Balasubramaniam, 47, a medical doctor from Jaffna, at the Colombo National Hospital last Wednesday morning. She had travelled to Colombo the previous day on a work related visit to the Colombo hospital. Other reports said she was arrested after she had accidentally wandered into the area where the SLA commander, Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka was being treated.

Also on Wednesday last week, three Tamil civilians were hacked to death and two children were abducted by Sinhala home guards at Thanganagar in Seruvila police division. The Sinhala home guards covered their faces with black clothes entered the houses of Tamil civilians and pulled up the inmates and cut them to death. Women in these houses had fled from the area, reports said.

SLA soldiers cordoned off and search the premises of the International Students Union office near Parameswara Junction, Wednesday morning. Soldiers ransacked the building and damaged students’ property.

Separately unconfirmed reports said a SLA trooper was injured in a grenade attack in Sithankerni area in Jaffna last Wednesday.

SLA soldiers also ransacked Tamil National Alliance (TNA) parliamentarian Mr. S. Gajendran’s office located inside the building, reports said. SLA soldiers also arrested one student who was later released and admitted to the Jaffna Teaching Hospital to receive treatment for injuries received while in SLA custody, student leaders told TamilNet.

In Vavuniya a senior member of the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), Mr. S. K. Senthilnathan, was shot by paramilitary gunmen last Wednesday and succumbed to his wounds at Vavuniya hospital. Mr. Senthilnathan, a popular trader, was a candidate for the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) in the local elections to be held in Vavuniya.

April 25

Amid escalating violence following the suicide bombing in Colombo and army bombardment of Muttur east in Trincomalee, violence escalated elsewhere in the Northeast also.

Two civilians and two SLA soldiers were killed in Jaffna district Tuesday night. One was shot dead by unknown gunmen at his relatives’ residence in Urumpirai, Jaffna Tuesday night and the other was shot by SLA soldiers during a cordon and search operation near the fish market in Chavakachcheri.

Two SLA soldiers were killed when they were attacked by unknown gunmen in Inuvil, Thuraiveethi area. Following the attack, additional SLA troops arrived at the scene and arrested several traders from the area.

A Tamil civilian, Mr. S. K. Raveendran, 36, was shot and killed inside the SLA High Security Zone (HSZ) in Omanthai on April 25.

Also on Tuesday, Dr. S. Arulanantham, 44, a qualified doctor who ran a private medial clinic at his home in Mattakuliya, Colombo, was shot dead by two unknown gunmen inside his clinic.

Three SLA soldiers and three civilians were injured in four incidents of grenade attacks in Jaffna peninsula Tuesday. In one attack by unknown assailants near the Kondavil,, two SLA soldiers were seriously injured near the Uppumadam SLA camp. In another grenade attack on the Point-Pedro-Palaly Road, near Ariyakulam junction, one SLA soldier was injured and three pedestrians were wounded. There were two other attacks on SLA positions near Sangilian Road close to Nallur Temple and another at Arasady Road Jaffna, but details of casualties were not available.

April 24

On Monday last week, two policemen and three civilians were wounded in a grenade attack on a police post in Eravur. The previous day, a three and a half year old child was killed and her mother was wounded in Polonnaruwa Muslim Colony when two unidentified gunmen entered a house searching for a man and shot his family members.

A Vavuniya trader was abducted by unidentified armed men in a white van that Monday. Around 7 to 9 persons were in the white van, eyewitnesses told TNA parliamentarian Vino Noharathalingam. The MP, who lodged a complaint at Vavuniya police, said there were again reports of paramilitary men demanding large ransoms from traders in Vavuniya town.

On the same day unidentified gunmen shot a Sinhalese man in the Seruvila police division, while an attempt by two unidentified people to kill a civil servant in Muttur was foiled. Also that day, two armed home guards were shot dead in Thutuwewa, south of Vavuniya and a former member of LTTE was shot dead by unknown gunmen in the Maravankulam area of Vavuniya. The home guards were returning home for vacation when they were shot dead by unknown gunmen.

Late that Monday, SLA soldiers opened fire on a mini bus at Kanakampuliyady junction in Jaffna, killing its civilian driver. The fate of at least four passengers was not known, but residents, who heard gunfire and screaming from the vehicle, had expressed fear that all inside the bus were killed and the traces removed from the attack site. The attack on the civilian bus took place 2 km from a claymore explosion site at Sarasalai-Meesalai border where an SLA soldier was killed and another wounded earlier that Monday evening.

Large numbers of soldiers were deployed at Kanakampuliyady junction following the claymore attack and the traffic had ceased. On Monday night, SLA officials said that their troopers shot at the bus after gunshots were fired at them from the bus. However, on Tuesday, SLA officials said the mini bus was fired upon as it did not stop at a roadblock set up by the soldiers.

On the same day, a bomb fixed under a bridge exploded on the Nelliyadi-Point Pedro Road, but no casualties were reported. Nelliyadi continued to be tense from the previous Saturday when two auto rickshaw drivers were shot and killed as part of a terror campaign targeting auto rickshaw drivers in Jaffna.

Also on Monday, paramilitaries who entered the Education Office in Valaichenai shot and killed a clerk from Vaharai Education Office and injured another official. The gunmen were covering their faces with helmets, witnesses said.

Meanwhile SLA troopers gunned down a youth and another was reported killed by the blast when SLA soldiers detected a claymore attack in Vantharumoolai, north of Batticaloa. The SLA claimed that the youths killed were attackers, and reported that a soldier was wounded in the attack.

A former Vice President of the Kayts Pradesiya Sabah was also shot dead by unknown gunmen Sunday, April 23. Nagamuttu Tharmarajah, 71, was appointed to the Kayts PS by the paramilitary Eelam Peoples Democratic Party (EPDP) and was a well known supporter of the group.

Also in Jaffna, an ice-cream seller was seriously injured when gunmen fired at the van in which he was travelling. The driver and his front-seat passenger said that the gunfire was from SLA soldiers who were stationed near the junction. The soldiers blocked ambulances from taking the injured to the hospital for more than half an hour, local witnesses said.

That afternoon an auto rickshaw owner was shot dead by gunmen at Irupalai junction on the Jaffna-Pt.Pedro main road. “The victim was sitting inside his vehicle. He was chased by the assailants when he tried to escape. He was shot and killed near Vairavar temple. Army soldiers were standing by,” an eyewitness told TamilNet.

April 23

Five Sinhalese people were killed, four injured and six others were reported missing when a group of gangsters attacked a suburb in the Morawewa police division along the Trincomalee-Anuradhapura main road. The attackers had set fire to a paddy harvester and attacked people in the village.

A former member of the PLOTE, Amirthanathan Kennady,35, was gunned down at Navanthurai, in Jaffna, around noon, Sunday.

Also that Sunday, a 54 year old Tamil man was seriously injured and his lorry severely damaged in a claymore explosion triggered by a SLA deep penetration unit in LTTE controlled area in the Vavuniya district. In the weeks prior to this attack, five Tamils were killed in six separate claymore attacks by SLA deep penetration units in the LTTE controlled areas of the Vanni and three Tamils who went hunting were hacked to death by a SLA DPU, press reports said.

Also that day, three cadres who were repairing the bunkers at LTTE controlled Vavunathivu were wounded by SLA gun and mortar fire, the LTTE’s Political Head of Batticaloa District, Mr. Daya Mohan, said. However, the SLA officials claimed that the Tigers were wounded when SLA troopers counter-attacked an LTTE penetration team attempting to enter government controlled area.

Meanwhile, unidentified attackers lobbed a grenade into the police check post located in front of the Batticaloa Police Headquarters wounding a Sub Inspector, a sergeant and a Police Constable. Another police sergeant was wounded in a grenade attack the previous night at Navalkuda police sentry in Kalmunai in Batticaloa district. Also, two SLA soldiers were wounded when unidentified gunmen launched an ambush attack on a check post southeast of Welikanda, with gunfire exchanged for about 30 minutes.

That Sunday also saw the funeral of a seventeen year old Tamil youth from Kanniya who had been taken into custody by the SLA the previous Friday and shot by soldiers while in custody. Another youth was shot dead at Kappalthurai, a Tamil village in the Chinabay police division, and the bodies of another two Tamil youths were found with gunshot injuries at Poddankadu in Kantalai. According to villagers, the victims were among five Tamil youths who had travelled to Kantalai from Muttur Saturday to meet representatives of an Insurance Company and were detained by Sri Lankan armed forces.

April 22

The day before, unidentified gunmen shot and killed a shop owner in the Vavuniya district. Local residents said he was a Tamil activist and was involved in the dispute with the security forces on flag hoisting during Heroes’ day celebrations.

Two SLA personnel were killed and 6 wounded when a Buffel Armoured Personnel Carrier was hit by a claymore blast at Kalmadu in Vavuniya that Saturday.

Also that day, two policemen were seriously injured when unidentified persons lobbed a grenade at their checkpoint at Anuradhapura junction in the Anpuvallipuram area, a suburb of Trincomalee town.

Two Tamil civilians were killed in the LTTE controlled area in Mannar district when their motorbike hit a claymore mine fixed in a tree by DPU of the SLA and collaborating paramilitaries.

An SLA Major and another soldier were killed and five soldiers wounded when their pickup was ambushed with a claymore on the Batticaloa-Polonnaruwa border.

Another soldier was killed and another injured when three claymore mines targeted at an SLA road patrol exploded north of Vavuniya. Also, unidentified gunmen shot a Tamil woman from China Bay and injured her husband after they arrived in a white van, entered her house and opened fire.

April 21

In anti-Tamil mob violence, fourteen houses, eight shops, one tractor, five two-wheel tractors and three motorbikes belonging to Tamil people in Menkamam and adjacent Tamil villages in Seruvila division were burnt down by Sinhala thugs following two claymore mine attacks on Sri Lanka government forces Friday morning and afternoon.

Sinhala mobs forcibly entered Tamil houses in these villages, ransacked the houses and looted jewellery from Tamil women. Hundreds of Tamil families started fleeing for safety seeking refuge elsewhere, reports said.

Also that Friday, a businessman from Vavuniya was killed in a claymore explosion and Kathankudy police, recovered the body of a middle-aged male at Kallady beach in Batticaloa. Meanwhile, the body of a youth with bullet wounds, recovered by Kathankudy police on 18th April from the Poonochchimunai cemetery in Kallady and another body of a youth around 17 years, recovered by the Kathankudy police on 11th April from Veloor in Kallady, were taken to the mortuary of Batticaloa Teaching hospital as police sought help to identify the deceased.

Two policemen were killed and two others were injured when a claymore mine hit a police jeep at Thanganagar village in Seruvila division in Trincomalee district that Friday.

A Tamil farmer was hacked to death and several houses were set on fire when Sinhala thugs armed with knives and clubs attacked villagers of Menkamam, a traditional Tamil village in the Seruvila division in Trincomalee after a homeguard was killed and a policeman wounded Friday morning. The claymore attack in the Sinhala settlement Friday morning was believed to be a retaliation for the killing of a Tamil youth Thursday.

April 20

Unknown gunmen forced their entry into the home of a Muslim couple in Vavuniya and shot dead the owner Thursday that week. His wife also sustained gunshot wounds and was admitted to Vavuniya Teaching Hospital.

SLA soldiers killed a Tamil youth near Kanniay village during a road patrol.

Meanwhile, a civilian went missing and another youth was injured by unknown gunmen in a separate incident in Trincomalee.

12 Tamil civilians from Kanguvely, another traditional Tamil village in the area were arrested and taken by the Sri Lanka Army to their camp close by.

In Jaffna, two unknown gunmen shot dead a fish-trader who ran a market in Chulipuram. The gunmen arrived in a motorbike, requested the trader to come out of the building, and escaped after shooting him at close range. This was the 17th killing of civilians to take place in Jaffna within a week, media sources in Jaffna reported.

On the same day, three claymore attacks targeting Sri Lankan forces were reported in Batticaloa. Two SLA soldiers were wounded in one attack in Urani northwest of Batticaloa town by a claymore mine was fixed to a beached boat. There were no casualties from another mine targeting a road patrol southeast of Batticaloa town. Two SLA soldiers were injured in the third attack also at Urani. Unidentified gunmen also shot and killed a senior paramilitary cadre of the EPDP at Batticaloa public market.

That morning two bodies with severe cut wounds and gunshot injuries were found in Kuttinagar area, Vavuniya, by local residents. The faces were covered with black cloth and gagged with duct tape, reports said.

April 19

Two motorbike-riding gunmen also shot and killed a shop owner at Kondavil junction in Jaffna the previous day. The gunmen asked the business owner to come out of the shop, opened fire on the victim and fled the site in their motorbike. Also that Wednesday two weeks ago, a 51 year old Korean citizen, was injured when the pickup truck he was travelling at the Vavuniya Aluthgama junction came under claymore attack. Meanwhile, two Sri Lanka Navy personnel were wounded in a blast at Vankalaipadu.

Sri Lanka’s Tamil, both in the island and the Diaspora, are now all too familiar with the laissez-faire approach the international community adopts in responding to humanitarian abuses against Tamil civilians in Sri Lanka. Hence, there was no particular surprise to the muted reaction from the international community when state-organized mobs, in some cases with the support of the security forces, embarked on a series of attacks on Tamils in the Trincomalee district.

Almost since independence and throughout the decades long ethnic question there have been several episodes of state-sponsored violence against its ethnic minorities. The most notorious was the 1983 anti-Tamil pogrom. President J.R. Jayawerdene, in the aftermath of violence that killed over 3,000 Tamils, asserted with satisfaction, that the minorities had been ‘taught a lesson’. His international allies murmured some discontent before carrying on as usual.

A decade later, the Sri Lankan military embarked on the ethnic cleansing of Tamils from large swathes of the island’s east, instigating a series of massacres which resulted in the mass movement of Tamils out of the area as Sinhala colonists moved into their homes. The violence and this strategy only ended when the LTTE began to retaliate in a similar manner.

Even before last month’s anti-Tamil rioting, the government of President Mahinda Rajapakse and its allies had indicated that violence against the wider Tamil population is tolerable, at the least, and at worst, a legitimate means of subduing Tamil political ambitions. Mangala Samaweera, the Rajapakse administration’s foreign minister, floated a veiled threat during a recent visit to the United States, saying that should LTTE violence against state forces increase, the Sri Lankan government ‘may not be able to restrain’ Sinhala mobs from attacking Tamils. Champika Ranawake, the policy guru of the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), the hardline Buddhist party allied to Rajapakse, was far more lucid, stating: “in the event of a war, if the 40,000 government troops stationed in Jaffna are killed, then 400,000 Tamil civilians living in Colombo will be sent to Jaffna in coffins.”

To date, the international community have chosen to allow President Rajapkase, despite his ultra-nationalist electioneering, the benefit of the doubt. The Colombo diplomatic community chose to embrace a comforting fiction that the President has been misjudged and is, in fact, a moderate attempting to placate his rightwing allies on which he is dependent. The policies now being implemented by Colombo vis-à-vis the Tamils must therefore have come as a rude shock. Repeated actions by Colombo that might have escalated the violence to an all out war have only been interrupted as the Indian government has not been averse to stepping in and telling Rajapakse to knock it off.

India, through its extensive experience in the region, has long been familiar with the duplicitous and chauvinistic politics of the Sinhala leadership, even if it has supported the latter to specific ends. Furthermore, with elections looming in Tamil Nadu and sympathy for the Sri Lankan Tamil plight growing there, India would come under severe pressure to act should Colombo’s actions result in large numbers of civilian casualties. Meanwhile, India has undoubtedly also been irritated by the Sri Lankan government’s decision to pursue Pakistan as a partner, after they failed to elicit support for their hard line policies from New Delhi. Historically an unreliable partner, there is no reason for New Delhi to give the current Colombo administration substantial backing.

The rest of the international community are however not burdened with the same concerns. The Tamils are well aware that the international community in the past has been happy to allow the Sri Lankan state to inflict collective punishment on its minority population to achieve its military objectives and thereby, their (international) interests.

The embargo that accompanied President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s ‘war for peace’ inflicted enormous suffering on the Tamils outside Colombo’s control. Yet the international community backed Kumaratunga’s strategy with billions of dollars of financing. International non-governmental organisations concentrated on campaigns against recruitment of under-18s by the LTTE, even as hundreds of thousands of Tamil children where denied food and medical assistance by the state. This deliberate collective abuse by the state against Tamils was accepted as a natural component of the conflict and was rarely challenged, except for a few critical observations in periodic human rights reports.

It is clear that the present Sri Lankan government is preparing the same strategy. Just as during the ‘war for peace,’ the military has begun preventing international humanitarian workers and press from reaching the Northeast as part of a wider process of controlling information that comes out of the region.

The unfortunate decision by the Canadian government to list the LTTE as a terrorist organisation a week before the state unleashed its violence against Tamil civilians is indicative of the misguided policies applied by international actors to Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict. It is particularly ironic that it was the LTTE which was censured last week considering it has largely limited its attacks to military targets in contrast to the Sri Lankan military’s consistent retaliation against Tamil civilians.

The ban by the Canadian government is whilst of limited impact, given the longstanding bans by the US, UK and India, is nevertheless a reminder of the uneven approach the international community has taken to resolving Sri Lanka’s conflict. Canada’s limited understanding of Sri Lankan dynamics is manifest when contrasted with that of India, arguably the most significant geopolitical player in Sri Lanka. Delhi, it is clear, is – at least for now - adopting a more even handed approach to controlling the violence.

With a European Union ban in the pipe, the international community has meanwhile opted to sever political relations with the only player backed by a majority of Tamils, whilst maintaining and endorsing the political position of their principal adversaries, the Sinhala elites running Sri Lanka.

To date the international community has displayed a cold-blooded pragmatism, rather than a commitment to humanitarian standards, when it comes to Sri Lanka’s conflict. During the early 1990s, when it was widely considered feasible to solve the ‘Tamil problem’ through militarily destroying the LTTE, many states were content to turn a blind eye to Sri Lanka’s brutality against the Tamils - some going further to finance and assist the project.

But by the turn of the century it was clear that this approach was not working. The LTTE had established a position as a quasi-state and had inflicted a series of telling defeats on the state. This had left the LTTE in control of substantial tracts of territory and a dominant position in the Tamil polity. With armed conflict proving ineffective, the international community them tempted both parties to the negotiating table, promising Sri Lanka further financial and military assistance and luring the LTTE with the possibility of legitimacy should it cooperate.

The international community ‘s approach to the LTTE has been mistakenly focused on the Tigers’ supposed desire for legitimacy and have lost sight of the LTTE’s greater objective: to irrevocably secure the protection of the Tamils against Sinhala aggression. In the face of a belligerent and confident Sri Lankan military, which is now publicly calling for an annulment of the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement and the resumption of military hostilities, the LTTE is unlikely to be particularly responsive to any further international threats.

More generally, the international community has proved reluctant to rethink its pro-state bias which has underpinned its past policies towards Sri Lanka. With the exception of India, there appears no willingness to confront and challenge the hawkish policies of the present Colombo administration, for example.

Moreover, pressure on the LTTE at this stage is unlikely to work amid the ongoing contest for military advantage. Both sides are recruiting, training and rearming. The state is receiving international assistance and is being promised more. Should the Sri Lankan military gain the upper hand because the LTTE ignores strategic risks whilst attempting to satisfy international demands for peace talks, the LTTE’s ability to deter aggression will be weakened. In an extreme case, should the military build up an overwhelming advantage, it is entirely possible that an all out ‘war for peace,’ this time by the Rajapkse government, could again be endorsed again by the international community.

Cognisant of this threat the LTTE will understandably prioritise security interests at the expense, if necessary, of the fleeting goodwill of the international community. Conversely, should the LTTE make any substantial gains in any impending conflict, it will likely further strengthen the organisation’s position at the negotiating table.

The international community had set out to engineer a peace process which would deliver some limited devolution to the Tamils in exchange for an end to Tamil violence and the disarming of the LTTE. This outcome, given the ending of Sinhala hegemony it entails, is unacceptable to the present Colombo administration. An international project which had been engineered to contain the LTTE has thus resulted in the Sinhala leadership being corralled into an unacceptable path toward federalism or similar.

Therefore, from President Rajapakse’s point of view, should his military succeed in gaining the upper hand in a renewed military conflict, the government can abruptly end any discussion of federalism and even revert to the scenario of the late 1990s where Sri Lanka had international backing to concentrate on militarily subduing the Tamil rebellion.

On the other hand, should Colombo’s military adventure fail then it would be back to the peace process and the road to federalism, as this ‘cap’ on Tamil aspirations, has been guaranteed by the international community, as even recent statements by many states demonstrate.

For the Sinhala hawks, therefore, there is nothing lost by exploring the military option. This perspective, moreover, is based entirely upon the premise that the future policies of the international community will mirror those of the past. It will be impossible for the international community to negate this logic; given its weak track record, it has no credibility in challenging a dominant Sri Lankan state. In other words, even if foreign states now promise to punish Sri Lanka if it pushes for war, Colombo won’t be deterred: if the state wins, then the international community, regardless of its pledges, will carry on backing.

The incentives and dangers for both protagonists are thus abundantly clear.

Meanwhile, it is unrealistic for the long suffering Tamil community to expect the international community to substantially deviate from their policies of the past. There has rarely been any moral basis for the policy considerations of foreign states in Sri Lanka. The more naïve members of the Tamil community nurture hopes that the international community will recognise the administration in Colombo for the chauvinists they are and dramatically change their approach toward the Tamil problem. Regrettably, history has proven that only a change in the ground realities of the conflict have resulted in any shift in policies.

But hoping that the international community will undergo a spontaneous realisation that they are backing a morally corrupt state and curb Sri Lanka’s abuses, is unfortunately just that – wishful thinking.

With the violence in Sri Lanka steadily reaching ever higher levels, even the international monitors overseeing the February 2002 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) admit there isn’t at present a condition of ceasefire (i.e. a cessation of hostilities). Nevertheless, they and the international community continue to take comfort from the commitment in principle by the Liberation Tigers and the Sri Lanka government to uphold the CFA and to pursue the Norwegian brokered peace process.

But it is clear to everyone that the peace process is disintegrating in an ever-deepening quagmire of violence and counter-violence as Army-backed paramilitaries and, increasingly, the Sri Lankan armed forces attack the LTTE and unleash deliberate punitive measures against Tamil civilians. It is the escalation of the latter that, above all else, raises the question as to whether there is indeed a peace process left to salvage. Tamil civilians are being murdered on a daily basis. Tamil parliamentarians are being threatened. This week saw a brazen attack on the offices of the popular Tamil daily, Uthayan. The international community, whilst making muted comments about a need to continue the peace process, have studiously avoided criticism of the Sri Lankan government (though some states, as ever, have been quick to heap invectives on the LTTE).

It is in this context that the determination by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) last week on killings of civilians was gratefully received by the Tamils. “We fear” the SLMM said, “that government security forces have, in the north and the east, been involved in extrajudicial killings of civilians.” Moreover, “this conviction,” the SLMM pointedly stated, “is based on our observation and inquiries on the ground.” The determination was vital as the SLMM, tasked by both sides with supervising the truce, has the attention of the international community. The ruling thus formally highlighted the ongoing murders of Tamil civilians suspected by the Sri Lankan military of being sympathetic to the LTTE. Crucially, therefore, it could have galvanised international pressure on Colombo to rein in not only its murderous paramilitaries, but, now, its security forces also. The SLMM ruling, of course, merely reflects what alarmed observers in Sri Lanka’s Northeast have been protesting for some time. In that regard, it must be noted, the ruling was long overdue.

However, this week the SLMM obfuscated its position on the extrajudicial killings. It did so, moreover, “after consultations with the Sri Lankan government” on the matter. Press reports say the second statement occurred after President Mahinda Rajapakse’s administration had summoned the SLMM and delivered a vehement denial. But it would have been expected to. What was not expected, was that the monitoring mission would buckle under the government’s howling rage and stutter a confusing ‘clarification’ that, for all intents and purposes, is being interpreted by all concerned as a retraction of its earlier unambiguous position. Instead of ‘conviction’, the SLMM now has ‘concerns.’ Whilst first ‘government security forces’ were blamed, now it is ‘some individuals on the ground.’ Most despicably, instead of ‘extrajudicial killings of civilians’ there are now ‘clandestine activities against civilians.’

This episode has amply demonstrated that the SLMM, for all its internationally accorded backing and prestige, is not a robust institution which can make courageous determinations and stand by them. It has lowered itself to level of the many well-meaning, but essentially powerless human rights organizations which have sooner or later quailed before an enraged Sri Lankan state during the conflict. The SLMM’s backtracking this week will therefore have far reaching implications for the integrity of the CFA, for the possibilities of curbing violence against civilians and, above else, for its own authority.

Most importantly, a dangerous precedent has been set. If the international monitors are prepared to retract their statements or abandon their ‘convictions’ simply because the Sri Lankan state expresses its displeasure, then what purpose is served by the SLMM? To monitor the LTTE alone? It is an unwritten but understood truism that the SLMM’s moral authority is underpinned by the support of powerful states for the CFA and the peace process more generally. But even that authority has been undermined by the SLMM’s timid behavior this week.

This, of course, still leaves the Tamils of the Northeast with the problem of how to protect themselves from the increasingly brazen and undisguised violence being unleashed against them by the Sri Lankan military and its paramilitary allies. With hopes of an effective defence of human rights by the international community now all but dashed, there can be but one option for the Tamils to fall back on.

Traditional bharathanatyam dancers were amongst performers who entertained the audience of six hundred people at the ‘Ilanthir 2006’ event hosted by the Tamil Youth Organisation (TYO) in London on Sunday April 9

Sri Lanka has placed orders with Pakistan for cluster bombs, deep penetration bombs and rockets and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), the Indian Express newspaper reported Saturday. Sri Lanka has turned to Pakistan for “a comprehensive list of weapons and other military hardware it wants to procure after India kept it waiting,” the paper said.

Separately, the UPI news agency, quoting an Indian diplomat, reported Sri Lanka “has even asked for satellite images and two unmanned aerial vehicles,” from Pakistan.

Of the various requests Sri Lanka made to Delhi over the past 18 months, very few items were actually cleared for transfer and the Indian government “in no hurry to change the status quo”, the Express said.

India has “no objection” to Sri Lanka seeking weapons from Pakistan or China, IANS reported.

“But the Indian military establishment has made it clear that any move by Sri Lanka to inject foreign military personnel or establish “listening posts” in any part of the island’s northeast would be viewed with grave suspicion,” the agency also reported Saturday.

“At the same time, India will not sell arms and ammunition of offensive nature to Sri Lanka. However, non-lethal military equipment and those deployed for defensive positions will be sold,” IANS said.

In response to a question about the possibility of India’s military assistance to Sri Lanka, external affairs ministry spokesperson Navtej Sarna told reporters: “We are already involved in training (Colombo’s) armed forces. There is an exchange of visits by the three service chiefs.”

On March 1, Sri Lankan chief of defense staff D.W.K. Sandagiri wrote to the Pakistan High Commissioner in Colombo requesting he urgently send a technical team to Colombo for an immediate survey of T-55 tanks and C-130 Hercules transport aircraft, UPI said.

The Express listed equipment and weapons Colombo is seeking from New Delhi.

Colombo has unsuccessfully asked India for “maintenance contracts and spares for the Sri Lankan Air Force’s large MiG-27 ground strike fleet, laser-guided bomb upgrade kits, dumb bombs, penetration bombs, rocket pod systems and strafing ammunition,” the paper said.

Sri Lanka also asked India for “ship-based mortars, ammunition, small fast-attack craft and sea-mines for the Sri Lankan navy,” but the Indian government “has only allowed the transfer of ammunition and some non-lethal stores.”

Sri Lanka also asked India for “multi-barrel rocket launcher systems, mortars, air defence artillery systems, 5.56 mm weapons, ground radars, night vision devices, armoured troop carriers, UAVs, Milan anti-tank missile jeeps and mine-protected vehicles for the Lankan Army.”

But “apart from a pair of radars, nothing of significance has been transferred,” the Express said.

“With no response from India on any of these, the Lankan government has gone to Pakistan for UAVs, cluster bombs, PGM [Precision Guided Munitions] upgrade kits, deep penetration bombs and rockets,” the paper said.

Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Mangala Samarweera’s visit to India on May 7-9 is now confirmed, but Delhi is likely to maintain its stance, the Express reported.

While one reason for the Government dragging its feet is the LTTE, Indian Defence Ministry sources told the paper.

“Another is the lack of a comprehensive Indo-Lankan defence cooperation agreement, despite talks going on it for over two years now,” the paper said.

Canada’s proscription of the Liberation Tigers was not entirely unexpected. Domestic pressures, particularly from some interior arms of the state, coupled with the platform of the new Conservative government, ultimately decided in Sri Lanka’s favour. The move is regrettable, not only because it alters the calculations on which the protagonists in Sri Lanka decide questions of war and peace, but because its effect is the exact opposite of Canada’s stated expectations.

Announcing the ban last week, Foreign Minister Peter MacKay, also declared that Canada was supportive of a negotiated solution to the island’s conflict and was even prepared to host talks between the Sri Lanka’s government and the LTTE. To begin with, this is a contradiction in terms - on what basis could the offer be accepted by the LTTE, given the partisan position Canada has taken?

More importantly, the logic put forward for the ban – that it would assist, not hinder the Norwegian brokered peace process is fundamentally flawed, ignoring, as it does, the now undisguised trends in Sri Lanka, where a hardline Sinhala nationalist administration has resumed the war, albeit covertly, against the LTTE. The Canadian decision is based on the premise that it is the LTTE which is being intransigent and blocking progress towards a permanent solution. But as close observers of Sri Lanka’s conflict, not least the Norwegians, are well aware, the issue is much more complex. First, Sri Lanka’s new government has already ruled out any meaningful power-sharing. It has adopted a defiant and uncooperative stance towards the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement. Most importantly, violence has resumed anew. Whatever the fate of the next round of talks in Geneva, dozens are already dying as Sri Lanka’s military intelligence and its paramilitary allies accelerate the cycle of killings.

In this context, the Canadian ban is not going to contribute to peace. In fact, it is going to do the opposite by emboldening the hardliners in the Sri Lankan regime and the Sinhala nationalists who support it. These forces will undoubtedly feel vindicated by the Canadian decision and take it, not unreasonably, as support for their uncompromising positions on the ethnic questions. Why, they will ask, do we need to share power, when the organization spearheading this Tamil rebellion has been proscribed as terrorists by the US, UK, India and now Canada? Sri Lanka has stepped up agitations for the rest of Europe to follow suit and proscribe the LTTE. Some Tamils think an EU ban is a foregone conclusion.

But there are two important elements which the international community needs to consider with regards the Tamil armed struggle; firstly, the LTTE’s domestic legitimacy is not linked to international support or censure, but to the objective conditions of oppression in Sri Lanka. Secondly, it is security considerations on the ground and the overall progress of the liberation struggle that influence the LTTE’s strategy and tactics, not external censure. War or peace, in short, is decided by the possibility of tangible progress at the negotiation table and the prevailing conditions of oppression on the ground.

Following successive proscriptions of the LTTE in India (1991), the United States (1997) and, particularly, Britain (2001), the Tamil community has become increasingly unmoved by such international criticism. Instead, an understandings of realpolitik, combined with heightened cruelty by the Sri Lankan state, particularly amid the internationally-supported ‘war for peace’ fuelled a desperate struggle which has culminated in the de-facto state run by the LTTE today. These dynamics are not going to change now. The LTTE occupies a critical position in the struggle for Tamil rights. Why was the question of federalism placed on the table in 2002 – we, the Tamils, asked for that as long ago as the fifties? At what point did the international community decide the war was ‘unwinnable’ and talks paramount?

And therein lies the rub. The present peace process rests entirely on the balance of forces between the Sri Lankan armed forces and the LTTE, a point bluntly put forward even by a former head of the international monitors overseeing the truce. In this context, the Canadian ban – and any others that prove forthcoming – can only serve to upset this balance and undermine the peace process. The ban will encourage Sri Lanka to more intransigent at the negotiating table. It will embolden the Sri Lankan armed forces to step up the shadow war against the LTTE. Most importantly, however, it brings into question the efficacy (for the Tamil liberation struggle) of following a negotiated approach, as opposed to an armed struggle, in the first place.

Even amidst the wider escalation of violence in the past few weeks, the anti-Tamil rioting by Sinhala thugs supported by the Sri Lankan security forces marks a new nadir, reiterating, as it does, the enduring nature of Sinhala chauvinism in the island state. The first victims of contemporary Sinhala supremacy were Muslims, targeted in 1915 by Sinhala thugs egged on by monks envisaging a Sinhala-Buddhist utopia. Anti Tamil riots have occurred in every decade since independence - 1956, 1958, 1966, 1977 and, most savagely, in the pogrom of 1983, where three thousand people were slaughtered in an orgy of rape and murder. There have been other, smaller incidents, such as Bindunuwewa.

Last week’s violence in Trincomalee were almost a carbon copy of the dynamics of ‘Black July,’ bitter memories of which were instantly revived amongst Tamils. The Sinhala thugs who attacked Tamil and Muslim villagers were transported to the target areas by military vehicles. The security forces looked on as the killings and torchings were carried out. The violence was systematic and organised.

And just as in 1983, when President Junius Jayawardene, whose government organised the pogrom, maintained an impassive silence, so last week, President Mahinda Rajapakse didn’t say a word. Despite Tamil outrage and fear, there no apology, no assurances of protection, no commitment to prevent reoccurrences, no promises of investigations. Nothing. And it is reported that it was blunt intervention by India’s government that even prompted Rajapakse to call off the attackers.

The Tamil National Alliance (TNA) has condemned the riots, as have the Lib-eration Tigers. The word genocide was immediately raised in Tamil characterisations of the event. The term is no hyperbole; it is used, not because of the scale of the violence - only a dozen people died before India intervened - but because of its specific dynamics: violence by one community, supported by the state armed forces, against another. Even the international monitors of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mis-sion, describing the town as ‘out of control,’ expressed justifiable fears of the violence spreading to the rest of the island. So much, then, for the communal reconciliation that peacniks often assert is waiting to erupt in the wake of a political solution to the conflict being reached.

The Trincomalee riots have touched a still very raw nerve amongst Tamils in the homeland and in the Diaspora. There is palpable rage at the attack and frustration over the absolute ineffectiveness of the international community to contain the Sinhala chauvinism that the Sri Lankan state is, for us, visibly shot through with - indeed, there is almost a dogmatic refusal amongst international actors to even recognise this racism. Meanwhile, this is not only a matter of the state. This paper has, at several times in the past few years, warned of a deepening chasm between the Sinhala community and the island’s minorities, particularly the Tamils. As with many other Tamil protests, these have been dismissed as inevitable utterances of ethno-nationalists. Yet there are frequent indications of the communal polarisation, from the surveys by some Colombo think tanks, to the repeated victories of the pro-autonomy TNA in parliamentary and local government elections. The series of mass demonstrations under the ‘Pongu Thamil’ banner have also been ignored.

The international community’s determi-ned refusal to recognise the all encompassing and insurmountable racism within the state, coupled with its procedural, even formulaic, approach to peacemaking has resulted in absolutely no progress in four years. Meanwhile, an insistence on repeatedly blaming the LTTE for the failures of the peace process while simultaneously absolving the Sri Lankan state has emb-oldened the Sinhala leadership to actively pursue the military option, confident as Colombo is, of international support for a punitive war against the Tigers.

This dynamic has severely undermined Tamil confidence in the international community and international norms as credible deterrents to aggression by the state (the intervention by India is, however, a welcome exception). The profound insecurity that has resulted from this statist international attitude has, for Tamils, positioned the LTTE as the only actor capable of defending their interests. In response to Tamil fears - sparked by the naked aggression exhibited by the armed forces and exacerbated by the Trincomalee riots - the Tigers have issued an unmistakable warning, one that comes amid the general degradation of security and peace in the Northeast: “If the genocidal attacks by armed forces [and] Sinhalese hoodlums continue, we would be forced to take steps to safeguard the lives and properties of innocent Tamil people. That would lead to undesirable serious consequence for the current peace process.”

Leaflets warning women to quit working for Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have been circulated across the eastern coast, after pornographic DVDs involving some female NGO workers surfaced last week.

Akkaraipattu Police Inspector A. Gaffar told the Daily Mirror one DVD contains explicit video clips of a foreigner sexually abusing a 19-20 year old Tamil girl. The DVD apparently contains shots taken in the Elle area in Badulla. The DVDs are available for Rs. 50 in open markets across the Eastern province.

The leaflets, distributed by an organisation calling itself the Tamil Eelam Women’s Uprising Army, warned all women working in NGOs to quit their jobs before April 15. The warning states that “your future life may be endangered” if this directive is not obeyed.

However, it has not yet been proved whether the foreigner or the girl in the pornographic DVD are employees of an NGO operating in the Ampara, Akkraipattu or Kalmunai areas, reported the Daily Mirror. However, Mr. Gaffar said investigations have not yet been completed in Trincomalee or Batticaloa.

The leaflet also quotes a statement made by the Batticaloa Tamil National Alliance MP Pakkiaselvam Ariyanenthiran which states that “183 Tamil speaking girls in Batticaloa and 163 in Ampara district have undergone abortions,” and that these women were “employees of NGOs”. This statement was made at a recent seminar on “Tamil women and culture” in Pawattan Thirukkovil.

The leaflet claims that “women working in NGOs are sexually abused” and that “in some cases where the abortions were not successful, they are on the verge of giving birth”. It also claims that parents who allow their daughters to work for NGOs should be held responsible for these supposed atrocities.

NGO sources also said two mosques in Kalmunai and Saindamaradu had publicly requested women to leave the NGOs. However, the Police did not corroborate this statement.

No complaints on sexual harassments have been recorded in the Akkraipattu, Kalmunai or Ampara Police divisions. Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies (CHA) Executive Director Jeevan Thiagarajah noted that a joint plea has been forwarded to Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, IGP Chandra Fernando and the DIG East asking for protection for female NGO workers in the region.

LTTE Batticaloa head Daya Mohan said the LTTE was unaware of such an organisation that was said to have issued the threatening leaflets.

The Norwegian-facilitated peace process was adrift this week after the Liberation Tigers said Saturday they would not go to talks - postponed once already - that were scheduled in Geneva for April 24-25, due to Sri Lankan military interference with a requested safe-conduct transport of LTTE commanders for a crucial pre-negotiation strategy meeting.

Amid escalating violence and communal tension in many parts of the Northeast, the indefinite postponement of the second round of talks in Geneva has alarmed diplomats and Sri Lanka’s residents.

Having refused to provide the customary helicopter airlift for LTTE commanders in the East to travel to Vanni for the central committee, the Sri Lanka military also refused to let Colonel Sornam and Colonel Bhanu travel by Sea Tiger boats shadowed at a distance by Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) boats.

The Tigers accepted international truce monitors’ offer to hire a civilian vessel for the transport, on the condition the SLN was not involved. That plan fell apart when at the last minute Colombo insisted the Navy would escort the civilian ferry. The Tigers called off the transfer and said they could not go to Geneva until the central committee had met.

If making transport arrangements for a LTTE conference ahead of the Geneva meeting was this hard, then the talks themselves could hardly be expected to be productive, diplomats told Reuters.

The impasse came amid a new high in violence which has left at least 70 people dead over the past two weeks. The US and other international actors have condemned the violence and demanded a return to negotiations.

The US has blamed the LTTE for the upsurge in violence and praised Colombo’s restraint.

However, diplomats say neither side is demonstrating enough flexibility to show commitment to the peace process, Reuters reported Monday.

The European Union, Japan, Norway and the United States, co-chairs of Sri Lanka’s donors’ group, expressed grave concern on Friday about the worsening situation in the country and condemned recent violence.

“The co-chairs also strongly encourage the parties to build confidence and an environment conducive for progressing toward lasting peace for all Sri Lankans,” a statement said.

The co-chairs are to meet in Tokyo on April 24 to review the situation and the peace process.

Many international actors have demanded Sri Lanka disarm Army-backed paramilitaries blamed for a series attacks on LTTE cadres and supporters. Meanwhile, the Tigers deny responsibility for the recent series of deadly ambushes against Sri Lankan security forces, but few analysts or diplomats believe them.

“There are various things that could be done that would not be very difficult that would allow the talks to take place,” one diplomat told Reuters. “But neither side is willing to allow them.”

Analysts point out that Colombo could easily pave the way for the LTTE strategy meeting and thus, the Geneva talks, by providing a helicopter to swiftly transfer the commanders to Vanni and bring them back a few days later.

Under the 2002 Norway-brokered truce that ended almost two decades of fighting, the Sri Lankan government had been providing helicopters for top LTTE officials traveling through government-held territory.

It has turned down several requests for air transport in the past, but started doing so with more frequency after relations became strained following a series of violent incidents since December.

Senior LTTE officials travelling through government-controlled territory have been murdered by Army-backed paramilitaries.

Without the talks as a safety valve, ambushes against Sri Lanka’s military and ethnic riots in the island’s northeast are expected to escalate further, Reuters reported. Some experts fear that could even include attacks within the capital Colombo, which would wreck investor confidence in the $20 billion economy.

Some diplomats believe neither side could win a war and so neither side will start one. But with both sides saying they could win if war was forced upon them, others fear that escalation could rapidly turn into a full-on conflict in the north and east that could devastate communities also hit by the 2004 tsunami.

It is the second time such attacks have pushed the island to the brink of war this year - the last was before the first round of talks was agreed. Some see them as a form of bloody brinkmanship and expect the meeting to eventually happen.

The government agreed at the first round of talks in Geneva to stop armed groups using its territory for attacks on the Tigers, but now says it cannot find any to disarm - a line that has upset the Tigers.

“I just see this as the LTTE playing tough,” analyst Rohan Edrisinha at the Centre for Policy Alternatives told Reuters.

“The immediate goal of the LTTE is to see that the government does something to rein in or restrain [paramilitary] forces and they are going to use the threat of postponing the talks.”

Swedish Major-General Ulf Henricsson, head of the unarmed Nordic mission overseeing the cease-fire, said he still believed both sides were not acting in the interests of their people but that he was also slightly more optimistic.

“I think it’s at its peak now,” Henricsson told Reuters in his Colombo headquarters, referring to the recent violence. “I’m not so afraid of a full scale war. If there was a military solution for one of the parties, we would have seen that by now.”

But for now, the Geneva talks remain off. The Tigers say they will not go until they can meet with their eastern commanders, and the government is preventing them from being transported to the Tiger headquarters.

“Until the hurdles in front of us to attend Geneva talks are removed and a more conducive environment created, our Geneva team is unable to come to the Geneva talks,” head of the Tiger political wing S.P. Thamilselvan said in a letter to Norway.

But the suspected Tiger ambushes are also seen as strengthening the hand of President Mahinda Rajapakse’s hardline Buddhist and Marxist allies, who oppose any concessions to the Tigers.

Rajapakse owes his election to a Tiger-inspired boycott that kept away Tamil voters seen as likely supporters of his more conciliatory opponent. At the time, some analysts took that as a sign the Tigers might have judged they were gaining too little from peace.

Sri Lanka’s stock market, closed for most of the last week due to the Sinhalese and Tamil new year, fell over 4 percent on Monday, with traders digesting the news of recent violence but still confident that talks would ultimately take place.

Norway, which brokered the original truce, said special envoy for the peace process Jon Hanssen-Bauer would fly into Colombo on Tuesday for urgent talks with both sides.

There has been a radical change in the world scenario since the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) engagement in northern Sri Lanka in the late 1980s. India has emerged as a major player on the world scenario both in economic and political spheres.

The other major powers, including the United States, recognise India’s new importance on the world scene, and they expect India to contribute to political stability in the world. So India has the additional responsibility to meet the expectations of other players in international affairs.

But Norway is playing the role of the mediator quite effectively, and the two sides to Sri Lanka’s conflict have made some progress. There is no need for India to participate in the peace process because that would only introduce a new element into a complex picture.

There is no armed resolution to the conflict. The Sri Lanka Army cannot win the war against the Tamil insurgents. The LTTE is also aware that it cannot achieve victory against the Lankans. There is no alternative to the peace process.

The basic parameters of the peace are recognised by both sides. The framework for the peace process has been spelt out in the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement signed in 1987, which speaks about ensuring the legitimate rights of the Lankan Tamils on the one hand, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka on the other. What remains to be done is to flesh out the principles of ‘legitimate rights’ and ‘sovereignty and territorial integrity.’

This comment is compiled from an interview with Gulf News. Lieutenant General A.S. Kalkat was once commander of the IPKF in Sri Lanka

Campaigning for Tamil Nadu’s election is gaining momentum. While leaders are busy touring and meeting voters up and down the state, the unfolding battle is drawing rapt attention in Delhi and elsewhere.

One major development last week was the resignation from the DMKof Mr. Sarathkumar, popular cinema actor and sitting MP, who belongs to the sizeable Nadar community. His supporters were reportedly demanding and pleading with Mr. Sarathkumar to sever links with DMK, and it was widely expected that he would acquiesce.

However Mr. Kumar has not thus far joined the AIADMK, although rumours are afloat that he would be joining the DMK’s arch-rival soon –the MDMK chief, Mr. Vaiko, declared during an election meeting he would.

The resignation of this popular cine actor would be a setback to DMK front as he used to draw large crowds to his rallies during the last elections. It seems that DMK tried to pacify and mollify Mr. Sarathkumar by sending top party leaders like Stalin (nephew of DMK leader Karunanidhi), Duraimurugan and Arcot Veerasamy to meet him at his residence but they failed to convince actor to stay put.

Last week AIADMK leader, Ms. J. Jayalalitha executed a major political coup by visiting the house of Mr. Vaiko at his native village Kalingappatty. Ms. Jayalalitha is not known for such gestures and has a reputation for treating other leaders with disdain. The visit has thus became major news and has reportedly further enthused the cadres of both the parties, whose shock alliance was forged a few weeks ago..

In the DMK camp, both Mr. Karunanidhi and PMK leader Mr. Ramadoss have started actively campaigning for their candidates and have been vowing that their alliance would return to power by winning more than 180 seats. There was good news despite the Sarathkumar resignation as Mr. Bakiyaraj, a one time popular and effective film actor and Director joined the front. He is likely to tour the entire state.

While no major Tamil Nadu magazines have come out with opinion polls, the popular Tamil publication Kumudam is serialising a report which claims a massive victory for AIADMK front is in the offing. Notably, during the last Loksabha elections Kumudam correctly predicted that DMK front would sweep the elections.

The popular newspaper, The Hindu, is however predicting a close fight with a poll suggesting AIADMK front leading by only 2% over its main rival DMK front. It even predicts no majority for any Front.

According to The Hindu, the coming elections to the Tamil Nadu Assembly appear to be unprecedentedly evenly balanced and if current indications are anything to go by, this could be the closest election ever fought in the State.

According to The Hindu’s poll it appears that the ruling AIADMK has been able to recover from the embarrassing rout in the 2004 Lok Sabha elections and establish a 2% lead over the DMK; the AIADMK alliance’s vote share could be anywhere between 44 and 48 percent, while the DMK alliance’s share could be anywhere between 42 and 46 percent.

Although The Hindu is the first to come out with opinion poll results predicting a hung assembly, it can be said with some certainty that Tamil Nadu’s electorate would never opt for a coalition government and analyzing the past results indicate that whatever the confusion generated by pre-election campaigning, the people vote massively against or in favour of a front and there is no reason for this trend to break this time. Seasoned observers are taking a watch and wait approach – albeit with hard-bitten nails.

The most decisive factor is who will lose vote to the BJP and film actor Vijayakant’s party. Both parties have chosen to fight alone. It is generally presumed that Vijayakant has a 5% share of the vote, as does the BJP. If these two parties cut into AIADMK’s votes , which the DMK expects, then this may be enough to help the DMK to come to power. However, other observers feel the voters of the traditional Tamil parties – the AIADMK, DMK and MDMK - are committed supporters and with Mr. Vijayakant posing more as a nationalist politician, he would in all likelihood only draw supporters of Congress (allied with the DML) and undecided voters. As such, it is still ‘advantage AIADMK.’

In many ways, it’s a community that is still new. As their New Year arrived last Thursday, representatives of Scarborough’s Tamils - 70,000 of them, counting just those who speak Tamil as a first language at home - want to talk about their many successes.

Young people at universities. Thousands of businesses and professionals. Institutions taking shape.

They would like to hear less about their community’s so-called gang problem or what a human rights group last month alleged were “clear patterns of intimidation and extortion” by local fundraisers for Tamil Tigers rebels in Sri Lanka.

For members of the Canadian Tamil Congress, however, talking about all these things is part of moving to the mainstream in Canada - exactly where they say the country’s 250,000 Tamils are headed.

Most came here as refugees after anti-Tamil riots in 1983 made them feel it wasn’t safe to stay in Sri Lanka. “We came with a suitcase,” is how Scarborough resident Ted Antony put it this week.

But in the 1980s, the choice for Tamils fleeing the former British colony was London, not Toronto.

“Really, if you’re talking numbers-wise, our community is only a decade old,” community activist Parthi Kandavel said last week around a table with other CTC members in an Ellesmere Road real estate office where the group shares space.

Organizations such as the Tamil Eelam Society formed to take care of immigrants’ needs and speak for the community. “They saw the gap. They didn’t wait for the government to fill it,” said Neethan Shan of Markham.

Tamil-Canadians are looking to fill the next gap, which is becoming a voice in government, said Shan, among several Toronto-area Tamils running for municipal office this fall.

Though many came to Canada with a distrust of politicians learned at home, the community’s thinking is changing; its members are ready for the mainstream, joining school councils and hospital boards, Shan said.

“We’ve learned the art of politics, Canadian politics. This year, we’re confident there will be at least one Tamil representative.”

The community is also working with Toronto police to clear up misconceptions and hopes to see young Tamils go into policing, added Shan, who said police have lacked information about Tamils. That “my last name is my dad’s first name,” for example, could be confusing when identification from both are checked.

The issue of violence and gangs among Tamils here is “a Canadian-born problem” that stems from settlement difficulties and lack of support. Every immigrant community goes through such stages and it’s a mistake to say “this is because of where they are coming from,” said Shan, arguing groups of Tamil youth hanging around are called gangs by the media and such stories actually fuel crime by conferring them status.

“These are a bunch of boys trying to find recognition,” he said.

“The amount of incidents is a fraction of what it used to be” during the late 1990s, Kandavel added.

The Canadian Tamil Youth Development Centre, with its annual Awards of Excellence for young Tamil-Canadian role models, also helps to combat stereotypes of Tamil youth.

There are many, however, who remain concerned about the well being of Tamils who may still carry emotional scars from the conflict in their homeland.

In 1999, a Scarborough man named Jeyabalan Balasingam jumped on the tracks in Victoria Park Station with his three-year-old son Sajanthan in his arms and both died. The Family Service Association of Toronto’s advisory council was concerned about the tragic incident and some others.

With the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, it launched the Tamil Mental Health Project in 2001, a study with 1,600 interviews, so that the community could ask governments for more culturally sensitive programs. (The study was completed last year but remains unreleased due to lack of funds.)

“We know the level of trauma in the community,” said longtime FSA worker Naga Ramalingam, suggesting the realities of getting a job, finding affordable housing and adjusting to life in Canada can compound problems Tamil-Canadians already have. “People here always think about relatives back home. That also re-traumatizes you,” he said.

Last month, when community leaders thought they had finally banished the “bad headlines” of the previous decade, the New York-based Human Rights Watch released a report suggesting Tamil-Canadians live in fear of local supporters of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

Widely reported in the media, the report was based on around two dozen interviews, “on innuendoes, (from) nameless, faceless people,” charged David Poopalapillai, the official CTC spokesperson.

“We didn’t witness any extortion. That report portrayed the Tamil community as living in dark ages.”

HRW “were taken for a ride,” said Poopalapillai by people intent on tilting the balance at the current peace talks in Sri Lanka in favour of the Sri Lankan government. “There are government agents working all over the world.”

Shan said non-Tamil co-workers and schoolmates in Scarborough have been asking Tamil friends if they are indeed living in fear. “I got asked, a lot of people are asking,” he said. “This has put us backward. In the name of human rights, this report is a threat to our human rights in Canada.”

The community, with more than 20 newspapers and three television stations, is well informed and well connected, so HRW’s recommendation there should be a campaign to make Tamil-Canadians aware of their rights is “an insult,” Shan argued.

“We believe in open communication. Things we didn’t get in Sri Lanka we are celebrating.”

Though the Boxing Day tsunami in 2004 devastated the Tamil community, it also brought more interaction with fellow Canadians and made the community stronger, Shan said. “A lot of people who got involved in the community because of the tsunami are still sticking together.”

Tamils are particularly grateful Canadians donated about $400 million for relief.

“It was so overwhelming how Canada showed its compassionate face,” said Poopalapillai. But he and others say they’re upset because the Sri Lankan government has so far prevented money from reaching the worst-hit areas on the island’s Tamil north and east coasts. “We all donated money and nobody knows what happened to it.”

Growing up feeling they are no different from other Canadians, the younger generation of Tamils expects equal treatment here, said Shanathela Easwarakumar, a student at University of Toronto in Scarborough.

This summer, the university will offer its courses on the Tamil diaspora and the Tamil language, the beginnings of a Tamil studies program for which Easwarakumar is on the board of directors. “I have full faith that it will rise to the highest of expectations.”

Organizations are also working on plans for a home for the aged and a Tamil community centre. “We need a central location where the community can celebrate its contribution to the country,” Shan said.

Canada’s recent listing of the Tamil Tigers as a forbidden terrorist group is not enjoying a lot of popularity in the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora.

Talk among the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora at the beginning of April usually centers around the Tamil New Year that falls in the middle of the month, but this year, different announcements have eclipsed that attraction: the Canadian Conservative government’s ban on the Tigers, which would limit their fundraising for any future war.

The Tigers are now listed in Canada with 38 other terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda and Hamas. It is illegal for any person to provide funding for or participate in the activities of a terrorist group.

The Canadian government’s listing came after reports last month of alleged extortion attempts for “a war fund” by Tamil Tiger operatives in Canada.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Peter McKay has indicated the Canadian government is intent on helping to achieve a negotiated settlement to the ethnic problems in Sri Lanka. “The LTTE’s repeated use of violence since signing a ceasefire agreement,” he says, “is unacceptable and seriously calls into question its commitment to the peace process.”

While the Canadian government sees the move as forcing the Tigers out of their combat fatigues to the negotiating table with the Sri Lankan government, it may be a little out of sync with the Tamil community itself, who the listing is supposed to help by protecting them from extortion and intimidation.

Montreal-based veteran Sri Lankan Tamil leader V. Navaratnam insists on the futility of talks and agreements with the Sri Lankan government. “The Tamils can no longer trust the Sinhalese [in government],” he says.

The 96-year-old Navaratnam, a former member of the Sri Lankan parliament, is the only living co-founder of the defunct Federal Party. This political party is credited with starting the Tamil struggle for rights in Sri Lanka, sparked in 1956 by the Sinhalese-only language act. Navaratnam points out how the initial Tamil struggle was modeled on Gandhi’s principles of non-violence. “We had been struggling and carrying out our campaign in a non-violent manner. It didn’t pay.”

In 1957, S. J. V. Chelvanayakam, the founder of the party, entered into a pact with the then prime minister of Sri Lanka, Solomon Bandaranaike, for the devolution of powers to the northern and eastern provinces of the island that were predominantly populated by Tamils. Caving into Sinhalese political opposition, Bandaranaike abrogated the pact. Soon after, he was slain. His assassin is believed to have been a Buddhist monk angry with Bandaranaike for being soft on the Tamils.

According to Navaratnam, Sinhalese politicians since Bandaranaike have reneged on every promise they made to the Tamils. In his view, only an “absolute separation” could ever bring a true and lasting solution to the Sri Lankan Tamil problem. He doesn’t think federalism will work. “You cannot put the fate of so many Tamils in the hands of Sinhalese politicians,” he says.

Other members of the Tamil community are also convinced that the Tamil-Sinhalese conflict can’t be resolved peacefully. “The Sri Lankan government will never give us anything,” says Vakeesan Natarajan, who has lived in Canada for some 25 years and teaches Sunday school at a diaspora Hindu temple. “We [Tamils] have to fight for it.”

Kanthan Tharmalingam, a 34-year-old Tamil shopkeeper, says he and his wife have never supported any armed warfare “because people are only going to die” but he isn’t opposed to the Tigers either. He remembers the 2004 tsunami: “If the LTTE hadn’t been there, the government wouldn’t have helped our people [the Tamils].”

The Sri Lankan government entered into an agreement called the post-tsunami operations management structure or P-TOMS with the Tamil Tigers to share tsunami funds with the affected regions in the north and east, but it fell through after strident opposition from Buddhist political parties in Sri Lanka.

“The Sri Lankan government is split four ways,” says Tharmalingam. “They don’t carry out what they agree on. They just listen to the Buddhist monks and keep wavering. The LTTE has always stood firm.”

He doesn’t bank much hope on the peace talks in Geneva this year. “Even if they [the Sri Lankan government] implement what they promise in Geneva, the situation would be okay. But it appears as if they want to drag the LTTE into war.”

Taking a different stand, R. San, a Tamil jeweler who has been in Canada for 10 years, says the rebel struggle in Sri Lanka is now unnecessary. He is strongly opposed to the Tigers. “I don’t want any of this. The rights we have now in Sri Lanka are good enough. I want to live in peace.”

San says he was asked to contribute $5,000 to the rebel movement recently. “Where will I go for the money? I don’t have that much money.” San has a mother and two sisters still living in Sri Lanka whom he wants to bring here. „I have to have about $27,000 in my savings to be able to sponsor their immigration papers.”

But San doesn’t seem to represent the majority. The prevailing opinion in the diapora is that most Sri Lankan Tamils in Canada are sympathetic toward the Tigers.

Pakiasothy Saravanamuttu of the Colombo-based Center for Policy Alternatives, when interviewed in July last year, offered some insight into why support for the Tigers runs so high among Sri Lankan Tamils, both in Sri Lanka and overseas.

“By and large, the vast majority [of Tamils] think the LTTE will get them the best deal. Historically, that’s been true,” he says. “I think the government’s failing has been to find a political and constitutional settlement that meets the aspirations of Tamil people within [a one-state] Sri Lanka.”

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The latest report on Sri Lanka by the New York based human rights advocacy group, Human Rights Watch, has caused something of a political furore amongst expatriate Tamils. The report, entitled – ‘Funding the Final War: LTTE intimidation and extortion in the Tamil diaspora,’ makes some damming claims, both about the LTTE and Tamils living in Canada and the United Kingdom. It argues that the LTTE is extorting funds for its final war under the cover of a fear - ridden atmosphere created through intimidation and violent reprisals.

According to HRW, Tamils living in the west have been subject to ‘death threats, beatings, property damage, smear campaigns, fabricated criminal charges, and even murder as a consequence of dissent.’ This pervasive atmosphere of fear and repression, HRW claims, forces all Tamils, regardless of political persuasion, to provide funds for the LTTE. At certain points the report qualifies some of its more damming allegations against the LTTE with the observation that many Tamils do willingly support the LTTE.

'This is not a cowed and moribund community, but one that is well integrated, massively skilled and deeply committed to what they see as their homeland. '

The focus of the report, however, and its major argument is that a minority of Tamils, argued to be a substantial minority, opposed to the LTTE are being forced to fund the LTTE through fear of violent reprisal. One informant in the report is attributed with the claim: ‘I think that most people who are giving money are not giving money for the cause. They give because of fear.’

Whilst the LTTE is portrayed as an essentially violent and anti democratic organisation that counts the forcible recruitment of children as one of its principal modalities of operation, the characterisation of Tamils living in the UK and Canada is hardly more flattering. They are, apparently, a community cowed into a moribund silence through the violence unleashed by the LTTE and its agents. Despite the occasional qualifications that stress that actual incidents of violence within the Tamil community are rare, the overriding characterisation is of a ghettoised people living in fear of their own mobs. According to HRW, the Tamils have learnt to keep their heads down and are completely lacking in any form of moral or political agency.

The controversy created by the HRW report is only to be expected, given the central role that human rights principles play in the legitimacy claims made by political actors, including the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. Neither can ignore the normative power of human rights as a standard through which political conduct is judged.

Moreover, the language of human rights is particularly important for the Tamil nationalist movement. The Tamil struggle is a demand for self - determination, a concept philosophically dependent on the understanding of individuals as rights bearing creatures. The demand for Tamil self - governance relies on an understanding of political rights, unlike Sinhala Buddhist nationalism that makes frequent recourse to the supposedly ancient history of a chosen people.

The centrality of human rights language both to the Tamil struggle and within the larger international arena places advocacy groups such as HRW in a very powerful position. However, HRW’s most recent report, especially when placed in the context of its wider reporting on Sri Lanka over the past two to three years, suggests that it is more interested in attacking and undermining the LTTE, to the advantage of its enemies, than in actually promoting a human rights culture within the Tamil independence movement per se.

Tamil expatriates’ fierce criticism of the HRW’s latest report is understandable given the disparaging and almost slanderous terms in which it describes their political and social life in the west. As a consequence of their criticism, HRW begrudgingly admitted that the extortion activities detailed in its report are being carried out by ‘a small number of individuals claiming to be from the LTTE.’

However, from this limited and qualified data set a gargantuan leap is made to assert that the LTTE as a whole is funding its ‘Final War,’ through systematic extortion in an atmosphere of fear and intimidation. This suggests that the collection of evidence was guided not by the usual standards of accuracy and objective inquiry, but by the author’s determination to prove that the LTTE was indeed a brutal and cruel organisation completely beyond the bounds of human rights norms.

'The portrayal of the LTTE as the main culprit of human rights abuses creates a grossly inaccurate misrepresentation of Sri Lanka’s multifaceted and difficult human rights situation.'

The portrayal of the LTTE as the main culprit of human rights abuses, a theme echoed by the overall tenor of HRW material on Sri Lanka over the past two to three years creates a grossly inaccurate misrepresentation of Sri Lanka’s multifaceted and difficult human rights situation. For example, in characterizing the climate of fear allegedly produced by the LTTE both in Sri Lanka and abroad, the report bluntly ignores the complex and dangerous ‘shadow war’ that has been underway in the north-east of the island. It makes the blanket assertion that the LTTE inflicts violent reprisals for ‘statements, activities or even social interactions that may be critical of the LTTE.’ It is then suggested that the LTTE has even killed Tamils ‘solely for working in educational, social or religious programs funded by the Sri Lankan government.’

This not only misrepresents but also, sinisterly, helps to conceal the ongoing violence against civilians perceived to be sympathetic to the LTTE by anti-LTTE paramilitaries. The recent abductions of TRO workers, the killings of journalists in Trincomalee who reported on paramilitary activity, the ‘execution style’ murder of two women, sisters of a former ‘Karuna group’ cadre who had switched sides to the LTTE, and many more have not figured at all on HRW’s Sri Lanka radar.

The violence unleashed by paramilitaries and Sri Lankan armed forces against Tamil activists over the past few months has led over 15, 000 people to cross from army held territory in Jaffna to LTTE held areas in the Vanni. a fear - ridden atmosphere created through intimidation and violent reprisals, indeed. But this reality too is however completely occluded by HRW’s selective reporting on the island.

Tamil perceptions of bias and inaccuracy in HRW’s advocacy in Sri Lanka have been fuelled by the organizations’ reports over the past few years, which have had an almost exclusive focus on the issue of the alleged recruitment by the LTTE of under eighteens, to the near total exclusion of all other human rights issues.

This reporting has not only missed the wider issues of child rights (regarding access to education, healthcare, clean water and adequate nutrition for example), it has also presented a Dickensian caricature of the LTTE as an entirely sinister and predatory organization. For example, an HRW statement issued barely two weeks after the Tsunami accused the LTTE of recruiting children affected by the natural disaster.

Firstly, amid now widely recognized issues of the state’s blocking aid to Tamil areas and of privileging the south over the north and east, the focus is notably narrow. Indeed, for many observers, the HRW statement seemed timed to deflect international attention from Sri Lanka’s denial of humanitarian aid and access to Tsunami affected areas in the Northeast of the island.

Moreover, this portrayal of the LTTE as rapaciously extractive was starkly contradicted by the experience not only of expatriate Tamils, but also of many other international actors and aid workers, who witnessed first hand the vital role LTTE cadres played in containing the humanitarian disaster created by the tsunami and in progressing post tsunami rehabilitation.

The Tamil diaspora activists, who have led the criticism of HRW, should be important partners for human rights advocacy groups. The former are members of long settled communities who have overcome enormous material and psychological hardships to integrate well into their host societies. Tamils have achieved success in a wide variety of fields including medicine, law, banking, computing and journalism and are well versed in the norms and traditions of Western liberal cultures.

Nevertheless, since the 2002 ceasefire large numbers of Tamil expatriates have visited the Vanni and contributed their skills and knowledge to reconstruction and rehabilitation work in LTTE controlled areas. This is not a cowed and moribund community, but one that is well integrated, massively skilled and deeply committed to what they see as their homeland.

However, through its inaccurate misrepresentations of the human rights situation in Sri Lanka, HRW has forfeited any possibility of fruitful engagement with the Tamil polity. Many Tamil activists are now convinced, purely on HRW’s output material, that the organisation is actively working with the Sri Lankan government to undermine the LTTE and, by extension, the Tamil independence movement.

They point out that even before the latest report on alleged LTTE extortion and fundraising was launched in New York, the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera was quoting it in a speech in London. The Foreign Minister’s early and strategically important access to the publication when placed alongside the evangelical and zealous anti LTTE tone adopted by the report’s author suggest that HRW will continue to play an important role in the Sri Lankan government’s drive to gain international support for a military push against the LTTE.

The implications of this highly selective defence of human rights are two fold. Firstly, it brings into serious question the efficacy of human rights as a vehicle for pursuing the Tamil political struggle, even though it is understood broadly as predicated as resistance to discriminatory and chauvinist state policies. Secondly, and more, importantly, it weakens the moral force behind the human rights criticism directed against the LTTE, both amongst the Tamils and, as a consequence amongst the organization. It is, thus, the norm of human rights itself that is ultimately brought into question and weakened as a consequence.