The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) continue to be an extremely potent, most lethal and well-organised terrorist force in Sri Lanka and has strong connections in Tamil Nadu and certain pockets of southern India, a tribunal said.

The tribunal, set up under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, was upholding the ban imposed on the outfit by the Centre on May 14, 2008.

Justice Vikramajit Sen of the Delhi High Court, who was on the tribunal, agreed with the Centre’s submissions that “the LTTE continues to use Tamil Nadu as the base for carrying out smuggling of essential items like petrol and diesel, besides drugs, to Sri Lanka.”

The Centre was represented by Additional Solicitor-General P.P. Malhotra, and Tamil Nadu by counsel S. Thananjayan. The LTTE was not represented by counsel.

It was submitted that Kalpakkam and Kudankulam, where nuclear plants are in existence, were proximate to LTTE bases in Sri Lanka. “The Government of India is apprehensive that unless the ban on the LTTE continues, acts of aggression on Indian soil are likely to occur.”

The judge also noted that the LTTE leaders had been cynical of India’s policy on their organisation and action of the state machinery in curbing its activities. Further, according to the submissions, enquiries on the activities of LTTE cadres/dropouts who had recently been traced in Tamil Nadu suggested that they would ultimately be utilised by the outfit for unlawful activities.

The tribunal said stress was laid on the fact that V. Pirapaharan, leader of the LTTE, and his intelligence chief Pottu Amman, wanted in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case, were still absconding and declared proclaimed offenders.

The tribunal took into consideration the submission that “the LTTE will continue to remain a strong terrorist movement and stimulate the secessionist sentiments to enhance its support base in Tamil Nadu as long as Sri Lanka continues to remain in a state of ethnic strife torn by the demand for Tamil Eelam which finds a strong echo in Tamil Nadu due to the linguistic, cultural, ethnic and historical affinity between the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka.”

The judge said: “Each of the submissions is fortified by instances and documents. Examples have also been given of the cases which were registered earlier and are still alive, and in many cases some of the LTTE cadres and members of the Tamilar Pasarai, the Tamil National Retrieval Troops and the Tamil Nadu Liberation Army, who are accused in these cases, are at large and efforts are on to secure them.”

“In the absence of any representation from the LTTE, the entire material placed by the Central government as well as the State government including deposition of their witnesses remains un-rebutted and is taken as having been proved.”

The LTTE was first banned in India following the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi.

With the Sri Lankan army closing in on Kilinochchi, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam headquarters, army officers are confident of decisive victory in the civil war. But LTTE political chief B. Nadesan does not agree. Recently, the Sri Lankan government dismissed Nadesan's statement that the LTTE "had always wanted ceasefire" and was "fighting a defensive war" as a trap and demanded that the Tigers lay down their weapons before coming forward for any talks.

In an email interview with THE WEEK from Kilinochchi, Nadesan says the LTTE is far from being defeated. Excerpts:

How is the situation in the Tamil Eelam?
The Sri Lankan government does not allow journalists-local or international-and human rights activists into our area. As a result, the massacre of Tamils by the Sri Lankan military does not reach the outside world. Aerial bombing and artillery shelling on Tamil civilians are continually taking place. Our homeland has been subjected to a severe economic blockade for many years. The current military action has displaced Tamils and many are living in forests.

The government is intent on brutally oppressing a group of people who are waging a struggle for their rights. Sadly, the media does not bring this out. I view this as a great human tragedy of the 21st century. The government and military chiefs insist on a military solution while we have been saying that a solution can be reached only through ceasefire and peace talks. The government unilaterally pulled out of the ceasefire. The world must understand this reality and recognise our struggle.

Is the 30-year-old struggle weakening?
This is a view propagated by the Sri Lankan government and military. They have the habit of making such victory declarations. During all these years, every government that came to power claimed that it was going to defeat the LTTE, but ended up facing humiliating defeats at our hands. During their Riviresa operation in 1995 and the Jeyasikuru operation in 1998 they said that 90 per cent of the LTTE strength had been wiped out. In reality, after Riviresa, we defeated the Mullaithivu military camp in a conventional war with the support of our people; and a few days after Jeyasikuru, we won back the land they took 18 months to capture.

Even now, they say that we have been weakened. The Sri Lankan military is facing heavy losses at the forward defence lines. To make up for the losses, they are bringing in men from other districts to areas surrounding Kilinochchi. Many army men are deserting their camps. A new military division, 61st Brigade, is being created with the captured deserters.

Responding to concerns raised by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the Sri Lankan government said it was attacking extremists, not innocent Tamils.
This is not true. Children and old people have been killed and injured in large numbers by aerial bombings and artillery shelling. The economic blockade has left our people without adequate food and medicine. We have sent news of attacks on civilians to the media with ample evidence. The expatriate representatives of the international agencies in our areas know about this situation. Now, even they have been expelled from our area by the government. This shows that the government has taken steps to block news of attacks on innocent people reaching the outside world.

How do you feel about the support rendered by the people, including the film fraternity, in Tamil Nadu?
The genocide in Tamil Eelam through indiscriminate attacks and the eviction of Tamils from their homes are the reasons for the rising support in Tamil Nadu. Whenever the people of Tamil Eelam faced great miseries at the hands of the Sri Lankan military, people of Tamil Nadu have expressed their support, beyond their political differences.

Has this increased the confidence in your struggle?
The oppressive action of the government has enraged not only the people of Tamil Nadu but also the Tamil diaspora. Sinhala political leaders, military chiefs and even Buddhist monks are emphasising a military solution. If the government continues to believe that an ethnic issue in a country can be solved by a military solution alone, it will only lead to the oppressed ethnic people achieving their aspirations with help from other countries.

The chief minister of Tamil Nadu says it is fratricidal war that has weakened the Tamil Eelam struggle. Do you agree?
He is saying this with good intentions. We, too, wish to bring Tamils together and wage our struggle as a strong force. Sadly, one or two Tamils have become traitors for trivial perks offered by the Lankan government.

Is it true that India is giving military aid to Sri Lanka?
The Sri Lankan government and military chiefs have openly claimed that the Indian government has been giving them military assistance. The Indian government is silent over this comment. This is indeed an issue that saddens the Tamils, people in Tamil Nadu, and Tamils all over the world.

What help do you expect from the Indian government?
It must stop all military assistance given to Sri Lanka, remove the ban on our movement and recognise our struggle. I like to point out that our movement and our people are true friends of India.

How do you react to comments by Sri Lankan army chief Sarath Fonseka about V. Pirapaharan's health? He said Pirapaharan would not live long.
Our leader is in excellent health and is leading the current war. This comment is an expression of the hatred he has for the Tamil people and our movement. Recently, he said the island belongs to Sinhala Buddhists. This shows that he is an irresponsible and immature military chief.

The All Party Representatives Committee (APRC) is a farce of the Sri Lanka government. It was always used to impress upon India and the International Community. The basic premise of the APRC not to go beyond unitary constitution of Sri Lanka, will not bring in any meaningful result. India and the IC know it well. Yet, if they continue to tolerate the farce, they will only be abetting the genocidal programme of Colombo, says Suresh Premachandran of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA).

In a wide-ranging interview with TamilNet, Premachandran explaines his views on the deliberations by the so-called All Party Representatives Committee (APRC) on devolution proposals, he said the committee was used by the Sri Lankan government to fool India and the International Community.

Full text of the interview follows:

TamilNet: What is your overall assessment of the discourse of the All Party Representatives Committee?

Suresh Premachandran: In the beginning there was an Experts Panel formed to support the APRC, which comprised several retired public officers, senior lawyers and academics. Even as the APRC kept delaying its deliberations, 11 members (6 Sinhalese, 4 Tamils and 1 Muslim)—a majority of the 17-member Experts Panel—came out with a document that was presented to the Sri Lankan President. This document spoke of some sort of federal system, devolution of powers and various other things. However, even before it was officially submitted to the President, this proposal was leaked to foreign media like The Hindu, published from Chennai. The infuriated President immediately scrapped the proposals and asked the APRC to come up with its own report. The APRC’s deliberations never came to an end. Finally, the APRC became a farce as it was used to suit President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s convenience. Every time he had to go to India, or he had to meet the Indian Prime Minister or prior to any visit by an Indian minister, Mr. Rajapaksa made it a point to refer to the APRC. Especially with respect to India, the APRC became an easy excuse to cite—the committee was always supposed to come up with a solution within two or four months time and so on.

Even when it seemed as though the APRC was ready to finalise its work before the Eastern Provincial Elections, Mr. Rajapaksa gave the 13th Amendment to the APRC and asked them to endorse it.

TamilNet: Was there any deliberation on the 13th Amendment in the APRC?

Premachandran: The parties, including the Muslim and Up-Country Tamils parties who were in the ruling UPFA fold, were asked to endorse the 13th Amendment only as a "first step". They were told by the President that 13th Amendment could be implemented as an immediate remedy and the deliberations would continue towards a better solution. With this promise, they were asked to extend their support and they did so. But, it became a trap. Now, this endorsement is cited out of context, as an endorsement by the parties, to be a basis for the solution. In fact, the APRC never deliberated on the 13th Amendment either as a basis for an interim or permanent solution. Mr. Rajapaksa had only asked the APRC that he wanted to implement the Amendment and asked signatures from these parties as an endorsement for his goodwill.

In reality, the APRC was used for Indian and International consumption. It was used to showcase that there was a discussion on the proposals, that there was progress towards a political solution and so on.

TamilNet: How do you view the composition of the APRC?

Premachandran: If you look at who constituted the APRC in the beginning, it was the partners of the government: JVP, JHU, SLMC and the CWC. Of course, the UNP was brought in later. But the UNP left when it became evident that the whole APRC exercise was viewed as a delaying tactic. The JVP and the JHU too left the APRC protesting the discussions on devolution. The TNA was not invited by the President.

Now, there is no point in referring to it as an All Party Representatives Committee as there is no participation by the main opposition UNP, and the TNA, not to mention the JVP. In fact, only last week in Parliament, the Chairman of the APRC, Professor Tissa Vitarana requested the UNP, JVP and the TNA to participate. Only the SLFP and its minority alliance partners are in the APRC. They only represent a minor portion of the views.

TamilNet: Does the International Community continue to place hope on the APRC?

Premachandran: There have been statements from the U.S. Ambassador Robert Blake that they were expecting the APRC to put forward proposals. There was a recent newspaper article where he expressed hope that the committee would come up with a solution on the basis of the Indo-Lanka accord. This clearly shows that the Sri Lankan Government has created a myth that this APRC would deliver a “substantial solution.”

Moreover, hardliner parties like the JVP and the JHU will oppose any proposal based on the 13th Amendment. Also, the APRC has been instructed by the Sri Lankan President to work out a solution within the framework of the Unitary Constitution. He has categorically told them not to go beyond that. The point I want to make is: there is no devolution possible at all within the Sri Lankan Unitary Constitution.

TamilNet: Do you view that devolution is possible within the Unitary Constitution of Sri Lanka?

Premachandran: Devolution is not possible if you can't go beyond the Unitary Constitution. Even the 13th Amendment was passed only after obtaining consent from a majority of Supreme Court judges who guaranteed that it would not affect the Unitary Constitution.

There can't be devolution within the Sri Lankan Unitary Constitution. There can only be a decentralisation of power. If we talk about decentralisation, the Central Government can, at any point of time and with a simple majority, take back whatever powers were decentralised.

A recent example to this is how the Government passed a Bill on the 21st of October claiming that all the roads now belong to the Central Government. Earlier, the National Highways belonged to the Central Government and the rest of the roads belonged to the provincial and local governments. This was simply taken back. In a similar manner, the agrarian services and the transport were taken back earlier. Even in future, they can take back any powers if they want to.

But, if you are having a devolution, that is some sort of a sovereignty over the de-centralisation. You can make laws and implement it in a proper manner. This is not possible in decentralisation within the unitary constitution.

Further, Article 76 of the Sri Lankan Constitution clearly states that the Parliament is the only Legislative Assembly and that it cannot devolve legislative power even to a subordinate body. This means that any provincial council does not have the power to make any statutes, they don't have any power to make laws. Even if they have to make any statues or laws, they have to be ratified by the Central Government. It is therefore not possible to have any meaningful devolution of power, whether it is based on the 13th Amendment or anything else contained in the Unitary Constitution of Sri Lanka.

At one time, former President Chandrika Kumaratunga and Prof. G. L. Peiris have also gone on record saying that devolution is not possible within the Unitary Constitution.

Therefore, it is clear that the APRC is only for “International consumption" and nothing else. Or, it is a tactic to buy time to continue waging the war.

They say that the APRC had met 82 times. For more than six months, Prof. Vitarana is saying that they have completed 90% of the deliberations. Now, he is saying that proposal would be tabled only after the war is concluded. What we can deduce from the discourse is that the APRC is a farce to buy time and to hoodwink the International Community with a myth based on wrong information. They will never come up with a meaningful solution.

TamilNet: Don't you think that the diplomats are not aware of the Sri Lankan Government’s alleged hidden motive behind the APRC?

Premachandran: Of course, in the real sense they know it very well. The EU and various Ambassadors and the concerned diplomats here in Sri Lanka know all too well that this APRC will not deliver anything. But, somehow they are made to feel that this is something they can use to keep up pressure on the Sri Lankan Government by expressing such hopes [of a solution]. Again, there is clear-cut framework given by the Sri Lankan President to the APRC: "Look, you have to come up with a proposal within a Unitary Constitution." How is this possible? There is no difference between the 13th Amendment and this stand. The International Community knows very well that they [the Sri Lankan state] will not go beyond the Unitary Constitution. The IC therefore attempts to create something like the 13th Amendment, with a different name, and push it on to the people in a bid to satisfy them. As I view it, this is not a healthy approach for conflict-resolution.

TamilNet: Why do you think the government avoided the TNA's participation in the APRC? Was there any invitation from the President to the TNA to join the deliberations?

Premachandran: This is a policy decision taken by the President. Two years back, I witnessed Mr. Sampanthan asking him about the participation of the TNA. Mr. Rajapaksa replied saying that they wanted to achieve a Sinhala consensus first before inviting the TNA. But, in practice, other parties representing Up-Country Tamils and Muslims, who were in the UPFA alliance were included in the APRC, with no regard to achieving "Sinhala consensus" first. They have invited us only now for the first time. Moreover, even that request to join has come from Prof. Tissa Vitarana and not from the President. It was a call he made in the Parliament and no official invitation was extended to us. The real issue is that we will insist upon a federal structure as the minimum requisite and they are not prepared to face it. They think there would be nothing left to bargain with the LTTE if they include us in their deliberations. That is the ground reality.

The TNA has openly and publicly reiterated its position on the APRC several times—we view it as a time-buying tactic to conduct the war and as an eyewash arrangement aimed at India and the International Community. It is not an honest attempt in solving the conflict.

TamilNet: What do you want to say to Indian policy makers at this juncture?

Premachandran: Not only the Government of India, but also political parties in Tamil Nadu should understand two facts:

Firstly, they should realise that the 13th Amendment, which arrived through the Indo-Lanka accord was only a testing ground to see whether it is possible to implement devolution within the Unitary Constitution of Sri Lanka. It has been very clearly proved that it is not possible to have any sort of meaningful devolution within the unitary constitution. It will never happen. New Delhi should therefore realise that it is meaningless to talk about the 13th Amendment or 13th Amendment plus plus.

Secondly, New Delhi needs to understand the mindset of the Sinhala polity. The Sinhala polity feels that the Sinhalese are the sons of the soil, and the rest whether Tamils or Muslims are aliens—Tamils having land in Tamil Nadu should seek their rights there, and Muslims having their land in Saudi Arabia, can go back there. This is not a new mindset; this has prevailed for 103 years, from the times of Anagarika Dharmapala onwards.

As a revivalist under the British colonialists, he not only fought against the Christian missionaries, he also said that Tamils and Malayalis were aliens, that they don't belong to this country, that they had to go back. All the subsequent Sinhala leaders have followed in his footsteps, be it S.W.R.D Bandranaike, D.S. Senanayake, J. R. Jayawardene and the rest. Before coming to power, D. S. Senanayake, the first prime minister of post-colonial Ceylon, said that he would safeguard the status quo between the Tamils and Sinhalese. But when he came to power, he disenfranchised one million Upcountry Tamils, as he viewed their existence as a threat to the Sinhalese people. They were deprived of their civic and voting rights.

The Sinhalese leaders who emerged in the latter part of the British colonisation and in the post-colonial era have been thinking that Sinhala nationalism could flourish only with the destruction of Tamils.

Even before independence, J.R. Jayewardene introduced a resolution in the State Council declaring that the Sinhala language alone would replace English as the official languge. He argued that there were 30 million Tamils across the Palk Strait and that the Tamils possessed a cultured literature, language and civilization. He argued that if both the languages become official languages in Ceylon, the Sinhala language would be destroyed. They adopted the agenda that Sinhala nationalism was to survive on the destruction of Tamil.

Instead of taking a line allowing both Sinhala nationalism and Tamil nationalism to progress positively with co-existence, they focused on the destruction of Tamil. This is what we rightfully identify as Sinhala chauvinism. Even Chandrika Kumaratunga, while addressing a South African television sometime in the 1990s as the Sri Lankan President said that Blacks in South Africa were entitled to fight for their rights because they were the sons of the soil whereas Tamils did not belong to the country and hence they cannot fight for their rights in Sri Lanka. Another President, D.B. Wijetunge compared the Sinhala 'majority race' as a tree and the Tamils and other communities as vines that can get entangled in it and grow. Sri Lanka Army Commander Sarath Fonseka in a recent interview to a Canadian paper has reiterated the same view.

The root-cause of the problem is this Sinhala mindset. Only from this mindset, the Sinhala Only Act springs out, oppressive standardisation, colonisation and so on are born out of it. For all these years, we have been talking about the side effects of this mindset, such as efforts to institutionalise Tamil also as an official language or to stop the colonisation. These are side-roots stemming from the main taproot. There is no sign of change in this 100-year-old mindset. We are witnessing this in every session of the Parliament. As long as this mindset prevails, there will be no federalism, no devolution and no solution at all.

Until New Delhi and the International Community really understand the problems of this mindset, they will continue to support the genocidal state of Sri Lanka that annihilates Tamils.

Earlier this month President Mahinda Rajapakse unveiled a budget comprising of tax rises and heavy borrowing to support the government’s war efforts against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and declared that offensive operations in the country's north would continue.

Noting that the war and its success appeared to be the lynchpin of the budget, observers point out that a quick victory is crucial.

Neither the island’s already frail economy nor the Sinhalese people, who are facing one of highest inflation rates in the world – 23.4% in October, would take the burden of an expensive war for long.

“If they can finish the war soon then people may bear with them, but not forever” the country manager of a leading multi-national firm in Colombo told IPS.

Observers feel that Sinhalese public will only tolerate the economic hardships they are facing provided there are regular success stories from the battle front.

Whilst Sri Lankan military has managed to capture territory from the LTTE, its goal of destroying the outfit continues to be a distant dream.

Sri Lankan military chief has had to revise his timeline for wiping out the LTTE many times over the past two years.

As defence expenditure continue to rise and casualty numbers continue to mount, Sri Lanka is desperately in need of a quick win.

Sri Lankan eeconomists are concerned that the government has got the war euphoria mixed up with economic management.

Whipping up patriotic fervour in expectation of military victory may indeed distract attention from the worsening economic outlook. But that strategy needs victory to come soon, said the Economist in a recent article published on Sri Lanka’s budget.

Economist Muttukrishna Sarvananthan, a Fulbright Visiting Research Scholar at George Washington University, commenting on the budget reflected similar views and said that as long as the military maintains its successes in the northern battles, Rajapakse would be able to muster public support despite the country's economic woes, reported IPS.

Shops and commercial establishments in Tamil Nadu shut down and the state's roads wore a deserted look as a result of the traders' bandh (shut down) Friday on the Eelam Tamils issue. According to reports in the Indian media, the bandh was total all over the state as over 25 lakh traders, owing allegiance to 5,500 trade unions, took part in the peaceful agitation to show their solidarity with the Eelam Tamils.

All political parties in Tamil Nadu had extended their support to this bandh which took place from six in the morning to six in the evening in Tamil Nadu and Puduchery (Puthuchcheari). The shutdown of the private sector has drawn more participation than the government organised human-chain, observers said.

The organisors of the shutdown said the state-wide success of the bandh, even in rural areas, reflected that sentiments among Tamil Nadu public for Eelam Tamils running high, independent of state orchestration.

T. Vellaiyan, President of the Tamil Nadu Traders Union that called for the bandh, demanded an immediate halt to the genocide of Tamils in the war-ravaged island.

The bandh had a two point agenda: to condemn the Sri Lankan military's genocide on Tamils, and to express solidarity with the Eelam Tamils who had lost their livelihood in the island.

The bandh call had a rousing reception from traders of all strata of society: roadside tea-shops and grocery stores never opened, so did some of the largest cloth stores and hotels.

Asia's largest perishable goods market at Koyambedu in Chennai, which has roughly about 2500 wholesale shops, was completely shut down from 12 midnight Friday. Consequently, about half a million fruit/vegetable shops which get their supplies from here, were also shut down. This market employs about 10,000 workers and 500 drivers.

The traders' bandh affected all cities in Tamil Nadu. The public was affected because it was impossible to locate any store that had not downed its shutters. It was difficult to even buy a packet of milk, because the distribution was wrapped up by six in the morning.

Scheduled to be held originally on 17 October, the bandh was postponed to 31 October on account of the decision taken at the All Party Meeting organized by the Government of Tamil Nadu. Over 5.500 trade unions had come together to organize this bandh – they had distributed pamphlets highlighting the sufferings of the Eelam Tamils to all affiliated traders.

Moreover, traders from other Indian states, who run some of the most successful businesses in Chennai also extended their support to the bandh and cooperated by not operating Friday.

Mr. Vellaiyan was arrested by the Tamil Nadu Police for alleged 'enforcement' of the boycott following 'politically motivated complaints', the organisers said and added that they promptly secured his release.

News papers and television channels in India labelled this bandh a hundred percent success.

The Indian government may be bereft of all guts to do anything in Sri Lanka. But at least it can render a great service by not talking about the 13th amendment as a basis to resolve the crisis. What is more dangerous than India abetting a war against Eelam Tamils by providing arms, armed personnel and intelligence to Colombo is the political sabotage of thrusting the rotten 13th amendment upon the struggling people to muffle their voice. India should rather acknowledge the decades-old Tamil voice for self-determination as a nation, to base exploration of fresh models, writes Opinion Columnist.

The fact that India, especially its Congress government was instrumental to the enactment of the 13th Amendment in the constitution of Sri Lanka doesn’t mean that India should adamantly stick to it even after seeing its failure for two decades. Individuals may care for false prestige, but not a great nation like India.

The provincial council solution facilitated by the 13th amendment in 1987, failed at the outset primarily due to its incompatibility in concept and structure to match the acuteness of the ethnic divide in Sri Lanka, than due to the opposition to it by the LTTE.

This should have become clear without any iota of doubt to India at that time itself as the Indian sponsored Chief Minister Varatharaja Perumal himself became so frustrated of the working of the solution despite the presence of the IPKF, that he decided to declare an independent Tamil country on the day he quitted. He must have received tacit assent from India to take that step, but well, there was a Janata government in power in Delhi at that time which was able to see the realities.

A fundamental, conceptual conspiracy in the 13th amendment was that it provided devolution for eight provincial councils when the question was between two ethnicities. Thus the amendment was designed to nullify the importance of regional identity by equating those who wanted it and those who never asked for it. A reputed Sinhala scholar recently pointed out at a workshop in Oslo how the model failed to arouse enthusiasm in the Sinhala provinces.

The 13th amendment was far too short in addressing the basic requirements of Tamils: recognition of their ethnic identity as a nation of self-determination which was essential for their emotional security in the context of the inherent nature of Sinhala nationalism in Sri Lanka, physical security in the context of ethnically charged and inflated armed forces of the state, integrity of land in the background of state sponsored encroachments which started even before independence and structural provisions to implement development in all sectors in the way and extent they wish without hindrance.

The advocates of the 13th amendment argue that all basic Tamil aspirations could be found in it in an implied sense. But it was a folly or perhaps a deliberate sabotage that India and Sri Lanka thought of stuffing and stressing a unitary constitution with a phenomenon that needs at least a confederation-constitution to handle.

Eelam Tamils have to be ever thankful to Mr. Mahinda Rajapaksa and the Chief Justice Mr. Sarath Silva, for aptly demonstrating to India the void of 13th Amendment by a court ruling dividing the Northern and Eastern Provinces united by the 13th Amendment.

It would have convinced even a child how so simple it is to deny the Tamils their geographical integrity. But however explicit the Sri Lankan President and Chief Justice were, they failed to convince the Indian government and some sections in Tamil Nadu for they still harp on the 13th Amendment.

When a political effort fails it is statesmanship to find improved remedies. But, what happened in the case of Eelam Tamils was the leadership in India and Sri Lanka decided on a retrogressive tactic to penalize the already suffering people by going back to zero.

Mahinda was talking of Panchayat system (local government) solution, started an aggressive war abetted by India and the West, divided North and East, truncated the 13th amendment, terrorized the Tamil population and effectively used the JVP and JHU to resist to any meaningful solution.

As the saying goes in Tamil, it was a tactic of making people say ‘let there be no alms but hold the dog’ (Pichchai vea’ndaam, naayaip pidi), so that they would agree to anything the Establishment concedes. This is a typical bureaucratic approach for we don’t have statesmen anymore in our region. They are all executives and bureaucrats of a larger system. If that says ‘terrorism’ all of them will endorse it blindfold.

It is time that the Tamils of Eelam and Tamil Nadu should tell India and the International community clearly and loudly what they have in their mind and what they want, without mincing words. It is not a matter confined only to the LTTE. Even those Tamil groups now in the Mahinda camp will need the security of an irrefutable constitutional platform for all their dealings. Otherwise they will be liquidated once their services are not required.

Other than the intertwining of Eelam Tamil nationalism with the LTTE, implicated in Rajiv assassination, and an opinion that Congress and its officials are biased due to their earlier failure in SriLanka arising from Tamil resisstance, there are many other facts or myths circulate about India’s attitude and fears towards Eelam Tamil self-determination:

'Eelam may create inspirations in Tamil Nadu and elsewhere in India. Therefore, what the maximum the Eelam Tamils can get should be less than what the Indian states have.'

'Sri Lanka may seek the help of ‘others’ who will threaten Indian security.'

'Turmoil and security threat possible due to a backlash of the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka in the event of recognizing Tamil rights.'

Often many western diplomats have hinted that it is India that is an obstacle for Eelam Tamils getting anything politically substantial.

There is a view that as events in Sri Lanka move in a way not acceptable to them, India and her strategic partners will allow only further chaos and will think of only incomplete solutions in order to facilitate space for their interests. The attitude is ‘if you don’t listen to us, go to hell; let’s grab what’s possible’.

Some political analysts also have cited a line of thinking that the easiest way for India is to allow the elimination of top LTTE leaders so that the crisis would die and no need to care what happens to the Tamils, as they can’t blackmail like the Sinhalese.

Well, now there is a situation that if India doesn’t see to it that Eelam Tamils get their autonomy or independence, she may face worse security threats.

The people’s awakening in Tamil Nadu is a serious matter. It is difficult to predict the form it may take. Besides, the behaviour of India in respect to Eelam Tamils will seriously erode the credibility of Indian establishment with its ethnicities, minorities and subalterns. They will not look at it as a lesson. Rather they will look at it as a challenge. While the Sinhalese continue with their blackmailing, the Eelam Tamils also will try to seek other avenues. Military defeat of the LTTE is not the end of the Tamil struggle.

Not that the Indian leaders don’t know that it was actually the Sinhalese polity and the average Sinhalese mentality that didn’t cooperate from the very beginning with India’s geopolitical and security concerns. Had there been an understanding and regional perception, they wouldn’t have contributed to the ethnic crisis attracting all hawks to poke their noses. Rather the Sinhalese leadership chose to exploit the Indian concerns for blackmailing India and to achieve their chauvinistic goals in Sri Lanka, which has now reached the stage of systematic genocide.

The exclusive Sinhalese polity will not stop until the Tamil identity is completely subordinated and Sinhalicised. The perception it has given to its people is that this is settling scores with a two and a half millennia old enemy. There is no immediate likelihood that the Sinhalese perception will change for pluralistic accommodation.

A concrete structural arrangement not less than a confederation, if not a separate country, can only prevent catastrophe in the island. That too will need international supervision and separation of the warring parties for some time, considering the deep divide the prolonged war has created. In extreme situations facilitation of demographic movement also may be needed.

If India can take a bold stand on this it won’t be difficult to convince its ‘strategic partners’. A noble mission will only enhance India’s prestige inside and outside and no more blackmailing.

Whether the present government at Delhi may able to carryout such a venture or not, at least it should not seal the fate of Eelam Tamils by instigating the zombie of 13th Amendment.

What Dr. Manmohan Singh should perform in Sri Lanka is a surgery, not abetting genocide.

A Sinhala-dominated Sri Lanka is not in India’s interests, writes T S Gopi Rethinaraj, a Singapore National University scholar, in the November 2008 issue of Pragati, the Indian National Interest Review. A unified Sri Lanka under Sinhalese domination will be deeply inimical to India's interests. Colombo will permanently exploit India in the absence of a buffer that an Independent Tamil Eelam could provide, he wrote.

Pragati is published by The Indian National Interest—an independent community of individuals committed to increasing public awareness and education on strategic affairs, economic policy and governance.

In an article titled “Don't abandon the Tiger: A Sinhala-dominated Sri Lanka is not in India’s interests”, Rethinaraj writes "India has reached an impasse because of its stated policy to safeguard the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka and unwillingness to recognise LTTE’s standing in the conflict. Unless India overcomes this fixation, the Sinhalese dispensation will continue to exploit New Delhi and pursue its agenda without inhibitions."

Further, detailing the benefits of an independent Tamil Eelam to Indian Security interests Rethinaraj writes "A unified Sri Lanka under Sinhalese domination will be deeply inimical to Indian security and strategic interests. Presence of two states in India’s southern frontiers will act as a powerful deterrent to both successor states from pursuing policies that are prejudicial to the Indian Navy’s predominance in the region."

Full text of the article follows:

IN THE April 2008 issue of Pragati this writer had argued that the survival of the Tamil Tigers is India’s insurance policy against Sri Lanka swinging over to interests of powers that might seek to contain India in the Indian Ocean region. Now that the ethnic conflict has resurfaced as a factor in Tamil Nadu politics, India can ill afford to be seen as actively colluding with the Sinhalese to subjugate the ethnic Tamils. While the recent competitive jostling among political parties over the issue is largely due to fragile electoral alliances in the state, there is also growing public sympathy for Sri Lankan Tamils due to the grave humanitarian crisis generated by the military campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

India has reached an impasse because of its stated policy to safeguard the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka and unwillingness to recognise LTTE’s standing in the conflict. Unless India overcomes this fixation, the Sinhalese dispensation will continue to exploit New Delhi and pursue its agenda without inhibitions. India should also recognise that the Sinhalese majority is yet to show any inclination to moderate its racist vision for Sri Lanka’s future. Frequent reminders by Colombo’s ruling elite that the ethnic minority will have to accept the country as Sinhalese land only confirms that the ongoing war is not really about defeating the LTTE, but part of larger strategy to Sinhalicise the entire island. Sri Lankan government efforts to alter the demographic character of traditional Tamil areas by settling Sinhalese peasants and creating high security zones are mainly to weaken the Tamil resolve.

Since the LTTE remains the only roadblock to this Sinhalese agenda, its military defeat will ultimately result in the political, social, and psychological subjugation of Tamils living in the North, East and other parts of the island. The Sri Lankan state has mostly achieved this objective in areas not under LTTE control. This is the reason why this writer had argued earlier that ethnic Tamils in the island and India will lose leverage with Colombo once the LTTE is militarily defeated. However, the LTTE leadership should also realise that the Sri Lankan Tamils have the best opportunity to secure an honourable settlement when they are still militarily relevant and explore alternative ways to quickly resolve the ethnic conflict.

While the LTTE’s violent methods—forced recruitment, employment of child soldiers, and unrelenting militancy—are repugnant, their largely ethical conduct in the civil war has gone almost unnoticed. The LTTE has been mostly fighting a defensive war restricting their combat within what they perceive as traditional Tamil areas, and their guerrilla attacks have mostly targeted military bases and security forces. This is in contrast to almost all other militant/terrorist organisations in the world which mainly target civilian infrastructure and inflict massive civilian casualties.

Ironically it is the Sri Lankan state that has been deploying its firepower and aerial bombing capabilities over civilian areas in the north, resulting is massive civilian casualties and damages to residences, hospitals, and other civilian infrastructure. Unlike its antagonists, the LTTE has rarely been accused or found guilty of rape and other crimes against women and children during combat. The conduct of the Sri Lankan state reveals that the ongoing military campaign has an almost genocidal streak, with the deliberate targeting of civilian areas mainly aimed to deter civilians from supporting the LTTE.

Within India, especially after Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination, there has been a carefully orchestrated portrayal of the LTTE as the source of all troubles on the island. While the LTTE’s role in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi deserves the strongest condemnation, that singular episode alone cannot be the basis for India’s Sri Lanka policy or for condemning Sri Lankan Tamils to eternal suffering. Suggestions that the emergence of an independent Tamil Eelam will hurt Indian security interests are disputable, because its ethnic and political ties to India through Tamil Nadu will be much stronger than that of the Sinhalese dominated state. However, given a chance, most Sri Lankan Tamils will be happy to live under a greater Tamil Nadu—comprising traditional Tamil areas in the North and East of the island—as Indian citizens. But India failed to explore that option to integrate the North and East with Tamil Nadu when several opportunities presented that outcome before 1987.

The historical baggage—some of which dates pre-Christian times—also continues to remain a major impediment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The British failure to present a partition plan to accommodate the political aspirations of the Sinhalese and Tamils allowed earlier historical grievances to fester. Since Sinhalese-Tamil social relations never assumed violent proportions like the Hindu-Muslim problem in pre-1947 India, the problem could have been easily sorted if the Sinhalese majority had been reasonable in their approach toward the ethnic minority. Until 1956 all ethnic groups at least shared a common identity and future as Ceylonese. The Sinhala Only Act and failure of Colombo’s ruling elite to produce a multiethnic national identity and vision for Sri Lanka deepened the social divide and paved way for separatism.

Competitive pandering to Sinhalese-Buddhist extremism by political parties gradually resulted in the constitutional alienation, linguistic disenfranchisement, and denial of education and economic opportunities of Tamils. Failure of conventional political methods to address these grievances and various state-led anti-Tamil pogroms eventually led the Tamil youth (from which the LTTE would emerge as the pre-eminent force) to wage an armed struggle for political separation.

The racism and blatant government discrimination against Tamils in jobs, education, and economic opportunities that produced the original conflict are still intact. Hence attempts to equate Sri Lanka’s ethnic problem with various insurgencies faced by India are not only incorrect but an unfair characterisation of the Indian state. India represents very different social and political values and every conceivable religious, ethnic, and linguistic group in India enjoys constitutional equality and protection.

Thus viewing Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict through the prism of Indian federalism is misleading. India has always been keen in ending the ethnic conflict by actively engaging with the Sinhalese, and has consistently advocated a federal solution to Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict. This, according to New Delhi’s assessment, would meet the aspirations of all ethnic groups in the island. While the federal political structure has worked remarkably well in the context of India, where coexistence of several ethnic/linguistic states acts as buffer to any chauvinism from the Hindi heartland, it is unlikely to work in Sri Lanka where there are only two main ethnic groups. But Colombo is not even prepared to offer Tamils the Indian-type solution, which would still preserve their political dominance in Sri Lanka. The failure to take into account this deep Sinhalese-Tamil divide explains the stagnation in India’s Sri Lanka policy.

Colombo has always keenly followed political undercurrents in India and within Tamil Nadu and benefits from the prevailing chaos. It has not only been successful is driving a wedge between the concerns of Tamil Nadu politics and the central government, but has also carefully cultivated certain Indian bureaucrats and journalists whose views on the ethnic conflict are compatible to the Sinhalese project. Historically too the Sinhalese have cleverly played one Indian kingdom against another to have an edge over the Tamil Hindu Jaffna kingdom. India’s succumbing to this contemporary scheming is, in the long run, deeply inimical to its interests and security.

Unless India makes a course correction, some political parties are likely to exploit the situation to revive the long-forgotten separatist propaganda in Tamil Nadu. While the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government was more sensitive and remained equidistant from the two warring groups, the current United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government has been providing significant military assistance to the Sri Lankan government. This policy is inadvertently contributing to the Tamil subjugation project of the current Sri Lankan government.

India must not allow its long term interests to be corroded due to the machinations of the Sinhalese regime and its Indian supporters. It should intervene as it did in East Pakistan if Colombo does not show any sincerity and returns to its old ways. Indeed, a strong case could be made that an independent Tamil Eelam will not only be in India’s interests but permanently avoid exploitation by the Sinhalese. A unified Sri Lanka under Sinhalese domination will be deeply inimical to Indian security and strategic interests. Presence of two states in India’s southern frontiers will act as a powerful deterrent to both successor states from pursuing policies that are prejudicial to the Indian Navy’s predominance in the region.

India would do well to remember how it lost all leverage with China by meekly accepting the latter’s invasion of Tibet. India’s appeasement policies in response to developments in Tibet in the 1950s not only paved way for Tibet’s invasion, but emboldened China to lay claim over vast tracts of India’s territory. Of course India doesn’t have any border to settle with Sri Lanka, but it occupies its soft underbelly and a strategic position in the Indian Ocean. Colombo will permanently continue to exploit India in the absence of a buffer that an independent Tamil Eelam could provide.

Already, India has been shamefully remiss in failing to take the Sri Lankan navy to task over the issue of frequent killings of Indian fishermen. The fact that Sri Lankan navy could kill a few hundred Indian fishermen with impunity is a sign of the future behaviour of the Sinhalese state once it secures a military victory over LTTE and impose a solution on ethnic Tamils on its terms. Once the Sri Lankan state achieves that objective, India will be, according to a popular Sinhalese refrain, “discarded like curry leaves.”

At a time of global financial crisis, Sri Lanka’s reliance on borrowing combined with plunging  foreign exchange reserves, spiraling inflation and poor fiscal policies are making Sri Lanka the most vulnerable in the region, according to international monetary experts.

In its annual report, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) directors expressed their concern on the risks of public debt distress arising from the increasing reliance on dollar-denominated, short-term commercial debt.

That risk has grown more acute since the dollar has strengthened against other currencies in the last month.  

IMF said the global financial crisis, which has drastically cut the availability of credit, had made "Sri Lanka's external accounts ...vulnerable to a reduction in international investor risk appetite."

Since October 2007, Sri Lanka has increasingly sought high-interest foreign commercial borrowings via syndicated loans and a sovereign bond issues to avoid local commercial loans that attract a rate of over 20 percent.

Rupee depreciation

IMF also said the real exchange rate of the rupee has been overvalued and the central bank's protection of it could create the risk of attracting short-term speculation and volatility.

Since mid-September, the Central Bank of Sri Lanka exhausted $ 600 million, 25 percent of its foreign reserve, to protect the local currency before it decided to allow 'limited depreciation' of the rupee.

After withdrawal of the 6-week long policy of defending the currency at 108 per dollar costing 100 million US dollars per week, the currency fell to 110 per dollar by the end of the week, its lowest level since late last year.

Bankers and currency dealers said they saw more rupee weakness and a foreign banker in Colombo said on condition of anonymity said:  “I expect we can see some more of the same, with depreciation of the rupee,"

FX reserves

In addition to the Central Bank’s attempt to peg the Sri Lankan rupees against US Dollars, Citigroup Global Markets Asia in a market commentary attributed foreigners exiting Sri Lanka T-bill and bond market for driving the decline in FX reserves.

Citigroup estimated foreign holdings to have fallen from $670 million in early October to around $380 million in bonds and bills combined by end of October.

"We also expect the FX reserves to continue to come under pressure - we think there is still more near-term pressure of foreigners liquidating their LKR bonds and bills, especially if LKR is at increased risk, thus, presenting possibly another $380m possible outflow (assuming foreign holdings could go to zero).

"How externally vulnerable is Sri Lanka? We think they are very vulnerable though how close is a bit unclear. We have repeatedly argued that Sri Lanka is the most extremely vulnerable country in the region, as highlighted in our recent report….” added Citigroup.

External borrowing

Analysts estimate the government will need external financing of between $4-$6 billion in 2009 to cover the budget deficit, short-term debt, and debt amortisation but point out the depreciating Rupee, record inflation and the global finacial downturn make it hard to raise debt.

James McCormack, Fitch Ratings' head for Asia-Pacific sovereign ratings  raised concerns about the instability of the exchange rate and said any sizeable depreciation of the rupee would impact the government's repayment capacity," said.

In addition Sri Lanka’s high inflation also had a negative impact on its capacity to borrow.

Eurasia Group analyst Maria Kuusisto in a report issued earlier this month said, with the inflation hitting 23.4 percent in October Sri Lanka would have to offer "painfully high interest rates" to raise debt.

"This would add expensive debt to Sri Lanka's already sizable foreign borrowing," she wrote.

Rating agencies blame increased government expenditure as the main reason for high inflation.

Sri Lanka sold its first sovereign bond for $500 million in October last year and on October 7 this year announced plans for two syndicated loans this year for up to $300 million each.

IMF is of the view that  the global crisis had drastically cut credit availability, making Sri Lanka's external account "vulnerable to a reduction in international investor risk appetite."

Citigroup also shared this view in its commentary saying “the recent announcement seeking proposals for a $ 300m syndicated loan looks very difficult under the current environment”.

Economic growth

In addition to increasein cost of borrowing SDri Lanka is also faced with a steep drop in revenues with its key revenue making industries facing the impact of global credit crisis.

With much of the developed world considered by economists to be in recession, analysts said Sri Lanka's exports growth will weaken this year, such as in its garment and tea sectors, the country's biggest and third-biggest export earners.

Sri Lanka’s $27 billion economy only grew 6.8 percent last year, slowing down from a two-decade high of 7.7 percent in 2006, and the IMF said it expects economic growth to slow to 6.1 percent in 2008 and drop even further to 5.8 percent in 2009.

The silence of Western media and government has emboldened the majority Sinhalese to embark on a renewed campaign to dispossess and kill the Tamil people.

The Tamil-controlled north-east of Sri Lanka thunders "day and night" under bombardment from the forces of the Sinhalese government in Sri Lanka's capital Colombo as they attempt to destroy Tamil autonomy.

Against this backdrop, "a great human tragedy" is also "exploding", according to Fr James Pathinathan of St Theresa's Church in Kilinochchi, the administrative capital of the de facto government of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

From the eye of the storm, Fr Pathinathan, who is also president of the local Justice and Peace Commission, reports that "deaths, injuries, displacements and attendant misery pervade the lives of innocent Tamil civilians... and the draconian economic embargo imposed slyly... has become a monstrous obstacle in giving relief and solace to the 170,000 persons recently displaced".

The Sri Lankan Government's economic embargo, involving the closure of roads and ports of access for food, medicines, and fuel for an already destitute population, has been compounded by its eviction of aid agencies from the north-east as it has increased the tempo of war in an apparent attempt to put a military end to Tamil aspirations for some kind of self-government.

War has broken out on various fronts in recent months, and the bombardment of Kilinochchi began a few days ago.

Government forces have driven Tamil civilians from their homes and farms, which, at least in the south, are in the process of being occupied by Sinhalese settlers.

This has extended a long process of violent colonisation, according to Tamil sources.

Church and aid agencies report that over 200,000 people have been "displaced" in the east of the Tamil homelands in recent months, now to be joined by 170,000 in the north.

Hopes for Sinhala victory lie not only in their numerical advantage, but also in the sheer quantity of explosives at their disposal and their ability to launch them from long range or from the skies.

Meanwhile, the silence of Western media and governments embolden the Sinhalese to embark on their campaign of pillage, rape and destruction.

The Tamils' defensive actions are driven by desperation that their race is threatened by genocide.

The depth of commitment of these people to Tamil Eelam, or the Tamil Motherland, is vividly demonstrated by sheer numbers.

Some 17,000 or more young Tamil men and women have already sacrificed their lives in the struggle for national liberation.

It is easy to see how Tamils believe that the Sinhalese are bent on wiping them out.

In 1948, Sri Lanka (then known as Ceylon) gained independence from the British.

Not long after, in 1956, the Sri Lankan parliament passed a Sinhala Only Act.

This relegated Tamils to the status of second-class citizenry.

It also exposed them to the repeated violence that culminated in the disgraceful race riots in 1983 when Sinhala mobs guided by voting-lists set out to destroy Tamil homes and even antiquities such as the library in Jaffna.

Sinhalese forces themselves invaded Jaffna and subjected the local population to barbaric treatment.

They were even prepared to murder journalists in their bid to intimidate the Tamil press.

Every day, Tamils in non-combat areas "disappeared", having been taken away in the backs of notorious white vans.

Underlying this conflict lies deep racist sentiment.

I personally have been astonished by the number of educated Sinhalese who boast of an "Aryan" heritage, compared to the "Dravidian" origin of Tamils.

The former implies some northern origin from lighter-skinned and educated forebears; the latter implies an origin in the jungles of India.

This antagonism is fuelled by fundamentalist Buddhist proclamations that ancient texts identify "foreign devils" who should be expelled.

This racism is supported in practice by the Marxist-Leninists of the People's Liberation Front (JVP) which holds 40 of the 225 seats in parliament and is part of the government coalition.

Proclaiming Lenin's doctrines of central dictatorship by the vanguard of the proletariat, it has vigorously urged military destruction of Tamil hopes for autonomy.

As bombs have begun to fall on the town of Kilinochchi, causing the population to flee, Fr Pathinathan has declared that "the call of the hour is urgent" and pleads for "the people of goodwill all over the world" to "protect the people of Vanni [north-east Sri Lanka] who are threatened with death and destruction and dehumanisation".

But few people seem interested.

With the Tamil homelands cut off more effectively than Biafra in the Nigerian civil war, who wants to see pictures of starving children?

The debate on economic competition between nations focuses centres on fair and unfair competition. It is unfair competition to protect local markets from foreign manufactured goods. But it is “fair competition” for governments to subsidise local industries that have “strategic significance”: defence or nuclear energy for example.

Genocide is the ultimate form of unfair competition: as Black July 1983 illustrates. In fact, each stage of the slow genocide of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka has also been an economic project.

Having looked at how the Tamil industrial base was eliminated, the unequal impacts of the ‘open’ economy, the numbers which prove that reparation to Tamils is unaffordable and how the Sri Lankan state has breached its contract with Tamil taxpayers, the rest of this piece focuses on how the genocide by the Sri Lankan state is funded by Tamil assets and the impact of the new Tamil international economy on the relationship between the Tamils and the Sri Lankan state.

Genocide funded by Tamil assets

The Sinhala State has not evidenced the faintest intention of restoring economic parity to the Tamil people on the island.

Following the 2004 tsunami, which hit the North Eastern Tamil homelands harder – because the tsunami waves came from the direction of the North and were more powerful when they hit the Tamil coast – the Sri Lankan government blocked the joint aid distribution mechanism it had agreed with the Liberation Tigers in order to ensure aid reached Tamil areas.

As Karen Parker of the IED has pointed out, there is no adequate explanation for blocking international aid from those who have already lost everything – other than the deliberate destruction of a people (genocide).

The genocidal war against the Tamil people is also financed by the distress sale of Tamil assets.

To cement international relations and finance the war, real estate in the formerly Tamil areas are being pawned off by the state.

For example, after the government “cleared” the East in a 2007 offensive against the LTTE, it entered into an agreement for India’s National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) to build a coal power plant on formerly Tamil land, despite the protests of Tamil parliamentarians representing the Tamil refugees displaced from there.

The Sri Lankan State has also invited international oil firms to bid for oil drilling rights off the Northern coast of Mannar.

Every stage of this genocidal war is ultimately about money, not only in its fungible form, but also in the form of assets such as land, titanium and oil that can be transformed into money.

But even in this the Sri Lankan government is not original for financing genocide with money belonging to the victims is not such a new idea.  

Consider Nazi legislation following Kristallnacht – the pogrom named after the vast number of broken windows.

The Nazis decided they could blame Kristallnacht on the Jews because it had been “sparked” by the assassination by a 17 year old Jewish teenager of a German embassy officer, Vom Rath, in Paris.

This would help them finance, for example, the cleaning up of the streets afterwards.

Accordingly, a "fine of 1 billion marks was levied for the slaying of Vom Rath, and 6 million marks paid by insurance companies for broken windows was to be given to the state coffers.

Similarly, Sri Lanka blamed the Tamils for the pogrom and as The Economist noted, the state benefited by taking over the damaged Tamil businesses.

This pattern of profiting from and financing genocide from the victims’ own assets, has continued ever since.

New Tamil international economy

Following 1983, the Tamil economic base has shifted globally to countries where it is safe. The Economist presciently noted this too, 25 years ago, in its article of the 20th of August on the 1983 pogroms: “Another key factor in Sri Lanka’s recovery will be the brain-drain of Tamils. Thousands of Tamil professional people are said to have left the country since the violence began last month.”

“One leading Tamil entrepreneur – and Sri Lanka’s most successful entrepreneurs are Tamil – estimates that 90% of his fellow-industrialists are now contemplating emigration,” the magazine noted.

In their host countries, Tamils are among the most economically successful refugee groups. For example, 1 in every 50 doctor in the British National Health Service is Tamil, as are nurses and other medical workers.

This despite an estimated less than 1 in 400 of every British adult being Tamil.

As an indication of per capita Diaspora income, the average British doctor earns over £106,000 pounds (circa 200,000 USD) or about 4 times the national average.

Sinhala State looks for Tamil investors

But the Sinhala government, NGOs and think-tanks have also noted the relative post-1983 prosperity of the Tamil Diaspora. And in it, they see a potential source of new income.

“The Tamil Diaspora is seen by the Sri Lankan state as an important actor in the ongoing war against the LTTE that needs to be checked,” Jehan Perera writing for the Daily Mirror in Colombo explains.

“It is a fact that many, if not most, who left the country did so in circumstances that were extremely painful and bitter to them.  They left for an uncertain future into alien cultures and societies, in which they would be an underclass for many years,” he concedes. 

“But due to the essentially egalitarian and merit-based nature of the Western societies to which they migrated, many of them and their children have finally prospered.”

The Sinhala State hopes that, once again, they can benefit from Tamil prosperity.

They  hope the Diaspora will ignore previous breaches of contract and help finance the failing Sinhala State – including its present judiciary, police and army.

In order for this to happen, the LTTE, their current rival for the Kavalar/government role, must first be destroyed.

Mr Perera, for example, explains that the Tamil Diaspora has not engaged with the Sinhala State because: “A large part of the reason has been the confidence of the Tamil diaspora that the LTTE's armed struggle for separation, which they support, will end in success.  So long as this belief, and desire, continues there will be little incentive on the part of the Tamil diaspora to engage constructively with the Sri Lankan state. However, recent developments on the ground and in international politics suggest that the struggle for Tamil Eelam will not be successful”

Once the LTTE is destroyed, so the thinking goes, the Sinhala State has an opportunity to persuade the Tamil Diaspora to “engage with it” – by investing money of course.

In his article, Jehan Perera explains this line of thinking: “This means that if the Tamil diaspora wishes to come to the aid of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka, they need to be prepared to engage constructively with the Sri Lankan state, and find ways to do so.”

In short, the failing Sinhala State, having alienated all its Western donors on Human Rights grounds can turn to the families of the entrepreneurs and professionals who fled the 1983 pogroms to finance the “protection” of the “liberated” Tamil areas. 

They can be persuaded to invest in the hopes of creating a “new Tamil economy” that can then be taxed by the Sinhala State and will finance its burgeoning army, parliamentary bureaucracy etc. As they did pre-1983.

Notwithstanding the Tamil Diaspora are tax-paying citizens in their new countries, they should also help the Sri Lankan State with its development objectives.

Because, so the Sinhala thinking goes, if the Tamil Diaspora want their internally displaced relatives not to starve, they won’t have any other option.

Apparently, the Tamil cow keeps giving milk long after it has been sent to the slaughterhouse. Whoever said you can’t have your cow and eat it?

The targeted killing last Friday of Mr. S. P. Tamilselvan, the LTTE's Chief Negotiator and the head of its Political Wing, along with five other LTTE officials, by the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) shocked the Tamil community. Across Diaspora centres and in the homeland, there is palpable grief and anger. The specificities of the attack - whether the SLAF knew Mr. Tamilselvan was at the location, for example - are irrelevant: the military has been trying repeatedly to kill him for years, frequently bombing his offices, residences and convoys. The assassination is a quintessential reflection of the Sinhala mindset. President Mahinda Rakapakse, along with the vast majority of Sinhalese, see the island's ethnic problem purely as a Tamil terrorist challenge. For all the lip-service (and there's not much of that about now) about power sharing, the south is single-mindedly focused on a military victory. The abandon with which the military has for two years blasted Tamil villages, driven hundreds of thousands of Tamils from their homes and continues to abduct, torture and murder Tamils is underwritten by the confidence the international community, despite its distaste, is nonetheless solidly behind Colombo’s war.

Both the Sinhalese and the international community have their legitimating theories. For the Sinhalese, once the LTTE is destroyed, the Tamils will docilely accept whatever limited (and decidedly undeserved) powers they are given. The leading members of the international community in Sri Lanka agree. But they also believe that once the LTTE is destroyed, the island can be 'developed' whereupon Sinhalese, Tamils and, for that matter, the Muslims, will come to see each other as fellow Sri Lankans and live happily ever after. Despite the decades of Sinhala oppression the Tamils have faced by successive governments since independence (i.e. three decades before Tamil militancy was triggered), the international community bases its strategy today off a utopian vision of an ethnic harmony to come. It is not that such a vision is impossible that is staggering but, rather, the belief it can be realized by enabling a violent Sinhala conquest of the Tamils followed by economic development.

The various reactions to the Sri Lankan military's assassination of Mr. Tamilselvan should serve as food for thought for anyone out there who still believes either that peace talks might end the bloodshed or, even more naively, that the international community will act to protect the Tamils against the rampages of the state. As President Rajapakse crowed in Parliament this week, he has secured the assistance of the international community to defeat the Tigers. As we have argued before, for all the noise about human rights (and much of that has dissipated now), the state actually wants for nothing. Ironically, the more the international community is convinced the LTTE can be defeated, the freer the hand the Sinhala state will have.

Let there be no mistake; irrespective of the extent of the casualties or suffering the Sinhala military inflicts on Tamil civilians, the international community will not restrain the state. Not, that is, until the military is checked on the battlefield by the LTTE's counter-violence. At that point, as in 2001, international peaceniks will rush back to help Tamils and Sinhalese solve 'their' problem. The insistence by some international actors, especially those who proudly proclaim their support and assistance for the Sinhala state, that 'there is no military solution' is duplicitous.

The solution must be political, we all know that. But it can be rammed down the Tamils' throats on the end of bayonet. Which is why several members of the international community advocating 'peace' in Sri Lanka have also banned the LTTE.

When Sinhalese unite

Last week Sinhalese reveled in Mr. Tamilselvan's assassination. Traditional drums were played in the street. Parties were organized at home. Some Buddhist temples held all night celebrations. For any Sinhalese who genuinely desires a negotiated solution, the killing of the other side's top diplomat should have been deeply worrying and regrettable. But very few in the south feel this way, something the Tamils need to bear in mind as they make their way in the time to come. For decades, when faced with violence and brutality by a Colombo government, many Tamils have rushed to the feet of the Sinhala opposition, voting it into power in a laughably futile effort to end their suffering, if only for a while. They have chased after the SLFP and UNP in turn, insisting, despite the evidence of their past suffering, that this time round it would be different.

In reality, for the Tamils, there is nothing to choose between the main Sinhala parties. This is because all of them are beholden to the sentiments of the majority of Sinhalese voters who, as is now starkly clear, bitterly oppose sharing of any power with the Tamils. The point was underscored this week by the reaction of the UNP - still the darlings, incidentally, of the 'peace through development' international community - to Mr. Tamilselvan's assassination. Firstly, the UNP hailed the killing as a 'great victory' for the (Sinhala) Air Force. It then went on to tacitly back Rajapakse's brutal war, saying there is 'no point' negotiating with the LTTE. Let us be clear; whenever the LTTE negotiates with the state, it is about the rights, powers and extent of self-rule that we, the Tamil people, are to have. The UNP, drunk with the same confidence in Sinhala military victory that the SLFP regime is, believes, like the government, that there is no point in negotiating with an enemy who is about to be defeated. The optimism may be misplaced, but the UNP sees no reason to hide it.

This week Tamils in the homeland and abroad have mourned Mr. Tamilselvan and his colleagues killed last Friday. We join them. Both Mr. Tamilselvan and Lt. Colonel Anpumani (Alex), who was also killed in Friday's airstrike, were friends of this newspaper. From the outset of the Norwegian peace process, concerned that the Tamil people be kept informed of developments, they, along with the LTTE's then Chief Negotiator, Mr. Anton Balasingham, went out of their way to ensure we were briefed on the peace process. We will miss them.

A time to struggle

Despite its bans on the LTTE, as the international community has openly acknowledged, every time the Tigers sit across the table from the Sinhala state, the interests they are negotiating for are those of the Tamil people. Whether it is a political solution - remember the fuss about the LTTE giving up independence for federalism? (Now the movement is thought to be weak, no one wants to use that word now) - or an interim administration or international aid for the Northeast, the Tigers were accepted by the state and the international community to be negotiating on behalf of the Tamils. Yet there is thundering silence after the Sinhala state assassinated the Tamils' chief negotiator. The international community has thus made it clear that any rights the Tamils secure depend entirely on the outcome on the battlefield. We therefore have to brace ourselves for an even more brutal military onslaught in the time to come. We must therefore be united in our resolve. Despite our skepticism, Tamil efforts to argue our case abroad, to win hearts and minds, must continue. But not in naïve optimism. If the state fails to defeat the LTTE then it will be compelled to negotiate with the Tamils. If it wins, we are lost. But, then, it was ever thus.

The all-party meeting chaired by Tamil Nadu's (TN) Chief Minister M Karunanidhi on October 14 passed a resolution that MPs from the state would resign if the Centre failed to ensure a ceasefire in Sri Lanka (SL) in two weeks. Since current Indian perception of the ethnic conflict has been clouded by Rajiv Gandhi's assassination, it is instructive to review India's past involvement in Sri Lanka and future options.

The goal of India's SL policy since the 1950s was to prevent any hostile power getting a foothold in the neighbourhood. So, over the years, India pursued various policies - some of them at the expense of Sri Lankan Tamil interests - to placate the Sinhalese leadership. Even India's support to Tamil militant groups in the 1980s angered the Sinh-alese leadership. India's current policy towards the ethnic conflict is influenced by the fear that an independent Tamil Eelam will rekindle secessionist tendencies in TN. How-ever, this view is incorrect.

India's policy since 1991 has sought the military defeat of the LTTE for the latter's role in Rajiv Gandhi's assassination and the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) debacle. From the beginning, however, India's SL policy failed to appreciate the historical roots of the ethnic conflict, which can be traced back to the wars between the Tamil and Sinhala kingdoms during the past several centuries. The LTTE's conduct also has its share of problems. It has put an entire generation of Tamils through immense hardship. This bitter history makes rapprochement between the Sinhalese and Tamils almost impossible. Given these ground realities in Sri Lanka, what are India's options?

It is clear that India cannot afford to remain fixated on its past bitterness with the LTTE while crafting its response to the ethnic conflict. The current policy stagnation, besides exacerbating the difficulties of Sri Lankan Tamils, can also be detrimental to India's security. During the Cold War, there was some anxiety in India as Sri Lanka began building a closer relationship with the US. Such concerns are irrelevant now in the light of closer defence cooperation between the US and India. However, there is another potential threat to India's southern frontiers: China is already playing a major role in building ports and potential naval bases in some Indian Ocean littoral states.

India formally extracted concessions from SL through the 1987 peace accord - currently in tatters - that Colombo will not allow any external powers in a way detrimental to Indian interests. However, Lanka has been building parallel defence cooperation tracks with China and Pakistan and the island has been brimming with Chinese and Pakistani intelligence operatives. Yet, India has helped SL to maintain its territorial integrity. This could prove to be costly. India cannot allow this situation to persist while putting pressure on the LTTE and providing military assistance to SL. A credible case could be built that an independent Tamil Eelam will be - for ethnic, linguistic, and religious reasons - friendlier towards India than the Sinhalese dispensation in Colombo.

Although the LTTE is banned in some countries there is also a realisation that any solution ignoring the militant outfit will not be viable. India should review its current policy and exert pressure on SL to seek a political solution for the ethnic conflict. Some argue that India's current free trade agreement with SL will buy more influence among the Sinhalese leadership.

Unless India is able to lock SL in a broad bilateral security relationship, their leadership will have no qualms about allowing China or Pakistan to get a foothold. This is the real danger of India's current policy facilitating the military defeat of the LTTE. If India were to take a hard-nosed view of its interests, a subtle shift in its position on the LTTE will go a long way in safeguarding its strategic interests in the region besides securing the interests of ethnic Tamils in the island. The all-party resolution should provide the UPA an opportunity to do some introspection about its Sri Lanka policy.

TS Gopi Rethinaraj teaches at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. This is a modified version of an op-ed piece that appeared in the April 2008 issue of Pragati: The Indian National Interest Review

The Battle of Stalingrad is considered the bloodiest battle with the largest battlefield casualties in the history of conventional warfare. Under a carefully worked out plan, the Soviet Army inveigled an advancing and over-confident Nazi Army into Stalingrad and then inflicted severe casualties on the Nazi Army. Many of those Nazi soldiers whom the Soviet Army could not kill were killed by "Gen.Winter". The entire Sixth Army of the Nazis was trapped by the Soviet troops with the help of "Gen.Winter" and destroyed.

As the battle began on July 17, 1942, the Nazi Disinformation machine worked overtime to tell an unsuspecting German people that the fall of Stalingrad and the collapse of the Soviet Army were imminent. The German people waited with bated breath for the news of the fall. "Within two days", they were told. Two days became two weeks. Two weeks became two months. Two months became seven months. The battle ended disastrously for the Nazis on February 2, 1943. This marked the beginning of the end of the Nazi dreams in the Second World War.

Is one seeing a mini version of Stalingrad in the battle for Kilinochchi, the current headquarters of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)? It is difficult to say on the basis of the scanty information available from the battle front. From even this scanty information, two things are clear: Firstly, the Sri Lankan Army, which senses victory against the LTTE, has been doing well, but not as well as it claims to be. Secondly, the LTTE has been doing badly, but not as badly as projected to be by the disinformation machine of the Sri Lankan Army . The LTTE has shown that there is still a lot of fight left in it-- and a lot of intelligence and innovative thinking.

But intelligence and innovative thinking alone cannot win wars without resources and the wherewithal. The LTTE is deficient on both counts. But it has shown itself to be as resilient as the Taliban in Afghanistan and as fiercely-motivated. In 2003, the Americans thought and claimed that they had finished the Taliban once and for all. Their facile assumptions proved to be wrong. The Taliban came back--as if it has risen from its much-proclaimed grave-- and has been moving forward relentlessly. Neither air strikes by the most powerful Air Force in the world nor heavy artillery strikes by the most powerful Army in the world have been able to stop its advance. Reluctantly, senior NATO military commanders in Afghanistasn have started admitting that the war against the Taliban is unwinnable and that one has to search for a political solution with neither victory nor defeat for either side. It has not only become unwinnable unless the Taliban commits some serious tactical mistakes, but is also likely to become increasingly unaffordable thanks to the financial and economic melt-down in the US and the rest of the world.

The LTTE is calculating that if it can keep fighting against the Sri Lankan Army for some more months, a prolonged war against the LTTE could become as unwinnable and as unaffordable for the rulers of Sri Lanka as a prolonged war against the Taliban for the NATO powers. The rulers of Sri Lanka are living in a fool's paradise if they think that China and Pakistan would come to their rescue if the government of India stops assisting them under pressure from public opinion in Tamil Nadu. The Pakistani economy is on the verge of a collapse. Even the Chinese were reluctant to help out their time-tested friend as they call Pakistan, as President Asif Ali Zardari found to his dismay when he visited China recently. The Pakistan Army is reeling under one set-back after another inflicted on it by the Taliban.To think that the Pakistan Army would rush to Sri Lanka to spite India would be the height of stupidity.

The Chinese, who are increasingly worried over the impact of the recession in the US on their manufacturing industries, which are heavily dependent on the US market, are hugging tight their foreign exchange holdings. They were reluctant to make any definitive commitment of help to Zardari. They are even showing a decline of interest in further developing the Gwadar port project. In a world beset with the most serious economic crisis it has known since the Great Depression of the 1930s, everybody, including China, is interested in saving every dollar and cent he can. Nobody wants a foreign adventure, which might drain off their depleting resources. If the Sri Lankan Army thinks that China would try to rush in if India stops helping, it is in for a disappointment.

The LTTE is calculating that if it can keep fighting against the Sri Lankan Army for some more weeks, "Gen.Monsoon" and "Gen.Recession" could put an end to the pipedreams of the Sri Lankan Army of a definitive victory over the LTTE.

Will its calculations prove right or will they be belied? Whatever happens, one thing seems likely-- there is going to be no definitive victory or no definitive defeat for either side in the on-going war.

B. Raman is Additional Secretary (retired), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi. and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies