As Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse begins his third year in office, India is desperately hoping that he will unveil a credible power sharing package to end one of the world's most protracted conflicts.

 

After two years of escalating violence and many political twists and turns, the optimism in New Delhi seems to be slowly ebbing away vis-a-vis an early negotiated solution.

 

Although Rajapakse chose India as his first destination after narrowly winning the Nov 17, 2005, presidential election and has visited New Delhi four times, the Sri Lankan leader is not revealing his cards to the Indian leadership.

 

The belief is that Colombo understands the seriousness of New Delhi's repeated urgings not to harp on a military solution even as it wins some battles against the Tamil Tigers and not to lose sight of the larger Tamil issues.

 

As a consequence, India remains firmly supportive of Norway's role as a facilitator in the war between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the government.

 

IANS learns that Norway's special envoy to Sri Lanka, Jon Hannsen-Bauer, may visit Colombo in early 2008 to try to take forward a peace process hit hard after the violence of the past two years that has killed thousands.

 

The intended visit has taken added importance after a dramatic spurt in tit-for-tat attacks.

 

On Oct 21, the LTTE dealt a stinging blow when a suicide squad attacked a Sri Lankan Air Force base in the northcentral district of Anuradhapura destroying 10 jets and damaging 14, some beyond repair.

 

On Nov 2, the air force hit back, bombing an LTTE base and killing among others the group's political chief S.P. Tamilchelvan, the most high profile LTTE leader to die at the hands of the military.

 

Amid the bloodshed, India and other countries are banking on a positive outcome from the prolonged deliberations of the All Party Representative Committee (APRC), which has been tasked to come up with a power sharing formula that will be nationally acceptable.

 

But much of the initial optimism has given way to pessimism. Critics say the ARPC has become a smokescreen for the government not to do anything beyond paying lip service to a negotiated solution to keep donor countries in good humour.

 

And even as the military prepares for a major push against the LTTE in the north, the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the main opposition United National Party (UNP) are draggers drawn, spiking a possible chance of their coming together to evolve a consensus on devolution of power.

 

Some here feel that if the APRC fails to come up with a just resolution of the grievances of the minorities, it will only prove that the ethnic conflict cannot be settled from within the island nation.

 

Sri Lanka has also come under intense attack from domestic and international rights groups and Western countries over the large-scale unaccounted killings as well as disappearances in the country.

 

N. Manoharan, an Indian scholar on Sri Lanka, says that while Rajapakse has taken some positive measures since coming to power, much of it has been negated by his own actions.

 

'Convening the APRC was a good move. But then came his own party's (widely criticised) devolution proposals and attempts to sideline the APRC,' Manoharan, from New Delhi's Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, told IANS.

 

'Another good move by the president was the idea of reviving a bipartisan consensus between the SLFP and the UNP on the ethnic conflict,' he said. 'Again that got negated when the president poached MPs from the UNP.'

 

Colombo is optimistic that it can bring the LTTE to its knees by attacking the Tiger-held north. But the LTTE is confident of resisting any military challenge. 'So there is no possibility of a negotiated settlement, at least for one or two years,' Manoharan said.

In his contribution to a recent publication, 'Sri Lanka: Search for Peace', by the New Delhi based Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), Professor P. Sahadevan, chairperson of the Centre for South Asian studies of the Jawaharlal Nehru University questioned the International Community's understanding of the nature and characteristics of the LTTE.

 

The decision to ban the LTTE by the European Union last year was a political mistake, Sahadevan writes while contending that the international community, playing a mediatory role, is the best bet to bring peace in Sri Lanka.

 

“Since its limited facilitation role, especially by the Norwegians, has proved to be a total failure, it is essential that the international community significantly expands its role and becomes pro-active by mediating between the parties,” he writes.

 

Prof. Sahadevan’s take was described in press reports as a “refreshing” and “a clear deviation” from the views of Indian defence analysis establishments and western analysis groups.

 

Excerpts of Sahadevan's views, cited from the Indo-Asian News Service, follow:

 

"Since its limited facilitation role, especially by the Norwegians, has proved to be a total failure, it is essential that the international community significantly expands its role and becomes pro-active by mediating between the parties."

 

"Such an involvement may evoke an internal political resistance which the mainstream democratic forces should be in a position to manage. This requires a bipartisan political approach - the much needed southern consensus on peace making."

 

"It is doubtful that the international community has developed a correct understanding of the LTTE in terms of its nature and characteristics. It is a complex organisation deeply committed to the cause of Tamil Eelam. Self-sacrifice and vengeance are the ingredients of its ideology. Compromise is hard to expect from the Tiger leadership."

 

"Pressurising a party in a peace process is acceptable but punishing it will tend to bring about negative results,' he said. 'The EU ban has cost the entire peace process; a total breakdown has now made some of the EU members feel that it was a hasty and avoidable decision."

 

One of the main reasons why the leverage of powerful countries over the LTTE was not working was the "unequal application of international pressure, meaning that the LTTE is coerced while the Sri Lankan government is spared."

 

"For leverage to become credible and workable, the international community has to target at both the combatants without tilting in position in favour of one or against another."

 

Vakarai division, largely jungle tracts crisscrossed with 14 or so villages and little hamlets, situated along the northern border of Batticaloa District. The people of Vakarai are engaged in subsistence farming and fishing, with a small element of those who are traditionally hunter-gatherers.

 

It was somewhere in December 1995; I was in the middle of conducting a meeting at a village called Paalchenai, in Vakarai, when suddenly a visibly distraught man from the same area burst into our meeting with a tiny transistor in his hand. “Amma, the army has entered Jaffna town,” he blurted out.

 

All of us, the Paalchenai villagers and I, exclaimed in horror. We quickly gathered round him to listen to the news of the conclusion of the first leg of the Riviresa operations that captured Jaffna town.

 

Nationalism

Whenever I recollect this incident, I cannot help but marvel at the power of the idea of nationalism that is able to mobilise such a diverse group of communities. There are no perceptible common links between the people of Jaffna and Vakarai in terms of class, caste, kinship, education, traditions or any of the generally referred to classifications based on primarily economic and cultural interests.

 

Both people would most probably have never visited each others’ localities. Yet, there in Vakarai, we saw them join on the basis of a nationality that was under threat of extinction.

But then, mobilising as a nation does not preclude the function of other smaller contradictions within. Take village-based loyalties for instance. This is extremely strong in Batticaloa District, so much so that they invariably change in to hostilities between contending villages.

 

Village-based loyalties

The continuing animosities between the adjacent villages of Vantharumoolai and Sittandy, Santhiveli and Kiran, and, Karuwakkerni and Sungankerni, Kinnaiyadi are cases in point.

Conflicts often erupt during temple festivals between inhabitants of the two villages in question over issues of protocols provided for the various clans and other matters. This polarisation is apparent even within organisations and armed groups such as the LTTE. These parochial differences are emphasised and dug up when needed to mobilise support for one-self, win positions of power or compete for resources.

 

Similarly, regional sentiments against Jaffna were triggered amongst the Batticaloa middle class, which was reacting to the preponderance of Jaffna Tamils in government positions and also within the bigger trading establishments in the district.

 

It was ironic that almost everyone who led the anti-Jaffna agitation at that time was from the second generation of Jaffna Tamils settled in Batticaloa. Whatever the social forces at play at its origins, today this situation has been equalised to a great extent.

 

Jaffna bogey

Almost all the government officers in the district are locals, and the Jaffna trading establishments have dwindled to only a handful. However, the Jaffna bogey is resuscitated every time the need arises for restricting competition, such as filling vacancies within the Eastern University or gaining recognition as community leaders.

 

In these situations the antecedents of possible competitors are aired, debated and used effectively to cancel them out in the first round itself.

 

That is what Karuna did when he felt the need to consolidate unbridled power for himself within the LTTE. He wanted all supervision and control from the north off his back, for which purpose he conveniently used the Jaffna bogey. His claim was that Batticaloa cadres were sacrificing their lives to protect Jaffna.

 

It is not my intention here to undermine in any way the contribution of Batticaloa cadres within the LTTE. But if at all a study could be conducted to ascertain the percentage of cadres within the LTTE in proportion to the populations of Jaffna, Batticaloa and the Wanni, other interesting facts may emerge.

 

One guess is that the plantation community that settled in the Wanni during the late 1970s and early 1980s in the aftermath of the communal violence in the South might easily score highest.

 

End of Karuna

Be that as it may, Karuna’s emotive claim prompted the hierarchy to dispatch him as supreme commander of the Batticaloa-Ampara region with autonomous political, military and financial powers, back in 1999.

 

The principle underlying this strategy was that Jaffna and Batticaloa each would manage and advance its own army in its own area. Perhaps this move may be termed as the beginning of the end of Karuna, for it was to lead to his ruin.

 

He amassed huge personal fortune through indiscriminate taxation on farmers, fishermen, traders and liquor dealers; and ensured a percentage cut off every village infrastructure development project in the district.

 

While the northern command was still engaged in merely exhorting potential recruits and trying to impose regulations for their compulsory services to the LTTE, he introduced the method of blatantly forced abductions.

 

Mysterious deaths occurred of a few of his insiders who had been identified by the people as being fair minded. Tactics of public relations changed whereby the people were intimidated and suffered extreme humiliation at the hands of his boys. They were so cocky in their boast that there was no appeal beyond Karuna Amman.

 

Benefiting Kiran

Although he styled himself as the undisputed leader of the Batticaloa Tamils, it looked like he was concerned only about his own village, Kiran. As they say in Tamil, “A full sized donkey wasting down to become a tiny red ant.”

 

Any government or NGO programme had to benefit Kiran first, no questions asked. A 100 housing project approved for a village called Settiyaar Kudiyiruppu was ordered by Karuna to be transferred to beneficiaries in Kiran.

 

The education community from Santhiveli had lobbied hard to obtain a much-needed additional building for their school. Karuna arbitrarily decided that this had to be built for Kiran School instead, despite the lack of a real need.

 

In addition to all this, a ‘modernising’ Kiran project was also underway. He wanted to bring down houses and temples in an attempt to re-route the Batticaloa Colombo main road through Kiran.

 

Drunk with power

It is said that when a president of the board of trustees of one of the temples objected to this plan citing that he as the head of the temple had a responsibility to protect it, Karuna had curtly replied through the mobile phone of one of his assistants, “He may be head of the temple but I am the head of Tamil Eelam.” He was so drunk with power.

 

Due to lack of contacts with rural Batticaloa, the professionals and intellectuals living within Batticaloa town were to a large extent ignorant of the highhanded approaches employed by Karuna, and the gradual ‘Kiranification’ of his original Batticaloa vision.

 

Therefore, when he declared his independence from the mainstream LTTE in March 2004, there was an initial jubilation amongst them, which began to taper only when the reality of his necessary collaboration with the army sank in.

 

Naturally, Batticaloa is not a terrain which can be held on its own. The battle for real estate was in the north, and it transpired that even to secure Batticaloa District, the cadres of Batticaloa had to fight in the north after all.

 

Desecration

If we say that the Military Intelligence tripped a falling Karuna into a coffin, the Sri Lanka Army drove the final nail. As soon as areas of east were captured, they mowed down hundreds of tombs of LTTE cadres both in Vakarai and in Tharavai. These graves were of the sons and daughters of Batticaloa who had fought along with Karuna, for the liberation of their people.

Even as he was instrumental in helping the army to capture the district, Karuna appeared powerless to prevent this desecration. All his tough talk (remember his Derana interview?) and his boast of being able to bring development to Batticaloa ended right there. He was finished. Karuna sang his own requiem.

 

Therefore, the purported expelling of Karuna from his party, Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP) in early October is a mere ritual of a fact that had concluded some time ago.

 

The only Leader

Pillaiyan, his deputy who has replaced him, is now busy calling traders, NGOs and others in the districts of Batticaloa and Trincomalee for meetings to explain the present status quo.

 

“Karuna embezzled money within TMVP. That is the reason for which Thalaivar (Leader) also had to sack him before,” he is reported to have said.

 

Thalaivar? But is that not the term LTTE cadres and other supporters use for Prabhakaran? On being asked for clarifications, he is supposed to have stated, “Then and now and always he is the only Leader (Ore Thalaivar).”

 

I have always marvelled at the power of the idea of nationalism.

Sri Lanka’s hardline government has approached Iran for a loan to replace aircraft destroyed by the Tamil Tigers in a daring raid last month. Colombo is also asking Tehran for the supply of oil and gas at concessional rates on credit, the reports said.

 

These requests are expected to be followed up personally by President Rajapakse during a planned visit to Iran shortly.

 

Iran supplied $150m worth of arms to Sri Lanka in 2005, barely weeks after the Indian Ocean tsunami devastated the island.

 

Indian security analyst B Raman, a former additional secretary to the Government of India, writing for the South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG) said last week Sri Lanka has requested Iran, through a Malaysian Muslim of Indian or Sri Lankan origin for an urgent loan at low interest.

 

The loan is to enable Colombo to purchase trainer and electronic surveillance aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles in replacement of those lost during the recent ground-cum-air attack launched by the LTTE on the Anuradhapura air force base, he said.

 

The report also said the Sri Lankan government has also requested Iran for the supply of oil and gas at concessional rates on credit.

 

According to the report, the Malaysian Muslim, who is acting as the intermediary, is a close personal friend of A. Q. Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist, and had come into contact with key Iranian officials in the past through A. Q. Khan.

 

In October this year, the Sri Lankan government extended its support for Iran’s ambitions to acquire nuclear technology.

 

The Islamic republic of Iran, labeled by US president George Bush as part of ‘an axis of evil’ is under intense pressure from US and European Union over its controversial nuclear programme.

 

The US and the EU believe that the Iran, a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is working towards developing nuclear weapons.

 

The US has seemed to threatened military action against Iran.

 

However, interestingly, Muhammad Zuhair, Sri Lanka’s ambassador to Iran speaking to media in October this year dismissed rumors of a possible US attack against Iran and declared that the United Nations conventions allow Iran to conduct nuclear researches.

 

Ambassador Zuhair added that the Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse’s meeting with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on the sideline of the UN General Assembly in New York that month would pave the way for the further expansion of Iran-Sri Lanka ties.

 

At the time Zuhair also said that Sri Lanka opposed imposing any new sanctions against Iran. However, the US introduced further sanctions against Iran in November.

 

This is the second time Sri Lanka has turned to Iran for beef up its military capability. In January 2005, the Sunday Times newspaper reported the purchase of USD 150 million of arms from Iran.

 

"Sri Lanka will procure military hardware and oil on concessionary terms. The deal is said to be worth over US $ 150 million," the Sunday Times reported at the time.

 

"The delegation is to take a look at the wide variety of military hardware available. The Army has identified its requirements after a delegation visited Iran earlier. The Navy and the Air Force will check on requirements. Thereafter the tri services procurements are to be incorporated in an agreement," the paper reported.

 

"This is the first time the Government is turning to Iran for procuring a broader variety of military hardware on a government-to-government basis. A similar deal was finalised last month with China," the paper pointed out at the time.

 

The first arms deal with Iran was agreed when then president Kumaratunga visited Iran in November 2004.

 

The first arms deal between Iran and Sri Lanka was finalized when the then Sri Lankan president Chandrika Kumaratunga visited Iran in November 2004.

 

According Sri Lankan government sources President Mahinda Rajapakse is most likely visit Iran after the Commonwealth Heads of State and Government summit in Kampala, Uganda from November 23 to 25.

 

There were earlier reports in Sri Lanka that the US had requested President Rajapaksa not to travel to Iran.

 

However, Sri Lankan officials making clear their displeasure at the West for turning the heat on Colombo over rampant Human Rights abuses were quoted as saying: “We know our bread is from the East and that is the new reality.”

 

China, Pakistan and now Iran are amongst the biggest arms suppliers to Sri Lanka. The United States, Britain, Israel and India are amongst the others.

 

According to the Sunday Times the government sources they spoke to said that though there was a lot of thunder from the West there was very little rain.

 

In aid terms US gives about $5 million per year to Sri Lanka, while the EU extended about Euro 129 million for four years and Britain had given less than two million pounds per year. In comparison Japan gave about $900 million, China $600 million and India $250 million per year.

 

The US embassy told the newspaper that it “does not discuss private exchanges with other governments, including with our friends. However, our concerns about Iran are well known and with any sovereign government Sri Lanka will make its own decisions about how to conduct its foreign affairs.”

 

Meanwhile, SAAG also reported that Sri Lanka has also requested Pakistan for the replacement of the unmanned aerial vehicles destroyed by the LTTE. Some of the craft lost last month had been given in the past by Pakistan and some others by Israel.

 

Colombo has also requested China urgently for the latest radar and other air defence equipment, SAAG said.

 

Pakistani Commandoes from its Special Services Group (SSG) have been training Sri Lankan Commandoes and some anti-LTTE Tamils in secret training camps in Southern Sri Lanka as a prelude to the expected military offensive in the Vanni region in the north, SAAG also reported.

 

Some of the Sri Lankan commandoes had also been to Pakistan for training in the SSG training institutions.

 

The Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF), with the help of Pakistani and Ukrainian pilots, has stepped up its efforts for a decapitation strike to kill LTTE leader Vellupillai Pirapaharan, SAAG also said.

 

“A monitoring station to locate the hide-out of Prabakaran has been set up at an unidentified location in the Eastern Province with the help of Pakistan's Directorate of Military Intelligence (DGMI) to identify [his] location,” the report said.

 

In an interview to the "Sunday Observer" of November 11, 2007, the SLAF Commander Air Marshal Roshan Goonatilleke said that “it was not a difficult task for the SLAF to get at [the LTTE leader] as he was confined to a very limited area.”

 

Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse, who also holds the finance portfolio, presented what can only be described as a war budget to parliament on November 7. (It was passed on Nov 19with a comfortable majority). Announcing a record allocation on defence spending, he insisted that “protecting the motherland” took priority over other areas of government spending.

 

Rajapakse is directly responsible for plunging the island back to civil war. Tensions immediately began to rise after his narrow victory in the November 2005 presidential election, followed by open military offensives after July 2006.

 

In his budget speech, the president openly boasted of “rescuing the entire eastern province, including areas that were in the control of terrorists consequent to the so-called ceasefire agreement through a successful humanitarian operation”.

 

The use of the term “so-called” underscores Rajapakse’s contempt for the 2002 ceasefire agreement signed by the United National Party-led government with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). As for “humanitarian”; the military’s offensives in the East have killed hundreds of civilians and driven tens of thousands more from their homes.

 

Rajapakse has made absolutely clear that his government intends to wage an all-out war to destroy the LTTE. Seizing on one of the LTTE’s few counterattacks, a raid last month on the Anuradhapura air force camp, he declared: “They [LTTE] will never be ready to surrender arms and agree to a democratic political solution ... we have no alternative but to completely eradicate terrorism.”

 

To wage this war, Rajapakse has increased the military budget for 2008 by another 20 percent to 166 billion rupees ($US1.5 billion). Since Rajapakse won office, the defence allocation has risen by a massive 265 percent and now constitutes 16 percent of total government expenditure.

 

Daily spending on the military is $US4 million, in a country where much of the population is surviving on less than $1 a day.

 

In his budget speech, the president said: “The priority that has been accorded to protect our motherland should not be compromised to any challenge.” Defence spending is now one and a half times the total spending on public health and education.

 

On the same day as the budget speech, the armed forces launched a new offensive in a bid to capture LTTE territory in the northern Wanni region. Despite being supported by tanks and helicopter gunships, the government troops were driven back in heavy fighting. Official figures put the army’s losses at 11 dead and 41 injured, but the actual figures may have been far higher.

 

In all likelihood, the operation was cynically pre-planned to underscore the budget message. The “Political Column” in last weekend’s Sunday Times noted: “Even before the offensive was launched, posters urging the public to forget their mouths and stomachs when troops were on the doorsteps of Wanni appeared in part of the City [Colombo].”

 

The Rajapakse government is well aware of the mounting public hostility to the war and the resulting economic burdens. While rising world commodity prices, particularly for oil, are certainly a factor, huge increases in defence spending have contributed to soaring inflation that has hit working people hard.

 

Rajapakse offered a number of cosmetic measures aimed at the deflecting popular anger, but the overall thrust of the budget will deepen the country’s economic and social crisis.

 

An economic columnist for the Sunday Times commented: “The huge war expenditure has been one of the serious financial and balance of payments problems for the country. This is quite apart from the consequences of the war on the economy and the undeniable fact that it is a serious check and constraint on the growth of the economy. The expenditure on hardware and the armed services has had a serious direct damaging impact on the economy in many ways.”

 

The article pointed out that expenditure on the war had contributed to a public debt of 2,607 billion rupees, greater than the country’s GDP. The largest allocation in the budget—373 billion rupees—is for debt servicing.

 

The government has borrowed another $US500 million on international financial markets at high interest rates that will further increase the debt burden.

 

Sections of the corporate elite are deeply concerned about the economic impact of the war. The Business for Peace Alliance, a grouping of business chambers, commented: “[The] increase in defence expenditure implies that there will be cutbacks in large-scale investment projects. With the rate of inflation at an unbearable level, such increased expenditure on non-constructive sectors will have a negative impact on the economy.”

 

Inflation has reached to its highest level in 17 years. For the month of October, annualised inflation was 17.7 percent by the Colombo Consumer Price Index and 22 percent by the Sri Lanka Price Index.

 

Cutbacks in government subsidies have resulted in huge price increases for essential items: a kilogram of flour rose from 39 rupees in January to 65 rupees in September and a popular brand of milk powder increased from 140 rupees in January to 250 rupees in October.

 

Further fuelling inflation, the government has resorted to running the printing presses to cope with the lack of money in the treasury. In 2006, the Central Bank printed 24.8 billion rupees worth of paper money. In the first quarter of 2007, it printed another 15.9 billion rupees.

 

The Rajapakse government has repeatedly rejected the demands of striking workers for pay rises to cope with inflation. Government ministers declared there was no money and accused workers of sabotaging the war effort.

 

In a bid to quell growing anger, Rajapakse announced a limited 375-rupee cost of living increase to monthly wages in January and another six months later. These will quickly be wiped out by skyrocketing prices, as will various small subsidies for the poor.

 

The president also promised to provide jobs for 15,000 graduates, but offered no details. Last year he announced that the government would provide 10,000 jobs for graduates but only 2,088 were employed.

 

In the past two months, police have broken up protest marches by unemployed graduates demanding jobs. While Rajapakse boasted that unemployment was now just 6.5 percent, the jobless rate for young people 15-29 years old is 19 percent, forcing many to join the army.

 

Taxes have been increased substantially.

 

Economic analyst Harsha de Silva commented in the Daily Mirror: “The only certainty in the budget for 2008 is that it will add further burdens on the people of this country who are already reeling under 22 percent island-wide inflation. The revenue estimates indicate that the total tax on goods and services will increase by a massive 25 percent in 2008. It is no secret that such consumption tax increases will hurt the poor more than the rich.”

 

Hoping to capitalise on widespread discontent, the opposition United National Party (UNP) declared that it will oppose the budget. For the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), however, the budget created an awkward political dilemma. While demanding an intensification of the war against the LTTE, JVP also postures as a defender of workers and the poor. (On Nov 19 the UNP and JVP both opposed the budget).

 

JVP leaders responded to the budget with bluster and noisy criticisms. JVP MP Wasantha Samarasinghe declared the party would “bring private sector workers to the streets” because the government had not directed employers to increase wages. Another JVP MP, Lal Kantha, leader of the party’s National Trade Union Centre (NTUC), has warned of strikes and protests.

 

Parliamentary leader Wimal Weerawansa told Rivira that the JVP was not satisfied with the budget because of rising inflation and tax burdens. In the same breath, however, he declared that the “party’s decision on the budget will depend on the political issues that have emerged in the country, the war that security forces are waging against separatist terrorists”.

 

He added: “There is no question over the increase of defence expenditure.”

 

For a long time now, many Tamils have been puzzled as to why the international community, specifically powerful Western liberal states, continue to support the Sri Lankan government despite its racist and oppressive policies and its genocidal actions against the Tamil people.

 

Reasons put forward on behalf of various members of the international community have ranged from needing stability in Sri Lanka given its strategic location, to requiring access to the island’s natural deep water harbor in Trincomalee, to supporting stability in the global economy.

 

However, none of these are actually significant enough to justify the disproportionate international focus and support Sri Lanka has received in recent years.

 

In today’s geopolitical context Sri Lanka’s location or Trincomalee harbor does not provide a strategic advantage for any of the great powers. Similarly, Sri Lanka’s role in the global economy is too small for it to be a key influencing factor.

 

So, what is it that Sri Lanka has that is attracting international attention? Nothing.  Rather, it is what the international community thinks it has to protect us, the Tamils, that is making, ironically, back the Sri Lankan state.

 

During the peace process there was talk about Sri Lanka being a test bed for the international community. As many incorrectly believed at the time, the international community was not testing a new model for peace building in Sri Lanka but a new framework for security - for states.

 

Right to protect

 

That new framework is called Responsibility to Protect or Right to Protect (R2P).

 

R2P is described as an evolving concept about the duties of governments generally to prevent and end unconscionable acts of violence against the peoples of the world, wherever they occur.

 

The R2P principles were first proposed in December 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and the Government of Canada in a report titled "The Responsibility to Protect”.

 

Four years later, at the September 2005 UN World Summit, R2P was adopted by United Nations.

 

According to R2P, states have a primary responsibility to protect their own populations and the international community has a responsibility to act whenever governments fail to discharge this responsibility.

 

In other words, when a state manifestly fails to protect its population, the international community is said to share a collective responsibility to respond.

 

Need for a new concept

 

The 1990s saw a series of catastrophes instigated by states against their own populations in places like Rwanda and the Balkans.

 

However, it was evident that the international community, even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, was unprepared to deal with situations like this. States, including great powers, reacted erratically, incompletely, counterproductively or not at all.

 

However, these states also faced a dilemma as they could no longer watch another Rwanda-style outrage and continue their claim to be the protectors of human rights.

 

When the genocide in Rwanda occurred the international community did nothing. However, when mass killings seemed likely in Kosovo in 1999, the international community decided to attempt a new tool in its policy box – they called it Humanitarian Intervention.

 

However humanitarian intervention undermines the concept of sovereignty of the state and thus a foundational principle – at least on paper – of the international system.

 

A condition of any one state's sovereignty is its corresponding obligation to respect every other state's sovereignty: the norm of non-intervention is enshrined in Article 2.7 of the UN Charter.

 

A sovereign state is empowered in international law to exercise exclusive and total jurisdiction within its territorial borders.

 

Other states have the corresponding duty not to intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign state.

 

The international community used to see intervention in the domestic affairs of states as harmful and leading to the destabilization of the order of states.

 

But the new cause of ‘human rights’ actually required intervention i.e. the deliberate, collective breaching of state sovereignty.

 

The R2P concept was aimed at bridging that contradictory gap.

 

Support for Sri Lanka

 

According to International Crisis Group, an influential think tank, the responsibility to protect embraces three specific responsibilities:

- A. The responsibility to prevent: to address both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting populations at risk.

- B. The responsibility to react: to respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention.

- C. The responsibility to rebuild: to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.

 

Thus, with R2P, the key emphasis is on prevention.

 

R2P does not see conflict prevention as a national or local issue and suggests failure to prevent can have wide international consequences and costs.

 

However, also according to R2P, preventive measures which do not intrude on sovereignty should be exhausted before intervention is even contemplated.

 

And the preventive measures prescribed by R2P, unlike humanitarian intervention, actually strengthens the state system by assisting in building the state’s capacity (including military capability), remedying grievances, advancing good governance, promoting human rights, ensuring rule of law, providing development assistance - and even offering inducements for such good behaviour.

 

After the ceasefire in 2002, Sri Lanka entered into a new phase in its protracted civil war at a time the international community had come up with this new framework and was looking for likely test beds.

 

If we review the actions of the international community in Sri Lanka since February 2002, we can identify the evidence of R2P thinking very much at work.

 

For example, the international community led by US, EU, Japan and Norway – the Co-Chairs - took a twin-track approach to address the root causes and direct cause of the internal conflict.

 

‘Legitimate Tamil grievances’ were identified as the root cause of the conflict and this was why Sri Lanka was pressured to devolve power to Tamils. (We still hear these being urged, somewhat weakly).

 

However, the LTTE was identified by the international community as a direct cause of internal conflict and from the word go the Western states sought to ‘remove this direct cause’ by isolating and undermining the organisation.

 

In contrast to how the LTTE was treated, and as per R2P principles, the Sri Lankan state was radically strengthened.

 

Under the guise of capacity building the Sinhala-dominated military was rapidly rearmed, thereby quickly destroying the military parity that led to the peace process in the first place.

 

International funds flowed to the corrupt and racist state in the name of development assistance. (It still, incidentally, continues to do so, albeit in slightly different forms.)

 

To ensure Sri Lankan state does not go down the route of Serbia, for example, inducements were offered for it to adopt international suggestions for governance reform etc. The Tokyo donor conference pledge of US$ 4.5 billions should be seen in this context.

 

Essentially, the international community bribed the Sri Lankan state into not behaving in an uncivilized manner. (The Tamils, however, were not given international aid unless they first agreed to behave – by giving up their demand for self-rule!).

 

Wrong choice

 

Unfortunately for the international community, they chose a poor test subject in Sri Lanka.

 

Abby Stoddard in her book ‘Ethnonationalism and the Failed State’ says that a failed state results when the leadership and institutions of the state are weakened and discredited to the point where the state can no longer fulfill its responsibilities or exercise sovereign power over the territory within its borders.

 

This radically weakening of capacity of the state leads to its classification as a failed state.

 

It should be remembered that the measures prescribed by R2P to strengthen the state considers only weak or failed states that do not have control over their territories and functions.

 

Measures to advancement of good governance, encouragement of rule of law and state capacity building will only work if the state infrastructure is weak and the political leaders are unable to execute reforms or prevent mass scale human rights violations.

 

But Sri Lanka is not a failed state. It is actually a powerful and stable, if racist, state.

 

The President and the Parliamentary government has the authority and the capacity to impose their will over territory the state controls and the state has firm control over its military.

 

Thus, and especially when the Sri Lankan state has no manifest interest in liberal values, including the principles of good governance, strengthening it is actually counterproductive.

 

Indeed, rather than actively working to address the racism that is the root cause of the conflict, the Sri Lanka state is clearly exploiting the military and monetary assistance it is receiving from international backers to advance its genocidal policy.

 

No Saviour

 

However, if the Tamils hope that Sri Lanka’s continued intransigence would prompt the international community to switch from ‘right to prevent’ to ‘right to react’ and militarily intervene in Sri Lanka to save us, we would be dead wrong.

 

Unlike Humanitarian Intervention, R2P recognizes that action by external forces in a country facing internal rebellion or secessionist violence could add momentum or ‘legitimacy’ to those fighting the state - as it has done so in Kosovo.

 

As a deliberate measure to protect the state system (i.e. prevent new states emerging), R2P proposes that those wanting to help from outside must recognize and respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries concerned and confine their efforts to finding solutions within those parameters.

 

It further adds, even where preventive measures have failed and right to react must be exercised by the international community, the objective should be to not change constitutional arrangements or undermine sovereignty, but to ‘protect’ them.

 

It is now impossible to pretend that the ‘legitimate grievances’ of the Tamils are not rooted in the Sri Lankan constitution, a self-reinforcing (‘entrenching’) constitution that enshrines Sinhala domination over the Tamils.

 

However, with the international community set on promoting a framework that protects and reinforces this constitution, Tamils simply cannot hope for a just solution or help from the international community.

 

Thus if the Tamils hope for saviours to emerge from over Sri Lanka’s borders, they will be bitterly disappointed. This leaves us no choice but to look for our saviours within and not outside.

 

In other words, for us, the ‘Right to Protect’ must be something we take up for ourselves, in our own interests.

 

It is called the Right to Self-determination.

Killings, disappearances and abductions of persons persist in the highly militarized environment of Trincomalee and Mutur, while thousands languish in welfare camps seeking adequate food, shelter and protection, the Law and Society Trust (LST) said in a report.

 

“Despite claims of liberation and reawakening of the East, civilians in Trincomalee live in a highly militarized environment. Despite the heavy presence of security forces, disappearances and killings continue regularly,” the LST said in the report based on a field visit.

 

Citing the Human Rights Commission (HRC) Trincomalee office, the report noted that abductions and disappearances were reported almost daily with 24 cases in August and 39 in September.

 

“Many incidents go unreported as no formal complaint is made to the HRC or Police due to fear of reprisals” the report notes while adding that Trincomalee remains heavily militarized and tense with the town deserted after 7 pm.

 

The LST said the TMVP or Karuna group, continued to abuse people, although the organization’s strength was dwindling with the number of TMVP offices in Trincomalee down from 10 to two.

 

It said though the HRC intervened on some violations, it failed to make any notable impact, while HRC investigations into the killing of five students in January 2006, 17 ACF aid workers in August 2006 and Ven. Nandarathna Thera in Trincomalee, had reached a standstill.

 

Commenting on Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) the LST said thousands of IDPs languished in camps, with friends or relatives.

 

“There are several camps around Trincomalee town, while there are three transit camps on the outskirts of Mutur, in Killiveddy, Paddiththidal and Manalchchenai. The people are also unaware of government plans to reduce the size of the proposed Sampur high security zone (HSZ), created by gazette on May 30 as no official announcement has been made,” the LST said

 

According to HRC statistics 15,425 IDPs will be affected by the HSZ, while most of the 11,672 displaced persons still in Batticaloa will also lose their lands. NGOs working with IDPs put the figure higher, the report adds.

"We tried our best to convince the International Community of our grievances. We are a small nation, struggling all alone to uphold our rights. But the International Community in an uneven judgement in applying its norms, scaled us with Sri Lankan government abounding with military and economic resources. The scale was not fair. The price we paid for the International Injustice is the life of Thamilchelvan," said Poddu Ammaan, the intelligence wing chief of the Liberation Tigers, in the obituary address of the funeral of Brigadier S.P. Thamilchelvan held in Ki'linochchi on Nov 5, 2007.

 

Narrating his close association with Thamilchelvan in his early days in the LTTE, Poddu Ammaan recollected events of exemplary bravery and leadership, shown by Thamilchelvan during IPKF times and the first Elephant Pass (EPS) operation.

 

However, he continued, "many of us were not aware of the inherent political abilities hidden in him, but our leader Pirapaharan rightly identified them."

 

"Our leader always use to say that fear comes from attachment to life. One who is fearless to sacrifice his own life to the welfare of people can only become a political leader. Thamilchelvan was one such."

 

"What is the payback for the killing of Thamilchelvan, many ask us."

 

"A few Sri Lankan soldiers, perhaps thousands, or a few Sinhala leaders cannot match the price for Thamilchelvan."

 

"The relentless effort to achieve Thamizh Eezham is the price. The Sinhala nation should realise that we will never stop in this effort."

 

In his address, Poddu Ammaan revealed that the LTTE came to know through subtle briefings of Norway, that the Sri Lankan government blocked Thamilchelvan's mother and siblings, living abroad, from attending the funeral.

Sri Lanka’s largest political party has condemned the US action to freeze the US-based accounts of the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) saying Washington was deepening the plight of the Tamil people.

 

“While the Government of Sri Lanka has imposed an effective economic embargo in Vanni, and the sustained bombardments of Sri Lanka Military have made situation difficult for International Non-Governmental Organizations to work amidst the affected local residents in border villages of Tamil areas,” said Kajendran, parliamentarian from the Tamil National Alliance

 

“The United States has made the situation worse for the Tamil people, internally displaced and reeling under economic hardship, by stopping the humanitarian aid from the branches world-wide of the TRO," he said.

 

"More than 300,000 Tamils have been internally displaced by the offensives by Sri Lanka armed forces. TRO, the only organization capable of providing the day-to-day support for the most vulnerable IDPs will now be debilitated with scarcity of funds.”

 

“Preschools, children homes, aged-people homes, livelihood beneficiaries, including tsunami beneficiaries will be affected by the ban.”

 

“Further, this action will be considered by the Sri Lanka Government as tacit support to the military approach, and will further encourage Colombo's military pursuits," the MP said.

 

Meanwhile, Suresh Premachandran, a senior parliamentarian of the TNA from Jaffna described as "contradictory" American ambassador Robert Blake's observation that the US treasury freeze of funds of TRO, a pro-LTTE front, was not against the Tamil people in Sri Lanka but against terrorism.

 

"It should be noted that US ambassador Robert Blake on Friday stated that the LTTE should return to the negotiating table, thereby recognising that it is the representative of the Tamil People in Sri Lanka," Premachandran said.

 

Mr Kajendran said that without a balanced approach to peace by the International Community, with an understanding of the Tamil peoples right to self-determination, Tamils are unlikely to be convinced by assertions of support to peace by the International Community.

The path is long, my friends, and we have lost another companion.

 

A companion who walked besides us as he showed us the way forward. A companion who knew the ugliness of war and sought out an alternative path. A companion who told the world of our struggle even as they turned their backs on us.

 

Even as he walked with us there was no way of knowing how dear he was to the Tamil people or how crucial he was to our struggle. And there was none of the arrogance which comes with power. None of the distance which comes with authority. None of the coldness which comes with importance. Just a smile. A warm open smile which made you comfortable enough to speak your mind, to question, to criticize. A smile that we all see today when we close our eyes.

 

Behind that almost child like smile was a razor sharp mind that understood the path to freedom was long and dangerous. Behind that smile was a man strong enough to be humble; wise enough to seek the counsel of others. A man so sure of our cause that he was willing to negotiate with an enemy who ultimately took his life.

 

The path is long and lonely, my friends.

 

Thamilchelvan Anna understood better that many that we need many companions to reach our destination. As a young diaspora Tamil who was not fully accepting of the struggle, it was refreshing to meet a man secure enough in his own beliefs to allow them to be questioned. Although he had never been to the West when I met first him in 2002, I was surprised by how well he understood that young Tamils in the diaspora would have many questions about the struggle and the movement, and was willing to answer even the most trivial questions.

 

For some time now we have had two paths in front of us: the path of peace and the path of war. Our nation sent Thamilchelvan Anna down the path of peace. A path that was opened to us by the sacrifice of many lives. We sent him ahead and waited with bated breath; waiting for him to give us the all clear; waiting for him to tell is it was okay to move forward.

 

When a warrior comes to talk peace surely that must have a special significance? He has seen the ugliness of war first hand; he has seen comrades fall in the red soil of our homeland; he has seen parents grieve for dead children; he has seen our people driven like animals into the jungles. When a man who knows the loss of war sits across the table from you and offers a way to bring peace to the island - do you talk with him or silence him forever?

 

We sent Thamilchelvan Anna and we waited.

 

We waited hoping against hope that this path would lead us to freedom. Lead us to a life of dignity and security. Lead us to lives filled with laughter and joy.

 

But this path has led us only to misery and tears of loss. This path led us to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Tamils. This path led to daily killings and disappearances of Tamils across the island. This path led us to the assassination of Kausalian, Joseph Pararajasingam, Raviraj and now Thamilchelvan Anna and the five others who died at his side.

 

The Sinhala people have shown us that they are unwilling to walk down this path.

 

Despite all this we have been patient; our leaders have shown restraint in the face of provocation. Even as death rained down upon our people our leaders have kept the path to peace open. Now they have taken our messenger of peace. A messenger that went forward with the blessing of our people and our leadership. When our messenger is taken from us, the message is clear: the road to peace is closed.

 

My friends, we walk alone to our freedom. We are all tired for the journey has been long and we have lost many companions along the way. Many of us have lost flesh and blood; many of us have lost house and home; some of us have lost identity and self.

 

It is tempting to say enough. It is tempting to say I will walk no more. I must rest. It is tempting to lose hope, to fear where this road will lead us. This is what they want from us. They want us to forsake our revolution; to give up our dream.

 

Now is not the time, my friends. As long as we have the will and means to resist those who seek to oppress us we must stay the path to freedom.

 

We must show the world they may kill the revolutionary but the revolution will come. They may kill the dreamer but our dream will be realized.

 

We have lost another companion. But in his name we walk on. In his memory and the memory of so many others we remain strong.

 

Freedom will come one day. United as a people, we will reach that goal. Thamilchelvan Anna knew this. That is why he was always smiling.

UNHCR expressed its ‘grave concerns’ on the deteriorating security situation and various incidents reported from areas in the eastern Sri Lanka, including incidents of involuntary return of displaced people.

 

“UNHCR has received reports of a number of killings, abductions, incidents of harassment and general insecurity in these areas,” said UNHCR spokesperson, Jennifer Pagonis, at today's Palais des Nations press briefing in Geneva.

 

“We reiterate our call to the government to ensure that the returns are voluntary, safe and in line with international standards,” Pagonis said.

 

Around 250 displaced people, who returned to their villages of origin in the Trincomalee district a few weeks ago, after fleeing escalating violence in 2006, fled their homes again this week back to welfare centres in the Batticaloa district after serious security incidents in their villages.

 

UNHCR has received reports of a number of killings, abductions, incidents of harassment and general insecurity in these areas.

 

These incidents have made the returns unsustainable for these IDP families. Those who fled to Batticaloa have indicated that at the moment, they have no intention of returning to their villages of origin.

 

They said their homes had been looted and damaged, and they now have nothing to return to. Incidents such as these clearly affect the sustainability of returns. Security is one of the main prerequisites for return and it is the responsibility of the government to ensure the security of returnees. We urge the government to strengthen the return process and build confidence among the returnees. We warn against any further moves towards premature return until these issues are resolved.

 

UNHCR is also concerned about incidents of involuntary return during yesterday’s, (Thursday) returns to Chenkalady in Batticaloa West.

 

According to reports, displaced people, IDPs, who were unwilling to return, were informed by local authorities that their assistance would be withdrawn if they opted to stay behind UNHCR has received a petition from the group of 92 IDPs indicating their unwillingness to return. There are also reports of looting of shelter materials in the Batticaloa district.

 

We reiterate our call to the government to ensure that the returns are voluntary, safe and in line with international standards. UNHCR should be fully engaged in the process and we urge the government to work with experts in this field to ensure the rights of IDPs, as stated in international humanitarian law, are safeguarded at all times.

Reacting defiantly to decisions by Sri Lanka and the United States to ban it, the leading Tamil charity in the island, the Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation, vowed to continue its founding mission to help the victims of the Sinhala government’s military campaign and called on Tamils around the world to support its work.

 

“We assure you that our mission will continue in our homeland areas without interruption and we call on the international community and the Tamil Diaspora to continue to support our work with war and tsunami affected persons,” the TRO said.

 

Both the United States and Sri Lanka claimed the TRO was a front for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

 

However, neither country has offered proof or ever charged the TRO or one of its workers with assisting the LTTE.

 

“One wonders what the goal of the US Government is since no proof of any wrongdoing has been presented that casts doubts on the work of TRO,” the charity said.

 

“The US Government currently does not provide any humanitarian relief to those in LTTE controlled areas and with the recent actions inevitably supports the GoSL's campaign to limit assistance to the Tamil people,” the TRO said.

 

The TRO said the Sri Lankan ban was a culmination of a campaign of harassment and violence against the charity and its staff carried out by the Rajapakse regime.

 

Last year the Sri Lankan government froze the TRO’s accounts. In January 2006 paramilitary groups, known to be working with and under the direction of the GoSL, abducted, raped, tortured and killed 7 TRO humanitarian workers.

 

The TRO, which has been the largest - and for long periods the sole - NGO assisting the hundreds of thousands of Tamils displaced by the conflict, said “with the banning of the TRO the final nail in the coffin of the peace process has been hammered home.”

 

Meanwhile the main Sinhala opposition parties, the United National Party (UNP) and the ultra-nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Perumana (JVP) hailed the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) led regime’s decision.

 

The TRO said it was being banned with the “ulterior motive of unleashing untold hardships on the Tamil people as part of [the Sri Lankan government’s] continuing discrimination and oppression of the Tamil people.”

The Sri Lankan government has indicated that it may ban the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) once again, considering the stormy political developments in the Sinhala south and the stepped-up war against the armed movement in the north.

 

A ban on the LTTE will rule out the possibility of any negotiations to end the protracted conflict as the Tigers have consistently refused to talk whilst they are deemed outlaws.

 

According to Senior Presidential advisor and parliamentarian Basil Rajapaksa, the ruling SLFP’s parliamentary group last week approved a proposal to proscribe the LTTE if the movement continued its terrorist activities.

 

Basil Rajapaksa, who is also a brother of President Mahinda Rajapaksa said that although some SLFP MPs expressed reservations on the grounds that a proscription would complicate the peace process, the proposal was backed by a majority.

 

“How soon the proscription will come will depend on how the LTTE operates in the coming weeks. If the LTTE continues with its terrorist activities, then the ban will come. The ball is now in the LTTE’s court,” Rajapaksa, said.

 

Rajapakse’s comments came at a time the ruling party was trying to woo Sinhala hardliner parties to support the annual Budget. Last Monday the government comfortably won the vote.

 

Rajapakse told the heads of the state media at a weekly meeting on Wednesday that President Rajapaksa was "willing to re-ban the LTTE" and negotiate with the Sinhala nationalist Janata Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), Sri lanka’s third largest party, in an effort to widen its base of support, while getting ready for a showdown in Parliament.