MORE than 11,000 Tamil refugees have fled to India since January to escape renewed fighting between the Sri Lankan army and Tamil Tigers and more are likely to come, officials said Thursday.

The figure includes a batch of about 500 refugees who travelled by boat to reach Mandapam camp in southern India`s Tamil Nadu state late Wednesday, said a senior government administrator from Ramanathapuram district.

Ramanathapuram, 700 kilometres (434 miles) from Chennai, capital of Tamil Nadu state, is the district nearest to Sri Lanka, ravaged by ethnic conflict since the early 1980s.

“So far 3,310 (Tamil) families have crossed over since January this year,” said the Ramanathapuram official who asked to remain anonymous.

“In figures, we are talking of 11,193 refugees,” he said.

India, whose Tamil population totals 62.2 million, shares close ethnic and cultural links with the Tamil community in Sri Lanka, who living mainly in the island`s north and the east.

The refugee tally was confirmed by C P Chandrahasan, who heads the Organisation of Eelam Refugees Rehabilitation, a non-government organisation in Chennai.

“With the new refugees, we have more than 70,000 displaced Sri Lankan Tamils who have sheltered in India since the early 1990s,” said Chandrahasan, a Sri Lankan Tamil living in India since 1983.

Chandrahasan warned of more refugees streaming into India because of the escalating violence in Sri Lanka.

“People are obviously feeling threatened they feel there is no one to protect them. Naturally they want to flee to India,” he said.

The latest exodus of refugees has come amid a bloody new phase in the three-decade ethnic conflict that has left a February 2002 truce in tatters.

Amid a deepening humanitarian crisis in the Northeast, the Sri Lankan government last week froze the funds of the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO).

The Central Bank said it had issued the directive on the basis of combating the financing of terrorism.

The move has blocked $750,000 of TRO funds, raised by international donors and Tamil expatriates, primarily for tsunami-related rehabilitation and development.

The TRO protested the freezing of its accounts, saying the Colombo government had made no communication with the NGO, which has been registered as a charity there since 1985.

TRO appealed to international institutions, human right bodies and humanitarian organizations to make representations to the Sri Lanka Government and intimate the importance the continued functioning of TRO.

“[We] also seek information and official notification from the Central Bank on the nature of its action and the reasons for such action with clear and precise details enabling TRO to respond adequately,” the charity said.

“The Central Bank’s actions [to block TRO funds] will lead to further deprivation and suffering for the tsunami and war affected populations of the NorthEast. The people of the NorthEast will again be denied much needed relief, rehabilitation and development,” the TRO said in a statement.

“The timing of this action by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka with callous disregard to its consequences truly shocks not only the TRO staff but also the Tamil Diaspora community,” the TRO said.

“Since registering with the Government of Sri Lanka as a Charity TRO has responded to all requests for financial and project information from the Ministry of Social Services, the Ministry of Foreign Resources, and the Parliamentary Select Committee on NGOs promptly and exhaustively. There have never been any follow up questions or requests to testify before any committees or courts,” the TRO said.

“TRO as always will assist and fully support any enquiry or investigation into any aspects of its operation, however, this action by the central bank exerts extreme pressure on its ability to operate and will negatively impact the tsunami and war affected populations.”

The TRO said that the move to block its funds comes after a concerted campaign of intimidation and obstruction against its operations.

“There had been a concerted, malicious campaign against TRO in the recent past.

“Beginning with the attacks on TRO offices and continuing with the abduction and disappearance of 7 TRO staff members by paramilitaries, some members of the Government of Sri Lanka have sought to intimidate TRO staff and restrict the delivery of humanitarian relief and development to the war and tsunami affected communities of the NorthEast,”

The Sunday Times reported the freezing of TRO funds was made known to TRO officials only when they sought to make a withdrawal from their accounts in Kilinochchi and in Colombo.

TRO officials who went to the banks were told about the order and their cheques were not accepted.

TRO Administration Director Lawrance Thilakar, said that no prior notice had been given to the organization though it was registered as a charity with the Sri Lankan government and has been functioning since 1985.

Mr. Thilakar said relief work of the TRO would be affected as they are currently looking after persons displaced by the conflict as well as carrying out tsunami relief operations.

TRO has thus far implemented over US$ 20 million in tsunami related projects benefiting all three ethnic communities in the island, using money donated by international donors and Tamil expatriates.

60% of the $750,000 frozen last week were project funds for contractual obligations under the Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) TRO has signed with international NGOs and UN Agencies (UNICEF, Save the Children, Operation USA and the Nippon Foundation amongst others).

40% of the funds were donated by the Tamil Diaspora to the TRO.

In January this year the Sri Lankan government called on the US government to ban the TRO operations in that country. The matter was raised by Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera during his visit to the US.

The TRO is registered as a charity organization in the US and functions in 28 other countries. In Britain, the Charity Commission examined the TRO after complaints by Colombo and subsequently a new charitable company known as the Tamil Support Foundation (TSF) was set up with TRO funds being transferred to the new trust and with the same staff.

Thousands of Tamils in Toronto

TNA parliamentarian Mrs Pathmini Sithamparanathan in London

Mr Yogan (right), a councillor for Royal Borough of Kingston with TYO officials inside UNICEF office - London

More than 3000 Tamils protested outside the UNICEF office in London

The Sri Lankan government and its forces, obsessed with the idea of destroying our movement, has, without realising the strategic advantages of making peace, used various counter insurgency tactics throughout the peace process to kill our cadres.

Ramanan was a great inspiration for the LTTE fighters in the east of the island. He skilfully liberated our territories from Karuna when he defected to the enemy. Ramanan then went on to build up a strong force there under Commander Bhanu.

We remember how in 1987 we lost two of our District Commanders, Pulendran and Kumarappa, when the Indians, mediating between the Sri Lankans and us, failed to save the lives of our commanders who were abducted by the Sri Lanka Navy in the seas during that peace engagement.”

That tactic didn''t help the enemy quell our movement. In fact, few believed that we could resist the world’s fourth largest military might. But we did. We did so under the strategic guidance of our leadership and with the support base of our people. Even when we were forced to withdraw from Jaffna, the urban base, and lead the Tamil struggle from the remote jungles of Manal Aru, we achieved the unthinkable this way.

We have shaken hands with the enemy on four different occasions in a bid to resolve the conflict peacefully. During this latest internationally assisted four-year peace engagement, our representatives have gone around and shook hands with many diplomats in Europe.

The whole world has had the opportunity to come here during the peace process, if they truly wanted to understand our situation. Can we expect those who failed to understand our political plight during the last four years of peaceful engagement to ever be able to understand it?

I can see the people of Tamil Eelam getting ready for the war. We know where we should stand –on the power of our people’s support, the guidance of our leader, on the sacrifices we have made for freedom in our own territory, be it Vavuniya, Jaffna, Mannar, Manal Aru Batticaloa, or Amparai.

Nobody can defeat us now when the Tamil people have resolved to decide our own destiny.

Funeral Photos

The remains of Colonel Ramanan, the most senior Tamil Tiger officer killed by Sri Lanka’s military since the February 2002, were buried with full military honour at the Thandiyady military cemetery last Wednesday.

Col. Ramanan, deputy head of the LTTE military forces in Batticaloa district, was shot and killed by a Sri Lanka Army (SLA) sniper whilst he was inspecting LTTE positions at the Vavunativu Forward Defence Line (FDL) on Sunday May 21.

Whilst several hundred people, including leading citizens, LTTE cadres and residents of Amparai and Batticaloa districts attended the military funeral, in Vanni, northern Sri Lanka, senior LTTE officers addressed memorials at Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi.

Tamil National Alliance (TNA) parliamentarian Mr. P. Ariyanenthiran, LTTE Batticaloa district Commander Colonel Banu, Batticaloa Political Head Thayamohan, Women Political Head Kuveni, Commander Piraba, Chief of Head Office Amuthan, Head of Rajan College Keethan, LTTE Division Commanders, Tiger soldiers and several hundred civilians watched the final rites.

Black flags were flown along streets, and shops, schools, offices and other institutions in Batticaloa Amparai districts were closed as the districts residents paid respects to the senior Commander Ramanan, a native Pallukamam in Batticaloa.

The events in Vanni paying homage to Colonel Ramanan were held at in Kilinochchi and Puthukudiruppu.

At both events, Thamilarasan, Col. Ramanan’s brother and Odduchuddan Regional Head of the LTTE, lit the lamp before the late officer’s portrait while another brother, Parathan, an LTTE cadre, garlanded it.

Colonel Ramesh lit the flame of sacrifice at the Puthukudiruppu event and garlanded Col. Ramanan’s portrait. He was joined by Colonel Jeyam, senior LTTE member Mr. K. V. Balakumaran, Peace Secretariat Director, Mr. S. Pulidevan, Mr. Illanthirayan (Marshall) of the Peace Secretariat, Mr. Seeralan, Deputy Head of the political wing in Batticaloa District and Mr. S. Selvanayagam, the principal of the Maha Vidyalam.

Colonel Jeyam addressed the event (see separate story), along with the other senior officials.

Mr. Illanthirayan, former head of the LTTE Political Wing in Batticaloa, following Col. Jeyam, hailed the personal qualities of Col. Ramanan

“Martyr Ramanan, knew every one in the southern Tamil Eelam and everyone there knew him. He was a master in translating our movement’s leader’s political and military strategies into skilful techniques in practice,” Mr. Illanthirayan said.

“It was Colonel Ramanan who surmounted the efforts by the traitor Karuna to split the LTTE through the wedge of regionalism. Though he is no more with us, the techniques and tactics Colonel Ramanan developed will be with us in our struggle to achieve our desired goal,” said Mr. Ilanthirayan.

Colonel Ramesh said: “All his feats in the struggle are not known because the victories he reaped and the way in which he achieved them cannot be openly revealed now. He was a great source of strength and a talented fighter in southern Tamil Eelam and he was killed precisely for these incredible qualities.”

In Kilinochchi, Colonel Balraj, addressing the people gathered to pay respects to Ramanan said the late officer was a gifted planning officer skilled in handling information.

Meanwhile, the LTTE Intelligence Chief Pottu Amman, in an interview to National Television of Tamil Eelam (NTT) Wednesday revealed that Ramanan was a key strategist behind the weakening of the Razeek paramilitary group in Batticaloa.

Ms. Thamilini Head of the LTTE Women political wing said: “Each tragic loss in our struggle for liberation leaves us injected with fresh vigour and determination. Col. Ramanan is not dead. He is here with us in the numerous combatants in whom he had instilled all his talents and tactics.”

Kandiah Ulaganathan, alias Ramanan, born in 1966, is from Palukamam, 21 km south of Batticaloa. He was enrolled for training in LTTE in 1986 after completing GCE (A/L) at Palukamam Kandumani Maha Vidyalayam.

Ramanan emerged as a talented military leader during the LTTE’s war with the Indian Army. He served in Jeyanthan Brigade, one of the most feared infantry formations of the Liberation Tigers. His contribution was high in the Unceasing Waves operations against the Sri Lanka Army launched Jeyasikurui operation that was routed by the Tigers in Vanni.

He was appointment as Chief of Intelligence Wing in Batticaloa and Amparai districts after Lt. Col. Nizam was killed in a Claymore attack.

Commander Ramanan’s decision to leave the renegade LTTE commander Karuna was a major setback for the renegade’s plans to hold his ground in the east.

He was appointed the Commander of Mavadimunmari division and later as Deputy Head of Batticaloa Amparai Military Wing of the LTTE under Special Commander Col. Bhanu.

The day after the funeral, Sri Lankan commandos of the Special Task Force (STF) troopers went around the markets in Arayampathy and Kalavanchikudy areas in Batticaloa district assaulting many traders and forcing them to close their shops for five additional days, as punishment for their current two day voluntary shop shut down as a mark of respect for Col. Ramanan.

The STF soldiers who regularly harass and attack Tamils civilians in the Batticaloa district had been infuriated by the successful hartal and the respect shown by local residents to the late Col. Ramanan, reports said.

International ceasefire monitors of the SLMM who went to Arayampathy and Kalavanchchikudy regional markets following the complaints, subsequently inquired the STF, who denied any wrong doing. The SLMM has asked the traders to resume their usual business activities from Friday.

Col.Veeramani

Col. Thurga, Col. Theepan and Col. Balraj, (the three officers are pictured (l-r) preparing to placing flowers on Lt. Col. Veeramani’s casket

Some of the public who came to pay their respect to Col Veeramani

The just-concluded elections to the Tamil Nadu Assembly saw the resurgence of sympathies towards the cause of the banned Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). And it is a far cry from the days of the Jayalalithaa government’s first crackdown on pro-Eelam elements.

For these elections, Jayalalithaa had to align with the Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK) and the Dalit Panthers of India (DPI), two parties that favour a separate homeland for Tamils in Sri Lanka. Since December, when the Dravidar Kazhagam (DK) organised an Eelam Tamils Protection Meeting in Chennai, various pro-LTTE parties have held meetings and rallies in support of the struggle without any police interference. The dpi and other parties protested against Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse’s proposed visit to Chennai last year, forcing Jayalalithaa to cancel her appointment with Rajapakse.

The Periyar Dravidar Kazhagam (PDK) held public meetings in support of Eelam, which drew huge crowds in cities including Chennai. A photo exhibition was organised and several books on the struggle were sold at the meetings. “There was overwhelming response. 1, 500 copies of Oppanthangalai Seerkulaithaithu Yaar (Who violated the agreements?) authored by Viduthalai Rajendran were sold at the Coimbatore meeting alone,” says a PDK cadre.

Many Tamil youngsters have looked upon LTTE chief Prabhakaran as a hero. “There is still a lot of sympathy and support for LTTE in the state. This is a genuine feeling which cannot be wiped out even if few newspapers write against the LTTE,” says SV Rajadurai, former national vice-president of the People’s Union for Civil Liberties.

The upsurge in pro-Eelam sentiment is not without reason. The Supreme Court’s observation in 2003 that an individual’s mere expression of moral support to a banned organisation does not constitute an offence under pota gave a boost to pro-Eelam supporters who had always argued that they were not against national interests.

In May last year, the Central pota Review Committee observed that it found no prima facie case for proceeding against Tamil Nationalist Movement president Pazha Nedumaran, stating that “sympathy or oral support for the cause of Eelam Tamils does not mean support for the ideology or methodology adopted by LTTE”.

Nedumaran, who was imprisoned for 16 months, continues to champion the cause of LTTE. “We continue to support the formation of Eelam, and regard LTTE as the sole representative of Eelam Tamils,” he told Tehelka. In the May 8 polls, his party appealed to the people to vote for candidates who support Eelam. However, the PDK and DK were with the DMK alliance. “The DMK will not support the LTTE, but it would respect sentiments of parties like ours, unlike the aiaDMK,” said PDK chief Kolathur Mani.

The DMK has never supported LTTE and would never do so in future, say DMK leaders. “The LTTE received lot of support from mgr in the 80s. LTTE once refused to receive money from DMK (lest it would annoy mgr),” said DMK organising secretary TKS Elangovan. Karunanidhi was identified with other outfits.

The DMK, he said, would support the policy of the Union government on Sri Lanka.

“We are interested in the welfare of Eelam Tamils. If the Tamils are put to hardship, we will impress upon the Centre to intervene and protect the Tamils,” said Elangovan.

However, few feel that the sudden rise in pro-Eelam activities in the state is linked to Assembly elections. “No party wants to lose the votes of Eelam supporters,” said human rights activist Agni Subramaniam.

“The compulsion of electoral politics works both ways. (While the government remained mum on pro-Eelam activities) The MDMK and DPI have stopped talking about Eelam because of their alliance with Jayalalithaa. Neither Vaiko nor Thirumavalavan condemned the bombing of Tamil areas by Lankan forces.”

The European Union resolution on May 18, the first step towards proscribing the Liberation Tigers, also marked the EU’s transition from observer to a partisan participant in Sri Lanka’s conflict. There are a number of controversial aspects to the resolution, including, for example, the directive to the LTTE to go for talks with the Sri Lankan government “without delay” and “be prepared to decommission weapons.”

But from a Tamil perspective, these need to be considered in the light of another controversial assertion in the resolution: that the EU does not recognise the LTTE as the “sole representative” of the Tamils. The resolution states that the EU “recognise that the LTTE does not represent all the Tamil peoples of Sri Lanka and calls on the LTTE to allow for political pluralisms and alternative democratic voices in the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka which would secure the interest of all peoples and communities.”

Representational legitimacy is a much-debated and contested topic, one that has invoked considerable academic and lay discussion. But there are two related aspects of interest here – firstly, the impact of the EU statement on the ongoing internationally facilitated peace process, and secondly, whether the fact that this position has been expressed matters from a Tamil perspective.

To begin with, it can be argued that one of the key drivers for the LTTE to involve itself in the Norwegian facilitated peace process was the opportunity it provided to improve its image abroad. The Norwegian initiative paved the way for the international community to examine the legitimacy of the LTTE’s claim to be the sole representatives of the Tamils. Indeed, this was the basis on which the Norwegian initiative began in 2002, with the LTTE demanding Sri Lanka’s proscription be lifted as a pre-condition and that it be treated with parity during the peace process.

In short, the LTTE expected the internationally monitored ceasefire and associated peace process to enable the international community to engage with itself and the Tamils and to ascertain for itself the support the organisation enjoyed on the ground. It should be noted that the LTTE has always argued that its very existence and growth (argued to be predicated on the public’s willingness under conditions of war to supply both recruits and succour) is implicit evidence of broad-based support. In keeping with the expectations of the international community, there were two ways by which the LTTE could demonstrate the extent of its support base – through the ballot box and by its governance.

Though not willing to participate directly in the Sri Lankan political arena, not least given the LTTE’s rejection of Sri Lanka’s Sinhala-Buddhist constitution, the LTTE backed the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), a coalition representing the four largest Tamil political parties, which in turn endorsed the LTTE as ‘sole representatives.’ It is notable that the TNA has been comprehensively successful at each election at which it has completed, sweeping not only the vast majority of the parliamentary polls in the Northeast, but also recently winning convincingly local government polls. Given that the TNA has always stood on a platform recognising the LTTE as sole representatives of the Tamils, its success at the polls can only be construed as political support for the Tigers amongst the Tamil population. In short, the Tamils voted for the LTTE by proxy.

There is an important point here. The LTTE was not demonstrating its support base to the Tamils – having defeated the indiscriminate onslaught of the Sri Lankan armed forces, the LTTE had already achieved a near hegemonic position as the primary actor representing Tamil interests vis-à-vis the state. Therefore, the efforts at the ballot box were meant to underline to the international community the popular support the organization enjoyed.

While legitimacy, particularly political legitimacy, is most easily proven through the ballot box, it can be reflected in other ways too, including popular demonstrations of support and solidarity. Even before the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement, the Tigers were able to mobilise mass rallies, both in the Army-controlled parts of the Northeast and across the Diaspora, expressing support for its leadership role. The mass attendances at the ‘Pongu Thamil’ rallies were meant – in time honoured tradition – as demonstrations of mass support for the LTTE. No other Tamil group, except the TULF before the armed struggle began, has come close to the numbers the pro-LTTE activists drew to the Pongu Thamil rallies.

Moreover, despite threats and violence by Sri Lankan security forces and, especially, paramilitaries, the Tamil media, both in Sri Lanka and amongst the Diaspora, have become more vociferous during the peace process in their vocal support for the LTTE. Whether the media shapes popular opinion, or reflect it, it cannot be denied that the majority of the mainstream Tamil media are firmly supportive of the LTTE as the representatives of the Tamil people. Those formerly coy on the question the legitimacy of the LTTE now sometimes question the movement’s policies, but not its right to speak on behalf of the Tamil people on the political question.

But with the EU ban coming at this historic juncture, the international community has effectively indicated that it neither wants to know nor cares as to whether the Tamils back the LTTE or not. In short, the EU has opted to declare itself what the Tamils ought to think. This has led many amongst the LTTE and the Tamils to question the point of the Norwegian peace process - of which the EU is a Co-Chair (along with Norway, Japan and the United States).

Amid the frustration over the EU’s single-minded decision, there is quiet support amongst Tamils for the understated firmness in the statement by the LTTE’s chief negotiator, Mr Anton Balasingham: “the more the international community alienates the LTTE, the more the LTTE will be compelled to tread a hardline individualist path.” Amid rising violence and brutality against Tamil civilians by the Sri Lankan armed forces, some go further, querying why the LTTE still remains in a peace process that has now been proven to have delivered no benefits and is even devoid of a functioning ceasefire.

Some members of the international community have questioned the LTTE’s legitimacy on the grounds that it has been accused of killing Tamil opponents. But for the past decade, these opponents are less political rivals than paramilitaries fronting a counter-insurgency campaign for the Sri Lankan state. Even the US State Department this year finally admitted the EPDP, et al are paramilitaries engaged in violence against the LTTE. In an unavoidable parallel, even the leading Western democracies have all now implemented draconian restrictions as part of the ‘war on terror.’ The LTTE’s security environment and policing requirements are no less complex.

Others seeking to deny the LTTE’s legitimacy have done so on the grounds that the organisation is autocratic and therefore does not have the moral grounds on which to claim representative status. But this is to ignore the extensive administrative, judicial and legislative structures the LTTE has built up in areas under its control. The scale and nature of the decade-old civil administration, constituting a de facto state, in the LTTE controlled areas, are demonstrative of the organisation’s ability to meet the governing expectations of Western liberal norms. The point here is that the LTTE is not a political party – it is a de-facto state.

But all the objections above precipitate an unavoidable question: if the LTTE are not sole representatives of the Tamils, who else represents them? All the other Tamil actors putting themselves forward have been comprehensively defeated at successive elections (ever since the oppressive conditions of war were lifted, allowing the Tamils to express their electoral preferences). Almost all the non-TNA political parties are paramilitary groups operating in the Northeast with the Sri Lanka armed forces. If the press reports are true, some attempt has been made to unify these paramilitary groups under one banner, but even this has proven a failure, with no support forthcoming from the people. And no wonder - the only reason these groups have been given any prominence by the internatonal community is solely because of their opposition to the LTTE – it is not as if they have any alternative platform to offer the Tamils.

With regards the peace process, if the LTTE are not the sole representatives of the Tamil people, who else is to represent them at the table? Unsurprisingly, the EU certainly makes no attempt to answer that question. But in any case, on what basis is the EU attempting to tell the Tamil people that someone else (other than the organisation they electorally selected, not once, but thrice) should speak on their behalf? That the European Union has decided it won’t recognise the LTTE as the sole representatives of the Tamils does not take away the mandate the Tamil people have given them.

The efforts of the European Union to deny the Tamil people their right to choose their own representatives and instead impose others on them will not lead to peace or even a peace process. Indeed all it will have achieved is to compel the LTTE to question the international community’s ability and willingness to resolve the real problems confronting the Tamils in Sri Lanka.

The matter has assumed critical importance as Sri Lanka slides inexorably towards the brink. The Tamil perspective was raised succinctly last week by an LTTE commander, speaking at the funeral of a colleague shot dead by Army snipers. “The whole world has had the opportunity to come here during the peace process, if they truly wanted to understand our situation,” noted Colonel Jeyam. “Can we expect those who failed to understand our political plight during the last four years of peaceful engagement to ever be able to understand it?”

Many observers of Sri Lanka’s brewing conflict appear resigned to a new war as inevitable, often reasoning that the hawks on both sides are presently too powerful to resist. Unfortunately, the only perception more flawed than this sense of an unavoidable doom is that there is little the international community could have done to prevent this lamentable scenario from occurring. A close examination of the island’s political and military history, however, serves as a useful guide to how the present vicious cycle of violence could be prevented from spiralling to its bloody end.

From the outset, the LTTE’s stated objective is the creation of a structure that provides a permanent condition of security for the Tamils. An independent state is, arguably, a security structure par excellence. The LTTE has expressed a willingness to consider alternatives, but physical security is the overarching goal. Moreover, the organisation has also reiterated it would pursue this objective via a negotiation process and, failing that, do so by military force.

But one of the unstated yet well understood principles of the LTTE’s approach is to always negotiate only having achieved a reasonable degree of military parity with the state. This is an understandable position, as a lack of military parity would seriously reduce the likelihood of reaching an acceptable solution, particularly with respect to the security and political freedom of the Tamils. This basic principle is illustrated time and again when the historical conditions under which the LTTE engages in negotiations or refuses to do so are considered.

Over a decade ago, President Chandrika Kumaratunga launched her infamous ‘war for peace’. Its notoriety amongst the Tamils stems from the unrestrained manner in which her administration and her armed forces waged the war, targetting the broader civilian population with a food and medicine embargo and indiscriminate use of heavy weapons.

Leading up to that round of conflict, the Sri Lankan state was engaged in direct peace talks with the LTTE. However, even whilst engaged in discussions, the state was steadily arming itself preparing for a full-scale assault on the LTTE controlled – and densely populated - Jaffna peninsula. The peace talks broke down in an acrimonious exchange of accusations of bad faith and the Sri Lankan state subsequently launched its offensive taking control of Jaffna and driving the LTTE from its strategic ‘rear base.’

With hindsight it is clear that the Sri Lankan state had achieved substantial military superiority during the negotiations, having received massive international support politically, militarily and financially to embark on its war. The ‘war for peace’, whilst waged in gross violation of international humanitarian law, had nevertheless been sanctioned by the world powers involved in Sri Lanka.

But if the objective was the shortest route to stability, the international community had erred in its unstinting support of the Sri Lankan state. Despite the initial success of the newly equipped and trained military, by the turn of the century the state was on its back foot. In 2001, having retaken vast territories of the Northeast from the Army, the LTTE attacked the Katunayake air base-cum-international airport, seriously weakening the airforce and, worse, shattering the export and tourism based economy.

It was under these conditions that Sri Lanka’s new premier, Ranil Wickremesinghe accepted the LTTE’s call for peace talks, initiated after the movement called a unilateral ceasefire. The LTTE, with its objective of securing a state of military parity achieved, engaged the Sri Lankan government in a peace process through which it expected to realise a semi-permanent state of security, namely through an interim administration.

Indeed, the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) made a promising start. The state pledged to restore conditions of ‘normalcy’ to the war-torn Northeast, withdrawing troops encamped in Tamil homes and public buildings such as schools and hospitals. The state also pledged to disarm Tamil paramilitary groups engaged as part of its counter-insurgency campaign.

Thus, to the visible relief of the Tamils, it appeared the international community had finally stepped away from a policy of resolutely backing Colombo’s military solution and had instead begun to a policy of pressuring genuine concessions from the southern polity that could result in a permanent negotiated solution.

But as months and then years passed, Colombo’s pledges fell by the wayside. Structures which were agreed to rehabilitate the Northeast became bogged down in bureaucratic disputes over control. The climax of this failed cooperation was the stillborn Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS); Sinhala nationalists used Sri Lanka’s judiciary to torpedo the tsunami aid sharing mechanism.

Combined with a series of diplomatic snubs to the LTTE by the international community, it became abundantly clear that the state of parity with which the LTTE had entered the peace process was gradually ebbing away. One explanation put about by some analysts is that the defection of Karuna to Colombo had resulted in a perception that the balance of power had shifted away from the LTTE and therefore there was little reason to continuing to pressure Colombo, as the threat of conflict was now remote. Speculation the tsunami having wreaked havoc amidst the LTTE’s ranks debilitating its combat readiness was another possible factor.

Whatever the logic, the gradual reversion to type of the international community stands in stark contrast to the balanced position it adopted whilst kickstarting the peace process. The Sri Lankan state, which had entered into the peace process in humility, is now emboldened by what appears to be a strident anti-LTTE position adopted by the international Community. The most recent victory for President Mahinda Rajapakse’s government is the ban on the LTTE by the European Union.

As in the 1990s, the willingness of the international community to overlook the state’s gross human rights abuses against the Tamils has also lent weight to a southern consensus that the international community is firmly behind the state once more.

Similarly, from the LTTE’s perspective, the objective of lasting security for the Tamils via a negotiated solution couldn’t be further away. Even the first round of negotiations in Geneva this year exposed the present administration in Colombo as an even less reliable and trustworthy negotiating partner than its predecessors. The Sri Lankan state did not only fail to deliver on its security-related pledges in Geneva, its spokesman flatly denied to its domestic constituency that such an agreement had even been reached.

While failing to demonstrate any ability or willingness to pressure the Sri Lankan state toward implementing its obligations, the international sponsors of the peace process have resorted to demanding instead that the LTTE make concessions to move towards ‘peace.’ In spite of the fact that the first act of violence after the Geneva negotiations was the assassination by Army-backed paramilitaries of a popular Tamil politician, the international community has sought to blame the LTTE alone for the increasing violence.

Furthermore, the international community has also rejected the LTTE’s position that it cannot negotiate whilst Tamil civilians are subject to violence by the Sri Lankan state. Indeed the message to the LTTE appears to be the gloves are coming off and it is those the Tigers claim to protect, the Tamil people, that are going to be punished most. It is an inescapable irony that it is the LTTE which is being listed in the EU whilst Tamils flee murders and massacres in Army-controlled areas to seek refuge with the Tigers.

Since independence, Sri Lankan governemnts have time and again either unleashed or encouraged violence against the Tamil speaking people. Although this protest is raised time and again by almost every Tamil political actor, the failure of the international community to understand the impact this has had on the Tamil psyche has repeatedly resulted in consistently flawed policy decisions.

The brutal fact of the matter is, regardless of what it is the international community believes it can threaten the Tamil people with, history has revealed that the implications of losing to the Sri Lankan state will be infinitely worse. The recent anti-Tamil riots in Trincomalee are testament to this reality.

In order to understand how a new conflict can be prevented, the international community needs to recognise the objective conditions from which the two protagonists have previously entered into conflict. During the 1990s, Kumaratunga embarked on the ‘war-for-peace’ when her forces enjoyed a massive numerical and technological advantage over the LTTE. The LTTE, meanwhile, refused to countenance entering into negotiations from a position of weakness. Exactly the same dynamic was at play in the mid-eighties.

But in 2001, having achieved military parity with the state, the LTTE pursued a negotiated solution, whilst the state, which had been severely weakened by the conflict agreed to a negotiate a path to powersharing. The problem, however, is that during the peace process the balance shifted once again in favour of the state. International support has been crucial in this regard. Colombo will now discuss nothing outside a unitary state and believes it is capable of military overwhelming the LTTE.

Given the historical context, war is not inevitable but peace is only possible if the balance that has been maintained during the ceasefire is restored. The international community, for its part, has on occasion in the recent past demonstrated an understanding of the need for a balance of forces to maintain the peace. It is perhaps miscalculations such as those undertaken after Karuna’s defection and the tsunami that has allowed the situation to deteriorate to its present position. The question now is what does the international community do now to stabilise the tilt to war? The indications suggest nothing will be done. The Tamil people need to brace themselves for yet another ‘war for peace.’

Desperate people do desperate things. The world has witnessed many instances where minority groups _ discriminated against, taken advantage of, and who want to attempt to improve their lot for their children’s future _ have resorted to violence against their oppressors. It is a human reaction that when requests and negotiations fail, people will fight, often physically, for their rights. Often when a government is the oppressor, the United Nations, a super power or a neighbouring alliance of countries, will put pressure on that government to show restraint and end the discriminatory practices.
The United States has correctly branded Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda and the pilots and hijackers aboard the 9/11 planes as terrorists. But President George W Bush is leading the White House and persuading its allies in misusing the label ‘‘terrorist’’ when referring to those minorities who are fighting, sometimes violently, their oppressors. These ‘‘Davids’’ of the world, in most cases, are only standing up to their ‘‘Goliaths’’ in the only way left to them after all else has failed.

It is extremely hypocritical that while Mr Bush touts democracy as being a main reason for the invasion of Iraq, when the Palestinians duly elect their democratic government in a free and fair vote, Mr Bush and his White House colleagues refuse to deal with them. The Hamas government is labelled a terrorist organisation, when in fact the Palestinians are in a desperate fight against their oppressors.

Last Thursday, under pressure from the US, the European Union agreed to label the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka as a terrorist organisation by June 1, unless it renounces violence. Yet the Colombo government historically discriminates against Tamils in Sri Lanka, limiting their education opportunities, denying them a place in government employment and restricting them in many other areas. This week, men in soldier’s uniforms gunned down an entire Tamil family and the second-highest Tamil Tiger leader was assassinated. Late last month, the Sri Lankan navy moved to close the shipping lane in the north which provides the only link to the outside world that the Tamils have. This vital transport route, if closed, would bring starvation and further destitution to the Tamils, so they retaliated with every means that they had available and a navy vessel was sunk with the loss of some sailors’ lives.

When the tsunami struck Asia, it wiped out many homes and infrastructure in the region which is under the control of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), but international aid remains blocked and certainly no government expenditure has been forthcoming to this desperately poor area.

In June 2003, the US, EU, Norway and Japan raised $4.5 billion in pledges of aid for the Colombo government but tied much of it to the progress of peace talks with the LTTE. Peace broker Norway has failed to bring the parties together for months as the supposed cease-fire continually is broken. Because no progress has been made in peace talks, it is unlikely these pledges will be called upon any time soon. This quartet of powerful nations is to meet again on May 30 to decide their future role in Sri Lanka.

The LTTE’s political-wing chief, S P Thamilselvan called the EU move ‘‘shocking and surprising’’, and added that the Tamil people were ‘‘banking their hopes’’ on the peace process. For the US and EU to be blacklisting the already downtrodden LTTE is humiliating for them and sending them further into global isolation. The Tamils began their fight in 1972 and reports suggest 60,000 lives have been lost since then, with more than 200 dead in April alone. Blacklisting puts travel restrictions on their leaders, freezes bank accounts and puts in place other hurdles at a time when the only solution appears to be just the opposite.

When the four big powers meet on May 30, they need to find a way to give the Tamil people some hope for the future. Because if not, desperate people do desperate things.

Published May 24, 2006.

Refugees who fled after an alleged military massacre on a northern Sri Lanka islet arrived at the inland Tamil Tiger capital at the weekend - and brought their fishing boats with them.

The 120 people from 27 families were among about 300 families who fled their homes in Allaipiddy on the Sri Lanka navy-controlled islet of Kayts after the May 13 killings in which 13 civilians were killed, the refugees told AFP Sunday.

“We are unable to go home while the military people are there,” said Xaviour Wilfred Kanista, 39.

She and the others arrived Saturday night and were staying at the District Cultural Hall in Kilinochchi that serves as the “capital” of territory controlled by Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the northeast of the island.

“Because of the safety” provided by the LTTE, they wanted to leave the government-held area, said Mardutheen Arulthas, 38, who was head of the local fishermen’s society in Allaipiddy.

He and the others spoke through an LTTE translator.

They had been staying at a church in Allaipiddy until international agencies helped them make their journey, they said in the sand-covered yard of the cultural hall.

Six small fishing boats, some with nets inside still smelling of the sea, sat on the sand under the hot morning sun.

Bicycles, bed frames, sewing machine tables and bags of other belongings also lay in the yard.

Most of the other Allaipiddy refugees, currently at a church in northern Jaffna, also want to move to the rebel-held area, Arulthas said.

The government has strongly condemned the killings and issued a statement saying they “could very well be a part of the LTTE strategy to divert international opinion.”

But the civilians who fled Allaipiddy told a different story.

They blamed the navy for the massacre, which happened two days after a Tamil Tiger suicide attack killed 18 crewmen on a navy gunboat.

Abiragam Ganaseeli, 45, a thin-faced woman in a blue sari, said her fisherman son Abiram Robinson, 27, was among eight people killed at one location.

The dead included the entire family of Keethes Waran, including his children aged four, and two months, they alleged.

The refugees showed AFP a picture of a pretty young woman in a red dress whom they said was the childrens’ mother, who also was killed.

None of the victims worked for the LTTE, the refugees said.

Those who fled the area told AFP the navy had begun to “harass the people” in late April.

“Out of fear all the people came and lived together in a two-storey house,” Kanista said.

She and Ganaseeli said most residents subsequently left the house and sought refuge at a church but some remained -- and allegedly became the navy’s victims.

Kanista said she could hear the early-evening gunfire from the church where she and the others were staying.

At least two people witnessed the slayings and survived, she said.

The massacre has further raised tensions in Sri Lanka where mounting violence has left a 2002 ceasefire in force only on paper.

April was the bloodiest month in four years, with more than 200 deaths.

Arulthas said he and the other men would like to get their boats off the sandy lot and back in the water.

“We want to go to a fishing area,” he said.

Amid increasing military brutality against Tamil civilians in government-controlled parts of Sri Lanka’s Northeast, there has been a sharp rise in people fleeing to LTTE-controlled areas and to southern India.

At least 2000 Tamils have already reached India and several hundred more are believed to be ready to leave Sri Lanka, official sources told PTI.

Two hundred and thirty four refugees have arrived in Rameshwaran on one day alone, Tuesday last week.

Public Relation Officer of the Organisation for Eelam Refugees Rehabilitation (OFER), Mohan Sundarapandian, said that most of them were from Trincomalee where last month Sinhala rioters attacked Tamils whilst security forces stood by.

The refugees have said that they fled the country as they were helpless without security, PTI reported. They have also said that there was no security in Trincomalee, no rule and and nobody to give protection.

The refugees have first fled Trincomalee to the Mannar area from where they came by boats to Rameshwaran paying around Rs.10, 000.

Sunderapandian said that authorities do not allow the refugees to go out from the camps and confined to the camps due to security reasons.

Refuting reports of fleeing refugees, head of the Sri Lanka Peace Secretariat, Dr.Palitha Kohona called the reports malicious propaganda.

“Trincomalee and Mannar are at two different ends of the country and there is government controlled line between the two”, he said.

When told that the District Collector in Ramanadapuram in Tamilnadu has confirmed the story, Dr.Kohona said that this was incredible and difficult to believe.

The Tamil National Alliance (TNA), the main Tamil political party in Sri Lanka has accused authorities of not doing enough to protect Tamils from violence by the security forces.

“It is the responsibility of the government to protect every citizen in Sri Lanka. But Tamils are not protected,” MP Nadarajah Raviraj said.

TNA parliamentary group leader, R Sampanthan told journalists “the security forces are behaving in a manner, totally hostile to the Tamil civilian population.”

Strongly denying the accusations, the government accused Tamil Tigers of forcing civilians to flee “as a political strategy”.

Planning Implementation minister Keheliya Rambukwella said civilians who fled Allaipiddy in Kayts Island (see separate story, this page) have admitted that the LTTE forced them to flee or “face consequences”.

“This is a long-established terrorist strategy,” the minister told BBC Sandeshaya.

Meanwhile, Tamils who fled from violence-hit Sri Lanka on Saturday expressed their gratitude to the Indian Navy and Coast Guard for rescuing and bringing them to refugee camps in Tamil Nadu.

Sivaranjani from Arichalmunai in Northern Sri Lanka, now at the Mandapam transit camp, narrated her horrifying experience to reporters. Their fibreglass boat carrying 50 refugees was tossed in the rough sea, drenching her two-month old baby.

“The journey was a nightmare and I could not even get milk for the baby before leaving the island. We were also dropped on a sand dune.” Starved for over four days, the Indian Navy who saved them, she said.

Another mother, Sasikumari, whose new-born baby was also completely drenched, reached the Indian coast Wednesday. She said their party of refugees were hiding in a jungle for two days without food before leaving Sri Lanka, fearing arrest by the armed forces there.

Meanwhile, in the wake of a horrific massacre by of 13 people in Allipiddy, most of the Tamil civilians living in that islet off the coast of Jaffna have fled their homes and moved into LTTE controlled territory.

Amnesty International said it had “received credible reports that Sri Lanka Navy personnel and armed cadres affiliated with the Eelam People’s Democratic Party, a Tamil political party opposed to the LTTE, were present at the scene of the killings.”

The Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) is providing temporary dwellings, food and transport facilities to the growing number of refugees moving into Vanni from Jaffna islets.

Following the Allaipiddy murders, the entire population of the village evacuated, followed by more than ten families from the neighbouring villages of Velanai and Suruvil.

The families left the islets after the Jaffna Government Agent (GA) and representatives of local non-governmental organisations were unable to guarantee the security of the residents.

Even the evacuating families were harassed by the SLA, with troopers at the Muhamalai checkpoint initially turning back half the families, demanding written permission from the Government Agent (GA) of Jaffna allowing them to move into the Vanni with all their possessions.

Some reports suggested that as soon as the residents vacated, preparations got underway to build a new SLN camp in Allaipiddy.

Sunday Times: Mr Balasingham, the LTTE is fighting – they are fighting shy of peace? Are they not?

Balasingham: The LTTE is seriously committed to peace and negotiated settlement. During the last four years, since Ranil Wickremesinghe assumed power, we have made every attempt to seek a negotiated arrangement to resolve the immediate and long standing problems of our people. Peace talks with Ranil’s administration could not progress due to the obstructionist and confrontationist policies of President Kumaratunga.

We participated in the peace talks with President Rajapakse’s government in the earnest with the hope of stabilising peace and normalcy through effective implementation of the CFA. We strongly believed and continue to believe that the peace process should be undertaken on a strong foundation of peace, for which the stabilisation of the truce accord is extremely crucial. Unfortunately, contrary to our expectations, the Sri Lankan army backed Tamil paramilitaries, soon after the Geneva talks, launched offensive assaults on LTTE’s border positions in the east, seriously disrupting the peace environment. The government’s attitude to paramilitary violence against the LTTE was hypocritical and deceitful. In total contradiction to the pledge given at the Geneva talks, the government refused to rein in Tamil armed groups and denied the very existence of such groups in the military occupied areas.

I should say in all honesty that the failure on the part of the Sri Lanka government to create a conducive atmosphere of peace and goodwill by containing paramilitary violence is the primary cause of the current turbulent situation and the stalemate in the peace process.

Sunday Times: The government refused theatre to theatre transport for the LTTE leaders, but agreed to peace process related travel and escorted surface transport, navy ferry and the option of a civilian ferry. Was this not good enough for the LTTE? If so why was that?

Balasingham: It has been the agreed modality, ever since the CFA, to provide theatre to theatre air transport for senior regional commanders of the LTTE. We cannot understand why such an agreed practice was suddenly suspended. A Central committee meeting, with the participation of regional leaders prior to crucial sessions of peace talks, is vital to prepare issues for negotiations. The LTTE leadership was eager to discuss the volatile security situation in the east due to increasing paramilitary violence. Therefore, this is also a peace related mission. If the government had adopted a congenial attitude and provided Air force helicopter transport as a goodwill measure to enhance the peace process, the negotiating process would have continued, avoiding the current war like situation.

The modalities proposed for surface and sea transport, in our opinion, were too risky for the safe passage of senior LTTE leaders. We could not take chances with paramilitaries on the ground and the hostile navy on the seas.

Sunday Times: Will the LTTE allow the Sri Lanka Airline engineers in to do depth checks for landing of float planes so that they can land safely in the Wanni?

Balasingham: The LTTE is prepared to allow them. But this is not the issue now. The government is refusing to grant permission for the LTTE commanders to carry personal weapons intended for their safety.

Sunday Times: The government is accusing the LTTE of a string of ceasefire violations. Minister Nimal Sripala de Silva gave a catalogue of LTTE violations in April to Parliament this week. The Minister said the LTTE is trying to create a communal riot once again. What do you say to this?

Balasingham: This is a typical mode of accusation levelled against the Tamil Tigers ever since the July 83 racial violence that followed the LTTE’s ambush assault on Sri Lankan soldiers at Thinnavelly, Jaffna. At that time, the LTTE, even in its wildest dreams, would not have anticipated a racial holocaust of that scale, emanating from a minor military incident.

Racial riots and mass killings of Tamils have occurred even before the birth and growth of the LTTE. We deeply despise racial violence since it has always been the Tamil community who has faced enormous suffering in terms of mass scale destruction of life and property. The elements of political sympathy that may be generated in India or from the outside world cannot compensate for the monumental tragedy that could befall our people in the event of racial riots. Therefore, the government’s propaganda that the LTTE is bent on creating situations to provoke communal violence against its own community is malicious and preposterous.

Sunday Times: Your Peace Secretariat handed over a dossier of alleged violations by security forces to visiting Japanese Special Envoy, Yasushi Akashi. He told a news conference in Colombo that relations between the government and the LTTE have ‘never been worse’ since the CFA of February 2002. What do you say to this? Did the LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabakaran send a message to President Rajapakse through Mr Akashi?

Balasingham: I agree with Mr Akashi’s characterisation of the current relations between the parties in conflict has not been worse since CFA. The Tamil paramilitary violence has escalated ferociously since President Rajapakse assumed power. Karuna’s armed men in the east and the armed EPDP cadres in the Jaffna peninsula launched a series of violent attacks on LTTE cadres. Prominent Tamil politicians, civil society leaders, popular journalists and innocent civilians sympathetic to the LTTE have been brutally eliminated. Almost all these killings have taken place in the government controlled areas with the active connivance of the state’s security forces. We have ample evidence to substantiate our allegations.

At the Geneva peace talks during February this year we presented a comprehensive dossier to the government delegation providing details about the existence, functions, command structures, leadership and locations of camps of Tamil paramilitary organisations and secured a written assurance from Rajapakse’s administration that these armed groups would be disarmed in accordance with the obligations of the CFA. The LTTE also agreed to strictly maintain peace and take all necessary measures to cease all acts of violence against the security forces and police. In accordance with our commitment we strictly observed peace before and after the peace talks, putting an end to all hostile acts. To our deep disillusionment, the GoSL has not only failed to take any action to disarm or contain Tamil paramilitary groups, but also denied their very existence in the government controlled areas. Following the Geneva agreement the paramilitary violence escalated manifold. During the first week of March Karuna’s armed group, with the active backing of Sri Lankan troops, attacked LTTE forward positions in Batticoloa and Trincomalee inflicting serious casualties on our cadres. These incidents were followed by a series of civilian killings in Batticoloa and Jaffna. The brutal murder of Mr Vigneswaran, a prominent Tamil leader on the 7 April, by paramilitaries with the connivance of the security forces, became the critical tuning point in the escalation of violence and counter violence.

The government’s calculated reluctance to contain the violence of paramilitaries against the LTTE and the Tamil civilian population, is the primary cause of the current turbulent war like situation, which has ‘never been worse’ since the CFA, as Mr Akashi has rightly observed.

Our leader, Mr Vellupillai Prabakaran did not send any message to President Rajapakse through Mr Akashi.

Sunday Times: The LTTE has been accused of claymore mine attacks on government troops that have led to over 150 deaths. What do you say to this?

Balasingham: The LTTE leaders in Wanni have already clarified that militias of the Tamil resistance movement, opposed to Sinhala military occupation and repression, have been carrying out these subversive operations. Unable to comprehend and identify this phenomenon of resistance, the Sri Lanka security forces are unleashing violence, killing with impunity innocent Tamil civilians as collective retaliatory punishment of the whole Tamil society, thereby committing blatant acts of genocide.

Sunday Times: There is controversy now about the use of the sea by the LTTE. This is the result of a belated ruling by the SLMM. What is the LTTE’s position?

Balasingham: The ruling of the SLMM, denying the right of sea movement of the LTTE’s naval force, is unwarranted and imprudent at this critical conjuncture. I do not understand why the monitors have made this uncalled for pronouncement on a disputed issue extremely sensitive to the parties in conflict, thereby creating controversy over maritime rights and conflictual situation at sea. I do not wish to elaborate on this matter since Mr Tamilselvan is dealing with this issue with the SLMM, seeking advice from international lawyers.

I can only say that the LTTE, possessing a powerful naval force, is an indisputable fact, an existential reality. During the times of war, before the signing of the CFA, the Sea Tiger naval wing played a crucial role in major sea and land battles and posed a serious threat to the Sri Lankan navy. Though the CFA did not specify modalities for the freedom of mobility of Sea Tiger vessels, this matter has been subjected to continuous discussion between the LTTE and the monitors. It is a well known fact that General Tellefson, the former Head of the SLMM was forced to relinquish his post by President Kumaratunga when he called for legal recognition of the LTTE’s naval wing. I think the present Head of the SLMM, General Ulf Henricsson should have studied the history of this dispute before making his provocative ruling.

Sunday Times: Is the LTTE happy with the role of the SLMM? Do you believe they are acting impartially? Do you believe they have been consistent?

Balasingham: On the whole I would say the SLMM has been doing a wonderful job in spite of the difficult task and formidable challenges. They have displayed impeccable integrity and their impartiality is unquestionable.

However, recently we are disappointed with the monitors premature, unnecessary statement on the LTTE’s right to sea mobility. What has further disturbed us deeply is the SLMM’s retraction of their original statement proclaiming the truth that the ‘government security forces have, in the north and east, been involved in extrajudicial killings of civilians’. The SLMM suffered a serious loss of credibility and reliability when they were forced to withdraw their well founded judgement under hostile pressure from the government. This shameful retraction by an international body tasked with a delicate responsibility of dealing with life and death of civilians, had far reaching negative consequences. Emboldened by the peace monitors’ retraction and encouraged by the silence of the international actors, who consistently praised the government for its restraint – extrajudicial killings of Tamil civilians by the Sri Lankan security forces, have escalated manifold. In this context the Sri Lankan government should also be criticised for undue interference in the delicate task of peace monitoring.

Sunday Times: Sections of Sri Lanka’s political establishment, like the JVP for example, say that Eelam War IV has already begun. What do you say to this?

Balasingham: More than anybody, the political organisation who wants war is the JVP. Like flies feeding and fattening on filth, the Marxists assume that they can enhance their political position, propagating a false sense of patriotism if war breaks out with mass scale death and destruction.
The JVP leaders have a distorted perception of reality. Conceiving the Tamil struggle for self-determination as a phenomenon of terrorism, they falsely believe that war is the only solution to eradicate ‘Tamil terror’, without realising the catastrophe the country as a whole would face in the event of a full scale military conflict.
I do not think Eelam War IV has already begun. What has developed now is a low intensity conflict with a dangerous potential for further escalation. The objective conditions for an outbreak of war are developing. Yet, there is still a space in which meaningful steps could be taken by the government to contain the violence of the paramilitaries and the excesses of the armed forces and create a congenial environment for de-escalation.

Sunday Times: Quite clearly the Karuna factor is a major issue for the LTTE. How do you and the LTTE leadership feel about this? This is particularly in view of the fact that the LTTE said earlier that this was an internal issue.

Balasingham: You are aware that Karuna’s rebellion was successfully crushed with minor casualties and the LTTE was able to take control of territory and command in the Batti-Amparai region, forcing Karuna to flee to safety. It is true that we characterised the conflict as an internal dispute and urged the government not to interfere in the matter. But to our dismay we learned later that the Sri Lankan government, particularly the state’s military intelligence agency, had decided to back-up Karuna, providing all facilities to build his group as a paramilitary organisation to fight the LTTE. Karuna factor became a major issue when his armed group, in collaboration with the Sri Lankan armed forces, launched a series of ambush attacks on LTTE cadres and murdered with impunity a large number of our civilian supporters. The Sri Lankan defence authorities seem to believe that Karuna is a military asset to be utilised effectively to weaken the LTTE and to destabilise the east through terror and by propagating the ideology of regionalism. Unfortunately, this subversive strategy by the government has brought the country to the brink of disaster.

Sunday Times: The LTTE, by banning presidential polis in the north and east, ensured the victory of Mahinda Rakapakse as the fifth executive President of Sri Lanka. How does the LTTE look at this position? Do you feel you made a mistake? Or, do you feel he has not seized the opportunity to address the issues raised? What are your comments?

Balasingham: The LTTE and the TNA jointly urged the Tamil people to boycott the Presidential elections as a collective protest by the Tamil nation, expressing disillusionment over the failure of the Sri Lankan political system to resolve the ethnic issue. Our motive was certainly not to ensure the victory of Mahinda Rajapakse or to cause the defeat of Ranil Wickremesinghe. We never anticipated that the Tamil boycott would help Rajapakse to win with a thin majority.
We are also deeply disappointed with President Rajapakse for failing to grasp the opportunity to address some urgent issues faced by the Tamil community.

The Tamil National Alliance (TNA) which consists of 22 Tamil Members of Parliament of the 23 Tamil Members elected to Parliament from the Northeast of Sri Lanka, the areas of historical habitation of the Tamil speaking people, and as the Party that has consistently polled well over 90% of the Tamil votes cast in the Northeast at consecutive elections, met to consider the Resolution that was recently passed in the European Parliament pertaining to the current situation in Sri Lanka. The TNA wishes to make the following observations: -

1. The conflict between the Tamil Nation and the Sri Lankan State arose because of the systematic refusal of the Sri Lankan State to accommodate Tamil political aspirations to exercise the right to self-determination. All attempts by the Tamil political leadership according to the democratic mandates given by the Tamil people to peacefully arrive at reasonable solutions to evolve a system of government for Sri Lanka that permit the Tamil people to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development in the areas of their historical habitation in the Northeast of Sri Lanka have been consistently, systematically and unilaterally denied by the Sri Lankan State for over 55 years.

2. In turn the Sri Lankan State while pursuing unjust legislative and executive actions against the Tamil people, adopted violent repressive measures to further subjugate the Tamil people and deny them any meaningful part in the governance of the State, particularly in the areas of historical habitation of the Tamil speaking people that is the Northeast of Sri Lanka.

3. It is in this backdrop that the Tamil National struggle that started seeking self-determination through non-violent intra-state territorial nationalism that in fact explicitly rejected separatism, transformed into separatist nationalism. Even in the case of the latter, Tamil separatist nationalism further transformed from a non-violent struggle to an armed struggle. The TNA wishes to reiterate that the single causative feature that triggered the evolution of the Tamil National struggle has been the intransigence of the Sri Lankan State in its refusal to recognise the Tamil People’s right to self-determination and share power on the one hand, and its violent repression against the initial 30 year non- violent Tamil demands on the other.

4. In the current phase of the Tamil National struggle that has lasted over the last two decades, it is the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) that has ascended to becoming the predominant politico-military organization commanding the support of the Tamil people. The Tamil people are acutely aware that the current peace process that commenced with the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) in February 2002 arose not as a result of the LTTE being militarily weakened or defeated, but rather as a result of the Sri Lankan State failing to achieve a military solution despite strenuously attempting to do so. In fact it is this reality, coupled with the fact that the LTTE had taken control of substantial territory that comprised the areas of historical habitation of the Tamil speaking people in the Northeast of Sri Lanka and had successfully established a parallel de-facto State, that compelled the Sri Lankan State to enter into a CFA.

5. Consequently, the current peace process is a reflection of the strategic balance of power that exists between the Sri Lankan State and the LTTE as reflected by the aforestated ground realities. This includes all the military formations possessed by the LTTE, including the Sea Tiger naval wing.

6. It is in full recognition of this reality and the overwhelming support enjoyed by the LTTE amongst the Tamil people, both in Sri Lanka and abroad, that the TNA as a mark of solidarity sought and received a resounding mandate from the Tamil people at consecutive elections recognizing the LTTE as the authentic and sole-representatives of the Tamil people at any peace process. The most recent demonstration of this mandate being the overwhelming victories enjoyed by the TNA at the recently concluded Local Government Bodies elections wherever held in the Northeast of Sri Lanka.

7. The cause of the current crisis in the peace process is the escalating cycle of violence between the LTTE on the one hand, and the Sri Lankan Armed Forces and Paramilitary armed groups on the other. This violence has been characterized by the former head of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) as a “shadow war”. Whilst Sri Lanka has been gripped by this violence despite the CFA, this violence has become particularly acute in the past few months since the new administration of President Mahinda Rajapaksa assumed power in November last year.

8. The primary cause of the current violence has been due to the refusal of the Sri Lankan State to implement key provisions of the CFA that obligates the State to disarm and dismantle Paramilitary armed groups in the Northeast of Sri Lanka. On the contrary the Sri Lankan State has been supporting and working with new Paramilitary armed groups in the Northeast of Sri Lanka that have been involved in targeted killings of LTTE members, prominent TNA political leaders including elected parliamentarians, leaders of Tamil Civil Society, Tamil humanitarian workers, and prominent Tamil journalists.

9. Particularly, in the past few months, as several local and international observers, including the SLMM have noted with alarm, the Sri Lankan Armed Forces along with its Paramilitary armed groups have been involved in extra-judicial killings of Tamil civilians. Further, in retaliation for attacks on the Sri Lankan Armed Forces, the Sri Lankan Armed Forces have carried out punitive aerial bombardments and indiscriminate shelling from land and sea of Tamil civilian residential areas, killing and grievously injuring several Tamil and Muslim civilians, and displacing tens of thousands of Tamil civilians. Large numbers of such persons have fled across the sea to India, and in so doing, there have been several casualties.

10. It was in a very grave situation that the Sri Lankan State and the LTTE met in Geneva in February this year and agreed to the full implementation of the CFA by both parties. The Sri Lankan State and the LTTE particularly committed themselves to taking all necessary measures to ensure that there will be no intimidation, acts of violence, abductions or killings. Further, the LTTE committed itself to taking all necessary measures to ensure that there will be no acts of violence against the Sri Lankan Armed Forces and the Police. The Sri Lankan State in turn committed itself to taking all necessary measures in accordance with the CFA to ensure that no armed group or person other that the Government Armed Forces will carry arms or conduct armed operations. The parties also agreed to meet again in Geneva from the 19th to the 21st of April 2006.

11. A close look at the events consequent to the agreements reached in Geneva will clearly show, all hostile acts against the Sri Lankan State Armed Forces and the Police were brought to an end. However, the Government delegation no sooner that they returned to Sri Lanka began to behave in a manner that was disrespectful, and undermined the said agreements. Further to this, the Government also failed to take any action whatsoever to disarm and dismantle the functioning of the Paramilitary armed groups. Contrary to this, the violence and killings by Paramilitary armed groups against the Tamil civilian population and the LTTE escalated many fold. The fact that the Paramilitary armed groups worked together with the Sri Lankan State Armed Forces in all these activities is well known.

12. There can be no doubt that despite the agreements reached in Geneva, the unabated violence by the Sri Lankan State Armed Forces and its Paramilitaries against the LTTE and Tamil civilians, which also included the assassination of Mr. V. Vigneswaran, the prominent TNA member who was to be appointed as a National List Member of Parliament to take the place of the late Mr. Joseph Pararajasingham who was also assassinated by the Sri Lankan State Paramilitary Forces, is what triggered counter-attacks against the Sri Lankan State Armed Forces and Paramilitary groups.

13. As such, recent events more than ever before have demonstrated yet again to the Tamil people that not only are the Sri Lankan State Armed Forces not going to be affording any protection to the Tamil people, but more importantly, the Tamil people in fact need protection from those very same Sri Lankan State Armed Forces. Therefore there is no doubt in the minds of the Tamil people that the LTTE’s military formations is something that is directly linked to the Tamil people’s need for human security and deterrence against repressive measures by the Sri Lankan State Armed Forces.

14. The TNA also points out that though the primary objective of the CFA was the evolution of a peaceful political solution, the Sri Lankan State has never demonstrated a genuine commitment to take forward the political process in a meaningful way. This was amply demonstrated by the deliberate scuttling of the commencement of negotiations on the proposals for an ISGA submitted by the LTTE in 2003, and the abrogation of the agreement between the Sri Lankan State and the LTTE regarding the Post-Tsunami operations Management Structure (P-TOMS). The Sri Lankan State and leading members in the political hierarchy in order to fulfill their personal political ambitions have been more concerned with pacifying Sinhala chauvinism and extremism than with the achievement of progress in the political process. Such attitudes on the part of the Sri Lankan State have raised legitimate concerns about the genuine commitment of the State to peacefully resolve the Tamil question. It is imperative that the frustration caused to the Tamil people and the LTTE by such an attitude on the part of the Sri Lankan State is properly understood.

15. This situation has been exacerbated by (i) the failure on the part of the Sri Lankan State to honestly implement the February Geneva agreement, (ii) the killing of around 200 Tamil civilians in the Northeast since the February Geneva agreement (iii) deliberately impeding the LTTE and complicating its efforts to prepare for the further round of talks. These actions of the Government clearly demonstrate that though the Government verbally reiterates the desire to engage in dialogue with the LTTE, every action of the Government is directed towards thwarting of such dialogue.

In the above background the TNA urges that no action be taken which casts the blame on one side. Such a step can irretrievably harm the legitimate interests of the long-suffering Tamil people. It would also strengthen the hands of Sinhala chauvinists and extremists who oppose a just and honourable resolution of the Tamil question. It also provides an opportunity to the intransigent Sri Lankan State to evade its responsibility to meaningfully move towards progress in the political process.

The TNA on behalf of the Tamil speaking people appeals to the European Union and the International Community for a more even-handed approach.

Signed

R. Sampanthan MP (Leader of the TNA Parliamentary Group)
Mavai Senathirajah MP (ITAK General Secretary)
Suresh Premachandran MP (EPRLF Secretary General)
Selvam Adaikalanathan MP (TELO President)
G. G. Ponnambalam MP (ACTC General Secretary)