Shortly after Sri Lanka’s 61st independence day celebrations on February 4 and his rousing speech on the occasion, President Mahinda Rajapakse was photographed intently watching a snake-charmer at an exhibition in Colombo. In the north-east of the country, his men in battle fatigues are doing the work of the snake-charmer, but with a minor difference. Their deadly opponents are not being incarcerated, but are being systematically obliterated from the face of the earth. And the success of the army in that job has been so overwhelming that the Rajapakses cannot but watch with bewilderment. A much-enthused Gotabaya Rajapakse, the defence secretary and brother of the president, has even wondered aloud why no one had done this before — “crush them with numbers”.

 

It is not as if the idea hadn’t occurred to leaders of previous dispensations. In fact, it was the persistent lure of watching the majority (Sinhalas) swamp the minority (Tamils) that has pushed Sri Lankan politics onto a rather tragic path. The numbers game may be the cause of the war in Sri Lanka, but not the reason its government is winning it now. The acquired ability of the army to best the fighters of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam at their own game of guerrilla warfare and the ruthless bombardments from the sky that make no distinction between Tiger hideouts and schools and hospitals are the two main reasons behind the success of the Rajapakse government’s military operation. The numerical advantage Gotabaya talks about remains undiminished. In the days ahead, it can be expected to play itself out in much the same fashion as it did during the days of the Bandaranaikes, J.R. Jayewardene and even Chandrika Kumaratunga, when jointly-agreed pacts were dumped to respect the majority sentiment. But before that happens, there is a minor play to be staged with the much-lauded concept of devolution of powers to the war-ravaged parts in the north and the east — an assurance for which India has fallen hook, line and sinker.

 

Ever since the Rajapakse government’s all-out effort to exterminate the Tigers became apparent and started to be questioned because of its severity, it has held out the carrot of devolution to ward off unsolicited interventions from outside the country. An all party representative committee, minus representation from major Tamil parties as also the Opposition, was hurriedly constituted in 2006 before the military offensive started. In its interim proposal, the APRC suggested full implementation of the 13th amendment to the constitution (which followed the India-Lanka accord of 1987). This meant “maximum and effective devolution” of powers to the north and east.

Two years later, when the nation seems to be teetering on the brink of a major breakthrough, the APRC is still in no hurry to finalize its proposals, and can only think of offering the provincial councils “a little more power” than originally planned. Without fiscal and police powers, this amounts to hardly anything.

For the president, however, this is no worry. In his scheme of things, devolution comes last, that is, only after demilitarization, democratization and development (in that order). As he puts it, “It is useless to give them devolution when they are not ready to accept it or you can’t implement it.” Meanwhile, the basic criterion of the devolution, that was the merging of the northern and eastern provincial councils, has been done away with following their de-merger on the basis of a supreme court verdict in 2006. The government has made no appeals to the court or tried to work around the problem. For it, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna-instigated demerger removes a major worry over the threat that a merged province would have posed to the country’s unitary structure in case the conjoined province became restive.

So far as the administration is concerned, the problem with the Eastern council has been neatly resolved. Following the provincial council elections last year, amidst widespread allegations of foul play, the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal, a breakaway Tiger faction, has been put in power. The armed TMVP militia ensures that the writ of the central government runs here.

 

The greatly thankful, newly appointed chief minister, Pillayan, can only hope that the government relents and grants him enough powers “to implement policies that [they] would like to for the benefit of the people” since even basic development projects are carried out by the central government.

But then the challenge had been different in a multi-ethnic Eastern province that has a substantial Muslim presence. It is quite another for a mono-ethnic, mono-lingual province like the Northern. The threat perception from it is so severe that a major campaign is already under way to create awareness of this security threat and force the government to consider each district in it as a distinct unit of administration, and hence of devolution, instead of considering the province as a whole. The fervent hope is that the crumbs of office will effectively forestall the power-hungry leaders (and Tamils can be no exception to the rule) from throwing in their lot with the Tigers again.

 

Threat perception. There it goes again. It is because of the threat perception that the newly liberated, and democratized Eastern province continues to be under siege. There are “mini-fortresses with earth embankments, look-out towers made of old railway sleepers and ammunition boxes, and roll after roll of razor wire”.

 

The Northern province, given its compromised status, could look even worse when it is re-populated. With the original inhabitants killed in the crossfire or tucked away in high-security camps, where they will be sifted from suspected Tigers by the State’s ingenious methods, the threat could be minimized by bringing in settlers. And there are seemingly credible reports already that the process has started.

 

Another threat perception that NGOs are in cahoots with the Tigers had made the government hound them out of the country. That attitude is not going to change in a hurry. This means that the millions displaced by the war will continue to be at the mercy of the Sinhala-majority government. This is probably what Rajapakse has in mind when he repeatedly assures the world that he will “personally” take care of the rehabilitation of the internally-displaced population.

 

For the Tamil population elsewhere, especially in the capital, which will be more vulnerable to LTTE suicide attacks than ever before, the burden of proving innocence will be heavier. But this burden of proof will no longer be shouldered by Tamils alone. This is probably where the most enviable victory for Sri Lanka will turn into its worst defeat. As the country turns into a police State to quell the threat perception, each citizen will become suspect in the eyes of the administration and of his neighbour unless he can prove his nationalist credentials. The foremost criterion is to show support for the government’s war efforts. Already, the cloud of mistrust and suspicion is darkening the horizon in the urban space. The ministry of defence has reportedly asked all citizens to register online, and people no longer feel confident to talk freely on the mobile in public. The vicious killings of mediapersons, the attacks on the media, the threat of being “chased out” are evidence of the shrunken tolerance for balanced, independent opinion. Gotabaya Rajapakse has warned that the war strategy will change after the Tigers are decimated, and “intelligence” will become a crucial part of this. Another reign of terror, State-sponsored quite obviously, is in the making.

 

Two factors will determine how extensively this terror is perpetrated — international pressure and pressure from within Sri Lanka. The last will depend on how effectively the Opposition, that is the United National Party under Ranil Wickremesinghe, shapes up its pro-freedom, pro-rights and anti-corruption agenda. But if its campaign for the forthcoming elections in the Central provinces and Wayamba is any indication, it is clearly stumped by the war propaganda. A proactive judiciary could be Sri Lanka’s saviour if it could push through the establishment of the constitutional council. The council, in which the Opposition will also sit, and which will have powers to regulate appointments in the police, judiciary and government, could curb police excesses and corruption.

 

As for foreign powers, it is unlikely that India will manage to have a lever in the internal reorganization of Sri Lanka now that it has shown its hand. Too much meddling may be counter-productive as it will antagonize the ultranationalist Sinhala parties. What it can do is pledge assistance in relief efforts and hope it will be accepted. The Co-Chairs of Sri Lanka’s donors, the United States of America, the European Union, Japan and Norway, too, could concentrate on the post-war rehabilitation without sending out confusing signals by insisting on amnesty for all Tigers.