Despite having proscribed the Liberation Tigers as a terrorist organization, Canada still wanted Sri Lanka to negotiate with it and was also prepared to host such talks, Foreign Minister Peter MacKay said last Tuesday.

“Mr. MacKay said he has spoken to Norwegian officials about Canada playing a more active role in the Sri Lanka talks, including possibly holding talks here,” the Toronto Star reported.

The new Conservative government Monday officially announced that the Tigers have been formally listed as a terrorist group. The listing makes it illegal for anyone in Canada to support or participate in Tamil Tigers activities, including fundraising.

The Toronto Star reported “the implications of the [ban] are a concern for many in the Tamil community, since the majority of Canada’s more than 200,000-strong diaspora supports the political aspirations of the Tigers to create an independent Tamil homeland.”

But according to one legal expert, aside from the political and symbolic implications, the move has limited practical application.

“It’s very unfortunate window dressing,” Queen’s Faculty of Law professor Sharryn Aiken, told the Toronto Star. “As a matter of law, there is very little added benefit.”

Aiken, who worries that Canada has lost its neutral position to help in the peace process, argues the negative impact of the listing outweighs any positive outcome, the paper reported.

The former Liberal government had barred the LTTE from raising cash in Canada, under anti-terrorism legislation brought in after 9/11, but had stopped short of an outright ban.

The LTTE has not commented formally on the Canadian proscription, but Political Wing Chief S. P. Tamilselvan said the move would embolden and encourage Sinhala nationalists urging war while undermining advocates of a negotiated solution.

“The move would definitely hurt Tamil sentiments,” Mr. Tamilselvan told reporters after meeting representatives of the Co-Chairs of Sri Lanka’s peace process.

Other LTTE officials pointed out that contrary to expectations, support for the movement has steadily grown in the United States and Britain, despite it being proscribed there, adding support for the organization stems from the decades of violence and oppression inflicted by the Sri Lankan state.

Sri Lanka’s Sunday Times newspaper reported in November 2004 that eighteen thousand people attended remembrance events in UK, coinciding with Heroes Day celebrations in LTTE-held Vanni. Organizers were compelled to organize two venues last year while five years earlier, before the UK banned the LTTE in 2001, eight thousand attended the London event, expatriates said.

The British ban in February 2001 came amid a unilateral ceasefire the LTTE had been observing since December 2000. The Tigers called off the truce two months later.

In the wake of the British decision, the hardline Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and Sihala Urumaya (now Jeyathika Hela urumaya) claimed victory and have announced that they will extend the campaign to oppose Norwegian attempts to facilitate talks between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government.

The LTTE’s Political Strategist and Chief Negotiator, Anton Balasingham warned at the time, “the British decision will encourage the repressive Sri Lankan regime to be more uncompromising, intransigent and to adopt a military path.”

Two months later, the Sri Lanka Army launched Operation ‘Agni Khiela’, an all out effort to recapture Elephant Pass, which had fallen to the Tigers a year earlier.

The offensive was defeated with staggering losses and many observers linked the extended incapacitation of the SLA’s offensive divisions as a major factor (along with the later Katunayake airport attack) in Colombo’s decision to enter into negotiations with the LTTE.

In all, 13 Tamil civilians were killed in Jaffna islets on Saturday alone, in revenge attacks by Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) personnel enraged by the sinking Thursday of two Dvora gunboats in which 18 colleagues perished.

SLN troopers from the Mandaithivu camp surrounded a civilian house in Allaipiddy in Mandaithivu islet, west of Jaffna, Saturday evening and opened fire, killing 8 civilians, including a four months baby and a four year old boy and their parents.

Three people with serious wounds were rushed to Jaffna hospital after Jaffna district magistrate ordered the Police to provide security to an ambulance from Jaffna hospital, medical sources said.

One of the wounded succumbed to his wounds at Jaffna hospital.

Palachamy Ketheeswaran, 25, his wife, Ketheeswaran Anex Ester, 23, four-years old Ketheeswaran Thanushkanth and the baby at four months, Ketheeswaran Yathursan, were the victims of a family in the massacre.

Abraham Robinson, 28, father of three, Sellathurai Amalathas, 28, father of one, Kanesh Navaratnam, 50, father of four, and Joseph Anthonymuttu, 64, father of five, were the other victims killed on the spot.

Relatives said that SLN troopers had harassed the joint-family and demanded their 2 story building, for military use, a few weeks ago. The request was politely turned down by the family.

Allaipiddy is located on the causeway from Jaffna towards islets of Velani and Kayts through Pannai bridge. After Mandaitivu, past the abandoned alluminum factory, lies the large Sri Lanka Navy garrison, 500 meters from Allaipiddy.

The SLN in Mandaithivu claimed that they were attacked with grenades and opened fire at the attackers. Only four have died according to the SLN. This claim was later denied by the SLN officials in Colombo.

Meanwhile, residents said eight persons, including the baby and the four years old child were massacred by the Sri Lanka Navy troopers. There was no grenade attack, according to them.

Separately, three civilians from the same family were massacred at their home in Puliyankoodal in Kayts by SLN-backed paramilitary gunmen, around 10:30 p.m. Saturday. A tea-shop owner was also found shot dead near Velanai junction.

The victims of this attack were identified as Murugesu Shanmugalingam, 72, his wife, Shanmugalingam Parameswari, 65, and their son S.Kantharoopan, 29. The attackers entered their house late in the night and fired indiscriminately, killing them on the spot.

Shanmugalingam owns a telephone centre close to his house which was also blasted by the attackers, TamilNet reported. A petrol station was attacked.

The Tamil National Alliance (TNA) contesting under Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi (ITAK) banner, won control of Trincomalee Urban Council and 6 other Northeastern Pradeshiya Sabhas in last week’s local government elections.

Despite the polls being postponed in most areas of the North East due to security concerns, in all the party won 35 of the 118 seats in 13 local authorities, including 2 urban councils and eleven Pradeshiya Sabhas, in the areas it contested.

The ITAK won 10 seats in Trincomalee Urban Council, 6 seats in the Trincomalee Town and Gravets Pradeshiya Sabha and was elected uncontested in the Verugal Pradeshiya Sabha. The party also won all the 9 seats in Thirukkovil and Alaiadivembu Pradeshiya Sabahs and won Karaithivu with 4 seats in Amparai district

In Trincomalee where local council polls were conducted after 12 years, the voter turn-out was high mainly in Muslim and Tamil majority areas. Assistant Elections Commissioner M.M.S.K. Bandara Mapa said people were not so enthusiastic in the Sinhala majority areas of Kantale, Gomarankadawala and Padavi-Sripura.

Mr. Mapa said two polling booths were set up at Kattaparichchan and Toppur for people from the LTTE-controlled areas to vote. A bus service was also in operation to transport voters in and out of the uncleared areas. The LTTE too operated a bus service to facilitate people to cast their vote.

“Tamils and Muslims are voting enthusiastically probably because they want to elect the parties representing their ethnic identities,” he told the Daily Mirror. In these areas, the turn-out was more than 50 percent.

All those elected to the Trincomalee Urban Council were Tamils and Muslims. The newly elected council consists of 9 Tamils and 3 Muslims.

The ITAK fielded fourteen Tamils and two Muslims for council, and of them, 9 Tamils and a Muslim were elected on preferential votes. The remaining 2 councillors were from an independent group consisted of five members from the United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA), four from the United National Party (UNP), 2 from the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) and five from the North East Sinhala Organization (NESO) and two of its Muslim members qualified to council seats.

The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and Eelam Peoples’ Democratic Party (EPDP), who had also competed for the council, were disqualified for the counting of seats when both parties failed to secure 20 percent of the total number of votes polled.

“The electoral victories of Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi in the districts of Trincomalee and Amparai has inflicted a stunning defeat of the paramilitaries allied with Government of Sri Lanka,” TNA parliamentarian Mr. M Sivajilingam was quoted by TamilNet as saying.

Suresh Premachandran, TNA parliamentarian, said, “Tamil speaking people in the East are fully supporting the Tamil National struggle. By give ITAK huge electoral success, Tamil people in the East has rejected outright Colombo’s efforts to portray paramilitaries as a viable democratic force in the East.”

Prior to the polls on March 30, ITAK had made a concerted effort to campaign in Trincomalee, seeing a victory for Tamil speaking people in the district as essential to preventing the demerger of the NorthEast.

“Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchchi must capture the administration of the Trincomalee Urban Council in the local poll to scuttle the campaign by chauvinist elements for a de-merger of the NorthEast province. Tamil speaking people in Trincomalee district must unequivocally demonstrate that they will not allow any moves of de-merger to materialize,” said Mr. K. Thurairatnasingham, Trincomalee district TNA parliamentarian, told a rally on the Sunday before the polls.

“We should be prepared to take the challenge to capture more local authorities, especially the Trincomalee Urban Council which is the main target of the chauvinist elements. Every Tamil speaking person in Trincomalee should get out on the polling day to cast his or her vote for the ITAK symbol, HOUSE,” Mr. Thurairatnasingham said.

Meanwhile, EPDP leader Douglas Devananda, whose paramilitary cadres operate with the Sri Lanka Army in the NorthEast, expressed dissatisfaction over the Elections Department’s decision to postpone elections in the North and East. Addressing a press conference Mr. Devananda said that it is unfortunate that the Election Department had to postpone the local government election except in Ampara and Trincomalee as it had prevented them from winning the Pudukudiyiruppu Pradeshiya Sabha in the North – the ITAK list for Pudukudiyiruppu had been declared invalid.

In the NorthEast, the Sri Lankan Commissioner of Elections has postponed elections to 45 local government authorities in the 6 districts of Jaffna, Mullaithivu, Killinochchi, Mannar, Vavuniya and Batticaloa till September 30.

Amid a furore over the Liberation Tigers’ demands that Sri Lankan government disarms a Muslim entity called ‘Jihad’ which is amongst five anti-LTTE paramilitary groups being sponsored by military intelligence, the Sri Lanka Army is reportedly planning to raise an exclusive Muslim unit in the island’s volatile eastern province.

The issue of Muslim militancy has been gaining focus amid renewed suggestions by the LTTE that Jihad has links to Pakistani intelligence – a charge leveled by Indian military analysts as early as in 2004.

Sri Lanka is setting up its first infantry battalion made of only Muslims. Whilst recruitment is from the Ampara district, which has a large concentration of Muslims, Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapakse says the troops will be deployed all over island and will not be restricted to the Eastern province.

Coming in the wake of repeated protests by the LTTE that Sri Lankan military intelligence was deploying a Muslim paramilitary group in its long running and bloody covert war against LTTE members and supporters.

Military spokesman Brigadier Prasad Samarasinghe said mobile recruitment units were dispatched to Muslim villages in the Ampara district and interviews for news recruits to this battalion which started last Tuesday would continue up to April 5 at the army’s Combat Training School in Ampara.

He said the command structure of the battalion which would initially made up of 500 soldiers is yet to be worked out. Up to 800 soldiers may eventually be hired. After training will be entitled to a monthly salary package totaling Rs. 15,000 and other allowances. Sinhala soldiers in the Army earn a package of Rs. 17,000.

An announcement in the state-owned Sunday Observer this week in the form of an advertisement said new recruits should have a minimum qualification of having passed Grade 8 in schools and be a Muslim living in the eastern province.

The development comes amid a furore after the LTTE, supplying a dossier of evidence, asserted during the talks in Geneva last month, that ‘Jihad’ in Trincomalee is amongst five paramilitary groups being sponsored by Sri Lankan military intelligence.

Jihad’s former leader, Abdul Hakeem, was shot dead last September. His killing was reported to be linked to business rivalry and infighting within the Muslim community, but came amid a bloody cycle of violence between Army-backed paramilitary groups and the LTTE.

This week, in an interview to Australia’s Broadcasting Cooperation, the LTTE’s Chief Negotiator and Political Strategist, Anton Balasingham, said the movement can provide evidence the Jihad group has connections to Pakistani intelligence.

The activities of Islamic militants in Sri Lanka (particularly in the strategically important Trincomalee district) and their organic links to Pakistan drew the attention of Indian military analysts as early as two years ago.

“There have been persistent reports of the beginning of a radicalisation of small sections of the Tamil-speaking Muslim youth of the Eastern Province [of Sri Lanka],” Bahukutumbi Raman, Director of the Institute for Topical Studies in Chennai, wrote in mid 2004.

Mr. Raman was once head of the counter-terrorism division of the Research & Analysis Wing (RAW), India’s external intelligence agency, and has been a member of India’s National Security Advisory Board (NSAB).

“The [Pakistan-based Islamic militant group] Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) has been showing increasing interest in taking jihad to the Muslims of the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka,” he wrote in 2004.

“The LET is very close to the [Pakistani intelligence] ISI” Mr. Raman said. “LET would not have taken its initial moves to explore the possibility of using Sri Lanka as a clandestine base for its activities and for creating sleeper cells there without the knowledge and prior clearance of the ISI.”

Mr. Raman cited the activities of the ‘Osama’ group amidst the communal clashes between Tamils and Muslims in the eastern province in 2002 as well as reports that Tamil Nadu police had arrested some members of a local organisation called the Muslim Defence Force who said they had planned meetings with the Pakistan-based LET in eastern Sri Lanka.

Details of the Jihad group were among those of five paramilitary groups supplied in the dossier the LTTE handed over to the Sri Lankan government during the talks in Geneva. It included names of the Sri Lankan military intelligence officers coordinating Jihad’s activities, including a Major with the SLA’s 22 Brigade in Trincomalee.

The Jihad group mostly comprises individuals who either left Sri Lanka military intelligence wing or those who ostensibly deserted it, the dossier, extracts of which were later published in The Sunday Leader newspaper, says.

“The mode of action of the Jihad group is that each area is under a [local] head. These heads operate with the policy that other Jihad heads of other areas must not interfere in their area. Thus they all work independently with the military intelligence wing,” the report said.

Training and weapons for the Jihad group are provided by military intelligence, but the weapons are brought from Colombo in vehicles belonging to cabinet ministers, the report said, although the names of the ministers were not included.

But Muslims politicians have angrily rejected the LTTE’s accusations. An all party meeting in early March condemned the LTTE’s accusations and the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), once the island’s largest Muslim party, has demanded the matter be taken up at the next round of talks.

However, the SLMC was itself once urging Muslims not to be drawn into militancy. In the wake of an attack on the newly opened LTTE political office in Muttur in June 2002, the SLMC leader Rauf Hakeem, then seeking an alliance with the LTTE, “condemned the sinister elements which attempt to disturb the prevailing cordial atmosphere between the Muslims and Tamils in the east.”

“The SLMC requests all peace loving Muslims to exercise restraint and not to fall prey to these extremist groups whose agendas go against the principles of peaceful cohabitation,” Sri Lankan state media quoted Mr. Hakeem as saying.

More generally, Muslim politicians have themselves often raised the spectre of Islamic militancy emerging in Sri Lanka to bolster their demands for political concessions from Colombo governments.

Even whilst denying the LTTE’s charges last week, Muslim politicians repeated a frequently aired warning that unless Muslim demands are taken into consideration a situation may develop where Muslim youth would be “compelled to take up arms.”

The Muslim United Liberation Front (MULF) leader Mujaber Rahuman even declared Muslims “have a right to take up arms if it was necessary for their defense as neither the Sri Lankan government, the LTTE nor the international community could defend Muslim rights.”

Muslim political leaders have also rounded on the independent election monitoring group, PAFFREL (Peoples Action for Free and fair Elections) after its head, Kingsley Rodrigo, voiced support for the disarming of groups involved in electoral politics, including Muslim ones.

PAFFREL has been attacked by Muslim politicians after they interpreted Mr. Rodrigo’s comments as claims of Muslim paramilitary activity.

The SLA has meanwhile rejected LTTE accusations it is supporting Jihad. Indeed, the military – like the Sri Lankan government – flatly rejects connection with any of the paramilitary groups blamed for a series of attacks on LTTE personnel and murders of LTTE supporters.

But SLA Spokesman Brigadier Prasad Samarasinghe went on to suggest Muslim gunmen might indeed be operating: "There maybe underworld Muslims who roam around with arms, but we are not aware of an armed group called Jihad consisting of Muslims."

Interestingly, Sri Lanka’s former Deputy Defence Minister, Anuruddha Ratwatte, on trial last year on charges of being behind the murder of ten Muslim youth in Kandy during the 2001 election, stated in his lengthy defence testimony that he had ordered Sri Lanka’s police chief to investigate the activities of Jihad members who had come to Kandy from Trincomalee on election day, December 5.

Muslim paramilitaries, most notably – and officially – under the banner of ‘Home Guards’ have long been a feature of the volatile and bloody dynamics of the eastern province.

The home guards are an auxiliary paramilitary force armed with assault rifles which operated closely with the security forces which are short of manpower in some disputed areas in the eastern province.

A Muslim home guard formation, including ex-militants from the then active ‘Jihad’ group, was also raised by the Sri Lankan military in the late eighties in a bid to stoke and exploit tensions between the Tamil and Muslim communities in parts of the east.

The Konduwattuwan Combat Training College in Ampara where the interviews are being conducted for the Muslim regiment now was also the venue where the eastern command of the Sri Lankan Army in August 1990 gave training to some 500 Muslim youths as home guards.

Sri Lanka’s ruling coalition has recorded a landslide victory in the local government election held Thursday, with the day marked by relatively low voter turn out but also by a lack of the violence that has marred previous elections.

The election was also notable for the large number of court cases filed in protest, as candidates and parties failed to understand the complex law on nominations.

President Mahinda Rajapakse’s United Peoples’ Freedom Alliance (UPFA) won nearly 85 percent of the local government bodies by winning majorities in 224 out of 266 where elections were held, the Government Information Department said Saturday.

The main opposition United National Party (UNP), which previously controlled almost all the local councils after the polls in 2002, won in only 32 bodies.

However, this was not surprising, as Sri Lankans favour the party in power in parliament when voting at local elections in the hope of getting more government money, reported AFP.

UNP spokesman Tissa Attanayake said that his party had fared well as the voter enthusiasm was at a low since the election was ‘not of any significance’ at the national level politics. He said the low voter turnout reflected this view and a majority of voters who had stayed away from the polling station were those who would have voted for his party in a crucial election.

The Tamil National Alliance (TNA) did well, winning control of seven councils.

The Sinhala hardline Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) retained control of the council it won at the last local polls in 2002. However, while not winning control of any more bodies, the JVP won more than 50 percent more local government seats than it took in at the last vote in 2002.

Two other groups won one council each while the all Buddhist Monk party of the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) failed to win a single council. The JHU managed only to elect a single member to 10 local bodies.

Local media read the results, especially the failure of the JVP and JHU to increase their control of local bodies, to be a positive for the peace process with the Liberation Tigers, but other analysts are not so certain.

“Sri Lankan voters have shown they do not support hardline or extremist parties,” said Jayadeva Uyangoda, head of political studies at Colombo University. “This is good news for President Rajapakse.”

“No doubt this augurs well for the future and the peace process,” the state-run Daily News said in an editorial. “It is quite obvious that those political parties seen as espousing the interests of specific cultural groups have been rejected.”

The JVP and JHU are both coalition partners of President Rajapakse in parliament but each contested the local elections independently. The JVP and UPFA were increasingly at odds in the closing stages of the campaign.

The privately-owned Island newspaper said the Marxists were disappointed by the results as they had expected to control at least half a dozen councils and demonstrate their electoral strength. But the poll had exposed the vote base of the Marxists, Island said, adding that the party had been left with only a “loin cloth” after the ‘tsunami’ which delivered the UPFA.

In an editorial headlined: “Road is clear, Mr. President,” it said the JVP had “overestimated its strength and, worst of all, came to believe in its own propaganda lies. It went to the extent of boasting that it was ready to even take over the country”.

There was no immediate reaction from either the monks or the Marxists, but the president’s party invited both to cooperate with him and work towards delivering services to people at the local level.

However, other analysts said the results did not necessarily meant the government would softening it’s stance on the peace process. They pointed to the increased vote for the JVP as indicating the electorate support for the hardline stance.

Analysts also point to many who saw the UPFA victory as signifying support for Sri Lankan President Rajapakse’s hardline ‘Mahinda Chinthana’ election manifesto, and say that on this reading, there will be no softening at the talks. ‘Mahinda Chinthana’ is based on a unitary Sri Lankan state and therefore offers no room for power-sharing with the Tamils.

Newspapers also speculated that a snap parliamentary election could boost the President’s party and it may be able to go on its own without the backing of the hardline Marxists and monks who helped him win the November presidential election, but the government refused to comment on the speculation.

However, the pro-UNP Sunday Leader newspaper reports that the JVP is to work independent of the government following its poor showing at the local government elections. While the party would act independent of the government and withdraw support in parliament, no attempt would be made to topple the administration until such time the party reorganises itself and weakens the UPFA, the paper said.

A group of hardliners within the JVP is allegedly arguing that the party lost ground because some members had identified the party too much with the government despite President Rajapakse moving away from the agreement signed prior to the presidential election.

Meanwhile, a low turnout marked the polls, which independent election monitors said were largely free and fair. Two people were killed in election related violence between supporters of the UPFA and the UNP in the week prior to the polls.

The Elections Commissioner Dayananda Dissanayake told reporters that voter turnout was between 55 to 60 percent, compared with usually high polling in the Indian Ocean island country of over 75 percent. The highest turnout was recorded in Nuwara Eliya of around 75 per cent.

Polling booths were set up in about 8,829 centres to elect 3,624 members to 266 local government authorities comprising 12 municipal councils for large towns, 34 urban councils for smaller towns and 220 pradesiya sabahs for rural areas.

For another 22 councils affected by court rulings on technical deficiencies in accepting nominations, Dissanayake said those elections would take place as soon as practically possible. They will be held 35 days after he announces the date, the Elections Commissioner told the media Friday.

A total of 11,037,763 voters were eligible to elect their members from about 25,523 candidates fielded by political parties and independent groups.

The Commissioner also said though some 192 cases of polls-related violence had been reported they were not serious enough to affect the polling or the final results.

“There are no provisions in the Local Government Election Ordnance for me to have a re-poll in the event of such violence”, Dissanayake said, in any case.

The civic action group People’s Action for Free and Fair Elections (PAFFREL), an independent election watch dog, said that there had been 49 incidents of violence, mainly assault taking place during the polling time.

PAFFREL also said election malpractices involved cases of intimidation, chasing away of voters from polling booths and snatching of polling cards. PAFFREL Chief Kingsley Rodrigo said his organisation deployed a total of 16,000 local election monitors – 14,500 were stationary while 1,500 were mobile monitors.

PAFFREL said most of the violent incidents were caused by candidates belonging to the ruling party against candidates from the UNP and JVP. However, the organisation said compared to previous years, incidents of election violence were less.

“The police and army monitors were also deployed to ease any tensions where voting was taking place,” said Rodrigo. Police Public Relations Director, SSP Rienzie Perera said around 80,000 police personnel were deployed for monitoring while the assistance of the army was also sought.

The Centre for Monitoring Election Violence (CMEV) had also deployed 45 Field Monitors, 20 Mobile teams comprising 40 CMEV observers and approximately 600 Polling Center Observers covering most of the areas where the local government election was held.

CMEV monitors in some areas encountered difficulties in gaining access to polling centres in the early hours as police denied access, reported The Sunday Leader. The monitors also recorded instances where polling centres had run out of finger print cards, intended for voters without National Identity Cards.

However, the Commissioner scoffed at such reports on violence because they were proven wrong when examining the reports submitted to him by senior presiding officers and police officers in charge of those polling booths.

“On examining the reports on violence, I found it does not tally with the reports from the senior presiding officers. I don’t know how they can compile such reports without visiting these polling centres”, he said.

The killing a week prior to the polls of UPFA Minister Maithripala Sirisena’s personal secretary, M. L. Dharmasiri was termed by election monitors as a ‘non-election related incident’ claiming that the assassins have taken advantage of the election period to settle a personal grudge.

“The election period is well known for revenge attacks. To date we have not found any evidence leading to Dharmasiri’s killing being election related,” CMEV co-convener, Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu said. Officials from PAFFREL agreed with the conclusion.

Since the close of nominations on February 16, CMEV recorded a total of 274 incidents of election related violence, of which 118 were categorised as major incidents out of which 73 were incidents of assault.

These polls will also be remembered for another factor – the number of legal suits filed by political parties as well as individuals.

PAFFREL said that a total of 42 petitions were filed in court, out of which, 20 cases were still pending. “There are still some cases on nomination lists pending, and most probably they would be rejected by the courts,” PAFFREL Chief Rodrigo said.

Speaking further on the reasons for the high number of lawsuits during this year’s local government elections, he said the candidates did not understand the law properly. He said the main issues were the age range of the youth included in the list and handing in the nomination list in time.

Sri Lanka’s economy expanded by 5.9 percent in 2005 and over 5.4 percent a year earlier, in the backdrop of high international oil prices and stiff competition for key exports like garments, the country’s Central Bank said Friday.

Economic growth during the fourth quarter of 2005 was 6.3 percent on higher inputs from agriculture, telecommunications, ports and apparel exports. Industrial exports dominated by textiles and garments reported a growth of 5.0 per cent in 2005 as against 18.2 per cent in the previous year.

Good rainfall contributed to bumper paddy harvest, while also helping the island generate more electricity using cheaper hydro power – which grew 26.2 percent.

However, tea, the country’s prime export commodity, faltered with excessive rains curbing production volumes during the latter part of the year. The damp weather conditions also saw prices fall 7.3 percent in the fourth quarter of 2005.

Tsunami rebuilding activities gave the construction sector a leg up creating extra work for other infrastructure related projects like road development, water supply and irrigation.

The telecommunications sector, continued its blistering pace, with mobile subscribers increasing by 52 percent and fixed line services by 11 percent during the fourth quarter of 2005.

Faltering tourism arrivals, which fell 24.6 percent in 2005, had a negative effects on hotel guests nights (36.5 percent drop), and restaurants (31.8 percent drop).

Tourist arrivals rose 40.2 percent in the first two months of 2006, according to Sri Lanka Tourist Board figures. The Ministry of Tourism expects arrivals to rise to 600,000 this year, after falling to 549,308 in 2005, after the December 2004 tsunami left most hoteliers struggling to fill rooms.

Sri Lanka’s $20 billion economy has recorded uninterrupted expansion since a February 2002 ceasefire halted the two-decade war.

The government is targeting growth of more than 6 percent in 2006, from higher revenues from tourism and export crops and infrastructure development, Treasury Secretary P.B. Jayasundera said on March 23.

President Rajapakse, who is also finance minister, is aiming to boost annual economic growth to 8 percent in the next six years.

“The economy can surpass 6 percent growth this year, unless there’s outright war and disruption,” Rachini Rajapakse, who helps manage the equivalent of $20 million of stocks and bonds at Unit Trust Management Co. in Colombo, told Bloomberg news. “The economy is bouncing back after the tsunami.”

“There was a slight slowdown in economic activity from the third quarter, because of elections and the heightened violence,” Vajira Premawardhana, director of research at Lanka Orix Securities Ltd. in Colombo, told Bloomberg. “The more stable interest rate environment will help the growth momentum this year,” he said.

Sri Lanka may start lowering its benchmark interest rate in the second quarter to fuel growth as inflation slows, Treasury Secretary Jayasundera said on March 23.

The Central Bank of Sri Lanka on March 15 left the repurchase rate unchanged for the third month at 8.75 percent, after increasing it by 1.25 percentage points in four steps last year to curb inflationary pressures arising from higher bank lending and oil prices.

Sri Lanka’s inflation rate slowed for the sixth straight month in February to 10.3 percent as prices of rice and vegetables declined due to favorable weather conditions, the Department of Census and Statistics said Feb. 28.

Sri Lanka’s export earnings rose to a record $625 million in December as the South Asian island shipped more clothes and rubber-based products, the central bank said last month.

In the run-up to the March 2006 elections the JVP signalled to its UPFA allies that it would be running for seats under its own steam. This signalled, firstly, the failure of the former UPFA allies to divide the spoils in a pre-election agreement, secondly, the JVP’s willingness to flex its muscles as a warning to the future intent of the SLFP leadership on a host of issues - including the peace process - and thirdly, its intention to capture more local councils, not simply a greater share of the overall seats.

The last was part of a long-term strategy to secure council control in order to effect the extension of the kind of flagship local governance that had informed the JVP’s experiment with Tissamaharama Pradeshiya Sabha, the only local authority that the JVP has controlled which it won in the 2002 local elections.

The reason Tissamaharama is significant is twofold. Firstly, the JVP’s control of Tissamaharama has posed a series of much needed questions on facets of local government which have, for the most part to date, been discussed amongst local government officials, policy makers, ministers for local government, the relevant bureaucrats, academics and NGO, INGO and IGO personnel who have specialist interest in this field.

The JVP’s ability to introduce new subject areas (or to bypass restrictions on these) into local government, to attempt to protect existing subject areas, to develop local services, to improve access to Pradeshiya Sabha members, to abolish some forms of existing inequitable local taxation and to rigorously and systematically pursue the collection of others has produced notable results. Tissamaharama PS has also provided a platform for the JVP to reinforce its image as a party of clean (corruption and violence free) and responsive politics which has forms of participatory local development as a key goal.

That this occurs in an environment of widespread decay and deterioration in local government effectivity is also a testament to the JVP’s continuing ability to assume the moral high ground in a context of governmental and mainstream party failure. Since JR Jayawardene’s UNP rule of the late 1970s and 1980s, local government has been increasingly vampirised by the tendrils of control over local government, which have emerging from political parties and the government at the centre. Much of the framework for this centralising predatory pattern was ironically first implemented under the guise of decentralisation.

Sri Lanka’s over-centralised state has also leeched away local authorities’ capacities in terms of the provision of and revenue from, for example, housing, water, infrastructural development, welfare services, education, guest houses etc. The state has effectively removed many of these spheres of activity from local government jurisdiction. These failures are extensively catalogued by state-sponsored research into local government – for example the ‘Commission of Inquiry into Local Government Reform’ published in 1999.

What Sri Lanka now has is a highly debilitated level of local government that has become the centre-dependent, patron-client based, playing ground for the mainstream political parties who use local councils as power bases for securing political ties from the centre to the regions and as training grounds for tomorrow’s centre-level political cadres.

In such a context of failure, the JVP obviously sought to exploit its successes at the local level in the recent local election and used Tissamaharama as a central motif in its media campaign strategy. As a result, many commentators, with some justification, thought it entirely possible that the JVP could potentially capitalise on its local government efforts.

However, what the local government election results have demonstrated is the JVP’s failure to have extended its reach into new local power bases. Although the JVP extended its overall number of seats, it failed to secure control of any more councils, merely retaining Tissamaharama PS. How did the JVP fail to capitalise on a key area of failure on the part of the two mainstream parties?

The answer is to be found in the contextual difficulties in Sri Lanka’s political culture which have acted as obstacles to the party’s strategy. Firstly, it is clear that the JVP have been to some extent hoist by the petard of the very local government retrogression that they sought to overcome. The deterioration of local government itself has led to the decline in the political relevance of local government at many levels of both state and society, amongst the media and the electorate.

These is also a subsequent paucity in the discourse of ‘local government’ in relation to its purpose, functions, targets, effectivity etc. This has reinforced, in a circular manner, what has long been noted as a core problem in the Sri Lankan polity; the centre-oriented and over-centralising thrust of the country’s political culture and institutions to the extent that local government institutions have frequently become obsolete, bypassed and/or neglected in the eyes of many local citizens who turn to their MPs or to other central institutions for solutions to their problems. It is not just that “there (is) an abiding concern for centralization among Sri Lanka’s political elites and parties” as one commentator, S Sirivardana, has astutely noted, but that this centre-oriented disposition has also become ingrained, out of necessity, in the political culture at wider social levels.

This facet of Sri Lanka’s political culture also evidently continues to strengthen the hand of the politically dominant party. Voters and local party cadres (even of the opposition in cross-party movement) will also be keen to leap on to the winning bandwagon; a factor that has lead to the widely accepted truism that the sooner a party holds a local government election on the back of prior electoral victory the greater the margin of victory, for national-level election pledges still ring loudly and the machinery of political patronage is still well-greased.

In that sense, the UPFA’s victory, like the UNF’s local election landslide in 2002, was an almost inevitable outcome of Sri Lanka’s continuing failure to challenge the centralisation embedded in the political system. In other words, local election outcomes were always deeply entrenched in the politics of the centre rather than in any governmental dynamics at a local level. Whilst it is impossible to completely separate these spheres of the national and the local, it is a matter of degree and Sri Lanka remains an example that veers in extreme fashion towards the centre-oriented end of the spectrum.

The JVP’s failure to reap the rewards of its more effective local government on a wider scale can thus be interpreted as a result of the JVP championing a cause which is neither celebrated or deemed relevant beyond the Tissamaharama flagship for a large section of the electorate. It therefore remains difficult for the JVP to translate their local government reputation to a wider level and thus to have brought about an extended capture of councils.

This is, however, certainly not to suggest the JVP is a champion of devolved or decentralised local power. On the contrary, it is clear that they are in favour of a centralised system. But local government issues have been a testament to their grass roots base and a tactic en route to the capture of the centre. On the way, they also demonstrate the relative failure of local governance in Sri Lanka and their characteristic for assuming the moral high ground in political strategies.

Thus, the outcome of last week’s local government election can be seen as a partial failure for the JVP’s short-term objectives to capture more potential local government flagships. However this cannot be extended to an interpretation that the local polls represented a “rout” of the JVP as has been articulated in some quarters. Nor can it be said that this has radically altered the dynamics of the peace process by inevitably strengthening the hand of the President vis-à-vis his more Sinhala nationalist allies for a number of reasons.

Firstly, it is clear from the statistics that the JVP have extended their overall number of seats even if capture of the Chair and Mayoral positions is decisive for control at the local level and this was lacking. The JVP themselves have also argued that the UPFA victory would have been even more decisive had the SLFP and the JVP worked together and the outcome of the election does demonstrate the SLFP’s and the JVP’s continuing mutual dependence upon one another rather than simply the ascendancy of Rajapakse.

The proof will really only be telling in relation to the next parliamentary elections but projected statistical forecasts at a national level indicate that it may be too early for the SLFP to risk casting off the JVP despite the fact that there are rumours that Rajapakse may declare a snap parliamentary poll to capitalise on the aforementioned momentum of success.

Secondly, both the JVP’s role in the construction of the Mahinda Chintanaya edifice, their refusal to dissociate themselves from Mahinda Chintanaya in the local elections campaign (in fact their continued endorsement of Mahinda Chintanaya was apparent) and the fact that Mahinda Rajapakse has not dissociated himself from this manifesto indicate that this victory could also be partly read as a deriving from a JVP-led ideological construct.

Furthermore, there is an ideological dynamic that has served to push the political spectrum in a distinctly Sinhala nationalist direction in the context of a crucial moment for the peace process.

It therefore remains to be seen whether Rajapakse has successfully engineered the cutting of the Gordian Knot that tied the SLFP and the JVP together. Certainly there are certain benefits the SLFP will gain from a local election victory – it can be argued that this may revitalise the SLFP’s hitherto flagging party machinery and provide them with local power bases. However, in the light of the UNP’s swift demise since 2002 one wonders how significant this is?

The above rationale can be seen as dismissive of local government politics but it is clear that unless there is a radical shift in relations between the local and the centre, the privileging of the centre will not abate. It is also, unfortunately, this privileging of the centre that has been a major ingredient in the reproduction of the ethnic conflict and Sinhala majoritarian dynamics. As a result a major shift in the dynamics of the peace process is not in sight either - the ideological atmosphere in which politics takes place is surely the ultimate outcome that must be judged rather than merely counting which councils, chairs and members fell to which party.

Dave Rampton is a visiting lecturer at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), London. The JVP and southern politics are the focus of his doctoral research.

In the aftermath of the local government elections, which saw an overwhelming vote for the ruling United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA), many media and commentators reported the results as a boost for the government’s approach to the peace process. They saw the voting pattern as a rejection of the anti-peace stance of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), which only managed to retain the council they won at the last polls, and the hardline monks, who were not able to win control of a single body.

“No doubt this augurs well for the future and the peace process,” the state-run Daily News said in an editorial. “It is quite obvious that those political parties seen as espousing the interests of specific cultural groups have been rejected.”

“Sri Lankan voters have shown they do not support hardline or extremist parties,” Jayadeva Uyangoda, head of political studies at Colombo University, told Reuters. “This is good news for President Rajapakse.” Uyangoda said he expected the government now to take a more conciliatory line with the Liberation Tigers.

However, this reading of the poll result conveniently manages to ignore some of the realities of the vote. Firstly, this reading assumes people voted on the peace process, which has not been proven. Secondly, the reported routing of the JVP ignores the gains the party made in the number of votes it polled. And thirdly, it assumes that the Marxists and monks were the constraint on President Mahinda Rajapakse and that a lessening of their control will see a shift in approach towards a more conciliatory approach – the basis of which assumption is not self-evident.

While many saw Thursday’s vote as a litmus test of the popularity of the JVP, and a statement on the stance taken by each of the parties towards the peace process, many other observers saw it as a vote purely on local matters. Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) leader Rauff Hakeem was one of many who argued that the election could not be seen as a mandate for anything other than improving utilities at the local level.

In fact, most of the observers agreed it was a vote for the President’s ‘Mahinda Chinthana’ platform, which was a vision for power sharing from the local village level. Similarly many observers agreed that Sri Lankan voters generally favour the party in power at local elections in the hope of getting more government money. On that basis, the vote was not on the peace process at all, and analysts say a true reading on the peoples’ stance towards the Norwegian-facilitated process can only be assessed at a national parliamentary or Presidential election.

Secondly the reading of the poll results as being a routing of the hardliners ignores the raw numbers polled. The JVP for instance managed to expand its voter base, increasing its number of councillors by more than 50%. The party itself saw the results as a ‘considerable victory’. The party’s general secretary Tilvin Silva said there was a 10 percent increase in the total number of votes polled by the party. “We managed to win 817,000 votes and there is an increase from 210 councillors to 366,” he said. The rise in number of votes for the JVP suggests this vote has not been a denouncement of the policies of the party. On the contrary, the party managed to gain more support for its policies and politics.

The only reason the count was seen as a blow to the hardline anti-peace process stance was due to an expectation that the JVP would have done better, with some suggestion before the election that they would sweep the polls. In reality, while the increase in support for the JVP may be read as a statement on their policies about governance at a local level – the party had a very clear policy on local government. Only the tiny support for the hardline Buddhist monks of the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) can be seen as support for an anti-peace stance as the party was formed and operates purely on this basis.

The other crucial assumption in the optimistic reading of the polls results is that President Mahinda Rajapakse is not a hardliner and that his ability to negotiate with the Liberation Tigers was constrained by his hardline allies. This conveniently ignores the issue of why the President would choose to have allies with whose philosophies he fundamentally differs from. That Rajapakse chose to align himself with the JVP and the JHU – much to the chagrin of some SLFPers, including party leader Chandrika Kumaratunga, and the horror of his liberal minded supporters - in the lead up to the Presidential polls suggests that the views expressed by the two parties were not entirely at odds to those of the President himself.

The reading of President Rajapakse as having his own hardline views gains credibility, moreover, when the acceptance speeches delivered by Mr. Rajapakse after he was sworn in as President and his subsequent actions are reviewed – Sinhala hardliners were sworn in to many positions including that of Foreign Minister and head of the Army. Many other hardliners have earned trusted positions in the President’s immediate circle.

Some are arguing that this view of the President as a Sinhala hardliner is incorrect and claim Mr. Rajapakse was merely being pragmatic in his choice of bedfellows, seeking allies who would help in securing his Presidential victory. But, even if this were the case, Rajapakse cannot afford to disregard the results of last week’s poll which as many, including the President himself, have hailed as a vote for his manifesto, ‘Mahinda Chinthana’.

Given that Mahinda Chinthana is resolutely and unambiguously based on a unitary Sri Lanka, the results immediately constrains the government when it comes to negotiating power sharing arrangements with the LTTE. The possibility of the government taking a more conciliatory approach to the next round of peace talks thus seem as remote as ever. The JVP, moreover, as co-authors of Mahinda Chinthana, will act as a potent watchdog in this regard, ready to seize on the first inkling of retreat.

These poll results have undoubtedly strengthened the President’s hand, but this does not necessarily lead automatically towards a positive development for the peace process. Indeed, a stronger President may now be less willing to enter into a national government with the main parliamentary opposition United National Party (UNP), thereby making more remote the chances of having negotiators at the peace table who represent a consensus view from Sri Lanka’s southern politics. Taking all these factors together, if the local government polls are to be read as having any impact on the peace process at all, it is more likely to be a negative one.

The announcement by the Sri Lanka Army last week that it is recruiting for a battalion comprising ethnic Muslims has drawn mixed reactions from a spectrum of observers of communal politics in the island’s contentious East.

Many Muslim community organisations have slammed the move as ethnically divisive, although the two main Muslim political parties, the National Unity Alliance (NUA) and the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) have both remained silent on the matter.

The militant Muslim United Liberation Front (MULF) welcomed the notion of a Muslim force, but was critical of its integration into the Sri Lankan armed forces. Some in the Muslim dominated Amparai district have welcomed the move, not least because it would provide the tsunami battered region with desperately needed employment opportunities.

The Sri Lanka military has been promoting the project as an effort to attract ethnic minorities into its overwhelmingly Sinhala ranks and as a ‘local’ force for the Amparai district. But the focus on only Muslim recuits, as opposed to Tamil speakers in general, or as residents of Amparai more widely have rightly raised suspicions about the military’s true motives. In either case, there is no obvious need for a specific Muslim battalion - the Sri Lankan military could expand it recruitment of members from ethnic communities and employ them within existing units.

Even the Sinhala-Buddhist monks of the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) have, without understanding the government’s subtle motives, criticized the move as an negation of the Sri Lankan national identity. The fiercely nationalistic party, which has a stake in the governing United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) coalition, is averse to formal recognition of non-Sinhala ethnicity in Sri Lanka.

The main Tamil party, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), has condemned the move as another effort to create a divide between the Muslim and Tamil communities. The TNA is basing its accusations on similar efforts by previous Sri Lankan governments to create Muslim armed units in the East and pit them against Tamil militants. The creation of the Muslim ‘Home Guard’ units in the early nineties was a key causal factor in the escalation of communal animosity and hostility in the east (a legacy of that era is the significant number of Muslims amongst the military intelligence commanders).

The benefit of Tamil speaking operatives has also been starkly evident in the ongoing ‘shadow war’ between the LTTE and the paramilitary units of the Sri Lankan Army. These organizations are able to carry out operations for which the military were able to plausibly assert deniability. With the beginning of the peace process, paramilitaries have been employed more than ever before in intelligence gathering activities and now the shadow war against the Tigers. Having a Muslim battalion will greatly assist the Sri Lankan military’s efforts to recruit and train Tamil speaking covert operatives - whilst preventing non-Sinhala infiltration into its wider body.

However, the formation of a Muslim battalion has repercussions beyond the use of Muslims in paramilitary activities. A less obvious but more dangerous implication of the formation of a Muslim battalion is the formal association of the Muslim community with the Sri Lankan military’s efforts to crush Tamil aspirations for autonomy for the Northeast.

To date, there has been no formal ideological opposition within the Muslim community to Tamil self-determination per se - only demands for its own self-determination. But the introduction of a Muslim battalion, with its own Muslim name, regimental colours and with recruits drawn explicitly from Muslims in the east, will bring with it a new political position for Muslims vis-a-vis the Tamil struggle: namely, Muslims become a participating community, rather than individuals.

As P. Sahadevan, an expert on South Asia at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, put it, ‘A Muslim unit is going to add to the communalisation of the Sri Lankan military. ... It is sure to create a divide between Tamils and Muslims.’

To begin with, this brings the Muslim community to have a practical stake in the conflict - on the state’s side. A similar politicisation took place in the Sinhala regions. The lower ranks of the Sri Lanka Army hail from rural areas in the south. Apart from integrating these areas into the war economy, this involvement has no doubt contributed to support for hardline positions on the ‘Tamil problem.’

In the aftermath of the tsunami, Tamil charities such as the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) reached out to the Muslim communities in the region as part of wider efforts to build communal relations. The LTTE also subsequently deployed political cadres and senior political leaders to the area to build Tamil-Muslim links.

With the formation of the Muslim battalion, the Sinhala government is seeking to create a structural obstacle to consolidation of Tamil-Muslim relations in the east and to begin to create structural cleavages in the region. Muslim political and community leaders have succeeded in maintaining a nominally neutral position for most of the conflict between the Tamils and the Sinhala dominated state. With a single stroke the Sri Lankan government and military have ensured this is no longer the case.

The introduction of ethnically constituted paramilitary organisations - particularly Sinhala and Muslim ‘Home Guards’ - during the early nineteen nineties led to a dramatic escalation of communal violence in the east. The state succeeded in pitting Muslims and Tamils against one another and the resulting massacres and counter-massacres left profound scars.

Over a decade later the LTTE, has enjoyed some successes in rebuilding communal relations. It is in recognition of these advances that organisations like the Muslim Peace Secretariat has condemned the Sri Lankan military’s move to create a Muslim battalion.

Many of the recruits from the tsunami-ravaged Amparai district to the new Muslim unit, drawn by the Rs. 15,000 monthly package, are unlikely to be reflect long on these aspects. But the Muslim battalion is, without question, going to undermine efforts to build Tamil-Muslim links. Like many of President Rajapakse’s other efforts to bolster the Sri Lankan military, his government claims it is merely a deterrent to prevent the LTTE from returning to war.

But whatever lofty rationale is presented, the Sinhala state is, as some, bitterly recalling the bloody nineties, quite rightly put it, positioning the Muslims as a buffer against the Tamils.

The Liberation Tigers will view any further attacks by military-backed paramilitaries as an act of war and may postpone next month’s talks in Geneva unless the state fulfils the Ceasefire Agreement and disarms them, the LTTE’s Political Strategist and Chief Negotiator, Mr. Anton Balasingham said last week.

In an interview to Reuters at his London home, Mr. Balasingham also said President Mahinda Rajapakse should dump his Sinhala nationalist allies and seek support from the main opposition UNP party which led a government that held six rounds of talks with the LTTE in 2002-3.

“If the paramilitaries continue to launch military offensive operations against the LTTE with the backing of the Sri Lankan armed forces, it will certainly be construed as an act of war against the LTTE,”

“It will lead to conditions of war and violence and it will block any forward movement of the peace talks and lead to the collapse of the peace process itself.”

“The LTTE leadership will consider postponing the second round (of talks), or they might even think of attending the talks and continue to insist on the same (disarmament) theme that was taken up at the first round,” Balasingham said.

“So there won’t be any forward movement of the talks if these paramilitaries are not disarmed,” he added.

But residents from the Northeast, particularly the garrison towns of Jaffna and Batticaloa reported heightened paramilitary activity. In Jaffna, gunmen of the EPDP were openly patrolling with Sri Lankan troops whilst in Batticaloa, cadres from the Karuna Group opened signposted offices.

Both developments – in which Sri Lanka’s military are involved - are being seen as a defiant response to the government’s reluctant agreement during the first round of talk in Geneva in February to implement the Ceasefire Agreement, which obligates Colombo to either disarm paramilitary units or absorb them into its regular forces for service outside the contested Northeast.

If the talks do go ahead this month, amongst the pressing matters the LTTE will raise are the Sri Lankan military’s continuing occupation of dozens of emptied Tamil villages in the high security zones (HSZs) and restrictions on Tamil fishing communities.

The Tigers want the vast HSZs in the far north vacated by the military so that thousands of displaced people can return to rebuild homes ravaged by years of incessant shelling. The Tigers also want the army to halt cordon and search operations and military harassment of civilians.

“The strategic objective of the current negotiations as far as the LTTE is concerned is to seek out a climate of de-escalation and normalisation, which is a necessary condition for resuming serious talks on the political issues,” Balasingham told Reuters.

Even if the present talks on ceasefire progress to negotiations on political issues, President Rajapakse’s ultra nationalist allies, the Marxist JVP (Janatha Vimukthi Perumana) and hardline monks party, the JHU (Jeyathika Hela Urumaya) are likely to be spoilers, Mr. Balasingham said.

“Rather than bring in these crazy Marxists and mad monks under the slogan of inclusiveness, the only way out of this mess is for Rajapakse to work out some form of alliance with the UNP (United National Party),” Mr. Balasingham told Reuters.

The UNP-led coalition which governed Sri Lanka from Dec 2001 to April 2004 signed a truce with the Tigers and held several rounds of Norwegian brokered talks with them, despite being hamstrung by a hostile President Chandrika Kumaratunga, Rajapakse’s predecessor.

In the past two weeks, the JVP resumed its vehement opposition to the Norwegian facilitation of the stuttering peace process. JVP Propaganda Secretary Wimal Weerawansa warned ‘undiplomatic’ activities by Norway would create a ‘storm’ that would jeopardize political stability of the country.

The JVP is Sri Lanka’s third largest party and is widely thought to be closing the gap on the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) of President Mahinda Rajapakse.

Rajapakse’s rejection of the concepts of Tamil homeland and nationhood – enshrined in electoral pacts he signed with the JVP and JHU before the Nov 2005 elections - presented an obstacle to a negotiated solution to the protracted conflict, Mr. Balasingham said.

“Unless Rajapakse...accepts the demand of the Tamils for regional autonomy, there won’t be any prospect for a political solution,” he said.

“If...internal self-determination is rejected, then only we will invoke the right to external self-determination - that is the right to form an independent state.”

ABC: Mr. Anton Balasingham, welcome.
Balasingham: Thank you.

ABC: Now, you claim peace talks are in jeopardy because of this “shadow war” also being fought by Tamil paramilitaries controlled by the government. What evidence do you have of this?
Balasingham: We have provided quite a lot of evidence documentary evidence, maps and other details to the Sri Lankan government with regard to their existence and functions, with regard to their leadership, their command structure, the location of their camps in the government-controlled areas. And we have submitted ample evidence to substantiate that these groups are actively functioning with the Sri Lankan troops in their offensive military campaigns against the LTTE.

ABC: What makes you think the authorities can control them? Because they sound as if they’ve got a will of their own to fight you.
Balasingham: Most of these armed paramilitaries are operating in the government military establishments, in the military camps. So, if Rajapakse government genuinely wants peace, the escalation in normalcy, they can put an end to this violence by disarming these paramilitaries.

ABC: One of these paramilitary groups is run by Karuna, your former Eastern Commander. Why did Karuna defect?
Balasingham: He has been misbehaving in the sense that there has been a lot of complaints about misappropriation of funds. He has been involved in recruiting underage cadets, and he has been committing serious crimes against the Muslim population in the east.

What is disturbing is that the Sri Lankan armed forces are helping him, harbouring him, sustaining him and helping him in this subversive role against the LTTE. That is a most alarming development.

ABC: These Tamil paramilitary groups were once your people. They’ve turned against you, so doesn’t that mean you no longer can represent the Tamil community, that it’s now Tamil against Tamil?
Balasingham: We are not asking the government to disband the political structure of these organisations. Let them function as political organisations. But their armed wings have to be curtailed, and have to be dismantled, because it’s posing a serious challenge to the peace process.

ABC: You claim that one of these paramilitary groups is a Tamil Muslim Jihad group. What can you tell us about this group? Because the Muslims in the east deny their existence.
Balasingham: We know why the Muslim political organizations are denying, is the fact that because the international community will be seriously concerned if there is a Muslim terrorist organization functioning in Sri Lanka, with connections.

I think we have evidence to prove that this Jihad organization has connections with the Pakistani Military Intelligence. Therefore, they are formally denying it. But we have ample evidence, and we can further submit evidence if the Muslim leaders contact us.

ABC: But it beggars belief that any government would allow the growth of a Muslim Jihad group, and one with links to Pakistan, in this current international climate.
Balasingham: Yes, that is a dangerous thing. But the Sri Lankan government has a very good relationship with Pakistan and China, that is our worry. Because Sri Lanka has been getting military assistance and training from Pakistan. And also they have very close relationship with China.

So, we are seriously worried whether the intervention of Pakistan in this matter, in training and providing assistance to the Jihad movement, will have serious repercussions. It may have serious repercussions in India, if India comes to know more about these Jihad groups.

ABC: Dr Balasingham, is it any wonder that you’re having difficulties with this hard-line president? Because by boycotting the elections, you prevented the sympathetic candidate from gaining power.
Balasingham: We are prepared to deal with the hard-liners, rather than with the soft-liners who promise certain things and never fulfil anything. So, let us take up this challenge and negotiate with the hard-liners and see how far they will tackle the problem.

Our concern is to impress upon the international community that the real problem, the real impediment to the resolution of the Tamil problem are the Sinhalese hard-liners.

ABC: So, how can the international community put pressure on this government?
Balasingham: I think the international community can assert tremendous influence on the Sri Lankan political system, because the Sri Lankan government is totally depending on the foreign aid that is given by the aid-giving countries.

So, these co-chairs of the aid-giving countries of the international community can exert enough pressure on Sri Lankan political leaders to offer something reasonable, something fair to the Tamil people like this, at these last stages.

ABC: Dr Anton Balasingham, thank you.
Balasingham: Thank you very much.

The text of the full interview Mr. Solheim gave to Tehelka was released by the Norwegian embassy and follows.

Tehelka: The Sri Lankan government was against holding the talks in Norway, as demanded by the Tigers. They insisted that talks be held in Sri Lanka or in some Asian country. How did the two parties agree on Geneva finally?
Solheim: The parties, the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), agreed to meet after being convinced that the CFA must be upheld to prevent further escalation of the situation. Throughout the call for such a meeting, Norway reassured the parties that Norway will be ready to facilitate talks between the parties wherever they agree to meet. The parties found compromise in Geneva with suggestion from the facilitator. Switzerland has always, in the eyes of the parties, played a constructive role in supporting the peace process and maintained an unbiased approach.

Tehelka: Have you decided on the agenda for the talks? When is it going to be held?
Solheim: As you know, the parties have agreed to meet in Geneva 22-23 February. The parties have requested Norway to facilitate talks on how to address the critical security situation and improve the living conditions for the people on the ground. The parties will discuss ways and means to strengthen the implementation of the CFA. This is by no means negotiations to end the conflict, but it is very positive that the parties have agreed to meet at high level to discuss how to improve the serious security situation. This is the first time in three years that the parties meet face-to-face at such a high level.

Tehelka: You have held talks with both the sides. What are the major complaints and grievances of the two parties?
Solheim: The main complaints are related to the high level of killings, abductions and other forms of violence which have occurred during the last month. But I trust you understand that I cannot paraphrase the parties’ positions on these matters.

Tehelka: Do you believe a negotiated solution is possible, given the history of aborted agreements, and failure of peace initiatives in the past five decades between the Sinhalese and the Tamils? If you believe so, then what is the timeframe you would like to give yourself?
Solheim: I sincerely believe in a negotiated politically solution. The Norwegian Government is at the same time committed to actively promoting peace and reconciliation internationally. I can assure you that we will continue to give priority to facilitating the peace process in Sri Lanka as long as the parties request our efforts and we see that we can play a constructive role. I hope that the parties can gain mutually confidence in each other during talks on stabilising the security situation to take the peace process forward.

Tehelka: There is clear pressure on President Mahinda Rajapakse from his allies, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), not to concede even the most basic demands of Tamils. For instance, both parties favour a solution within a unitary state structure, which is a departure from the position of former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe, who was in favour of a federal solution. With the present government dependent on these two parties for its survival, how meaningful do you think the talks could get?
Solheim: I cannot in my position as third party facilitator involve myself in political issues regarding internal dynamics on either side.

Tehelka: Do you think a solution is possible within a unitary state structure?
Solheim: I take the view that the parties should not be blinded by the use of different terms. During negotiations, the parties will address the substance and find a durable solution acceptable to all Sri Lankans.

Tehelka: What in your view are the legitimate grievances of Tamils?
Solheim: There is broad agreement in the international community in support for Tamil rights to some form of self rule or power sharing within a united Sri Lanka.

Tehelka: Do you agree with the view that trouble in the Island nation started with the controversial Ceylon Citizenship Act in 1948 (which disenfranchised thousands of Tamils), the declaration of Sinhala as the official language, and the subsequent laws in education favouring the Sinhalase etc, resulting in alienation of Tamils?
Solheim: Both parties would have a different take on this issue. Norway is tasked to bring the parties to the table and assist them in finding a durable solution to the conflict. We have to be careful in our comments to historical mattes, however important they may be.

Tehelka: There is a view that the European Union (EU) will revoke its travel ban on LTTE cadres following the resumption of talks between the two parties. Do you see that happening?
Solheim: Norway is not a member of the EU, and thus not involved in EU discussions with regards to travel ban on the LTTE - and neither do we have an official stance on this issue.


Tehelka: The Sri Lankan government’s proxy war against the LTTE through the Karuna group is said to be the main cause for the escalation of violence, undermining the CFA. Has the Lankan government given any assurance of disarming the Karuna group?
Solheim: Disarmament of Tamil paramilitary groups is covered by paragraph 1.8 in The Cease Fire Agreement. Both the GOSL and the LTTE have reassured that they will do their utmost to stop violence before the Geneva-meeting. It is very positive that we see a clear reduction in the use of violence from the moment this commitment was made by both parties. I truly welcome the willingness by both parties to discuss these issues in Geneva.

Tehelka: In the absence of any action against Karuna group, the LTTE has come out with its counter strategy of creating its own ‘paramilitary’ groups. Where will this ‘proxy war’ indulged in by the two parties lead to?
Solheim: I trust that the two parties are able to agree on how to improve the security situation in Geneva. These discussions will by no means be easy for the parties – I expect the negotiations to be tough. We think more than one meeting will be needed. The parties are nonetheless taking a small but very significant step towards putting the peace process back on a positive track.

Tehelka: Article 2:1 of the CFA states that both parties should “abstain from hostile acts against the civilian population.” But the Lankan military has been harassing civilians, triggering an exodus of Tamil refugees into India. Nearly 300 refugees have crossed over to India in the last month, bringing with them tales of rapes, and harassment by army men. The SLMM too has admitted to an increase in army harassment of civilians. How do you propose to address this issue?
Solheim: The parties are committed to end the campaign of violence. The parties explicitly stated that they will do their utmost to stop violence, also against civilians.

Tehelka: What did LTTE leader Prabakaran tell you when you met him?
Solheim: Prabakaran promised to do his part to put a stop to the escalating violence. He reaffirmed his commitment to the peace process and his support for a peaceful solution. Both parties repeated their confidence in Norway as an impartial facilitator for the peace process.

Tehelka: America seems to have taken a completely pro-Sinhala stand. The recent statements of US Ambassador to Sri Lanka Jeffrey Lunstead and US Under Secretary for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns have betrayed their bias. How will this stand of the US impact the peace talks in Geneva?
Solheim: Many governments, including the US, have expressed their support to the parties ahead of the Geneva-talks and welcomed the commitment by the parties to sit down at the table. We are encouraged by the support of India, US and other international actors for the Norwegian involvement as facilitators.

Tehelka: Both parties, even while they have agreed to hold talks, seem to be preparing for war as well. Sri Lanka has proposed to increase its defence expenditure by thirty percent this fiscal year, while the LTTE has built a new airstrip and reportedly increased the strength of its ‘Sea Tiger’ naval force. What do these developments augur for a peaceful solution?
Solheim: The aim of the Geneva talks is exactly this: To avoid Sri Lanka slipping back to war.

Tehelka: The Sri Lankan government’s failure to implement the Post Tsunami Operational Management Structure (PTOMS) agreement that it signed with the LTTE has affected thousands of Tamils in LTTE controlled areas. They could not receive international aid. Will you take up this issue in the Geneva talks?
Solheim: The Geneva-meeting will be addressing the security situation. The parties will decide when and how to approach other issues.

Tehelka: What was the outcome of your recent Indian visit and meetings with National Security Adviser M K Narayanan and Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran? How do you think India could help Norway in the peace process?
Solheim: The Government of India has always been supportive of the peace process and Norwegian as facilitator, and India reiterated her support during the meetings. India also welcomed the flexibility shown by both parties in agreeing to Geneva as a compromise. Norway will continue to keep India informed and consulting throughout the process.

International human rights bodies have expressed concern that Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Commission (HRC), the country’s human rights watchdog, may collapse because the government has failed to replace the outgoing commissioners.

On Friday Amnesty International called for “immediate action to preserve the country’s key institution responsible for the protection of human rights”.

“Given the serious and widespread abuses of human rights that affect Sri Lankans across the country, a fully functional, independent national human rights commission is essential,” said Kavita Menon, South Asia researcher at Amnesty International. “Victims of human rights abuses in Sri Lanka have too little recourse to justice and redress as it is.”

Outgoing HRC chairperson Radhika Coomaraswamy, who last month was appointed as the UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, has warned that without urgent action by the government, “there will be a real crisis”.

The HRC carries out investigations into cases of torture, ‘disappearances’, political killings and other human rights violations. It also acts to promote and protect human rights. The rights commission has sweeping powers to investigate allegations of excesses by the police and the security forces. It is also empowered to investigate public services for any violation of fundamental rights.

The Hong Kong-based Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) said that Sri Lanka’s commission was set up in the early 1990s to “introduce some semblance of accountability into the system,” but that was in danger of being undermined without staff.

The AHRC executive director Basil Fernando said he believed the real problem was the “government’s deliberate attempts” to place all independent commissions under its direct control and to discourage the monitoring of government agencies in any form.

Appointments to the HRC are to be made by the President on the recommendation of the Constitutional Council, which itself lapsed in March 2005 and has not been reconstituted due to political disagreements among parliamentary parties over filling the final spot on the 10 member panel.

The deadlock has already resulted in the collapse of the National Police Commission and the Judicial Services Commission, which are responsible for the day-to-day administration of the police and the judiciary respectively. With the collapse of the independent commissions, the administrative powers have reverted to the police chief in the case of the police department and the chief justice in the judiciary.

“The important work of the Commission is likely to be severely disrupted as the current term of the Commissioners ends on Monday 3 April, with no new members selected to take their place,” said Amnesty International.

With the collapse of the rights commission, the investigations would have to stop, reported the Daily Mirror newspaper.

“With human rights under grave threat each and every day, the government should ensure the continued functioning of the Human Rights Commission as a priority,” said Amnesty’s Kavita Menon.

“In the longer term, the Commission must be strengthened further, including by providing it with adequate funds, and expanding its powers to carry out independent investigations and bring cases directly to the courts,” she added.

Pakistan and Sri Lanka have reiterated their mutual desire to further intensify and broaden cooperation in military and other fields following a three day visit to India’s arch-foe by Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse.

The two countries vowed “to combat extremism and terrorism” in all its forms “in the interest of peace and progress of their societies,” the Pakistani foreign ministry said in a statement.

Pakistan also offered defence equipment, producing in Pakistan and training facilities to the armed forces of Sri Lanka, the Sunday Observer reported.

Pakistan also reaffirmed its support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Sri Lanka.

Issuing a joint statement at the conclusion of the three day official visit by Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse the two leaders outlined the need to further strengthen SAARC, while expressing satisfaction on the ratification of SAFTA by all member States of SAARC.

Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz also reaffirmed their support for the ongoing peace process in Sri Lanka between the government and the Liberation Tigers, the Pakistani foreign ministry said.

Relations between the two countries have improved notably since 2000, when Pakistan helped Sri Lanka with military weaponry after the Liberation Tigers came close to capturing Jaffna in the Tamil heartland.

The two countries discussed matters of mutual interest and underscored the need for promoting peace and security in the region during a meeting Saturday between President Rajapaksa and Senior Federal Minister and Pakistani Minister for Defence, Rao Sikandar Iqbal.

The Defence Minister thanked Sri Lanka for providing the valuable supports to Pakistan in the wake of the October 8 earthquake.

Dr. P. B. Jayasundera, Sri Lanka’s Finance Secretary told the Sunday Observer in Islamabad that the visit was also focussed on economic ties between the two countries.

“The bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the two nations entered in to in 2005 has boosted trade and doubled exports to Pakistan. As a further support to these developments, the Sri Lankan government offered a 10 million USD credit line to Pakistani importers to buy Sri Lankan products particularly from SME sector,” he said.

Both countries are making efforts to work towards increasing the tourist traffic between them and enhancing the air connectivity. Discussions are also being held to recommence a regular feeder shipping service between Colombo and Karachi.

Meanwhile, a team of senior Sri Lankan government officials are scheduled to visit India next week, Presidential sources told the Sunday Times newspaper.

The delegation, to comprise of Foreign Secretary H. S. Palihakkara, Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Finance Secretary Dr. P.B. Jayasundere and Secretary General of the Peace Secretariat Dr. John Gooneratne, comes on the heels of President Rajapakse’s visit to Pakistan and an earlier visit by Sri Lanka’s Defence Secretary to China.

India had raised concerns over Sri Lanka’s seemingly increased ties with Pakistan and China, and the visit is to reassure India and water-down its concerns, the Sunday Times reports.