Sri Lanka

Taxonomy Color

red

‘Our people will not be tolerant any longer’

Dec 09

Mr. Pirapaharan at a ceremony on Nov. 27 to salute fallen LTTE fighters

The Sinhala nation continues to be entrapped in the Mahavamsa mindset, in that mythical ideology. The Sinhalese people are still caught up in the legendary fiction that the island of Sri Lanka is a divine gift to Theravada Buddhism, a holy land entitled to the Sinhala race. The Sinhala nation has not redeemed itself from this mythological idea that is buried deep and has become fossilised in their collective unconscious. It is because of this ideological blindness the Sinhalese people and their political and religious leaders are unable to grasp the authentic history of the island and the social realities prevailing here. They are unable to comprehend and accept the very existence of a historically constituted nation of Tamil people living in their traditional homeland in north-eastern Sri Lanka, entitled to fundamental political rights and freedoms. It is because of the refusal by the Sinhala nation to perceive the existential reality of the Tamils and their political aspirations the Tamil national question persists as an unresolved complex issue.

We do not expect a radical transformation in the social consciousness, in the political ideology, in the Mahavamsa mental structure of the Sinhalese people. The scope and power of Sinhala-Buddhist hegemony has not receded, rather, it has revived and taken new forms, exerting a powerful dominance on the southern political arena. In these objective conditions we do not believe that we can gain a reasonable solution from the Sinhala nation. We have to fight and win our rights. We have never entertained the idea that we could obtain justice from the compassion of the Sinhala politicians. This has always been the view of our liberation organisation.

Even though we are deeply convinced that we cannot obtain justice from the Sinhala political leadership, but rather have to fight and win our rights, we were compelled by unprecedented historical circumstances to participate in peace talks with the Sinhala state. We were compelled to engage in the negotiating process by the intervention of the Indian regional superpower at a particular historical period and by the pressure of the international community at a later period. There were other reasons also that encouraged us to engage in the peace process. Constructive engagement in the peace process is a viable means to secure legitimacy for our liberation organisation as the representative organ of our people. We also wanted to internationalise our struggle and win the support and sympathy of the international community. Furthermore, there is a need to convince the world community that we are not war-mongers addicted to armed violence, but rather, firmly and sincerely committed to non-violent peace process. Finally and most importantly, we wanted to demonstrate beyond doubt that the Sinhala racist ruling elites would not accept the fundamental demands of the Tamils and offer a reasonable political solution. It was with these objectives we participated in the peace process.

Over the last three decades of our national liberation struggle we have observed ceasefires and participated in peace talks at different periods of time in different historical circumstances. We knew that our enemy was dishonest and devious. We knew that these peace talks would not produce any positive results. We knew that there would be peace traps. Yet we participated in the peace talks with sincere commitment and dedication. In the course of our engagement we encountered pressures and complex challenges. There were traps to undermine our liberation struggle. We acted prudently and avoided pitfalls. We vehemently opposed all subversive strategies that were detrimental to the interests of our people. The Tamil people are fully aware of the fact that during the time of Indian intervention, when we encountered a serious threat to our freedom struggle and to the interests of our people, our liberation organisation was bold enough to oppose the Indian superpower and fight its military machine.

From the Thimpu talks, we have participated in several peace negotiations, at different times, at different places. Unprecedented in the history of our struggle, it is only now, we have devoted a lengthy period of four years for the peace effort. However, despite this protracted period of time our sincere and persistent efforts to reach a settlement to the problems of our people have become futile.

The recent peace talks have been significant and essentially different. They have been held with the facilitation of a third country, with the supervision of the international community. There were sessions of negotiations with Mr Ranil Wickremasinghe’s administration and later with Chandrika Kumaratunga’s government. The decisions, resolutions and Agreements reached during these negotiations were never fulfilled. During this process of negotiations we were extremely tolerant and even compromised on several issues. Nevertheless, the Sinhala political leadership refused to offer justice to our people.

On the 24 December 2001 we unilaterally declared cessation of hostilities and opened the doors for peace. At that time, when we extended our hand of friendship to the Sinhala nation, we stood on a strong foundation. Having liberated the Vanni region and over run the Elephant Pass military complex, we had firmly established the balance of military power in our favour. I need not go into the details of the peace negotiations we had with Mr Ranil Wickremasinghe’s government in various world capitals under Norwegian facilitation. It is suffice to say that Mr Wickremasinghe’s administration was unable to resolve even the basic existential hardships and urgent humanitarian needs of our people. Adopting delaying tactics, Ranil’s government was primarily focusing on setting up an international safety net aiming at decommissioning our weapons. An international aid conference was organised in Tokyo in June 2003 as an essential element of this subversive scheme. Having realised the implications of the international safety net we decided to boycott the Tokyo conference and eventually to suspend the peace talks. Having failed to achieve anything, Ranil’s regime came to an end. In the meantime President Kumaratunga formed a new government with the alliance of racist forces opposed to peace. Chandrika refused to initiate the peace talks even though our organisation was willing to negotiate on the basis of our proposal for an interim self-government authority. Time began to elapse in a political vacuum without an interim settlement or a permanent solution. We realised that the aim of the Sinhala chauvinistic political leadership was to misdirect and undermine our liberation struggle by entrapping us in the uncertainty of a political vacuum. Faced with the meaningless absurdity of living in the illusion of peace we decided to resume our national liberation struggle. It was at that conjuncture, during the latter part of last year, when we were charting our action plan, that the horrendous natural disaster struck.

Suddenly, unexpectedly the tsunami waves struck at the villages and settlements along the eastern coastal belt of our homeland causing an unprecedented catastrophe. In this cataclysmic disaster unleashed by nature, twenty thousand Tamil and Muslim people perished and about three hundred thousand people lost their homes, properties and were reduced to conditions of refugees. As nature inflicted further calamity on the Tamil nation, which had already suffered monumental destruction by war, our people were burdened with unbearable suffering. In these circumstances, our liberation movement was geared to confront the crisis. Our fighting formations, as well as our cadres belonging to various social and administrative services, were immediately engaged in the tasks of relief and rehabilitation.

As the tsunami catastrophe shook the conscience of the world, the international governments volunteered to provide huge sums of money in aid for relief and rehabilitation of the affected people. In the meantime President Kumaratunga expressed her willingness to form a joint administrative mechanism in cooperation with the LTTE to implement the tasks of relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction for the affected Tamil speaking people. We decided to talk to the Kumaratunga government since we had to give primacy to the extraordinary humanitarian tragedy faced by our people. Talks were conducted at the level of peace secretariats. Since we wanted to avoid delays in the negotiating process we adopted a flexible attitude, even compromised on crucial matters, and finally an agreement was reached to establish a joint administrative mechanism. The Accord was also signed by both parties.

The international community expressed full support for the joint administrative structure worked out by both the Sri Lanka government and the LTTE. The international governments also expressed hope that a congenial environment for joint effort by warring parties had been created. But the Sinhala-Buddhist racist forces could not tolerate the emergence of a congenial environment of goodwill. Having registered their vehement protest to the joint administrative mechanism, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and Jathika Hela Urumaja withdrew their support to the government. These parties also filed a case in the Supreme Court challenging the constitutional validity of the joint administrative mechanism. The determination of the Supreme Court made the joint mechanism inoperative.

With the demise of the tsunami mechanism the Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism killed the last hope of the Tamil people. Even the all-powerful President Kumaratunga could not provide a simple humanitarian project for the Tamils against the wishes of the Sinhala racist forces. The tsunami mechanism was not devolved with any political power nor was it to have any administrative authority. If there was so much opposition in southern Sri Lanka to a simple provisional arrangement then it is a daydream to expect to secure a regional self-governing authority in the Tamil homeland by negotiating with the Sinhala political leadership. This is the political truth that we have been able to learn from the four year period of the peace process. We hope that the international community, which has been intensively observing this political drama, similarly understands this truth.

I wish to explain here a matter of crucial importance, which betrays the politics of duplicity of the Sinhala ruling elites. You would have heard about a secret shadow war being waged against our organisation behind the screen of peace. This subversive war has been unleashed with the aim of weakening our liberation organisation and to undermine our struggle. A large number of people consisting of our senior cadres, important members, supporters, Tamil politicians, journalists and educationists who were sympathetic to our cause, have been cowardly murdered. We know the real masterminds behind this shadow war. Though these violent acts were committed under the guidance and direction of the Sri Lankan military intelligence, we are aware that mysterious hands of some racist Sinhala politicians are behind these nefarious activities. This subversive war is being conducted in the government controlled territories, with the backing of the armed forces, utilising Tamil para-military elements as instruments. We expressed vehement protest to the Sri Lanka government when our unarmed political cadres were murdered and our political offices were bombed in the government controlled areas. Since the government ignored our protests we were compelled to withdraw our cadres to our controlled areas.

A strange low intensity war has been unleashed against us taking advantage of the conditions of peace effected by the ceasefire. Disarming the Tamil para-military groups is an obligation of the state under terms of the Ceasefire Agreement. Having failed to fulfil this crucial obligation the Sri Lanka state has been utilising the Tamil para-militaries as instruments of this subversive war against our liberation organisation. This is a serious war offence. This is similar to a treacherous act in which one stabs you in the back with one hand while pretending to embrace you with the other. This behaviour clearly demonstrates that the Sinhala ruling elites have no genuine interest in peace and ethnic reconciliation. The Sri Lanka state has not given up the military option but rather transformed the war into a new mode of state terror under conditions of peace. We hope that the international community will discern the real mode of this shadow war and perceive its ugly face and ulterior motives.

As far as the Tamil people are concerned, the concepts of peace, ceasefire and negotiations have become meaningless; concepts that do not correspond to or reflect reality. A shadow war conducted under conditions of peace, military occupation perpetrated in violation of the terms of ceasefire, an international subversive network woven during political negotiations, are the distorted ways the peace process has been abused. Because of these factors our people have lost faith in everything.

Our people have lost faith in a peace process that has failed to secure them a real, peaceful life; they have lost faith in a ceasefire that has failed to remove the occupation army from their homes; they have lost faith in the talks that have failed to resolve their long standing problems.

Our people can no longer tolerate an unstable life and an uncertain future. The waves of popular upsurgence erupting in the Tamil homeland are manifestations of the discontent and despair of our people; they are fierce demonstrations of their political aspirations. The multitude of Tamil masses, who converged at recent Tamil resurgence conventions, have publicly proclaimed their demands. The international community cannot ignore these proclamations of a unified nation calling for the recognition of their right to self-determination, of their right to rule themselves. Our people aspire to determine their own political status. Having been subjected to decades of systematic state repression, they call upon the international community to recognise their political aspirations.

We have now reached a significant historic turning point in our struggle for self-determination. The ruling elites of southern Sri Lanka will never recognise our people’s right to self-determination. The Tamil right to self-determination will never find space in the entrenched majoritarian constitution and in the political system built on that constitutional structure. Our people have, therefore, realised that they have no alternative other than to fight and win their right to self-determination. Self-determination entails the right to freely choose, without external interference, our political life. The Sinhala nation has been refusing to embrace our people, to recognise their national identity and to share political power. This political alienation has continued since the independence of the island 57 years ago. Frustrated by years of alienation, oppression and ill-treatment as an unwanted people, the Tamils have finally decided to exclude and boycott the Sri Lankan polity and its power system. The boycott of the presidential elections by the vast majority of Tamil people was a concrete expression of this perspective. Our people did not participate in the election even though they had the voting power to determine the election of a new president. The non-participation of the Tamils should not be construed as a judgement of the personalities or policies of the presidential candidates. Rather, this political boycott was an expression of deep distrust and disillusionment of the Tamil people with the Sinhala political system. This event symbolises a serious turning point in the political history of the Tamils. It signifies that the Tamil people may choose their own path and freely determine their own political destiny.

The Sinhala nation has chosen a new national leader. A new administration has assumed power under his leadership. This new government has been elected by the Sinhala majority specifically with their voting power. The national minorities are not represented in this government. It is essentially a Sinhala-Buddhist regime. Therefore Mahinda Rajapakse does not represent all the social formations of this country. He has assumed power as a president to protect and promote the interests of the Sinhala-Buddhist community. We are all aware of Mahinda Rajapaske’s thoughts and policies. We are also aware of the incompatible gaps and the irreconcilable contradictions that exist between Mr Rajapakse’s political vision and the Tamils’ struggle for self-determination. I do not wish to engage myself in a comparative analysis of this issue.

The recent presidential elections and the change in governance effected by the Tamil boycott have created a wide rift, politically, between the Tamil and Sinhala nations. While Sinhala-Buddhist hegemony has assumed predominance in the south, Tamil nationalism has emerged as a powerful force and consolidating itself in the Tamil homeland. While a new government under Mahinda Rajapkse has assumed power in the Sinhala nation, LTTE’s administration is expanding and gaining strength as a concrete embodiment of Tamil nationalism.

The international community is fully aware of the fact that we are running an efficient, self-governing administrative structure in the majority areas of the Tamil homeland, which were liberated from Sinhala military occupation by our organisation. Our administrative structure is formidable, consisting of our controlled territories with huge civilian populations, protected by a powerful military force. We have a police force and a judicial system to maintain law and order. We have also developed a complex administrative infra-structure of a shadow government. Though a large number of Tamils are still living in the military occupied Tamil region, their allegiance is with our liberation movement. The Sinhalese ruling class refuses to accept this ground reality, this political truth and attempts to belittle our liberation organisation as a ‘terrorist group’. We are disappointed and sad to note that some international governments, having been influenced by this false propaganda, continue to retain our organisation on their terrorist list. Biased positions taken by powerful nations acting as guardians of the peace process, in excluding and alienating our liberation organisation as a ‘terrorist outfit’ and supporting the interests of the Sri Lankan state, severely affected the balance of power relations between the parties in conflict at the peace negotiations. This pro-state bias constrained our liberty to choose our own political status. This partiality finally became one of the causes for the collapse of the peace talks.

There is no clear, coherent, globally acceptable definition of the concept of terrorism.

As such, just and reasonable political struggles fought for righteous causes are also branded as terrorism. Even authentic liberation movements struggling against racist oppression are denounced as terrorist outfits. In the current global campaign against terror, state terrorism always finds its escape route and those who fight against state terror are condemned as terrorists. Our liberation organisation is also facing a similar plight.

We have now reached the critical time to decide on our approach to achieve the objective of our struggle. At this crucial historical turning point a new government under a new leader has assumed power in the Sinhala nation. This new government is extending its hand of friendship towards us and is calling our organisation for peace talks. It claims that it is going to adopt a new approach towards the peace process. Having carefully examined his policy statement in depth, we have come to a conclusion that President Rajapkse has not grasped the fundamentals, the basic concepts underlying the Tamil national question. In terms of policy, the distance between him and us is vast. However, President Rajapakse is considered a realist committed to pragmatic politics, we wish to find out, first of all, how he is going to handle the peace process and whether he will offer justice to our people. We have, therefore, decided to wait and observe, for sometime, his political manoeuvres and actions.

Our people have lost patience, hope and reached the brink of utter frustration. They are not prepared to be tolerant any longer. The new government should come forward soon with a reasonable political framework that will satisfy the political aspirations of the Tamil people. This is our urgent and final appeal. If the new government rejects our urgent appeal, we will, next year, in solidarity with our people, intensify our struggle for self-determination, our struggle for national liberation to establish self-government in our homeland.
A change in tack

Even in comparison to bloodletting in the ongoing shadow war, the intensity of the violence which erupted last weekend in Jaffna was extraordinary. Amidst the dozens of gun and grenade attacks on Sri Lanka Army (SLA) positions in the northern peninsula, the claymores which ripped through two military vehicles killed a total of fifteen soldiers. It is the first time the mines have been used there since the February 2002 truce. The blasts reverberated across the island, sending the Colombo stock market into freefall and triggering panic that a resumption of Sri Lanka’s bloody conflict was imminent. But then, as abruptly as it began, the violence stopped.

Two weeks ago LTTE leader Vellupillai Pirapaharan delivered an unmistakable warning to newly elected President Mahinda Rajapakse that his administration must put forward ‘a reasonable political solution’ to the ethnic question within a year or risk the resumption of the LTTE’s struggle for self-determination. Since then, seasoned observers of the conflict have been uneasily awaiting Colombo’s response. In contrast, other analysts, including sections of the Colombo press, incredulously saw Mr. Pirapaharan’s Heroes Day address on November 27 as quite tempered – or at least less confrontational than might have been expected.

Which is why the Jaffna violence – and the lethal claymore blasts in particular – have come as such a shock. The immediate question for many was whether the LTTE had advanced plans it might have drawn up for a war next year. To begin with, and as is becoming clearer now, the eruption in Jaffna was not connected to any wider military strategy being rolled out by the LTTE. Even the SLA, which did not go on alert this week, did not think so.

The attacks do, however, mark a distinctive new approach to the ongoing shadow war. Since November 17, when Mr. Rajapakse won the Presidential elections, there had been an encouragingly marked decline in the violence between Army-backed paramilitaries and the LTTE. It had even prompted the international observers of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) to hail the improvement.

However, the killing of two pro-LTTE activists by suspected Army-backed paramilitaries in Jaffna broke the lull. It also triggered a wave of violence against the SLA unprecedented since the ceasefire. Apart from the intensity of the retaliation, there were other differences too. It was near instant, regular Sri Lankan troops in the region came under fire, the attacks took place in several locations spread out deep within Army-controlled territories and were they closely coordinated.

The Jaffna violence therefore sends several unmistakable messages to the Sri Lankan government. Firstly, that further attacks on LTTE supporters and members by military intelligence or their paramilitaries are likely to draw a strong, even vehement, response, irrespective of the ceasefire agreement. More specifically, the response will not necessarily be constrained by a need to avoid being seen to be breaching the ceasefire. In other words, security is being visibly prioritised over propriety.

Secondly, the distinction between Sri Lankan military intelligence and the rest of the Army no longer holds. (Of course, the distinction between paramilitaries and military intelligence that many observers insisted on drawing – and which underpins talk of ‘splits within the LTTE’ or ‘groups opposed to the LTTE - was utterly irrelevant to the Tigers, who know first hand what it takes to run a guerrilla campaign from within Army controlled territory.)

Last month, whilst commenting on the shadow war in his Heroes Day address, Mr. Pirapaharan made a pointed accusation: “though these violent acts were committed under the guidance and direction of the military intelligence, we are aware that hands of some Sinhala politicians are behind these nefarious activities. This subversive war is being conducted in the government controlled territories, with the backing of the armed forces, utilising Tamil paramilitary elements as instruments.”

In other words, the state and its armed forces are waging war, not just a renegade element within it: “the Sri Lanka state has not given up the military option but rather transformed the war into a new mode of state terror under conditions of peace.” This marks a specific advancement from the LTTE’s position, stated a few months ago, that military intelligence is behind the shadow war. With the state and its armed forces implicated, last week’s attacks underline that the response will not be restricted to the ‘instruments’ alone.

But it is the third message that has profound implications, especially for southern militarists. In the past few months, as the shadow war has smouldered on, paramilitary camps and military positions have come under grenade and grenade attack deep within Jaffna, particularly in the town and its environs. But last weekend the LTTE deliberately revealed a measure of its infiltration into the Jaffna peninsula and demonstrated its ability to wage a coordinated and sustained campaign far behind the frontline. Indeed, for many of the region’s older residents, the attacks were reminiscent of Tamil militants’ guerrilla attacks of the early eighties.

This factor comes further to the fore when considered against the backdrop of rising public frustration over the lack of normalcy four years since the ceasefire for large sections of Jaffna populace - particularly the displaced, those whose livelihoods are disrupted by security directives and those struggling to raise families in a militarised environment. Whilst the Army’s peace time conduct has been devoid of the rights abuses that were the norm before the ceasefire, irrespective of what the more starry-eyed of observers and the claims of some of Jaffna’s better heeled residents, the tensions between the military and ordinary people are just beneath the surface. The periodic bouts of rioting against the security forces and the constant petitioning of the government, the truce monitors and the international community indicate a seething resentment.

In the wake of many of the attacks this week, troops assaulted civilians in the vicinity of the sites. On occasion in past weeks, troops have also conducted cordon-and-search operations to locate possible perpetrators of attacks on their positions. This has led many observers – as well as the Army, naturally - to suggest the LTTE is attempting to provoke the troops into violence against civilians. But this erroneously assumes that the military violence against civilians, whilst undoubtedly contributing to popular resentment, is the main or sole cause for it. Indeed, some argue, that after four years of waiting, protesting and petitioning, it won’t take much now to make the region ungovernable.

This week’s violence, particularly the devastating claymore attacks, have jolted President Rajapakse’s administration into action. Norway, long kept on the sidelines, has now been hurriedly requested to resume its facilitatory role. Whilst Colombo has reacted angrily, condemning the LTTE and calling for international censure, on the ground in the Northeast, the military is being wary.

Even the newly appointed Army chief, Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, though a well known hardliner, was decidedly cautious in his comments. “We need to talk to the LTTE,” he said speaking about the claymore attacks, “to get their assistance to prevent such attacks.” As the then Jaffna commander, Gen. Fonseka almost stalled the Norwegian-brokered peace talks in January 2003 when he refused to withdraw his troops from the occupied civilian spaces incorporated into the SLA’s High Security Zones (HSZs).

The immediate question then is what Norway’s shuttle diplomacy can achieve, given the structural dynamics of the shadow war. If, as the LTTE believes, Sri Lanka is waging war by other means, then continuing paramilitary attacks will not only escalate the level of violence, given the gloves-off responses the LTTE seems prepared to give, it will also further poison the negotiating atmosphere.

More importantly, it very much remains to be seen if the paramilitary infrastructure will be dismantled. After at least two years of the shadow war, it is unlikely that merely standing down the covert operatives but leaving their assembled cadres in their Northeastern camps will suffice either to advance the peace process or curtail the LTTE’s engagement in the shadow war.
Diaspora Tamils mark Heroes Day

Heroes Day 2005 being marked by Tamils in Switzerland

Diaspora Tamils celebrated Heroes Day on November 27 along with Tamils across their homeland in Northeastern Sri Lanka. At large and small venues across North America, Europe and Australasia, tens of thousands gathered to pay their respects to Tamil Tiger fighters killed in the struggle for independence and to listen to LTTE leader Vellupillai Pirapaharan’s Heroes Day address.

Mr. Pirapaharan’s much anticipated speech is recognized as the movement’s annual policy statement and this year, it was broadcast across the world from the Vanni. The transmission from there by the LTTE-run satellite television, National Television of Tamileelam (NTT) was rebroadcast by other Diaspora run satellite and cable channels.

In the Tamil homeland, events were organized at twenty-five Great Hero cemeteries where 17,903 fighters, both men and women, are laid to rest.

In cities with concentrations of Diaspora Tamils, including Toronto and London (which host the largest expatriate communities), tens of thousand attended Heroes Day celebrations in amphitheatres, clusters of school halls and other venues lavishly decorated in the Tamil national colours of red and yellow.

Galleries of photographs of fallen LTTE fighters, particularly the most famous and those with relations in the local community, allowed visitors to file past, pay their respects and place floral tributes.

At most events, the Tamil national flag, bearing the LTTE’s emblem against red background was raised – but not in Britain, where the LTTE is banned (it is illegal to display the emblem of a banned organization). In the United States, where the LTTE is also banned, the LTTE flag was raised by Tamil Americans alongside the Stars and Stripes.

Mr Anton Balasingham and his wife, Adele, pictured shortly before speaking at Heroes Day 2005 in London

In London, the event was held in two large venues, including the famous Wembley Arena where an estimated ten thousand people filed in to pay their respects to fallen LTTE fighters and listen to Mr. Pirapaharan’s address as well as a speech by Mr. Anton Balasingham, the movement’s political strategist.

Mr. Balasingham's speech was broadcast to the Wembley Arena from the second venue, Alexanda Palace, where he was delivering it to several thousand other people.

The week before, an effort by an anti-LTTE Tamil organization to block the London Heroes Day event through a legal injunction was thrown out by the court they petitioned.

In Toronto, more than 25,000 people gathered in two sessions in the Congress Centre, one of the biggest indoor arena in the city. The Tamil national flower (Karthigai Poo) was distributed to everyone. The leader of ‘Viduthalai Chiruthaikal’ political party in Tamil Nadu participated in the morning commemoration and delivered an address. Representatives from various political parties in Canada also participated and delivered speeches on Sri Lanka’s conflict and the peace process.

There were other events in Ottowa, Cornwall as well as in Quebec for Tamils living these locations.

In Switzerland, thousands of Tamils attended their Heroes Day to pay their respects. The event was addressed by Tamil MP for the Jaffna district, Mr. Gajendran.

In Norway, over three thousand people packed into the Exporama hall in the city of Oslo to celebrate Heroes Day. The Tamil community in Bergen, on other side of Norway to Oslo, also gathered at a local venue. Jaffna district MP, Mr. Krishnan Sivanesan from the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), addressed the event in Olso.

In Sweden, his colleague, Vanni district MP Mr. Kanagaratnam Sathasivam, addressed Tamils gathered in Stockholm city.

In Herning, Denmark, 2,500 Tamil people from Denmark, Holland and Finland, gathered to join the celebrations. Another 500 people attended the event in Sjælland.

Heroes Day was commemorated simultaneously in five places - Gien, Monoco, Renne Strasbourg, Troyes - across France on Sunday.

The tiny Tamil community in southern Italy gathered at Letche on November 27 to join their countrymen across the world in the event. ‘Uthaya Tharahai’ music group performed patriotic songs. The students of Thileepan Tamil School performed patriotic dance and poems.

Tamils in Germany are planning to hold their event in Essen next Monday.

In Australia, Heroes Day celebrations were held in Adelaide (Nov 20), Brisbane (Nov 26) and Melbourne (Dec 3). Tamils in Sydney are to hold their event on December 10.

A bharathanatyam dancer participates in Heroes Day 2005 celebrations in Toronto, Canada

Hundreds of people from the Tamil community in New York attended the event at Queens on November 27. Families of fallen LTTE fighters were honoured with the distribution of ‘Sooriya Puthalvargal’ book.

In New Jersey, four hundred Tamils gathered at the Piscataway High School auditorium on December 4 to mark Heroes Day. Padmini Sithambaranathan, TNA MP from Jaffna addressed the gathering.

She also addressed the event in Dublin, Ohio, where a hundred local Tamils marked Heroes Day on December 4. Amongst the performers was Anita Sivaraman, a renowned Bharatha natyam dancer and grand daughter of the late Tamil Nadu politician, MGR.

World Tamil Coordinating Committee (WTCC-USA) which organised the events is arranging others at more states across USA in the coming weeks.

In South Africa also hundreds of Tamils gathered at Arudpa club in Durban, raising the Tamil Eelam flag and paying floral and candle tributes to fallen fighters, families of whom were amongst those attending.
No exceptions to ban on torture

The absolute ban on torture, a cornerstone of the international human rights edifice, is under attack. The principle we once believed to be unassailable - the inherent right to physical integrity and dignity of the person - is becoming a casualty of the so-called war on terror.

No one disputes that governments have not only the right but also the duty to protect their citizens from attacks. The threat of international terrorism calls for increased coordination by law enforcement authorities within and across borders. And imminent or clear dangers at times permit limitations on certain rights. The right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is not one of these. This right may not be subject to any limitation, anywhere, under any condition.

Many UN member states disregard this prohibition and continue to subject their citizens and others to torture and ill-treatment. Although a broad range of safeguards is available now to prevent torture, many states have either not incorporated them in their legislation or, if they have, do not respect them in practice.

Particularly insidious are moves to water down or question the absolute ban on torture, as well as on cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Governments in several countries are claiming that established rules do not apply anymore: that we live in a changed world. They argue that this justifies a lowering of the bar as to what constitutes permissible treatment of detainees. An illegal interrogation technique, however, remains illegal whatever new description a government might wish to give it.

Two phenomena have an acutely corrosive effect on the global ban on torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The first is the practice of having recourse to so-called diplomatic assurances to justify the return and “rendering” of suspects to countries where they face a risk of torture; the second is the holding of prisoners in secret detention.

The trend of seeking “diplomatic assurances” allegedly to overcome the risk of torture is very troubling. The international legal ban on torture prohibits transferring persons - no matter what their crime or suspected activity - to a place where they would be at risk of torture and other ill-treatment (the non-refoulement obligation).

Faced with the option of deporting terrorism suspects and others to countries where the risk of torture is well documented, some governments, in particular in Europe and in North America, purport to overcome that risk by seeking diplomatic assurances that torture and cruel, degrading or inhuman treatment will not be inflicted.

There are many reasons to be skeptical about the value of those assurances. If there is no risk of torture in a particular case, they are unnecessary and redundant. If there is a risk, how effective are these assurances likely to be?

But the problem runs deeper. The fact that some governments conclude legally nonbinding agreements with other governments on a matter that is at the core of several legally binding UN instruments threatens to empty international human rights law of its content. Diplomatic assurances create a two-class system among detainees, attempting to provide for a special bilateral protection regime for a selected few and ignoring the systematic torture of other detainees, even though all are entitled to the equal protection of existing UN instruments.

Let me turn to my second concern. An unknown number of “war on terror” detainees are alleged to be held in secret custody in unknown locations. Holding people in secret detention, with the detainee’s fate or whereabouts, or the very fact of their detention, undisclosed, amounts to “disappearance,” which in and of itself has been found to amount to torture or ill-treatment of the disappeared person or of the families and communities deprived of any information about the missing person.

Furthermore, prolonged incommunicado detention or detention in secret places facilitates the perpetration of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Whatever the value of the information obtained in secret facilities - and there is reason to doubt the reliability of intelligence gained through prolonged incommunicado or secret detention - some standards on the treatment of prisoners cannot be set aside. Recourse to torture and degrading treatment exposes those who commit it to civil and criminal responsibility and, arguably, renders them vulnerable to retaliation.

(Edited)

Louise Arbour is the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
The killings must be investigated

I recognize that my visit has come at an extraordinarily sensitive and critical time for the peace process. During the short period I have been here, there have been numerous killings in the north and east of the country of both Tamil and Muslim civilians as well as members of the security forces and the LTTE. I condemn these attacks without reservation and urge all parties to take immediate steps to de-escalate the situation and prevent this tide of violence rising further with catastrophic results for the country and its hopes of finding peace.

I am an independent expert, appointed by and reporting to the UN Commission on Human Rights. My final report will be submitted in early 2006. I should emphasize that the comments included in this statement are only of a preliminary nature. My full and final report will be available within three months from now on the website of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Before the report is made public the Government of Sri Lanka will be given an opportunity to make observations on the report. I will also seek further input from the LTTE and other parties.

The principal theme of my report is that extrajudicial killings, if left unchecked, have the potential to fatally undermine the peace process and to plunge Sri Lanka back into the dark days of all out war. This conclusion has tragically been borne out by the developments of recent days.

Neither of the principal parties to the conflict seems to give adequate recognition to the deeply corrosive impact of the killings that have been steadily accumulating and then accelerating throughout the course of 2005. These killings should not be thought of only in the cold and detached language and statistics of ‘ceasefire violations’, although they clearly are that. Nor should they be thought of only in abstract terms as violations of the international legal obligations of the parties, although they are that too. Most importantly, they are violating the right to life of a large number of Sri Lankans from all ethnic groups, and by undermining the peace process, putting at risk the lives of many more.

Both the Government and the LTTE have signaled the need to review the implementation of the CFA and to strengthen international monitoring arrangements. But pending a resumption of contacts and talks on these issues, it is essential and urgent for all those involved to immediately adopt a range of confidence-building measures. These steps cannot wait until a major breakthrough is possible. But equally importantly, they will make it far more likely that such a development can occur.

In order to put an end to the killings the key is to strengthen the accountability of those responsible. This involves a mix of initiatives including: far more effective police investigation, a role for the SLMM that includes investigation as well as monitoring, and unequivocal denunciations of killings by all parties. It is simply not enough for one party or another to throw up its hands and proclaim ‘we didn’t do it, and we can’t really tell you who did’. Permit me to elaborate briefly.

The upsurge in extrajudicial killings has been accompanied by a vacuum of investigative responsibility. The Sri Lanka Police have lost much of their appetite for serious investigations. While the difficulties presented by the environment in which they work must be acknowledged, they have in too many cases become a recording agency. This deters witnesses from coming forward and leaves the groups involved free to accuse one another regardless of the facts which might emerge from serious investigation.

The LTTE, for its part, issues frequent denials of killings and then contents itself with accusing the Karuna faction or other groups of acting in cahoots with the security forces to perpetrate most such killings. These denials do not appear credible to most observers and are contradicted by evidence I have collected during my visit that suggests that the LTTE has either been directly involved or has given protection to the perpetrators in some cases.

At the same time, the security forces find it convenient to downplay the significance of the Karuna faction by dismissing many incidents as being LTTE-related and suggesting that it is irrelevant whether the LTTE or Karuna was responsible. This ambivalence toward the Karuna faction is reflected in the weak response of the Government to the relevant killings despite firm official instructions and denials of involvement.

The failure to effectively investigate the killings has resulted in many areas of the North and East – whether controlled by the Government or by the LTTE – becoming zones of impunity for killers with different motivations and affiliations. This in turn generates inflammatory and often contradictory rumours that risk giving way to cycles of retaliation.

A case in point is the attack last month on the Akkairapattu mosque which killed six persons and seriously wounded 29 others. This was a particularly heinous act, involving the violation of a place of worship and an assault on innocent parties at prayer, and it has led to further convulsions of violence between the Muslim and Tamil communities in the East. I do not exclude that there were many complex elements at play in the incident.

But no such elements can excuse such an act. And unless crimes of this kind are properly investigated, and those responsible held to account, they will only fuel the cycle of retaliation and violence. With that in mind, I call on the police to effectively investigate this attack. I must also note that, while the LTTE has denied its involvement in this attack, it has not taken the further step of unequivocally denouncing this act of killing.

The absence of effective investigation has placed considerable pressure on the SLMM to fill the vacuum. But its mandate has sometimes been interpreted excessively narrowly and in a way that makes it also appear to be mainly a recording agency. While it has made an invaluable contribution over its nearly four years in existence, it is time to reinforce its vital work. It should be accorded a stronger and better equipped role to enable it to carry out more in-depth monitoring of killings and to publicly report its findings of the facts in different cases. The Minister of Foreign Affairs said the Government had a long-standing desire to strengthen the effectiveness of monitoring arrangements. And Mr Thamilchelvan indicated to me that the SLMM’s role should be upgraded and ‘given teeth’. While the parties should continue to explore other, specialized models for human rights monitoring, strengthening the role of the SLMM on these issues would be an important first step in promoting respect for human rights and building confidence among the parties and the people.

(Edited)

Professor Philip Alston is the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions. He visited Sri Lanka earlier this month.
Desperate Move

Almost two weeks after taking office, President Mahinda Rajapakse has finally taken the most basic step towards a peaceful solution: inviting Norway to resume facilitating a dialogue between his government and the LTTE. The new government in Oslo was the first international actor to congratulate the new President and offer its good offices in ending Sri Lanka’s protracted and agonizing conflict. But Mr. Rajapakse has ignored the outstretched hand and snubbed Norway in his inaugural speech. And it is only amid the erupting violence in Army controlled Jaffna that he relented and sought Norway’s help. By contrast the Liberation Tigers requested the new government in Oslo to facilitate talks as far back as October. President Rajapakse has prevaricated and fumbled, trying to find alternatives to Norway – but none has been forthcoming.

During his election campaign, Mr. Rajapske – and especially his Sinhala nationalist allies, the Janatha Vimukthi Perumana (JVP) and the JHU – repeatedly lambasted and denigrated Norway’s efforts to promote peace in Sri Lanka. In the past, Norway’s diplomats have been subject to racial and communal slurs whilst aspersions have been cast on their country’s intentions and integrity. This mindset, from a Tamil perspective, is an integral part of the conflict. The insistence on a third party to broker talks remains a Tamil one; the Sinhala-dominated state has, jealously guarding a misguided notion of its sovereignty, long resisted ‘external’ involvement – unless, of course, it was to help crush the Tigers. The LTTE, an armed non-state actor, is well aware of international interests in Sri Lanka’s conflict and any political solution to it. Yet the Tigers have embraced the Norwegian role and, despite some misgivings, international involvement in it. Indeed it is not the internationalization of the conflict, but ‘over-internationalization’ – the foisting of external preferences - that they have resisted.

Norway’s assistance has never been more crucial for Sri Lanka’s peace. Oslo is not only the sole acceptable conduit for dialogue between both sides, but as head of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, is intimately connected with micro-efforts to prevent an outbreak of war. Norway has thus earned the gratitude of the people of the Northeast for their indefatigable efforts. But many Sinhala leaders have irresponsibly heaped invectives on the only international actor both prepared to get involved in promoting peace and – at one stage at least – acceptable to both sides. It is hard not to draw the conclusion hat Mr. Rajapske’s invitation to Norway this week is less an act of statesmanship than a desperate scrabble forced upon him by events in the North - and thus hardly the basis for any optimism.
War By Other Means

The violence which exploded across the Northeast –particularly in Jaffna – in the past week has understandably sent shockwaves throughout Sri Lanka and alarmed international actors with a stake in securing peace in the island. The frustration of the international ceasefire monitors is palpable, particularly given that just a week ago it appeared the smouldering yet relentless violence of the shadow war seemed to have eased, if not ceased. The lull ushered in by the Presidential election of November 17 was shattered last Thursday when gunmen murdered two pro-LTTE Tamil activists and wounded a third in Army controlled Jaffna. Subsequently, there has been an eruption of violence against the security forces in the northern peninsula – amid clashes between Army-backed paramilitaries and the Tigers in Batticaloa and simmering communal tensions in Trincomalee. But it is the situation in Jaffna that is being nervously watched most closely.

In the past week a rash of attacks on Sri Lankan troops across the government-controlled parts of the peninsula, including two lethal claymore attacks, have left at least fifteen soldiers dead. The question that has understandably risen amongst many is whether this presages a wider resumption of Sri Lanka’s conflict. The government says the LTTE is attempting to goad the armed forces into resuming the war. But this charge is untenable – recent events are too naked to be a provocation. The dynamic is quite different – and depressingly familiar: the violence in Jaffna, like that which has gripped the eastern province for over a year is unmistakably part of the shadow war between the military intelligence and the LTTE. But the clashes, as many, including this newspaper, have repeatedly warned, are escalating in scope and reach. Individual incidents are now serious enough in themselves to question the viability of the truce.

But ceasefire breaches that result in high loss of life are not new. Earlier on this year, Army-backed paramilitaries brazenly massacred an LTTE political delegation traveling through government held territory, killing the head of the movement’s political wing in Batticaloa, several of his aides and a Tamil parliamentarian traveling with him. In 2003, the Sri Lankan government twice attacked and sank LTTE ships in international waters, killing a dozen cadres each time. Nevertheless Norwegian-brokered talks went ahead a week after the first sinking and dialogue (though not direct talks) has taken place on numerous issues and occasions after the second.

What is concerning about the ongoing violence is that nothing is being done to reduce it. Despite repeated urgings by the international community – and at least two formal reprimands by the Co-Chairs of the peace process – Sri Lanka steadfastly refuses to disarm the Tamil paramilitaries. Instead, military intelligence is aggressively – even forcibly – recruiting more gunmen and expanding the scope of its war. The induction of newly constituted paramilitary units to the Jaffna peninsula in the past few weeks is the latest step in this war. Hopes that newly elected President Mahinda Rajapaske would be more prepared than his predecessor to rein in Sri Lanka’s military intelligence and halt its campaign against the LTTE and its supporters have now been dashed. Efforts by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) to arrange a meeting between military officials and the LTTE failed when the government – without explanation - withdrew permission for its officers to attend – even though the Army’s new commander has also called for dialogue.

A plethora of names are being bounced around – shadow war, stealth war, subversive war, and so on. But no concrete action is being taken to arrest it. As this newspaper has argued before, any peace process can only make progress amidst a stable security environment for both protagonists. Since the February 2002 ceasefire was signed Sri Lanka’s south has enjoyed security and stability – save a few high profile and isolated incidents and those, moreover, in recent times. But the security situation in the Northeast has been getting steadily worse for at least two years. Colombo’s schoolyard politics of sneak attacks and claims of innocence have been tolerated by the international community for too long. The Co-chairs must exert their influence with the new Sri Lankan administration to demonstrably implement Clause 1.8 of the Ceasefire Agreement immediately. A period of mutual de-escalation and confidence building is a sine quo non if a meaningful peace process is to resume. It must begin with an end to the Army’s covert onslaught.
Australian police search Tamil-owned premises

The Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Victoria Police Wednesday searched the premises of several persons in Melbourne, Victoria suspected of providing assistance to the Liberation Tigers, Australian press reports said.

Although no arrests were made, the raids carried out early on Wednesday are related to an ongoing investigation, The Australian newspaper reported.

It quoted a federal police spokesperson as confirming that “a number of warrants were executed” and items were seized.

The nature and scope of the warrants remained unspecified, but the AFP said their investigation was into activities that did not involve plans to carry out an attack in Australia

A man who frequents the community centre told The Age newspaper: “It wasn’t like a raid. The police talked to people and took away a computer. No one was arrested or charged. The house is a resource centre. It’s like a library.”

The AFP have not made any arrests or laid any charges and those who were taken for questioning were all release later the same day, friends of some of those detained said.

The AFP say the investigations are not terrorism related, the Australian Broadcasting Cooperation reported. According to the AFP the raids are part of an ongoing investigation of a sensitive nature, the state-owned television station said.

Four Melbourne properties were raided by the police investigating possible links with the LTTE, The Age newspaper said.

However, the Melbourne building raided by the AFP is a Tamil community centre and a distribution centre for the Tamil newspaper, Eelamurasu, The Age newspaper quoted community sources as saying.

The Tamil Co-ordinating Committee (TCC) of Australia, raided on Wednesday, was a legitimate organisation looking after the welfare of Tamils in Melbourne and Sri Lanka, a community leader said.
It does not matter a jot to the Tamils

The Sri Lankan presidential election that was held on Thursday, 17th November 2005 has produced a result that is of supreme irrelevance to the Tamils of the country. The Sri Lankan Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse of the UPFA has won the race receiving 4.88 million votes or 50.3% of the total cast to become the Sinhala nation’s fifth President. He has beaten the former Prime Minister and UNP candidate Ranil Wickremesinghe who received 4.70 million votes or 48.4% in a close-run race . It is reported that most Tamils did not cast their votes in this election. The Election Commissioner has put the voter turnout at some 75%.

This election should have been Ranil Wickremesinghe’s opportunity to build bridges with the disenfranchised Tamil community by pursuing a programme for equality, justice and peace for all citizens of the country. It is obvious from the figures of votes reported that he had a significant proportion of the Sinhala electorate supporting his policies for economic development and racial harmony and that he lost by a wafer thin margin. When considering that his rival Rajapakse by his virulent anti-Tamil stance had forfeited the right to Tamil votes, Wickremesinghe could have harvested the votes of all reasonable and moderate Sinhalese and as well as those of a majority of the Tamils and other minorities, if he had only shown some statesmanship and political fortitude.

But he and his senior cohorts like Moragoda and Dissanayake tried to outbid the devil himself by claiming during the hustings the dubious battle credits for sinking Tiger supply ships and for turning over the treacherous Karuna and his brigands. Sinhala triumphalism was to be his path to electoral glory. They also paraded the hoary chant that they had got the LTTE in the vice of Western governments and international public opinion. Wickremesinghe had still to learn the lesson that prosperity and leadership need courage and vision, and he has now paid the price for feebleness and chicanery. He has once again lost his chance to become President of the country and there is no doubt that he will now be cast on the scrap-heap of politics where he will be remembered as a good but weak man who was always out- manoeuvred by his old contemporary in politics, Chandrika Bandaranaike.

The new president Rajapakse took a hardline against the Tamils by entering into a pre-election agreement with the extreme Sinhala racist party, JVP, which has consistently advocated no political compromise with the Tamil parties and supported a military campaign for the annexation of the traditional Tamil homelands within a unitary Sri Lanka . He also allied himself with the chauvinistic party of the Buddhist monks, JHU, which has campaigned relentlessly for the domination of the Buddhist religion and the Sinhala race in the fabric and politics of Sri Lanka .

Mahinda Rajapakse, on the other hand, as the outgoing Prime Minister in the government of President Chandrika Bandaranaike had previously supported the continuation of the Cease Fire Agreement with the Liberation Tigers. He had also been a vocal supporter of the P-TOMS agreement with the LTTE to deal with the administration of foreign funds for tsunami relief in the north and east. But the principles and consciences of Sinhala leaders are like those of Faust, available to trade with the devil of Sinhalese racism and political opportunism. Rajapakse saw no dilemma in shedding his previous support for these watershed agreements for communal amity and constitutional progress.

He has now won the prize that he has always wanted and is an undeserving second-rater for the position. His attempts to siphon out some of the tsunami funds for his private account will besmirch him forever He had feared that because of his low birth and his undistinguished background, the more sophisticated Bandaranaikes would keep him out on this plum position.

The Tamils have no cause for celebration but have to view these events with circumspection and alarm. The madhouse of politics in Sri Lanka is once again in their hands of the inmates of the asylum. Rajapakse along with the JVP and the JHU have got the time bomb in their hands and can summon the roll of the war drums. It is up to them to engage in racist war cry and to shatter the fragile peace that has prevailed in that blighted country for nearly three years. Or, it is up to Rajapakse to abandon his ill-gotten friends of the extreme racist fringes and go forward in peace to implementing the Oslo accord and to restart peace talks.

The Tamils have been but innocent bystanders in the national politics of Sri Lanka since independence. There will not be a single Tamil in government this time again except for a few quislings. The Tamils will not want to be marginalised for ever and it is up to Rajapakse to grasp this opportunity to pursue peace with justice and prosperity or to reap the harvest of dragon’s teeth that he and the country will inevitably sow if he is hell-bent on a destructive Sinhala majoritarian and anti-Tamil course.
Liberal economics and illiberal politics

The international community has been visibly angered by the Liberation Tigers’ call for a boycott of last Thursday’s Presidential elections and for thus contributing to the defeat of Ranil Wickremesinghe of the United National Party (UNP). It has been no secret that Wickremesinghe was the international community’s preferred candidate and not the victorious Mahinda Rajapakse of the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) - even though diplomatic protocol precludes even the most vocal critics of the LTTE from saying so. The decision of the island’s Tamil community, including the majority of those in Colombo, to not exercise one of the limited rights they enjoy under Sri Lanka’s constitution to contribute to the installation Mr. Wickremesinghe as head of state has been met with incredulity and, in certain quarters, intense displeasure.

In the past few years, Mr. Wickremesinghe and his UNP have been embraced by the liberal world order as one of its own who has embraced the enlightened philosophies of globalisation and economic liberalisation. During his brief tenure in power, for example, he created the Ministry for Economic Reform, appointing the eloquent free-market warrior, Milinda Moragoda, to it. Mr. Wickremesinghe’s ‘Regaining Sri Lanka’ plan won the enthusiastic backing of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The economic blueprint might have been drafted by the international finance organisations, so complete was its embrace of neoliberal principles. The ethos of his administration was to roll back the state from the market: to privatise state assets, restructure government and open Sri Lanka’s markets to global trade.

The decision by the Tamils not to back Mr. Wickremesinghe is incredulous, especially when the argument that there was no difference for them between him and Rajapakse is impossible for advocates of the liberal peace to accept. Surely he is no chauvinist, they argue. Such a strong advocate of globalisation is surely beyond the petty politics of ethnicity, or so Mr. Wickremesinghe’s sponsors may suggest. Indeed, contemporary assumptions tend not to associate ethno-supremacists with pro-globalisation policies. Indeed, Mr. Wickremesinghe’s backers’ point to Rajapakse whose economic protectionist policies and Sinhala nationalism seem to go hand in hand.

But from a Tamil perspective, Mr. Wickremesinghe’s failure in redressing Tamil grievances go hand in hand with his successful regeneration of Sri Lanka’s economy - and military. The UNP administration inherited a failing economy and a debilitated military, both of which they proudly claim to resuscitated with the help of the international community. In the meantime, aside from the cessation of violence, the mainly Tamil Northeast has enjoyed few benefits from peace.

The question is whether anything was going to change if Mr. Wickremesinghe won. Tamil scepticism was confirmed most vividly during the closing stages of the UNP election campaign, when the party began unabashedly courting the Sinhala nationalist vote. Most surprising, it was Milinda Moragoda, the arch neo-liberal in Mr. Wickremesinghe’s coterie who launched the most crucial thrust, gloating over the government’s successes in dividing the LTTE, and generally undermining Tamil aspirations via the peace process.

Mr. Moragoda’s statements are the most incontrovertible evidence in recent times of the dichotomy in Sri Lanka between liberal economic policies and liberal political philosophies. The post-election tussle for power within the party between Mr. Wickremesinghe and more vociferous hawks within the UNP confirm Tamil concerns that beneath the party’s skin of liberal values, beats a Sinhala nationalist heart.

Contrary to expectations one might expect of globalist liberals, when Mr. Wickremesinghe’s party has sat in opposition in the recent and more distant past, they have consistently reverted to hawkish positions on the ethnic question. Most recently, for example, the UNP failed to support mechanisms for sharing aid with the LTTE. The much vaunted Post-Tsunami Operation Management Structure (P-TOMS), for example, collapsed by the wayside without a murmur from the UNP – save a grumble about not enough Sinhalese being in the structure (intended for the Northeast). In 2000 and earlier, the UNP even echoed the sentiments of ‘extremist’ parties such as the Janatha Vimukthi Perumana (JVP) in blocking President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s devolution proposals, however limited these may have been.

Mr. Wickremesinghe’s version of the party is not the first to mix ethnocentric politics with liberal market policies. The UNP administration of (first Prime Minister, then) President J. R. Jayawerdene in the 1980s is arguably the most ardent economic reformist in Sri Lanka’s post independence history. But he also brought in the present constitution concentrating power in a Presidency and entrenching the dominance of Sinhala Buddhism. Furthermore, by specifying unassailable thresholds for constitutional reform, Jayawerdene ensured that reform of the Buddhist state is a practical impossibility.

However, President Jayawerdene’s seriously flawed ethnic policies were ignored by the International Community, who welcomed the inaugural President’s economic reforms as welcome move away from the socialist policies of the 1970s. In the global context of the Cold War, Western powers prioritised Presdient Jayawerdene’s shift towards capitalism over other ‘minor’ issues such as his anti-Tamil policies. And this is the leader, after all, who unashamedly declared in 1983: “I am not worried about the opinion of the Jaffna people now...Now we cannot think of them. Not about their lives or of their opinion about us... The more you put pressure in the north, the happier the Sinhala people will be here...really, if I starve the Tamils out, the Sinhala people will be happy.”

With the induction of Sri Lanka into the capitalist block viewed as the more essential project, the international community turned a blind-eye to the growing state violence against the island’s Tamils. Academics such as Ronald Herring argue that the external financial assistance rendered to Sri Lanka to encourage further economic reform exacerbated the ethnic conflict in several ways. In his 2001 study, Herring argues, for example, that “the expanded flow of benefits enabled by aid was skewed” in favour of the Sinhalese. But, Herring argues, “escalation of ethnic conflict was not caused by foreign aid or structural adjustment,” but by “decisive contributions made by an autonomous sphere of politics.” The resulting foreign-assisted state patronage of specific ethnic groups fuelled communal tensions.

Herring singled out the Mahaveli scheme as an example of foreign aided state projects which exacerbated ethnic tensions. Drawing up to 45% of project aid between 1979 and 1981, the scheme was drawn up by the Jayawerdene administration, and resulted in “a large influx of ethnically motivated [Sinhala] colonists and settlers who come to the area with a confrontational attitude.” But despite utilising international aid to implement an ethnic colonisation programme, President Jayawerdene was hailed by his sponsors as an poster boy for economic liberalism.

Much like his uncle, Mr. Wickremesinghe had hoped to dazzle the International Community with the economic virtues of his administration and simultaneously placate the Sinhala nationalist constituency. Had the Tamil community played their part last week he would most likely have succeeded. But they did not and he has not. But regrettably, last week’s outcome is another misjudgement of Sri Lanka’s ruling parties by the international community, just like those which have in resulted fiscal, political and military assistance to the state to the detriment of the Tamils. As in the past, with Mr. Jayawerdene and Mrs. Kumaratunga, the international community continues to judge Sri Lanka’s leaders on their economic platforms and their dovish rhetoric, rather than their concrete actions on the ground.

The international community need to begin accounting for the variety of political, economic and religious dichotomies that plague the island, if they expect to be able to influence the emergence of a liberal peace. Amid these anomalies, it should come as little surprise that ethno-chauvinism and economic liberalism can be espoused at the same time by a mainstream political party keen to secure power and international aid at the same time. One might argue that international assessment of Colombo administrations’ hawkish or dovish character needs to be conducted on the same basis as the Tamils: a measure of what it actually delivered, not pledged.
‘Military, not LTTE, is intimidating presence’

Denying accusation they had intimidated Tamils into not voting in last week’s Presidential election, the Liberation Tigers said the boycott last week was a reflection of prevailing Tamil sentiments towards Sri Lankan leaders, based on their bitter experiences of the past.

The near total boycott by Tamil voters took place despite the oppressive presence of thousands of Sri Lankan troops and Army-backed paramilitaries in Jaffna and other parts of the Northeast, the LTTE’s Political Head, Mr. S. P. Thamilchelvan, told TamilNet Tuesday.

“The reality was that the Tamil people, faced with intimidation by the all pervasive presence of Sri Lankan troops, Army-backed paramilitary cadres and intelligence operatives delivered a message against intimidation by the military,” he said.

He questioned how the allegation of intimidation could be levelled against the LTTE when the voters in question were living under the guns of the occupying Sri Lankan forces?

He also pointed out that LTTE members had long ago been withdrawn from SLA held areas in the wake of Sri Lankan military intelligence supported paramilitary attacks on them.

“There are forty thousand Sri Lankan troops in Jaffna alone exercising a clear intimidatory presence,” Mr. Thamilchelvan said. “Nevertheless, there was a record low in polling in Jaffna.”

“Those who allege that the Tamil people were intimidated not only fail to understand the ground reality prevailing in the Tamil homeland in both political and historical context, but also fail to interpret the message the people have given,” he said.

“The reality today is that the tsunami and war displaced people are enduring flood damage in temporary shelters despite four years of peace” Mr. Thamilchelvan, who was monitoring relief work amongst floods in the Vanni, told TamilNet.

“Our stand, as representatives of the Tamil people, on Colombo’s elections, was a reflection of what the vast majority of Tamil people felt,” he said.

“Our conclusion [on the elections] was a thus a reflection of the prevailing views of the Tamils. We, as the representatives of the Tamil people have simply adhered to the principle of reflecting that view,” he further said.

Mr. Tamilselvan further pointed out that the LTTE had not ordered Tamils to boycott the elections, but had refused to mobilise for or against any of the Sinhala candidates contesting.

“All access was provided to election monitors if they so wished. Roads were open,” the LTTE’s Political Head said.

He added that election monitors were still welcome to take up the complaints against the LTTE “issue by issue” and “to examine the circumstances concerned in-depth.”

Over the weekend, the European Union and the US State Department condemned the Tigers, accusing them of interfering with the election and of intimidating Tamils into boycotting the elections.

“The United States regrets that Tamil voters in the northern and eastern parts of the island did not vote in significant numbers due to a clear campaign of intimidation by the LTTE,” a State Department statement said.
LTTE condemned as Tamils boycott poll

Whilst large numbers of Sri Lankans turned out to back their candidates of choice in Thursday’s Presidential elections, the ballots were cast mainly in the island’s Sinhala dominated south and in parts of the multi-ethnic east.

There was a near-total boycott in the Tamil dominated north and few Tamils voted in the eastern province after the Liberation Tigers and Tamil parliamentarians urged them to stay away.

“The Tigers had clearly sent a message to the people not to vote. They called for a boycott without actually saying it,” a military commander told AFP.

In the lead up to the election, the Tigers made no secret of their lack of interest in the outcome, but said they would not interfere in the elections.

“After the election, all promises are forgotten. We are totally unconcerned about the outcome of this election. We are a responsible political organization and have decided that people are at liberty to decide whether to vote and how to vote,” LTTE political head S.P. Tamilchelvan told Reuters

Less than one percent of voters in Jaffna turned out to vote. Turnout amongst Tamils was low in the eastern Batticaloa, Trincomalee and Amparai also, though Sinhalese and Muslims voted.

In parts of the east, LTTE supporters and cadres burned tyres and manned barricades at crossing points between LTTE-controlled and Army-controlled areas, sparking furious condemnations from election monitors and supporters of the main opposition United National Party (UNP) whose candidate, Ranil Wickremesinghe, was relying on a large number of Tamil votes.

After the scale of the Tamil boycott became clear, the UNP formally demanded a repeat of the polls in the Northeast, saying voters had been denied the vote by the LTTE’s call and disruption.

However, when Sri Lanka’s Election Commission declined to re-poll, on the basis the disruptions – as opposed to the heeding of the LTTE call - would not have altered the outcome, the UNP agreed to abide by the victory of Mahinda Rajapakse, Wickremesinghe’s archrival.

The BBC reporter in Colombo, Sanjoy Majumder, said it is clear that Wickremesinghe lost not just because of the Tamil boycott in the north and east of the island, but also because many Tamils in Colombo, where his support has been strong, did not vote for him.

UNP party workers were bitter about the Tamil boycott in the north which, they say, not only denied Wickremesinghe potential votes, but also facilitated electoral fraud on behalf of Rajapakse.

Even in the predominantly Tamil Batticaloa district, Rajapakse, despite campaigning on a hardline Sinhala platform, had apparently secured several thousand votes, they said.

The European Union and the US State Department condemned the Tigers, accusing them of interfering with the election and of intimidating Tamils into boycotting the elections.

International ceasefire monitors of the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM) said that whilst accusations the LTTE set up barricades could not be proven, the Tiger should have ensured there was free movement of people.

Complaints were made that angry crowds gathered to prevent Tamils from leaving LTTE-controlled areas to vote in polling booths set up in Army-controlled regions.

However, LTTE spokesman Thaya Master pointed out that it were crowds of unarmed citizens gathered, not LTTE soldiers.

“They were expressing their disinterest toward the elections, and protesting against the Sinhalese candidates,” he said. “It is not our business to do something like this, but if our people choose to demonstrate, we will not stop them.”

The scale of the Tamil boycott startled many. Sri Lanka’s Elections Commissioner Dayananda Dissanayake said: “We have never seen anything like that before. I can’t say what caused this.”

From the Kilinochchi district, only 1 person out of 66,596 voters – and he picked Wickremesinghe.

In Jaffna, about only 8,500 people voted (of which 5,500 opted for Wickremesinghe and almost 2,000 for Rajapakse). Election officials said over 701,000 people were eligible to vote in Jaffna, but pointed with many abroad or displaced, in the last Parliamentary elections only 250,000 voted.

The Jaffna electorate comprises Kayts, Vaddukoddai, Kankesanthurai, Manipay, Kopay, Udupiddy Point Pedro, Chavakacheri, Nallur, Jaffna and Kilinochchi towns.

In Vanni, comprising Mullaithivu, Mannar and Vavuniya, 85,874 of 250,386 registered voted. Wickremesinghe took 65,798 against Rajapakse’s 17,197.

In Trincomalee, where eligible voters are split 34.3%, 32,7% 26.4% into Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese, 154,000 of almost 239,000 cast their ballot, just over 92,000 for Wickremesinghe and almost 55,700 for Rajapakse.

The Trincomalee electorate comprises Mutur, Trincomalee and Seruwila. In areas of Trincomalee where the government arranged for buses to transport people from Tiger-controlled areas to polling booths in government-held regions, the buses travelled empty.

In Batticaloa electorate, comprising Kalkudah, Pattiruppu and Batticaloa, 154,615 of the 318,728 eligible voters cast their ballots – 121,514 for Wickremesinghe and 28,836 for Rajapakse. Of the eligible voters in the electorate, 76.4%, 23.5% and 0.25% are Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese.

In the Digamadulla electorate, comprising Amparai, Sammanthurai, Kalmunai and Pottuvil, 288,208 of 396,453 eligible voters cast their ballots – 159,198 for Wickremesinghe and 122,329 for Rajapakse. Muslims, Sinhalese and Tamils comprise 41.7%, 39.3% and 18.8% respectively of the eligible voters in the Digamadulla electorate.
Rajapakse’s move on peace awaited

Amid political turmoil in the wake of the election last week of President Mahinda Rajapakse, who campaigned on a hardline Sinhala nationalist platform, anxieties continued this week for the stalled Norwegian peace process.

An offer Friday by Norway to resume peace facilitation with the new administration has gone unanswered and, in his inaugural speech, President Rajapakse, until last week Premier under President Chandrika Kumaratunga, pointedly did not mention Norway’s offer or future role.

President Rajapakse was elected in elections last Thursday, defeating his main rival, Ranil Wickremesinghe of the main opposition United National Party (UNP) by a narrow margin.

But whilst Wickremesinghe secured the support of the main Upcountry parties and Sri Lanka’s biggest Muslim party, Rajapakse’s victory stemmed from a solid Sinhala vote bloc mobilized by ultra-nationalist allies.

Sri Lanka’s Tamils boycotted the election. And although the UNP initially challenged the outcome of the election Friday, it agreed to abide by the “people’s decision” Saturday, after the country’s Elections Commission refused a repoll, saying the outcome was not affected by the boycott.

Even before the controversy had been resolved, Friday night Norway offered its congratulations to President Rajapakse and declared its preparedness to continue peace facilitation in Sri Lanka.

“Norway remains willing to facilitate the peace process … for as long as the two parties request such assistance, and for as long as it is possible for Norway to play a constructive role,” veteran Peace Envoy and now Norwegian Minister of International Development, Mr. Erik Solheim, said.

Doubts over Norway’s role had been raised consequent to the bitter criticism leveled against the peace broker by Rajapakse’s campaign allies, the ultra-nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Perumana (JVP) which condemned Oslo as conspiring to divide Sri Lanka with the LTTE.

“It is an acknowledged fact that the ongoing peace process has certain shortcomings,” Rajapakse told state television on the eve of the vote. “If that is the case, the peace process has to be revised. Each and every step that was taken in the direction of peace has failed so far.”

Rajapakse and the JVP, which is suspicious of the West are said to prefer a leading role by India. However, some analysts suggest India would be reluctant to take a leading role and would itself prefer Norway to continue.

The immediate concern is the February 2002 ceasefire which continues to come under intense pressure from a simmering shadow war between Sri Lanka military intelligence and the Liberation Tigers which has claimed over two hundred lives.

Sinhala nationalists have long condemned the truce, which ended seven years of intense conflict as having weakened Sri Lanka’s security, a theme Rajapakse returned to in his inaugural address.

“I want to state the dedication of my government to upholding the ceasefire (but) I am also ready to review the ceasefire agreement,” Rajapakse said, speaking in Sinhalese.

The LTTE has refused to countenance a redrafting of the truce and says that is the implementation of the agreement which is flawed, not the terms and conditions themselves.

However, the Tigers have said they are committed to the ceasefire and observers expect the truce to hold. They have, however, warned the new Colombo administration not to contemplate a return to the military option.

“If they try to use military means to occupy our land or wage a conflict it will have negative implications for [them],” the head of the LTTE’s political wing, Mr. S. P. Tamilselvan said.

Rajapske insists he is committed to a peaceful solution amid his criticism of the Norwegian peace process.

“From this moment I will work towards my goal of making a new Sri Lanka. … I will try to achieve honourable peace for all,” he said, echoing his pre-election platform which dismissed the Norway-brokered peace process of Wickremesinghe’s government as having weakened national security and strengthened the LTTE.

“We will discuss peace talks with the LTTE and all political parties,” he said.

The LTTE has not responded formally to Rajapakse’s victory and comments, but the movement’s annual policy statement will be made Sunday when LTTE leader Vellupillai Pirapaharan makes his annual Heroes Day’ address.
JVP outside as President clears house

New Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse swore in a 25-member cabinet on Wednesday, demoting key figures from his predecessor’s team and keeping the defense and finance portfolios for himself.

Combining the presidency and defense minister roles was expected as Rajapakse followed in the footsteps of his immediate predecessors.

But while former President Chandrika Kumaratunga previously held the finance post for some of the time she was in office some experts say combining the two may be unconstitutional.

The ultra-nationalist JVP party which helped sweep Rajapakse to power by mobilising the southern vote has decided not to accept any cabinet positions, officials said. The JVP will not rejoin the ruling coalition led by Rajapakse’s party either, they said.

The JVP was said to be unhappy with the posts offered and declined them, the BBC Sinhala service, Sandeshaya, reported, adding the all-monk JHU said it had not expected posts and would support the government.

Sandeshaya said the JVP was offered five portfolios but disagreements led the party to decide not to take any.

The JVP’s not joining the minority government may point to an early parliamentary election to allow President Rajapakse to strengthen the representation of his Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) which leads the ruling coalition.

Parliamentary elections are not necessary for more than five years, but the president is allowed to call an election a year after those which decided the present makeup of the 225-seat house.

Rajapske Monday appointed Ratnasiri Wickremanayake, a prominent Sinhala nationalist, as Prime Minister, though analysts suggest he might be replaced if a deal with other parties necessitates it.

However, the swearing in of the rest of the cabinet was delayed from Monday because of the horse-trading over jobs.

Eighteen ministers without cabinet rank and 29 deputy ministers were also sworn in Wednesday.

Former finance minister Sarath Amunugama, who presented a budget days before the election that now looks to be at least partly scrapped, was appointed minister for public administration and home affairs.

The previous budget, delivered days before the election, was seen falling short of some of Rajapakse’s manifesto pledges on subsidies for goods from milk powder to fertilizers.

“I think Amunugama is paying the price for being loyal to [Kumaratugna] in presenting a budget that she wanted and not that Mahinda wanted,” Rohan Edrisinha at Colombo’s Centre for Policy Alternatives told Reuters.

Kumaratunga is accused by Rajapakse’s camp of subtly undermining his election campaign.

The foreign ministry went to Mangala Samaraweera, who managed Rajapakse’s campaign. Samaraweera will also remain minister of ports and aviation.

Previous foreign minister Anura Bandaranaike, who is also Kumaratunga’s brother and also often criticised Rajapakse head of the vote, also lost his post as foreign minister.

A former media minister Anura Priyadharshana Yapa got his old job back to head the Media and Information ministry.
Six killed in Akkaraippattu mosque

The Liberation Tigers Friday condemned a grenade attack on a mosque in the eastern Amparai district as a calculated attempt to create “division and animosity” between Tamils and Muslims.

The LTTE blamed Army-backed paramilitaries for the killing of six people in a grenade attack on Friday prayers at Akkaraippattu – while the Army blamed the LTTE.

Over a hundred Muslims were praying at the mosque on the Akkaraipattu-Amparai road when grenades were thrown into the congregation early Friday morning, killing four people and seriously injuring over twenty.

The Amparai division of the Tigers immediately condemned the attack and called for calm, saying it was an attempt to cause communal tension.

Saying the attack was aimed at disrupting peace and understanding between Tamils and Muslims and creating “division and animosity” among them, the LTTE appealed for calm and patience.

The LTTE also expressed “its deepest sympathies to the families and friends of the victims of the atrocious grenade attack” and pledged to soon reveal the role of Army-backed paramilitaries in a wave of violence in the region.

Tension prevailing in the area and additional Sri Lankan police units were moved into the area. But Tamils in the border areas, fearing reprisals took refuge at the Ramakrishna School, Akkaraippattu.

There is speculation that the attack is linked to Thursday’s Presidential elections, in which Army-backed paramilitaries were backing Mahinda Rajapakse, the Sinhala-nationalist candidate.

Many Muslims, however, voted for Ranil Wickremesinghe, who had received the backing of the country’s largest Tamil party, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC).

On Wednesday, the eve of the elections, there were attacks on individual Muslims. While a homeguard was shot dead in Kalmunai another civilian was wounded by shooting in Maradamunai.

SLMC leader Rauff Hakim who was touring the east at the time said the killings were done in order to “create fear in the minds of the Muslim voters”.

He said “those who would benefit by low polling have resorted to these terror tactics”.

The Tamil Tigers had said that they will not “actively be involved,” in the election and called on Tamils to boycott the elections.

But, the SLMC leader said that it is “highly unlikely,” that the LTTE was involved.

Hakim who backed Wickremesinghe after reaching a pre-poll agreement, said that “allies of the government hand in glove with paramilitary outfits aiming to obstruct a large voter turnout,” are to be blamed.

With the Presidential race being decided in total aggregate votes across the island, a reduction in the Muslim turnout would have benefited Rajapakse.

Rajapskse ultimately won, with the assistance of Muslim leaders opposed to Hakeem's SLMC and some of whom have received posts in the President's new cabinet.

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