Last Thursday’s Presidential elections have shaken the kaleidoscope of Sri Lankan politics and the pieces will undoubtedly take a while to settle. Nevertheless, there are many lessons to be drawn from the results, as underlined by the intense soul-searching and horse-trading in Colombo. Despite numerous controversies, including the near total Tamil boycott, Mahinda Rajapakse of the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) has convincingly defeated Ranil Wickremesinghe of the main opposition United National Party (UNP). Many, not least those supportive of Wickremesinghe, point to the narrow margin: Rajapakse took 50.3% against Wickremesinghe’s 48.4%.

But the inferences they suggest may be drawn from figures are misleading. Whilst Wickremesinghe’s tally is compiled from a number of vote banks, including those of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) and the Upcountry parties - including the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC) – as well as the UNP’s loyalists, Rajapakse clearly won over the overwhelming majority of the Sinhalese. What can be inferred of Ranil’s ‘support’, furthermore, when the possibility that the SLMC and CWC might switch and join Rajapakse’s SLFP in government is being floated in Colombo? What is clear, therefore, is that the Sinhalese have overwhelmingly backed Rajapakse and his hardline stance on the peace process with the Tamils while Wickremesinghe’s minority allies’ supported him not on his peace platform per se, but his pledges of post-victory political largess. The notion that last week’s election was a referendum on the peace process is thus only partly true; patronage clearly played its part.

The main controversy of the elections was undoubtedly the Tamil boycott. Less than 1% of Jaffna’s voters participated – and only 1 person from Kilinochchi’s 90 odd thousand people. Colombo’s Tamils also stayed away and in the multi-ethnic eastern province, few Tamils participated. That Tamils were undecided as how to vote has been clear for some time. The months of criticism in the Tamil press and popular disgruntlement over the lack of normalcy in the Northeast after four years of ceasefire should have alerted everyone, not least the UNP, that the Tamil vote could not be taken for granted. Instead, there is now vehement condemnation of the Liberation Tigers for inspiring the boycott. In the east some crossing points were blocked by LTTE supporters and, reportedly, cadres. These incidents have been rendered emblematic of the entire Tamil boycott and, amid sensational press coverage, is obscuring a stark ethnic polarisation amongst Sri Lankans.

The UNP and its leader must take the blame for his failure to bring the Tamils out in its favour. It may be easier – and certainly more comforting - to write off the Tamil boycott as a consequence of LTTE coercion, as many, including some members of the international community, have. But to assume that Tamils saw the ‘obvious’ benefit for peace of having Wickremesinghe as President is to misunderstand both Tamil sentiments and, we suggest, the man and his party. The UNP is gripped this week by internal post-poll wrangling: but the debate is not about the Tamils and the peace process, but how to recover the Sinhala heartland. Supports of the liberal peace in Sri Lanka undoubtedly would have preferred a Wickremesinghe win. But to fixate on the LTTE and any role it may or may not have had is to ignore the overarching dynamic: the Sinhalese have swarmed to support Rajapakse and his ultra-nationalist platform.

This – and the Tamil boycott - should not be a surprise to close observers of Sri Lanka’s politics. Resentments and antagonism have long been part of the vernacular streets, both Tamil and Sinhalese. Before the elections Wickremsinghe did not utter a word on sharing tsunami aid with LTTE areas or setting up an interim administration for the Northeast – remember the ISGA? But these factors have simply been ignored amid misguided confidence that the hardline platform trod by Rajapakse and his allies, the ultra nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Perumana (JVP) and hardline monks party, the Jeyatha Hela Urumaya (JHU), would make Wickremesinghe the Tamils’ de facto choice. The UNP leader did absolutely nothing to build bridges with the Tamils. Moreover, he – as many are equally erroneously doing now – assumed that the Tamil constituency can be separated from the LTTE.

The aftermath of Mahinda Rajapakse’s victory in the Presidential elections has been marked as much by diagnosis of the Tamil boycott as it has by the usual speculation over cabinet reshuffles which follows any election. The Tamil boycott has resulted in severe criticism of the Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) by the United States and European Union and equally robust denials of the accusations by the LTTE. Whilst the furore has exercised questions of whether or not Tamils should or could have voted, it has failed to address the central issue thrown up by the whole episode: under what conditions does the act of voting become central to democratic governance? The answer is not obvious.

Democracy’s central demand is that the government’s authority to rule must rest on the consent of the governed. Free and fair elections with universal franchise and without arbitrary restrictions on public office are a central part of the minimum procedural requirements that ensure governments rule by consent. The others include a free and independent media that allows all citizens to hear the full range of opinion and to make their views known. Such conditions are intuitively plausible as minimal requirements of democratic governance. It is also arguable that as Sri Lanka meets many of these conditions, albeit with qualifications, the act of voting equally enables all citizens to hold the government, or more recently the president, to account.

However, the procedural criteria can only guarantee democratic accountability to all citizens if electors and political parties exclude ethnicity from their decisions and campaigns. The minimal criteria of democracy require citizens to choose between alternatives based on rational and objective criteria that provide two generic reasons for adopting a particular policy. Policies can be adopted either because a majority considers them in the public interest or because it is in the personal interests of a particular majority group, for example farmers.

In either case the model ensures that no individual will find themselves in a permanent minority perpetually excluded from the decision making process. In the first case, citizens vote by political conviction, which is voluntary and in the second because of economic interests that can also be changed. For example, socialists in a country that continuously elected neo liberal governments can be said to enjoy a democratic government in so far as they have every opportunity to campaign in favour of socialist policies. Similarly capitalist interests in a country that adopted policies favouring the state sector or small farmers cannot complain of undemocratic or unjust treatment in so far as their fundamental rights are not violated, they have equal access to other means of earning an income and of campaigning vigorously for pro market policies.

Whilst Sri Lanka might meet the minimal procedural criteria for democracy, the processes of electoral choice and party political competition departs radically from norms required to ensure that certain groups do not become permanently excluded minorities. The realities of a Sinhala Buddhist demographic majority and the emergence of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism as the dominant political ideology has meant that governments, and presidents, can be elected by appealing to the this majority alone. Sri Lankan elections, including the most recent, have provided almost textbook demonstrations of the phenomenon of ethnic ‘outbidding’ where parties offer ever more extreme ethnic positions in the hope of gaining the majority of the ethnic vote. Whilst Rajapakse embraced the JHU and JVP, Wickremasinghe – belatedly - wrapped himself in the lion flag while his deputy claimed credit for splitting the LTTE and sinking two of its ships even whilst negotiating with it. The two main Sinhala parties, the UNP and SLFP, which have formed every government since independence, have to trade off pursuing minority votes with losing majority support and invariably opt for the safer option of shoring up their Sinhala vote banks.

Ever since the momentous electoral victory of S.W.R.D Bandaranaike on a platform of ‘Sinhala Only’ in 1956, all Sri Lankan governments have justified their policy programmes, whether neo liberal or socialist, in Sinhala Buddhist terms. This has had specific material consequences. Minorities have been discriminated against in public sector employment and education whilst public sector investment, in infrastructure, public institutions and manufacturing capital has been directed towards the Sinhala heartlands. Even under neo liberal policy regimes, minority areas have been denied the benefits of private investment, because the south enjoys better infrastructure and more careful political attention. Anecdotal observation is enough to confirm the glaring disparities in capital investment between the Sinhala majority areas in the south – west and the minority areas of the northeast. The major ports, tourism related developments, free trade zones, public sector institutions, airports, ports, railway lines and trunk roads are all outside the minority areas.

Sri Lankan governments are therefore not democratically accountable to all citizens, but ethnically accountable to the majority. Sri Lankan politicians habitually confuse democracy with narrow ethnic accountability when they use argue that any constitutional change has to take into account the views and interests of the majority Sinhalese. Under these conditions, the simple but powerful act of voting is insufficient to ensure that governments are democratically accountable to the minorities. Because of their ethnicity, Tamils, Upcountry Tamils and Muslims have found themselves as permanent minorities, structurally excluded from influencing policies that have materially damaged their interests.

The best that minority parties can achieve is to negotiate in coalitions for portfolios that can affect the most important interests of their constituencies. Parties representing Upcountry Tamils typically negotiate for the plantations portfolio while Muslim parties seek the ports ministry. However, this approach has very clear limits. The Upcountry Tamil parties are powerless to demand policy action to alleviate the terrible conditions of estate workers and Muslim parties were unable to secure urgent Tsunami relief for the Muslim majority areas in the east. In short, minority coalition parties are precluded from demanding large shifts in policy that cannot be promoted as furthering the interests of the Sinhala Buddhist majority, even if such policies are arguably for the larger public good.

The discussion on whether Tamils should or could have voted makes little sense unless it is placed within a larger context that examines how far voting furthers democratic accountability. In order to ensure that Sri Lankan governments become democratically accountable to all citizens, regardless of ethnicity, one of two fundamental transformations is required. The first option is the replacement of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism as the mainstream political ideology by a form of political rhetoric that gives equal weight to all the ethnic and religious identities in the island. The second option is a constitutional transformation that recognises and enshrines the plural, even multinational character of Sri Lankan society.

Under the current conditions voting alone cannot bring about either of these changes. Voting is not just an expressive act; it is not just about making one’s views known to others. The act of voting is only meaningful within a larger structure of democratic governance in which citizens can meaningfully hold their governments accountable. Despite the concern over the Tamil boycott, it is clear that Tamil electoral participation cannot effect the structural changes needed to make minority votes really count.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) last week announced their decision not to back either of the major Sinhala coalition parties contesting this week’s Presidential elections. The organization argued that in its view neither the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) nor the United National Party (UNP) would successfully implement the structural changes that were required to deliver the dividends of the peace process which had eluded the residents of the areas the LTTE controls. The organization’s position has been misinterpreted, intentionally in some quarters, as further evidence of its continuing effrontery to democratic principles.

The Tamil residents of Sri Lanka have participated in the island’s various democratic processes since it achieved independence from the British in 1947. The dawn of Sinhala nationalist politics within years of the island’s independence sparked a countdown to an ethnic confrontation - which the island’s Tamil speaking minority sought to challenge, initially at least, through legal and political recourse with an admirable Gandhian faith.

Two decades later, after a series of political treaties repudiated by Sinhala leaders unwilling to appear weak to their followers, the rules of the democratic process were immutably altered. The introduction of the 1972 Constitution by leaders of the then ruling Sinhala party disposed of the safeguards to protect the island’s minorities embedded within the Soulbury Constitution and deemed to be unalterable by Her Majesty’s Privy Council in Great Britain. The new republic’s Constitution would establish hurdles which would render the minority vote superfluous to the main issues of the island’s politics. The combined minority population of the island is under twenty-five percent, making the attainment of the sixty-six percent majority in Parliament necessary for reforms possible only in the realms of political theory.

In the subsequent three decades, the island’s Tamil minority have been trapped in a democratic purgatory, having enough in numbers to balance the nationalist contenders, but never enough clout to alter their distressing predicament. Despite persistently backing the more dovish of the main Sinhala contenders, the demographics of the island ensure that no party is, in any case, able to dominate parliament to the extent required for constitutional reform.

Sri Lanka’s 2005 Presidential election places the Tamil electorate in their familiar, unappealing position. Should the Tamil community take their lead from the LTTE’s statements and choose not to participate in the election, the likely favourite is Mr. Mahinda Rajapakse. However, with Christians concerned about the anti-conversion bills and other minority anxieties the outcome is a very close call.

Despite lacking the leadership experience of his opponent, the UPFA candidate in his inaugural presidential campaign is proving to be a serious contender for the post - an admirable achievement considering that he is following in the footsteps of President Chandrika Kumaratunga. In keeping with their nationalist manifesto, Mr. Rajapakse and his party have also chosen to ally with the Marxist-cum-nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the Buddhist nationalist Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU). The distinguishing features of the UPFA’s electioneering seem to be their no-nonsense stance in dealing with the LTTE. More recently, the party has attempted to allay the concerns of the International Community, insisting that despite its alliances with extremist parties, it will in fact pursue peace with the Tamil community, albeit in its own uncompromising style.

The previous permutations of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) led coalition governments headed by President Kumaratunga, applied a similarly non-conciliatory approach, illustrated best by her disastrous ‘war-for-peace’. Her inaugural People’s Alliance (PA) coalition government, which came to power in 1994, was itself an example of the failings of the Sri Lankan state, as far as the Tamils are concerned. The President was brought to power in a landslide victory, with considerable support from the island’s minorities based upon her promises of peacefully resolving the conflict. Having failed to reach a compromise with the LTTE which would be palatable to the country’s parliament, Mrs. Kumaratunga engaged in the most bloody phase of the ethnic conflict for the next seven years. President Kumaratunga’s political transformation from the princess of peace to warrior queen dealt another blow to Tamil confidence in Sinhala leaderships.

In contrast to the PA, Mr. Ranil Wickremesinghe’s government UNP-led, has arguably enjoyed the greatest success of contemporary Sri Lankan governments in challenging the LTTE’s military and political ascendancy. The then Prime Minister, whose party took power in 2001, successfully engaged the LTTE in a peace process which allowed the space for the government to rebuild the country’s debilitated military and its crumbling economy. The failure (or, from a Sinhala nationalist perspective, the success) of the Wickremesinghe administration, meanwhile, to deliver any benefits to the residents of the Northeast have been exhaustively outlined in the columns of this newspaper. Most notably, the UNP, like many of its predecessors, failed to deliver on deals it signed with the LTTE aimed at returning normalcy to residents of the Northeast. The sole redeeming feature of Mr. Wickremesinghe’s tenure may be the aversion of an all out war; however, this is more likely attributable to the military’s incapacitated condition than the state’s benevolent intent.

However, Sinhala leaders cannot be blamed solely for their belligerent strategic decisions. The reality is that the island’s present political system was constructed to ensure only a united Sinhala polity could deliver any concessions the island’s minorities. However, Sinhala parties sitting in opposition are frequently seduced by Sinhala nationalism when approaching the ethnic question. Whilst in opposition to Mrs. Kumaratunga, Mr. Wickremesinghe’s party obstructed – on three separate occasions - devolution proposals submitted by Mrs. Kumaratunga’s government. The charge, as ever was that her government was being too accommodating of Tamil demands. That her proposals had already been rejected by the LTTE for being woefully inadequate was irrelevant. Similarly, President Kumaratunga rejected the UNF government’s notion of providing the LTTE with two-year administration in the North-East - despite claiming to have offered the Tigers a similar ten year deal during her government’s tenure. The dynamics of Sri Lankan politics ensure that at least one of the major contenders will seek the powerful nationalist lobby in its pursuit of the control of parliament.

Nevertheless, throughout the contemporary political history of the island, the Tamil lobby has repeatedly backed the more dovish of the main Sinhala candidates. The resulting delicate balance of power in parliament has impeded any structural changes to Sri Lanka’s constitution that may deliver a resolution to the minority’s grievances. From a Tamil perspective, a decision to cease participation in process where they have no influence appears long overdue.

One may counter that by repudiating their democratic rights, the island’s Tamil community is spurning its only peaceful means of stimulating change. However, it has been demonstrated that there are unassailable limits to the impact the Tamil electorate can have on the island’s political system. Continued engagement in this pointless political process can only detract from more inventive efforts to seek a genuine and permament solution to the underlying issues.

The most puzzling aspect of Sri Lanka’s political landscape is not that the Tamils have finally decided to boycott the process, but the consistent and inexplicable assertion that the more hawkish coalition would enjoy a resounding victory without the dovish Tamil counter-balance. In spite of Mr. Wickremesinghe’s resounding strategic successes against the LTTE, his party has had to revert to crudely hardline rhetoric to retain any chance of returning to power. By contrast, Rajapakse is a major contender chiefly as a result of his unwaveringly hardline positions and his alliances with the right-wing JVP and JHU.

Populist ethnicity-based politics are not the preserve of the rival political campaigns this week alone. Perhaps the most revealing development on the Southern political landscape is the exponential rise of the JVP over the past decade based on the twin policies of promoting nationalist solutions to the ethnic conflict, whilst simultaneously promising to confer the economic benefits of a socialist state to its voters.

Despite being the pro-peace camp’s choice, Mr. Wickremesinghe’s credentials as a patriotic leader are impeccable. His government reversed the deteriorating military position of the Sri Lankan state through a series of political maneuvers – as the UNP has proudly pointed out. His only mistake, relative to Mr. Rajapakse, appear to be politically engaging the LTTE in doing so. And yet, the country’s Prime Minister, along with his uncompromisingly hawkish position, appears to be enjoying the support of a substantial part of the Sinhala people. Joseph de Maistre famously noted that ‘every nation has the government it deserves.’ The Sinhala nation has repeatedly and enthusiastically chosen populist hawkish leaders unwilling and, in any case, unable, to deliver a lasting peaceful solution to the ethnic problem. And this week, whoever it picks, it will do so again.

Sri Lankans go to the polls Thursday to pick a replacement for outgoing President Chandrika Kumaratunga. Irrespective of which of the leading contenders, Ranil Wickremesinghe of the United National Party (UNP) or Mahinda Rajapakse of the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), wins, it is clear that a major change in the country’s political dynamics will follow. As this newspaper has pointed out before, despite Kumaratunga’s assertion she is leaving without mud or blood on her hands, she is wrong on both counts. It remains to be seen what role, if any, she will now play in the island’s fractious politics, but it will undoubtedly depend on who wins – and the irony is Kumaratunga would rather it was her former archrival, Wickremesinghe.

With the island’s most powerful office up for grabs, the contest will go all the way down to the wire. In true Sri Lankan tradition, the outcome will be decided not only by the popularity of policy, charisma of candidate or efficiency of party machinery, but also by the practicability of electoral fraud. In this regard, the opposition UNP has a distinct disadvantage. The ruling party’s control of the security forces and, by extension, the Army-backed paramilitaries, will give Rajapakse an edge – should he need it, of course. On Wednesday cadres of the ‘moderate’ Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) were reported to be seizing voters’ identity cards in parts of Army-controlled Jaffna. The UNP had even earlier cried foul, alleging Army deserters have been flown into the northern peninsula to assist the rigging.

Rajapakse may need the scales to be tipped. The loose class and urban/rural divides inherent in the UNP and SLFP’s support bases, along with the various alliances these parties have struck have created profound uncertainty as to who will triumph. The yo-yoing Colombo stock market is just one indicator the contest is too close to call. Rajapakse’s unabashed embracing of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism has alarmed Sinhala Catholics as well as the island’s ethnic minorities. On the other hand, the JVP’s formidable cadre based machine is at work, alongside whatever effort the disunited SLFP can summon. Most importantly for Rajapakse, President Kumaratunga has called a truce in the party’s internal squabbles, freeing him to concentrate on campaigning.

The election is being interpreted by many as a referendum on the peace process. The voters are deemed to have a choice between a ‘pro-peace’ Wickremesinghe and a ‘hardline’ Rajapakse. Whilst understandable a few months ago, this view is not shared by the Tamils and the Liberation Tigers today. The LTTE’s scepticism has been amply justified by the events of the past two weeks. When it became clear that the Tamils were backing away from him, Wickremesinghe’s response was not to appeal to their interests, as he had with the hill country Tamils and Muslim communities, but to stumble back towards the Sinhala nationalists. In a particularly crude display of patriotism, Wickremesinghe, the darling of local and international liberals, is reported to have held a Lion flag aloft and vowed to unite the island under it. The pledge will no doubt be put to a practical test should he win.

The LTTE’s undisguised disgust with both candidates and its less than subtle call for a Tamil boycott have infuriated many observers, including some international ones. But the irony of the Tamils being called on to boost the chances of a candidate whose lieutenants only last week were boasting about how their government trapped and split the Tamil struggle through the peace process is not lost on us. Of course, there is more than just the peace process riding on the Thursday’s election - the international neoliberal project, for example. A phalanx of non-state actors anxious about life under Rajapakse have lambasted the LTTE for ‘interfering’ in the election and dispensed much advice about what the international community is and isn’t like and what the Tamils might or might not want. We suggest the LTTE’s finely honed intelligence machine might give the movement a much better idea as to sentiments prevailing in the Northeast – to say nothing of the Diaspora.

There has been some incredulity at the suggestion the Tamils are waiting for a signal from the LTTE in deciding who to vote for. Some have reduced this to a matter of fear, an analysis reinforced by the observers’ own prejudices against the Tigers. The simple fact is that the now highly politicised Tamil electorate are looking for a course of action which could meaningfully contribute to the advancement of their political struggle. The best insight in this regard, from a Tamil perspective, must come from the LTTE - as unpalatable as this is to those in the Sri Lankan peace caravan who cling to expectations of a Wickremesinghe-delivered federal solution. True, Wickremesinghe may be better for some aspects of the peace process. But the catchall of ‘federalism’ demands close inspection and not merely blind faith. In this regard, as far as the Tamils are concerned, Wickremesinghe and Rajapakse have laid out the facts of the matter clearly over the past few weeks. Both are products of the same Sinhala-dominated political system. Both have now wrapped themselves in the Lion flag. And both are equally committed to denying a Tamil political identity and, thence, political rights. There is no real choice between them.

Doyen of Tamil expatriate social activists, Mr C J T Thamotheram, passed away Tuesday. A retired teacher, Mr Thamotheram, devoted his years in UK working on Tamil issues.

He established the London’s first Tamil School - the West London Tamil School and was among those involved in forming the Standing Committee of Tamils (SCOT) in 1977. In October 1981 he founded the monthly Tamil Times which served as the voice of the expatriate community for many years, but which he later criticised as having turned against the Tamil cause.

He then set up the League of Friends of the Jaffna University and a London-based think tank, the International Tamil Foundation (ITF). Earlier this year, despite poor health, he launched the Tamil Writers' Guild.

The funeral service is on Friday November 4 at 11.00 AM at the Rivercourt Methodist Church, King Street, Hammersmith, London W6 9JT. It will be followed by a private family cremation.

He is survived by his wife Florence (Malar), his sons, Vijay, Priya, and Raj, daughters Sunetra, Thiru and Shantini, six grand children and two great grand children. Family requests not to send flowers but encourages making donations made payable to 'White Pigeon', (Registered Charity).

Amidst the liberal hand-wringing over the prospects for peace in Sri Lanka, political culture in the Tamil areas of the island has become a critical point of concern for many activists and analysts in the south. The ongoing violence in the Northeast that prevents vigorous electoral campaigning and widespread electoral participation is seen as symptomatic of a deeper political malaise. It is argued that extensive democratisation of the Tamil areas is an absolute prerequisite for a genuinely lasting and peaceful solution to the island’s ethnic conflict.

In this view the democratic deficit in the Tamil areas is characterised in two ways. The first is the presence of the authoritarian and anti democratic LTTE that has consistently stifled the growth of a genuinely democratic culture. The second area of democratic deficit is to be found in the Tamil people themselves, who have either been seduced by the LTTE’s exclusivist ideology and have become ‘comfortable with terror’ or are so terrified by its coercive might that they are unable or unwilling to voice their true opinions. Democratisation and therefore peace therefore requires not only radical transformation of the LTTE but also of the Tamil people themselves, who need amongst other things education about the basic processes and principles of democracy

The force of this argument rests on a simplistic assumption about the nature of the LTTE and, by implication, its support base. This assumption checks a more nuanced analysis of both the LTTE and politics in the north-east as a whole. Demands for greater democratisation in the northeast inevitably characterise the LTTE as a clandestine organisation, immersed in an exclusivist ideology and held together by the authoritarian and charismatic leadership of one man. This caricature of the LTTE allows many committed human rights activists living in Sinhala dominated areas to provide two very different explanations of deviations from liberal democratic norms in the north and the south. Assassinations of journalists and political opponents, systematic electoral malpractice, and widespread human rights abuses in the south are criticised, but understood mainly as deviations from the norm. In other words, the Sri Lankan state, its armed forces and political parties are seen as complex multifaceted institutions that can be reformed. In contrast, human rights violations by the LTTE are often held up as merely symptomatic of its dark and menacing nature.

Such a one dimensional and simplistic portrayal cannot capture the reality of a large organisation that engages in a wide range of both military and civilian activities. An estimated force of twenty thousand cadres in uniform and several thousand more civilians including both paid workers and volunteers cannot be held together by the sheer force of charismatic personality. Like any other complex organisation, the LTTE has bureaucratic structures, chains of command and decision-making processes. It could not function as it does otherwise, either in a military or civilian capacity. Even its most ardent critics have been forced to admit that the LTTE’s all out mobilisation in the aftermath of the Tsunami was effective in both halting the spread of disease and rehabilitating the worst affected civilians. To refuse to engage the LTTE’s successes and failures in terms that recognise it as a complex, multi-layered and multi-faceted organisation is to abandon the terms of rational analysis for those of mystification and obfuscation.

The related simplifying assumptions about the LTTE’s support base also do not stand up to scrutiny. Support for the cause of Tamil political independence cannot be explained away as either the result of coercion by the LTTE or conversely the attractions of exclusivist Tamil ethnonationalism. Tamil political mobilisation behind the cause of independence has been too long lasting, varied and deep to be understood as either forced or irrational. Support for the cause of Tamil political rights arises not just from the LTTE controlled areas, but also from areas under Army control and, very importantly, from the Diaspora. Conversely, to suggest that Diaspora support is simply armchair nationalist indulgency ignores the fact that most Tamils in the Diaspora have extensive and close familial connections with the northeast - and that most are refugees or earlier migrants spurred by portends of troubles to come. Many Diaspora Tamils have taken advantage of the relative peace afforded by the ceasefire agreement to volunteer their time and skills for rehabilitation projects across the northeast.

It is also a misreading to understand Tamil politics as the result of a surrender to a charismatic ideology that implies ancient glory and promises utopia. Tamil nationalists themselves have rarely if every resorted to myth and history to justify their demands for Tamil political rights. The Federal Party leader SJV Chelvanayagam stated early on that he was not interested in history: “Solve a modern problem in a modern way. Do not solve a modern problem in a medieval way. Bring to bear towards the solution of a twentieth century problem, a twentieth century mind.” The demand for Tamil political autonomy is not the result of a misplaced belief in the need to protect some alleged ancient glory but on the need to secure a political present and future that is safe from the policies of governments elected on the rhetoric of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism. Tamils consistently supported the Federal party from the mid 1950s to the mid 1970s because they thought it provided the best means to secure their political autonomy. Tamil participation or abstention from the most recent elections has to be understood in the same terms.

The assertion that peace requires the urgent democratisation of the Northeast conceals an unwillingness to confront two unavoidable realities of Sri Lankan politics. The first is the uncompromising postures adopted by mainstream Sinhala Buddhist actors towards Tamil interests and rights. The fate of the PTOMS, a fairly banal administrative structure that had the sole purpose of alleviating the suffering caused by the December 2004 tsunami, exposes the extent to which even the most basic conditions of Tamil life are hostage to Sinhala Buddhist sentiment. Addressing this sentiment, however, poses a far more difficult and daunting challenge for indignant liberals in the south than lecturing the Tamils on their inadequate grasp of the principles of liberalism and democracy. Challenging the critics of the PTOMS and the Ceasefire Agreement means facing up to an ideology that is not only politically dominant but also socially deeply entrenched.

Calling for greater democratisation of the Northeast also conceals the far more acute need for military de-escalation and normalisation. These areas of the island have borne the brunt of the civil war many and Tamils are displaced and living in refugee camps where the normal processes of every day life are next to impossible. Under these conditions it is difficult to imagine the possibility of genuine democratic engagement and reflection on the choices offered. Similarly, while the Sri Lankan security forces and the LTTE are engaged in a ‘shadow’ war, the free movement of people, ideas and goods that is critical to democratic politics is impossible. The more banal, practical difficulties of democracy in militarised Sri Lanka are amply demonstrated by the activities of Army-backed paramilitaries this week.

A peace process that has democratic legitimacy is infinitely preferable to one that is unilaterally imposed or unacceptable to significant sections of the population. However, the political culture of the northeast is not the most challenging or even the most difficult obstacle to creating a negotiated solution with democratic legitimacy. It must be remembered that the most sustained support for the peace process has come from the Tamils, in the island and in the Diaspora. The uncompromising demands of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism have to be challenged. This is likely to be a difficult and long-term task. A more immediate objective is to work towards the de-escalation and normalisation of the northeast. The humanitarian interests of people who are displaced are beyond democratic debate. However, the uncomfortable reality is that even the most prosaic moves demilitarisation and normalisation will be hostage to the democratic legitimacy of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism.

Several political cadres of the Liberation Tigers were amongst those killed this week in the ongoing shadow war between Army-backed paramilitaries and the LTTE in Sri Lanka’s Northeast.

On Wednesday two LTTE cadres were killed in Valaichenai, 32 km north of Batticaloa. One had been arrested by Sri Lanka Army (SLA) troops at Chenkalady Black Bridge on Tuesday.

The bodies of two LTTE cadres were found Tuesday in SLA-controlled part of the Amparai district. The two cadres, who had come to Pallikudiyiruppu to purchase meat, had been abducted Monday. Both were found with their hands tied.

A former Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) member was found dead after being abducted in Valaichenai Wednesday afternoon.

The Batticaloa office of the Tamils Rehabilitation Office (TRO) was attacked early Wednesday morning. Grenades were thrown at the office, causing damage to their computer section and vehicles parked outside. This was the third attack on this office this year.

Two Home Guards, were shot at in Welikanda Wednesday morning. One was killed and the other hospitalized. Army-controlled Welikanda is known to be where Army-backed paramilitaries, including the Karuna Group maintain several camps.

A grenade blast wounded a Sri Lankan Army soldier and a police officer at Koolavady Junction in Batticaloa Wednesday evening. An hour later there was another grenade attack in Eravur, Batticaloa, but there were no casualties.

Two separate grenade attacks injured three SLA soldiers from the Kallady camp and 2 policemen in Manmunai.

In Kalmunai, 39 km south of Batticaloa, a policeman was shot dead by an unidentified gunman on motorbike. Later that evening, a Muslim businessman was shot and killed outside his house by men on motorbikes. 45 minutes later, another Muslim businessman was shot at and seriously wounded, but survived.

In Trincomalee, an unidentified Sinhalese person was shot and killed Tuesday afternoon. The motive for the attack is not clear.

In Jaffna, a partially clothed body was found in the temple well of Chuttipuram Amman Kovil in Varani. The SLA’s 52-4 Brigade Headquarters located in the vicinity, rousing suspicions and fear among local residents amid the parallels to the disappearances during the times of conflict.

In Kayts, Jaffna, an Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) cadre sustained head injuries after being shot at by unknown assailants while distributing pamphlets in support of Mahinda Rajapakse, Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) presidential candidate.

An EPDP cadre, was killed in Wellawatte, Colombo Sunday night by unidentified gunmen. He is alleged to have been a key intelligence operative and also involved in directing security for EPDP leader Douglas Devananda.

On Saturday a police constable died instantly after being accidentally electrocuted by a wire fence in Mannar. The previous Tuesday, eight SLA soldiers attached to the 512 brigade occupying hotels in Jaffna were electrocuted when their truck became entangled in the surrounding security fence.

Compiled from TamilNet reports

Sri Lankans go to the polls Thursday to pick a replacement for outgoing President Chandrika Kumaratunga. Despite the inevitable emphatic assertions of victory by the two leading contenders, most analysts suggest it will be a photo-finish.

This is not only because both candidates have different vote banks and policies, but because with the country’s most powerful office up for grabs, electoral fraud is feared, particularly in the restive Northeast.

Premier Mahinda Rajapakse, representing the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), and Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe of the United National Party (UNP) are relying on their parties’ respective party’s allies to deliver vote banks they don’t have access to.

Within days of the race to replace Kumaratunga being announced, Rajapakse, her party’s candidate, announced electoral pacts with the ultra Sinhala nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Perumana (JVP) and the hardline monks party, the Jeyatha Hela Urumaya (JHU) and got off to a flying start on the campaign trail.

Wickremesinghe was slow to announce his alliances, but the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC), representing a substantial section of the Estate Tamil vote, swung behind, as did the other Estate party, the Upcountry People’s Front (UPF).

Wickremesinghe also secured the support of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), the island’s largest Muslim party before it became beset by internal splits and controversies.

Rajapakse, however, has retained the support of another Muslim party, the National Unity Alliance (NUA).

Whilst Wickremesinghe is considered pro-market and an internationalist, Rajapakse is seen as a economic conservative and a traditionalist. These have resulted in them courting different vote banks: Wickremesinghe the urban, educated middle class and Rajapakse the rural poor.

Both candidates have pledged a raft of subsidies on goods, from milk powder to fertiliser for the rural poor and farmers, in a $20 billion economy whose biggest currency earners include foreign remittances, garment and tea exports and tourism.

As in all elections, Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, has entered the poll campaigns. Rajapkse was the first to embrace it, vowing to defend the unitary status of Sri Lanka – in other words, not conceding an inch to the minorities – and to address Wickremesinghe’s weakening, as he described it, of national security through the peace process with the Tamil Tigers.

Wickremesinghe was less overt in courting the Sinhala nationalist vote, titling his manifesto’s section on the peace process ‘Defeating Separatism.’ But in the past two weeks, as it has become clear the Tamil vote will not be coming his way, Wickremesinghe has also rushed to trumpet his nationalist credentials.

At one closing rally, for example, Wickremesinghe had held up the Lion flag and vowed to unite the island under it. A close confidante, Milinda Moragoda, boasted last week of how the UNP-led government of 2001-3 had trapped the LTTE in an international safety net, engineered a split within the organisation and sunk its ships.

The alliances with the Estate and Muslim and the division amongst the Sinhala voters has left analysts unsure as to who has the upper hand.

The Colombo Stock Market has for several weeks been rising in the anticipation of a Wickremesinghe victory, but has slid sharply in recent days, as it has become clear the Tamil vote may not being accruing to him.

In a clear signal to Tamil voters, the Liberation Tiger have expressed their disgust with both candidates and indirectly signalled a boycott would be preferable.

But while the LTTE says it will not intervene to prevent Tamils from voting, Army-backed Tamil paramilitary groups are expected to rig polls in some areas in favour of Rajapakse.

Two paramilitary groups, the Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) in Jaffna and the Karuna Group in Batticaloa, have urged people to vote for Rajapakse and throughout Wednesday there have been reports of gunmen seizing voter’s registration cards in parts of Jaffna.

Indicative of the prevailing uncertainty of the outcome, the Colombo Bourse rocketed 4% Wednesday on the back of an erroneous report in the Daily Mirror that the LTTE had reversed its stand and was urging Tamils to turn out and vote. The LTTE has flatly denied the report.

More than 13 million people are eligible to vote in the presidential election, Sri Lanka’s fourth national poll in six years. Many voters are said to be apathetic at the prospect of another election.

Ballot boxes have been taken to nearly 10,000 polling stations.

Tens of thousands of police and soldiers took up positions across Sri Lanka Wednesday – though the UNP fears some senior military officers are supporting those rigging in favour of Rajapakse.

Sri Lanka has a history of election bloodshed, but this campaign has been one of the most peaceful for years.

Nevertheless, foreign aid groups and diplomatic missions have ordered staff to stay indoors on election day and some have advised them to stockpile food, Reuters reported. Liquor sales have been banned over the election period to dampen partisan rivalry.

Intimidation in the Northeast [Nov. 16, 2005]
Editorial: Constant Factor [Nov. 16, 2005]
A deficit in Sri Lankan democracy? [Nov. 16, 2005]
The paradox of the Tamil vote [Nov. 16, 2005]

Whilst campaigning for this week’s presidential elections, the main opposition United National Party (UNP) has been pushing for a post-poll consensus between it and the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) on the ethnic question.

Such a consensus would make the Sinhala polity, of which the two – along with the ultra-nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Perumana (JVP) – are the main players, less vulnerable to pressures to accommodate the island’s minority groups, Tamil, Estate Tamil and Muslim alike.

More importantly, it would form a broad Sinhala front against Tamil political aspirations.

Last Monday Prof G. L. Peiris, former Constitutional Affairs Minister and UNP stalwart, pledged that if its candidate, Ranil Wickremesinghe, won, the UNP would seek agreement with the SLFP for a federal resolution to the conflict, while firmly stating “there is no compromising on anything that goes against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.”

Whilst the notion of federalism is accepted in principle by both the UNP and SLFP (though it has been vehemently rejected by the latter’s Presidential candidate, Mahinda Rajapakse), they have very different conceptions from the Tamils as to what powers ought to be devolved to the Northeast – the JVP is resolutely opposed even to the notion of federalism.

On Saturday, Wickremasinghe also called for a consensus, aruging that there should be no enmity between the UNP and SLFP post-election and that working together would prove more fruitful for both Sinhala parties’ interests.

“If there is a consensus between us, we will also be able to end political enmity,” he stated.

What such a consensus entails for accommodation of interests of minority groups whose bargaining power is weakened by the denial of ‘king maker’ was left unsaid. But the contours were hinted at in Wickremasinghe’s next statements: “I will never betray the country but unite it by meting out justice to all the communities.”

Prof. Peiris also called for “consultation with the major political party in the South, the SLFP. There is no way of reaching a solution without a consensus being first reached with the SLFP.”

Wickremasinghe attempted earlier this month to meet with of outgoing president Chandrika Kumaratunga, who heads the SLFP and obtain her backing for his consensual vision.

Though he finally met with her outside the confidence of SLFP candidate Rajapakse, who President Kumaratunga is party-bound to support, Wickremasinghe apparently failed to obtain her backing.

In a letter requesting President Kumaratunga’s audience in October, Wickremasinghe argued: “I urge you with all sincerity not to allow the peace process to become the subject of national division. Instead we should seek to build further upon the platform of consensus that has already been developed between the UNP and the SLFP. Future generations will not forgive us should we fail to seize this hour and the opportunity it offers.”

These attempts towards a consensus with the SLFP mark the shift in UNP policy and is a u-turn away from its stance in 2001, after the SLFP approached then-Prime Minister Wickremasinghe to form a national government.

Wickremasinghe first responded that the UNP could not be part of a government rooted in Sinhala hegemonism at the expense of minorities.

However, one week after these incontrovertible statements against a UNP-SLFP alliance, the UNP, with the support of Peiris, agreed to form a government of “National Reconciliation.”

During his term as Prime Minister – from late 2001 to November 2003, Wickremesinghe repeatedly sought conciliation with a hostile Kumaratunga, but was repeatedly rebuffed.

Ultimately, the President – whose office wields extraordinary powers, compared to Palriament and the cabinet – seized three ministries from Wickremesinghe in November 2003, precipitating a governing crisis.

Several months later, in April 2004, an alliance between Kumaratunga’s SLFP and the JVP toppled Wickremesinghe’s UNP- led government.

As Sri Lankans go to the polls this week, Kumaratunga’s alliance continues to rule, but as a vulnerable minority government, the JVP having walked out in June 2005 in disgust at her plans to sign an aid-sharing deal with the Tamil Tigers.

Rehabilitation efforts in tsunami-struck Muttur East are stagnating amid an unofficial embargo imposed on the region by the Sri Lankan military in Trincomalee.

Efforts to revive the local economy are also foundering as transport of goods and people in and out of the Tamil-Tiger controlled enclave is disrupted.

Muttur East is a part of the Sri Lanka military-dominated Trincomalee district which is held by the Tamil Tigers. Residents, aid workers and government officials must pass through the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) checkpoint at Kaddaiparichchan to enter it.

Despite permits for aid organizations to transport building materials into the impoverished region supplied by the Government Agent (the most senior civil servant in the district), the SLA has prevented the entry of gravel and other such needed supplies, Tamil politicians protested to the government this week.

“I appeal to you to intervene and take appropriate steps to alleviate the sufferings of the civilians in the LTTE held areas in running their day to day lives and their agricultural and development activities without interruption,” the letter from TNA parliamentarian for Trincomalee, Mr. K Thurairatnasingham, said.

The letter cites instances in which approved projects for rehabilitation and reconstruction have stalled due to the SLA’s refusal to allow needed materials to enter.

The coastal geography means many residents in Muttur East are dependent on the ocean for their livelihood. The devastation caused by tsunami of December 2004 has since been compounded by Sri Lankan government and military regulation.

Fishing times, for example, have been arbitrarily curtailed as a result of new measures imposed in the High Security Zone fishermen must pass through. Many of these restrictions are prohibited by the February 2002 ceasefire agreement.

Agricultural work has also been halted: an acute fuel shortage means tractors and other farm machinery, much of donated by international NGOs cannot be used.

Residents are also decrying heightened restrictions on the transportation of goods such as eggs, meat and other foodstuffs into the region.

They are concerned at more invasive searches at the SLA checkpoint and the sheer arbitrariness of the restrictions. One youth was arrested for having three CDs with music supportive to the Tigers in his possession, for example.

Mr. S. Elilan, the LTTE’s Trincomalee district head, has brought these restrictions to the attention of the North East Provincial Council (NEPC) and appealed to the Sri Lankan government to ensure development in the region is allowed to progress without restriction.

Mr. Elilan asked the NEPC to give voice in Colombo to the difficulties of people in Muttur East in rebuilding their lives and communities.

The harassment of civilians at the SLA checkpoint is not limited to non-Sinhalese. Even Sri Lankan officials from the Education International (EI) enroute to a meeting in Muttur East were detained for hours at the checkpoint, and subject to interrogation.

They were then told that Sinhalese people will not be allowed entry into Muttur East without prior permission from senior Defense officials.

The EI workers had intended to begin work on two schools in Tamil villages which were destroyed by last December’s tsunami. After bringing the issue to the attention of the international ceasefire monitors, they were allowed entry by the soldiers.

This is only one of numerous incidents cited to the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) by residents of Muttur East.

The checkpoint at Kaddaiparichchan was once left open on a 24 hour basis, in the interests of promoting development throughout the war and tsunami-devastated region. However, these hours have been sharply cutback. Troops now refuse civilian entry after 7 pm and before 6 am.

These recent incidents are reminiscent of the decade-long embargo imposed on the LTTE-held areas in which food, medicine and almost all other supplies were refused entry, often despite permission being obtained by NGOs from the defence ministry in Colombo.

Compiled from TamilNet reports

To: the US Congress,

We would like to express our grave concerns regarding the stalled peace process in Sri Lanka. As Sri Lanka’s presidential elections approach this Thursday, both of the two main contenders are crudely marginalizing the interests of the Tamil minority.

Both candidates are playing to the forces of ethnic nationalism in their efforts to secure a political victory, with neither side pledging concrete support for the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) which the United States, as one of the Co-Chairs for Sri Lanka’s peace process, has backed and repeatedly called for implementation.The most crucial aspect of the CFA is Clause 1.8, which demands the disarmament of paramilitary groups currently engaged in a covert shadow war against the Tamil minority. The Norwegian-led peace monitors have documented over 190 deaths due to this subversive war, as local residents report paramilitaries being given arms from the Sri Lankan Army, and residing in camps well-fortified by the military.

We call upon you to ensure that whoever wins Friday’s election comes under immediate pressure from the United States government to fully disarm paramilitaries and stop those perpetuating violence against innocent civilians.

Both main presidential contenders, United National Party Opposition leader Ranil Wickremasinghe and Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse are essentially ignoring the eighteen-percent Tamil minority beyond superficial claims to “consider all communities’ interests”. Indeed, Rajapakse has secured nominations from both the Eelam People’s Democratic Party, a notorious armed political group, and Colonel Karuna, head of the faction of the Tamil Tigers that split from the organization in 2004. Officials from Wickremasinghe’s government, which was in power during the signing of the 2002 CFA, recently admitted they helped facilitate this split within the Tigers, which has directly led to a cycle of violence in a ‘shadow war’ and the deaths of hundreds of people. Paramilitaries operating under the umbrella label of Karuna’s forces have since terrorized Tamils throughout the region. This has caused unbearable tension among a population already devastated by last December’s tsunami.

It is within this bleak context that many Tamils are simply refusing to participate in the upcoming elections, to show the world that “the land of the Tamils will no more trust Sinhala leaders,” as the Jaffna Student Organization of Higher Education Institutions states. This provides a dangerous opportunity for ballot-stuffing and election fraud, which may involve violence against Tamils who do decide to vote. Given the history of election violence against minorities in Sri Lanka, seen in December 2001 and April 2004 parliamentary elections in which hundreds were massacred in party conflicts and indiscriminate bombings, there is a high likelihood for indiscriminate killings. Indeed, foreign election observers have reported that “systematic intimidation” is being carried out by government ministers, using state vehicles and people in STF-style uniforms to warn Tamils against voting. Additionally, government documents have been found describing a plan to send army deserters to Tamil regions to dilute their vote.

We call upon you to ensure that the next president of Sri Lanka implements the Ceasefire Agreement, particularly the Clause stipulating the disarming of Army-backed paramilitaries, to halt the violence that has daily plagued the Tamil people.

Thank you for your concern in preserving peace and democracy in Sri Lanka.

As many as 208,820 people living in the areas controlled by the Liberation Tigers and who are eligible to vote at Thursday’s Presidential election have to travel anything between 20 to 100 kilometers to clustered polling stations in Army-controlled areas, Election Commissioner Dayananda Dissanayake said Monday.

Voters in the Mulaitivu District, under the control of LTTE, have to travel such distance and hundreds of buses and other vehicles will be provided by the Elections Commissioner to enable them to commute to clustered stations in government controlled areas.

Around 20 million rupees will be spent as transport charges and for building cluster polling stations for those living in the LTTE controlled areas, Chief Accountant, Election Secretariat H. A. S. Hapuarachchi said.

A recent Supreme Court decision has ruled that cluster polling centres should be located at least 1,000 meters away from the Forward Defence Lines of the Sri Lankan armed forces.

According to the Assistant Commissioner of Elections, Batticaloa, T. Krishanan Anandalingam, there are 318,728 persons in the district eligible vote under the electoral register 2004 of which 80,443 living in LTTE controlled areas.

There will be 353 polling stations in the district including 88 cluster polling stations for voters in the LTTE controlled areas. Staff at these polling stations will be Tamil speaking public servants selected from the Colombo District.

Vanni District Assistant Commissioner A. S. Karunanidhi said there were 66,596 registered voters in the Mulativu District, of which 65,504 were living in the LTTE controlled area.

There will be 50 polling centres for this district with 49 cluster polling stations at Omanthai. Some of the voters here will also have travel about 100 kilometers to reach the polling stations.

The Mannar District has 78, 906 voters of which 16,131 are living in LTTE controlled areas. This district will have 67 polling stations of which 12 will be cluster polling stations.

Assistant Commissioner, Trincomalee District, M. M. S. K. Bandara, said there were 238,755 registered voters in the district with 278 polling station and 2 cluster polling stations at Kattaparichchan for 12,000 voters living in the LTTE held areas. These voters will have to travel up to 20 kilometers to reach their cluster polling stations.

There are 791,938 registered voters in the Jaffna District and 96,328 voters in the LTTE-controlled Kilinochchi District.

The total number of polling stations in Jaffna District with 224 cluster polling stations and 103 cluster polling stations for Kilinochchi Distirct located at Muhamalai and at Vadamarchchi East, Assistant Commissioner for Jaffna District P. Kuganathan said.

Members of Sri Lanka’s security forces and Army-backed paramilitaries, along with underworld thugs, were this week intimidating voters in the North and east, paving the way for fraud in favour of Premier Mahinda Rajapakse during Thursday’s Presidential poll, press reports and opposition politicians said this week.

Two of Sri Lanka’s most prominent Army-backed Tamil paramilitary groups have endorsed Mr. Rajapakse, the Sinhala nationalists’ candidate of choice, in Thursday’s election.

The Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) has been spearheading Mr. Rajapakse’s campaign in the Jaffna peninsula for several weeks now. And this week, Karuna, a renegade Tamil Tiger commander who defected to the military in April 2004, this week also endorsed the Premier, whose campaign is built on a ultra Sinhala nationalist and anti-LTTE platform.

“Mahinda Rajapakse has said he will review the ceasefire agreement with the LTTE. This is an important issue for us. He has also said he will commence talks with all parties to find a solution to the ethnic problem. This too is important for us”, Karuna was quoted by the Daily Mirror as saying.

The EPDP last month urged all Tamil speakers to vote for the Premier - whose campaigning kicked off with electoral pacts with hardline Sinhala parties ruling out power-sharing to resolve the island’s ethnic conflict.

The main opposition United National Party (UNP), whose candidate, Ranil Wickremesinghe, is Rajapakse’s main challenger in the election to replace outgoing President Chandrika Kumaratunga, this week warned of efforts to subvert the polls in Jaffna, where the EPDP is active under the aegis of the military.

“We have documents and other evidence to prove government’s attempt to disrupt the poll in the Jaffna district. Government leaders have planned to send about three hundred army deserters to Jaffna by private commercial flights,” UNP official Sarath Munasinghe told reporters.

“Some senior officials of the three armed forces are also involved in the sabotage attempt,” Mr. Munasinghe, a former spokesman for the Sri Lanka Army (SLA), also said.

Sri Lanka’s Elections Commissioner Dayananda Dissanayake said the actual number of voters in the northern Jaffna peninsula are much less than the registered number of 700,000.

“Only about 250,000 people had voted in previous elections,” Dissanayake said responding to news reports that a large number of poll cards are yet to be delivered.

Dissanayake said the poll cards were not mandatory to vote. If a voter’s name appears in the register he could vote after proving his identity.

Meanwhile, press reports said members of the ruling United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) were intimidating voters in Sri Lanka’s eastern province.

Persons dressed in uniforms of the Special Task Force (STF) were also involved in the intimidation in military controlled Akkaraipattu and Pottuvil, the Daily Mirror newspaper reported Tuesday.

The STF is an elite counter-insurgency unit of the Sri Lankan police which works closely with Tamil paramilitaries and Army commandos in the ongoing shadow war against the LTTE.

The Daily Mirror quoted foreign election observers in the area as saying “systematic intimidation” was being carried out by government ministers using state vehicles and persons attired in STF-style uniforms.

“These uniformed persons, the police and private supporters were going door to door warning people to stay at home on election day,” the Daily Mirror also said, quoting an election observer.

“Akkaraipattu and Pottuvil are areas heavily in favour of the UNP candidate. So this is an attempt by government politicians in the area to try and make sure the people refrain from casting their ballot,” the observer told the paper.

“The use of state vehicles, with visible number plates is good indication that this is clearly government sponsored intimidation”, he added.

A tense atmosphere prevailed in the Ampara district as several dozen thugs allegedly hired by local UPFA strongmen hung around areas where the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) has its main support in the district, the Daily Mirror also said.

“The intimidating presence of these underworld figures especially in Kalmunai and Samanthurai electorates has given rise to fears that the government is bent on creating mayhem on election day,” Mr. Rauf Hakeem, leader of the SLMC, which is backing Mr. Wickremesinghe, said.

Sri Lankan security forces have stepped up patrolling and erected new checkpoints in several parts of the island, though pre-election unrest has been minimal.

“We have intensified security, mostly in urban areas,” police spokesman Rienzie Perera told Reuters. “But the violence is very much less (than during previous elections).”

In the northern Vavuniya district, Sri Lankan security forces have stepped up the intensity of their checks on travellers, sparking anxiety amongst local residents, the Liberation Tigers said this weekend.

The European Union’s chief election observer said Saturday that a second vote should be held if serious irregularities occur.

“It would be our view that re-polling should be held if there was serious electoral malpractice.” John Cushnahan told The Associated Press on the weeked.

He criticized Sri Lankan election officials for not re-polling in the wake of accusation of irregularities in the April 2004 polls. The Election Commissioner, has rejected the demand, saying it would not have significantly affected the outcome of the results, with more than a dozen parties contesting.

Sri Lankan media reports suggest that the contest will be close - leaving tight enough margins for vote fraud to make a difference. Sri Lanka has 13.3 million eligible voters.

Confusion has been created in the minds of the people regarding the position of the UNP on the peace process. The UNP
has consistently stood for a negotiated political solution based on Federalism within a united Sri Lanka. The country has only
two options open to it, which is to revert to war or seek a solution through power sharing within a united Sri Lanka

No third option is available and if a military solution is to be rejected then it means working towards a viable solution based on
federalism, which is a sharing of power within one united Sri Lanka.

Federalism is nothing intimidating, it is only a process of sharing power within one united country. It is only a way of
preserving intact one country made up of multi ethnic, multi-religious groups. It is a way of preserving peace and tranquillity.

We want to make it clear that nobody has a monopoly over patriotism. All of us are patriotic, we love our country and we
belong to a party formed by the first Prime Minister of Independent Sri Lanka, the late D. S. Senanayake. It is impossible to
even imagine a situation where our party and its leader will do anything harmful to the interests of Sri Lanka.

I want to make it quite clear that the model of Federalism that we are considering has four basic safeguards. The first is that
there is no compromising on anything that goes against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. All the powers
that are needed to ensure the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the country will be vested in the Central government
and will not be devolved to Provincial Councils. Control of the armed forces, the national budget, and foreign policy will be
exclusively within the domain of the centre, they will not be devolved to the periphery.

The third area will be consulation with he major political party in the South, the SLFP. There is no way of reaching a solution
without a consensus being first reached with the SLFP. The fourth safeguard is that its acceptance will depend on the
peoples approval at a referendum.

Discussion with the LTTE had reached a stage where the partes had agreed to explore federalism as a solution to the
problem. However before detailed negotiations could be commenced into the development, Parliament was dissolved and
the peace process was stranded. What we need to do is to carry forward the process from where it was stalled so that we
could have access to US $ 5 billion to improve infrastructure and also establish more facilities in the country.

The [other] major political party in Sri Lanka, the SLFP, recently publicly stated that the ceasefire agreement had helped the
country develop and also was a factor in attracting foreign direct investment.

It is also refreshing to note that there is an appreciable measure of agreement between the UNP and the SLFP to bring
about a permanent solution to the North East conflict through a negotiated political settlement.

Compiled from comments quoted in The Island on Nov. 14, 2005