Britain will be pressing Sri Lanka’s hardline government for greater access for senior UN officials and would join European allies in taking a stronger position against Colombo over human rights abuses.

In a meeting with Tamil Diaspora representatives at the British Foreign Office on February 25, Foreign Minister Lord Malloch-Brown said he would personally be attending the UN Human Rights Council meeting in Geneva to press the point.

At the UN a few days later Lord Malloch-Brown strongly criticized the Colombo regime, saying “international concern had not made an impact [on it]”.

Saying Britain accepted Sri Lanka “facing considerable terrorist threat”, the minister told the UNHRC: “The international community condemned terrorism, but countering terrorism required respect for human rights.”

In response, Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Minister Mahinda Samarasinghe slammed Britain’s criticism, saying “it was difficult for some countries to let go of their colonial possessions.”

“Sri Lanka was proud of its records for combating terrorism, while minimizing harm to civilians,” Mr. Samarasinghe said, adding his country did not need to be told that countering terrorism required full respect for human rights.

“Sri Lanka was strengthening democracy and pluralism in a manner that had proved difficult in the past,” he asserted.

Speaking at a meeting with expatriate Tamils at the British Foreign Office on Feb 25, Lord Malloch-Brown said the government of President Rajapakse had “made political process secondary to military process.”

The British Tamil Forum (BTF), a Diaspora advocacy group which attended the meeting, quoted Lord Malloch-Brown as saying that there are two key issues with regards to Sri Lanka’s conduct: prosecution of war and failure to enter into serious negotiation, and human rights issues.

“I have told the [Sri Lankan] President, Foreign Minister and visiting delegation that we do not find the political process credible or serious. We feel that we really sought to push for a political negotiation as a way forward. There is no military solution to this problem,” Lord Malloch-Brown said.

“We are going to go on pushing hard to put the political negotiation back on track,” he said adding this will not be done from a bilateral position but by working closely with Europe, UN and the Commonwealth.

The UK will be demanding and pressing hard for wider access by Sir John Holmes, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, he said.

The UK will also demand that all recommendations made by Louise Arbour, Head of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Ms. Coomarasamy be implemented in full.

The purpose of the meeting called on Monday by the FCO was to engage with the Tamil Diaspora and understand their perspective to the conflict in Sri Lanka, the BTF statement said.

It was attended by Parliamentarians from Britain’s three major parties and members from the House of Lords heard views were made by different Diaspora representatives.

Tamil National Alliance (TNA) Parliamentarian Gajan Ponnambalam was also present and spoke as part of the Tamil community.

Britain will support political solution with major devolution of power to the Tamil areas, Lord Malloch-Brown said, adding that Britain could not support independence for Tamils.

The BTF argued that UK and the rest of the international community “must explicitly make their support for Sri Lanka unity and territorial integrity conditional on the Tamil people collectively being satisfied with the state’s sharing of power and its governance.”

“Tamils safety and political future can only be guaranteed if the Sri Lankan state is restrained by international law,” the BTF told the meeting, adding that the international community must, on this basis, support the Tamils’ claim for independence, just as it had supported the Kosovars’.

“At independence in 1948 Sri Lankan State was entrusted with all minorities’ rights,” BTF spoksman Suren Surendiran told the meeting. “They have abused the trust against Tamils, human rights, free speech, pluralism and denounce the demand for statehood.”

He pointed out that in the 1977 elections, long before the armed conflict began, the overwhelming majority of Tamils voted for an Independent State as the only way to escape state repression.

TNA MP Ponnambalam noted that “even though I am an elected member of parliament I cannot espouse the wishes of the vast majority [of the Tamil] due to the 6th amendment of the Sri Lankan constitution [which outlaws advocacy of independence].”

Mr. Ponnambalam reiterated the position adopted by the TNA when it met Lord Malloch-Brown last summer, arguing that UK should make its development assistance conditional on human rights, progress in the political negotiations and implementation of the ceasefire agreement.

The UK should seriously consider trade and travel bans on Sri Lanka and the international community must take up the position that if the right to internal self determination of the Tamil people is denied any further, the right to external self determination of the Tamil people will have to be inevitably recognised, he said.

Whilst Lord Naseby, an advocate of the Sri Lankan government’s stance had denounced the BTF and its views, sources at the meeting said. However the organisation had been praised by Parliamentarians and the Foreign Minister had also welcomed their engagement with the British government.

“It is extremely important and absolutely correct for you as British citizens to organise and demand sympathy and support for your objectives from your local MPs. This is how the British democracy works,” Lord Malloch-Brown was quoted as telling the meeting.

“I wish the Sri Lankan democracy also worked that way. I want to register that point.”

Noting that “the British Tamils Forum has been labeled ‘terrorists’ and there had been some smear campaigns,” he observed: “I can draw parallel to my own experience. I have lived in the US for 21years. My wife is Irish American. We have been in the same position as you are. How do we support the change that we want in Northern Ireland while making sure that one doesn’t actually support violent acts against the British or the British Army?”

“There is always a case for freedom struggle and self determination,” the British Foreign Minister said.

The Sri Lankan government is responsible for widespread abductions and “disappearances” that are a national crisis, Human Rights Watch said in a new report released today. Human Rights Watch urged the government to reveal the whereabouts of the “disappeared,” immediately end the practice, and hold the perpetrators accountable.

Since major fighting between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) resumed in 2006, Sri Lankan security forces and pro-government armed groups have “disappeared” or abducted hundreds of individuals, many of whom are feared dead.

The 241-page report, “Recurring Nightmare: State Responsibility for ‘Disappearances’ and Abductions in Sri Lanka,” documents 99 of the several hundred cases reported, and examines the Sri Lankan government’s response, which to date has been grossly inadequate. According to the United Nations Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances, in 2006 and 2007 Sri Lanka recorded the highest number of new cases of “disappearances” in the world.

“President Mahinda Rajapaksa, once a rights advocate, has now led his government to become one of the world’s worst perpetrators of enforced disappearances,” said Elaine Pearson, deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “The end of the ceasefire means this crisis will continue until the government starts taking serious measures.”

Under international law, a state commits an enforced disappearance when it takes a person into custody and denies holding them or disclosing their whereabouts. “Disappeared” persons are commonly subjected to torture or extrajudicial execution, and cause family members continued suffering. An enforced disappearance is a continuing rights violation – it is ongoing until the fate or whereabouts of the person becomes known.

The vast majority of cases documented by Human Rights Watch indicate the involvement of government security forces – army, navy, or police. In some cases, relatives of the “disappeared” identified specific military units that had detained their relatives and army camps where they had been taken. In other cases, they described uniformed policemen, especially members of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), taking their relatives into custody before they “disappeared.”

Vairamuththu Varatharasan, a 40-year-old truck driver and father of five, was abducted from his home in Colombo on January 7, 2007, and has not been seen since. His wife told Human Rights Watch:

“A group of about 20 men – some in police uniforms, some in civilian clothes surrounded the house. One policeman came inside and asked for our identity card. I went into one of the rooms to get the identity card. By the time I came out of the room, my husband was not there; neither was the policeman. I ran out and spotted a van parked in a dark place on the road. I ran to the road, but by the time I got there, the van started and left.”

Most of the victims are ethnic Tamils, although Muslims and Sinhalese have also been targeted. In many cases, the security forces “disappeared” individuals because of their alleged affiliation with the LTTE. Clergy, educators, humanitarian aid workers, and journalists also were targeted – not only to remove them from the civil sphere, but also to warn others to avoid such activities.

Pro-government Tamil armed groups are also implicated in the abductions and “disappearances” – specifically the Karuna group and the Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) – acting either independently or in conjunction with the security forces.

The number of abductions perpetrated by the LTTE is comparatively low since targeted killings, rather than abductions, appear to be the LTTE’s primary tactic. The LTTE has also been responsible for numerous other egregious abuses, including bombings against civilians, political assassinations, forced child recruitment, and the systematic repression of basic civil and political rights in areas under their control.

In the face of the crisis, the government of Sri Lanka has demonstrated an utter lack of resolve to investigate and prosecute those responsible. Not a single member of the security forces has been brought to justice for involvement in “disappearances” or abductions. Human Rights Watch said that Sri Lanka’s emergency laws, which grant the security forces sweeping powers to arbitrarily arrest and detain people without being held to account, have facilitated enforced disappearances.

“So long as soldiers and police can commit ‘disappearances’ with impunity, this horrific crime will continue,” said Pearson.

The Rajapaksa government has set up an array of special bodies tasked with monitoring and investigating “disappearances” and other human rights violations. None have yielded concrete results.

Human Rights Watch said this failure is unsurprising given that, at the highest levels, the Sri Lankan government continues to downplay the problem, denying the scale of the crisis and that its own security forces are involved.

“The government’s mechanisms to address ‘disappearances’ will remain impotent so long as the president and top officials fail to send a clear signal to the security forces that these abuses will not be tolerated,” said Pearson.

Sri Lanka’s key international partners and the UN bodies, including the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, have raised serious concerns about the alarming number of “disappearances” and prevailing impunity. They have expressed growing support for the establishment of a UN human rights monitoring mission to investigate and report on abuses by government forces and the LTTE throughout the country.

Human Rights Watch deplored the Sri Lankan government’s opposition to an international monitoring mission, given that such initiatives have proven effective elsewhere in dealing with “disappearances.”

With sufficient mandate and resources, the monitoring mission could achieve what the government and various national mechanisms have failed to do: establish the location of detainees through unimpeded visits to the detention facilities; request information regarding specific cases from all sides to the conflict; assist national law enforcement agencies and human rights mechanisms in investigating the cases and communicating with the families; and maintain credible records of reported cases.

“The Sri Lankan government’s rejection of a UN monitoring mission reflects badly on its commitment to human rights,” said Pearson. “While the government dawdles, many Sri Lankans will continue to pay the price.”

Human Rights Watch called on the government of Sri Lanka to:

- Take immediate measures to end the practice of enforced disappearances, vigorously investigate all cases reported, and bring the perpetrators to account; and
- Cooperate with the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to establish and deploy an international monitoring team to report on violations of international human rights and humanitarian law by all parties to the conflict;

Human Rights Watch also called on Sri Lanka’s international partners, in particular India and Japan, to make further military and other non-humanitarian assistance to Sri Lanka contingent on government efforts to halt the practice of “disappearances,” and to end impunity, including its acceptance of an international monitoring mission.

“They started beating Thiyagarajah. They took his T-shirt off and stuffed it into his mouth. The neighbors came out to help, but they pushed them away. His wife was crying and shouting, and they hit her with a gun butt. She was nine months pregnant. They were accusing Thiyagarajah of having bombs in the house, and forced him to dig the ground around the house. They searched the house, turning everything upside down, but didn’t find anything. They beat him so badly that he couldn’t walk – they had to carry him away. They took him away on a motorcycle.”
– A relative of 25-year-old Thiyagarajah Saran, “disappeared” on the night of February 20, 2007, from East Puttur, Jaffna

“The villagers told me they saw Pathinather and Anton being interrogated by the military. The military held them at gunpoint. Then the military put them into the Powell [vehicle], and also loaded their bicycles into their vehicle. The villagers could not see much because the army ordered them to disperse, and now they are too afraid to talk to anybody about what they saw.”
– A relative of 21-year-old Anton Prabananth, “disappeared” on February 17, 2007 together with 24-year-old Pathinather Prasanna, from Jaffna

“When we got to the [Kodikamam] army camp, I saw my nephew’s bicycle parked there. It was parked near the camp, in the military-controlled area. When we asked the soldiers, they denied arresting them, and when I said we had seen the bike, they got very angry, and started yelling, ‘Who told you to go and look there?! We’ll shoot you if you ever approach this place again!’ We asked the GS [local civilian official] and the police to get the bike back, but they couldn’t. Eventually, the commander in the camp returned the bike to us. He said that the people who had arrested our men were no longer there, so we should just take the bike and go.”
– A relative of 26-year-old Thavaruban Kanapathipillai, “disappeared” on August 16, 2006, together with 30-year-old Shangar Santhivarseharam from Kachai, Jaffna

“Two people came to our door, in uniforms. They were armed. Another man was dressed in an army T-shirt and jeans. I asked where they were taking my husband. The person in civilian clothes showed me a pistol. I asked where they were taking him again and he showed the pistol again, and then they took him out. I ran after them, and they had two vans, white and blue.”
– Wife of 21-year-old Ramakrishnan Rajkumar, “disappeared” on August 23, 2006, from Colombo

The euphoria in the Sri Lankan government and military over the prospects of a quick victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is beginning to fade.

While the security forces regularly report the killing of LTTE members, little progress appears to have been made in seizing the LTTE’s major northern strongholds in the Kilinochchi and Mullaithivu districts.

Open warfare erupted in July 2006 when President Mahinda Rajapakse ordered the army to capture the LTTE-held area of Mavilaru in open breach of the 2002 ceasefire agreement.

In the space of a year, the military quickly overran the remaining LTTE bases in the East and turned its attention to the LTTE’s northern territory. Last July, the Rajapakse government celebrated the victory in the East with jingoistic speeches and a parade through the capital of Colombo.

In January, Rajapakse finally dropped the pretence of adhering to the ceasefire. The decision to pull out of the truce was accompanied by a series of statements declaring that the LTTE would be defeated militarily by the end of the year.

On December 30, Army Commander, Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka, bragged to the Sunday Observer that “the LTTE could not prevent losing their remaining 3,000 cadres and there is no assurance that the LTTE Leader V. Prabhakaran would survive for the next six months”.

Fonseka, who is expected to retire in December, told foreign journalists on January 11 that he would not hand the war to next army chief. Government leaders enthusiastically repeated the statement, even declaring that Prabhakaran would be captured and sent to India for trial over the murder of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by a LTTE suicide bomber.

A month later, however, the military high command is not so confident. On February 10, Fonseka explained in Irida Lakbima that he was not committed to a deadline for winning the war.

“They [the LTTE] are an organised force with a lot of experience... I don’t conduct the war looking at deadlines and timeframes.” Expressing a degree of frustration, he added: “Can a war that has been going on for more than 25 years be completed by March? But, what I say is—give us a chance.”

On February 23, military spokesman Brigadier Udaya Nanayakkara echoed the army commander’s comments. As reported by Agence France Presse, he declared that the military was “winning the war...but we have never said that we will finish them off. We have never set deadlines.”

Military operations in the North were always going to be more difficult than in the East, where the LTTE had been seriously weakened by a devastating split in its ranks in 2004.

The course of the war is difficult to follow in detail. The only sources of information are the security forces and the LTTE, which both distort reports to suit their own propaganda.

The army allows no correspondents into the war zones. The Colombo media functions under the threat of censorship and physical violence. Anyone publishing negative reports on the military is quickly branded a traitor.

The military’s basic strategy appears to be one of attrition—the use of superior firepower, including air strikes and artillery bombardments, to sow panic among the population, wear down the LTTE’s defences and kill its fighters. The high command is only too well aware of the failure of previous broad scale offensives.

In 2000, the LTTE inflicted a devastating series of defeats on the army, capturing its key strategic base at Elephant Pass, in a sharp counteroffensive against an overextended military operation.

In the North, the military is seeking to slowly advance on the LTTE strongholds from all sides—from Mannar in the west, Vavuniya in the south, Welioya in the east and Muhamalai in the north. While there have been numerous reports of small victories and LTTE casualties—all undoubtedly exaggerated—the military has failed to gain a great deal of ground.

The Mannar operations started last July. The army captured the fishing village of Silavathurai last year and has since seized several other areas but the gains remain small. The main aim in present operations is to secure the Madhu area then Viduthalaithivu. The area is crucial to the LTTE’s main supply routes from the neighbouring southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu.

Recent fighting has taken place around the Madhu church area, including Admapan and Pandivirichchan, in preparation for a push on Viduthalaithivu. The Sunday Times reported last weekend that the military had announced the capture of the Pandivirichchaan area. The pro-LTTE Tamilnet reported the recapture of the area on the evening of the same day.

On Sunday, the LTTE claimed to have repelled the military’s advance from Palaikushi. This week, the defence ministry claimed the army had penetrated deeper into LTTE-held area in Mannar. Whatever the true figures and territory gained or lost, the fighting is obviously heavy.

On the Welioya front, the results are similarly inconclusive. The military reported that it gained control of some areas previously in “no-man’s land” under the ceasefire arrangements.

The aerial bombardment of LTTE-held areas continues unabated.

Another sign of the military’s difficulties is its turn to India for assistance. General Fonseka undertook a six-day tour to India last week “to further strengthen the military ties”.

He met India’s defence minister, A.K. Anthony, as well as top military and civilian officials in a bid to obtain weapons and light aircraft. However, Fonseka is unlikely to get all that he wants from India, which to date has provided limited assistance and training. While wanting to prevent an LTTE victory, New Delhi is concerned that the ongoing war will inflame opposition in Tamil Nadu.

The Sri Lankan military is under pressure from Rajapakse to deliver a quick victory. His government, an unstable coalition of 13 parties, confronts growing popular discontent over the economic impact of the war, which is helping to fuel inflation and undermine living standards.

Rajapakse needs success stories to boost his chauvinist appeals and to dispel fears in ruling circles of an inconclusive and protracted war that will inevitably fuel an economic and political crisis.

Speaking on Sunday at a rally in Ratnapura organised by his Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), Rajapakse declared that the government would carry out “liberation operations” against the LTTE until “every inch of land is captured and the last terrorist is completely destroyed”. He insisted it was the “bounden duty” of people to support the war.

The government is not conducting a war for “liberation” or against “terrorism” but to maintain the economic and political dominance of the country’s Sinhala Buddhist elite

For six decades, Colombo governments have whipped up communal politics to divide working people and prop up their rule. Rajapakse’s decision to plunge the country back to war was bound up with his government’s inability to deal with growing unrest over declining living standards.

The return to war has only compounded the economic burdens on working people. The military has purchased new weapons and boosted its strength to 150,000, recruiting 34,000 last year. Another 15,000 are to be recruited this year.

Along with rising oil prices, military expenditure is a major factor fuelling inflation. The annualised inflation rate hit 24 percent in February. Rajapakse has responded to any opposition, including strikes and protests, by demonising critics as “pro-LTTE”.

These social and political tensions will inevitably sharpen if the military operations against the LTTE slow, or if the army suffers reverses. That accounts for the shrill tone of Rajapakse’s speech at Ratnapura—it is a sign of growing desperation.

Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia this Sunday. In his four hour long valedictory media conference, outgoing Rus-sian President Vladimir Putin has denounced the move as "illegal and immoral". Serbia and Russia have called for an emergency me-eting of the UN Security Council. Russia, China, India and South Africa are among the countries which have opposed Kosovo's declaration of independence.

The open secession of Kosovo and its recognition by powerful Western states takes place not-withstanding UN Resolution 1244 of 1999 which recognizes Kosovo as part of Serbia. As the Russian Federation's charismatic Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (who stunned me by a burst of fluent Sinhala upon introduction) warned in his Gunnar Myrdal Le-cture in Geneva a few days back, the recognition of Kosovo's independence runs contrary to the very basis of international law and is fraught with consequences for Europe and other parts of the world.

The Russian position has consistently been that any solution should be agreed upon in negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo. This was abandoned as impossible by Marti Ahtissari, who recommended de facto independence for Kosovo. Incidentally he was brought to Sri Lanka as a possible negotiator or facilitator by the Et-hnic Affairs Advisor of President Kumaratunga, but luckily for Sri Lanka was objected to by Lak-shman Kadirgamar and, it must be admitted, the JVP.

There were options other than secession for Kosovo. One was for the fullest autonomy within Serbia. The other was the carving out of the Serbian majority portion of Kosovo and its annexation with Serbia. However, all options were aborted by the obduracy of the Kosovo leadership, which insists on independence.

It must be noted that the current leader of Kosovo is a former leader of the separatist army whi-ch practiced terrorism, the Koso-vo Liberation Army (KLA). The majority of people of Kosovo had become accustomed to the idea of independence during the several years of administration by a UN High Commissioner (later nominated as an IIGEP member for Sri Lanka by the EU).

The hardening of the position of Kosovo was also due to open pledges of recognition of independence by several key Western powers.

Of course the breakaway of Kosovo merely completes the unraveling of the former Yugosla-via. There were many reasons for this: the abandonment by majority Serbian ultra-nationalists, in the new context of electoral competition, of the enlightened compact forged by the unorthodox Communist Joseph Broz Tito, a founder leader of the Non-Align-ed Movement (and friend of Sri Lanka); the exacerbation of ethnic tensions by the adoption of an IMF package; the rollback by Serb nationalism of Kosovo's autonomous status as a province; recognition by certain Western European states of the breakaway Yugoslav republics setting off a centrifugal chain reaction; the excessive brutality against civilians of the Serbian army and Serb militia in the breakaway repub-lics; the partiality of the Western media which focused only on Serb excesses but not those committed by anti-Serb forces.

In the final instance however, the secession of Kosovo is traceable to a single mistake: the decision by President Milosevic to fo-llow the advice of President Yelt-sin (who had already been lobbied by the US), and withdraw the Yugoslav army from Kosovo, not-withstanding the fact that in its heavily camouflaged and dug-in positions, it had withstood US/ NATO bombing and was well positioned to inflict, with its tradition and training in partisan warfare, unacceptable casualties on any invading ground forces.

Cuban leader Fidel Castro re-veals that at this crucial moment he had written to Milosevic and urged him, in the final words of his missive, to "Resist! Resist! Resist!", but the Belgrade leadership failed to do so. In short, the impending independence of Ko-sovo is the result of the failure of political will on the part of the ex-Yugoslav leadership.

Instead of resisting, the Yugo-slav army withdrew and was repl-aced by an international presence on the ground in Kosovo. After a period of tutelage, Kosovo was encouraged with a nod and a wink, to secede completely.

These then are the lessons for Sri Lanka: never withdraw the armed forces from any part of our territory in which they are challenged, and never permit a foreign presence on our soil. After 450 years of colonial presence, and especially after the experience of the Kandyan Convention, we Sri Lankan should have these lessons engraved in our historical memory and our collective identity. The Western imperialists who failed to capture our island milita-rily were able to take control of it only because we double crossed our leader, trusted the West, sign-ed an agreement and allowed foreign presence into our heartland.

The Western war against Yugoslavia was waged not by the Bush administration but by a liberal one. It was waged under the doctrine of liberal internationalism, and humanitarian interventi-onism. These doctrines were updated to "preventive humanitarian interventionism" in the case of the invasion of Iraq.

Today, the buzzword is the "Responsibility to Protect", and I refer not to the UN World Leaders summit of 2005 which requires the endorsement of the Security Council, but the original 1998 version of the Canadian government sponsored International Co-mmission on State Sovereignty, which had a far more elastic interpretation! The co-chairman of that Commission was former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans (whom Lakshman Kadirgamar was determined, should not play a role in Lanka's peace process despite his offers to do so in 1995).

We may find a newer version arising with UK Foreign Secre-tary David Miliband's Aung San Suu Kyi lecture delivered at Oxford University a few days back. In it, he says that notwithstanding some mistakes in Iraq and Afghanistan, the West must not forget, and must take up once again, its moral imperative to expand democracy throughout the world (including, interestingly enough in "established democracies").

He identifies and rejects three objections to that project: the "Asian values" school which in its 1993 variant of a statement by 34 countries, recognizes democracy but resist the imposition of western values as neo-colonial; the Realpolitik school which stresses "interests" rather than values and morality; and even the pragmatic school which points out that democracy is the product of internal historical processes. Foreign Secretary Miliband makes several pointedly critical references to China, (which he will be visiting shortly) in his speech on the need of the West to extend democracy worldwide.

The patterns of world politics appear kaleidoscopic, with coalitions forming over one issue, only to break up over another. At first glance this would make long term alliances or affiliations almost impossible. However, certain iss-ues are revelatory of underlying dynamics which are of a defining character. Kosovo is certainly one such issue.

The Kosovo crisis sheds light on a dynamic in world politics which is of central importance to Sri Lanka. This is the matter of state sovereignty. As a country which is grappling with a challenge to its territorial integrity and unity, all tendencies towards the break-up of established states are against the basic interests of Sri Lanka.

The issue of Kosovo not only illustrates the phenomenon of secessionism. It reveals a more fundamental contradiction within world politics, namely that betw-een state sovereignty on the one hand and those tendencies which act to undermine states. Such tendencies are twofold: secessionism from within and hegemonism from without. The tendency towa-rds hegemonism manifests itself most starkly in the phenomenon of interventionism.

Kosovo and earlier Chechnya disprove the identification that some make between Western int-erventionism and particular religions. While it is true that on a global scale, the West perceives itself as besieged by and struggling against what it calls Islamist terrorism or Islamic radicalism/ extremism (some hard-line ideologues even talk of Islamo-fascism) attention must be drawn to the fact that Serbs are Christian, while Kosovo Albanians are Islamic.

The Chechen separatists, so-me of whom were headquartered in the West, were also Islamic, while Russia is mainly Christian. Western interventionism is not tied to any particular ethnic or religious group. The name of the game seems the old one of divide and rule, and whichever group or struggle weakens the target state appears to be the one that is afforded patronage.

All tendencies in world politics which weaken, fragment and de-stabilize states, undermining their sovereignty and making them vulnerable to hegemony and intervention, are inimical to Sri Lanka. All tendencies which strengthen and defend state sovereignty, unity and territorial integ-rity, are friendly and helpful towards Sri Lanka.

By extension, all state and non-state actors which work tow-ards the weakening of state sovereignty in the non metropolitan areas of the world, i.e. the global South and East, cannot be regarded as the strategic friends, allies and partners of Sri Lanka. All state and non-state actors which support, defend and work towards the preservation and strengthening of the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integ-rity of states, are objectively the friends, allies and partners of Sri Lanka

Amidst firework displays, stre-et parties and concerts around the capital and much of the country, the Republic of Kosovo was born on February 17, 2008.

The long-awaited 'Unilateral' Declaration of Independence was made in concert with the United States and leading members of the European Union.

The events leading up to Kosovo's UDI and its aftermath will undoubtedly be a source of hope for peoples around the world committed to the liberation of their homelands from oppression and tyranny.

Over the last six months, for obvious reasons, Russia has ado-pted a 'no precedent' approach, defending the territorial integrity of its ally Serbia.

Russia's leaders are committed to their own notion of sovereignty - one as selective as the US's, but with a different perspective.

This was first exhibited by Moscow's anger at Chechnya's refusal to sign up to the Russian Federation, thus leading to the first and second Chechen wars and destabilization of the entire Caucasus region.
Whilst sovereignty is key to statehood, it is not an automatically isolationist property.

Throughout the history of the modern state, countries have, to some degree or other, pooled their sovereignty for mutual gain, be it in the form of economic or cultural cooperation or state integration/ merger as with the union between Scotland and England 1600's; German Unification in 1871; Italy's during the 1840s-1870 and, of course, the European Union itself in the past few decades.

Thus, it is disingenuous to argue that the mere emergence of new independent states would be destabilizing; newly independent states are no more likely to create international instability than existing states.

Rather, there is an argument that, in order to ensure their long-term futures, states, including new ones, are more likely to join the world's proliferating 'soverei-gnty pooling' organizations, thus actually increasing international cooperation - just as several post-Soviet Eastern European states have willingly joined the EU.

The separation of Kosovo and Serbia arguably provides a period in which both can overcome their differences, address the issues that led to the conflict and build new cordial relations, whilst at the same time retaining genuine ownership of their own futures, as well as sharing a joint one in which both sides have a degree of control.

In contrast, Moscow fears this 'break up' of Serbia will give fresh impetus to several independence movements along its own border from North Ossetia, Abkhazia and Chechnya.

Though both the South Osse-tia and Abkhazian movements are pro-Moscow, Russian politicians have raised the possibility of recognizing these entities as states (along with Transdniesta ; a break away region of Moldova where there is a large Russian troop presence), only as a threatened response against the US and EU for recognizing Kosovo.

Ultimately, Russia fears that as a consequence of all such declarations, Moscow's power and influence in the world will be eroded.

This is why Russia has sullenly promised to veto Kosovo's application to the United Nations.
During the past years of talks over Kosovo's future, leading members of the international co-mmunity came to the realization that independence is inevitable given the failure of the negotiation process to voluntarily retain the loyalty of the Albanian-majority province within the Serbian federation.

Therefore, most European States have recognized the newly independent state, as they have with all the Balkan states which sought independence since the 1990s.

At the same time, the international community continues to dictate the ability of less powerful states to govern or to gain access to all the institutions and powers that ought to come with international recognition.
A classic example of this is the continuing international stewardship of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the EU's provision of 2000 judicial, police and other law enforcement 'advisors' to Kosovo.
Sovereignty is therefore never absolute.

Since December the US and EU have been dragging Kosovo's independence, hoping to buy time to persuade Russia to their point of view.

Whilst vehemently insisting on the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity, Serbia's response to Kosovan independence is to threaten to recognize the independence of the Republic of Srpska (a constituent member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina).

Whilst warning of instability in the region and elsewhere, it is Serbia itself which is also threatening an economic blockade of Kosovo and reduced diplomatic cooperation with states that recognize Kosovo.
That there is discord over Kosovo amongst the world's states is not in doubt.

The emerging tensions bet-ween Russia and the West will be exacerbated by the Kosovan UDI.
Even within the EU, there are deep divisions, with Spain, Ro-mania, Greek Cyprus, Greece and Slovakia joining with Russia in stating fears other independence movements will be encouraged.

As a result of these fears, there is a concerted international atte-mpt to define Kosovo as a 'special case', a one-off in international affairs.

This, however, does not alter the basic premise of a people's right to self-determination.

Nor, indeed, does it preclude the creation of future 'special cases' (i.e. transitions to independence under international stewardship) based either on model of Kosovo or Bosnia-Hercegovina or more traditional ascent to independence like Eritrea.

Furthermore, the traditional arguments about 'sovereignty' fail to account for the very real legacy of Europe colonialism for what is disparagingly now described as the 'third world'.

It is rarely acknowledged that the 'internal' conflicts in these regions stem to a great part from the arbitrary delineation of international borders during the post WW2 rush to 'de-colonise.'

Some argue that the 'special case' status of Kosovo is justified because it is the final stage of the break up of Yugoslavia, an artificial construct.

But this line of thinking could be applied to any number of post-colonial developing states on the basis their splitting into cohesive sub-entities is the simply a continuation of the process of decolonization, of dismantling the artificial constructs of the European empires.

The irony is that, amid a 'globalising world', demands for self-rule and independence stem not from isolationist tendencies, but a desperation to escape state repression.

Especially given the drive to sovereignty pooling in today's 'globalised' world, the most effective response to present and future independence demands is to make the status quo of a united state more appealing by ensuring equitable power-sharing.

Rather than pouring billions into stamping out popular armed challenges to the 'sovereign' state, the international community should look at the other end of the 'problem' and forcibly compel repressive states to end their persecution of ethnic and religious minorities, accept demands for internal power-sharing and simply govern better.

Imagine a country whose greatest asset truly is its people. A country in which over a third of its citizens speak fluently one or more of English, French, German, Spanish, Norwegian, Danish, Swedish, Dutch, Creole, Zulu and many more, in addition to speaking the worlds oldest living classical language, Tamil.

A country with one of the highest literacy rates in the world, which has for decades exported professionals – doctors, teachers, scientists, engineers, accountants, computer programmers - as far a-field as Britain, the United States, Canada, Australia, much of Africa.

A country which is secular, but where learning is held to be sacred. You already know this country: this is Eelam.

Imagine a country whose unpolluted seas are a clear turquoise blue, lined with white sandy beaches, still unspoilt, whose skies take on the azure hues of the Indian sub continent, whose shore is lined with coconut palms, and tens of varieties of mango, guava and jack fruit. Imagine a country of rice fields and banana groves, chilli plants and hibiscus flowers, brimming with the lushness of the tropics, which even in places which are not naturally green has been made so by the industriousness of its people, its network of traditional water wells and irrigation channels.

You remember this country. It is Eelam.

Imagine a country, where unlike in all its neighbours, one cannot bribe one’s way past the traffic police or for that matter any government official. Where jobs are awarded on merit and not patronage. Where, unlike its neighbours, there is no sex tourism or porn industry. Where organised crime is not allowed to flourish.

Imagine a country with a written history of over 2000 years. Which predates the existence of the United States of America by over a thousand years. A country whose treatise on ethics, the Kural, declared circa 30 BC that “all men who live are alike at birth. Diverse actions define their distinction”, well before the American constitution came along to tell us that “all men are created equal”.

A country whose citizens’ attitude to unjust government is defined by that other phrase from the Kural: “more malicious than a professional murderer is a leader who rules his people with injustice and oppression”; a country, whose concept of justice and common law predates the arrival of the Romans in Britain.

A maritime, island society situated in the midst of strategic sea routes, which has assimilated and learnt from the waves of passing colonial powers – the Portuguese, the Dutch, the British and yes, even the Sinhalese. In short a country, which while nourished by the past can look confidently to a global future.

A global people. On a trip to the Vanni during the ceasefire, it was common to see, in a single guest-house, visiting Diaspora children playing together who spoke between them almost all the languages of Europe.

Although there are only a few hundred thousand Tamils in the UK, over one in fifty of every doctor in Britain’s National Health Service is Tamil. Across Europe, the Americas, Asia and Africa, you find today that the Tamil community produces several times as many highly skilled professionals on a per capita basis than the national average.

You know the exceptional educational standards, the literacy levels achieved in the Tamil homelands before the Sinhalese sought to crush us by war. You know the economic standards that were achieved then and are possible in the future. You have seen the blueprints for the development of Eelam, the plans for the industries which will be developed, the respect for the environment embedded in these plans, the role of the knowledge industries, the eagerly awaited return of the Diaspora.

But the governments of Sri Lanka and their allies in the international order tell us something entirely different.

They give us instead their abhorrent and twisted version of the vision. They tell us that the East is liberated even as its people languish in endless refugee camps. They tell us Jaffna is liberated even while its citizens are crushed by an occupying army.

Recently, one “Sri Lanka expert” from a leading Bristish think tank and advisor to the British government, told a conference that the aspirations of the Tamil people were being met during the ceasefire because the A9 had been opened up and starvation warded off temporarily from Jaffna.

They tell us it is illegal and unconstitutional to talk of secession. Then they tell us it would be a bad example for neighbouring India. They say that it might not be good for global security, whatever that means in the killing fields of the Northeast. When all else fails, they wheel out the post 9-11 “T” word. They tell us we are extremists if we dare to speak of Eelam.

They tell us that the moderate Tamils of Sri Lanka have no wish to live in Eelam, but prefer instead their current conditions of Sinhala repression and hopelessness. They conveniently forget that through fifties, sixties and seventies, generations of ‘moderate’ Tamils had already agitated and in 1977 even voted for independence – before the Tamil youth took up arms.

They tell us our hopes for Eelam are all false. Or unachievable. Or too costly.

They conjure up, as junior British foreign minister Kim Howells, did in last month’s British Parliamentary debate, a nightmarish rerun of the partition of India and Pakistan, forgetting how much of the responsibility for the failure of that partition must be laid at the door of the arrogant British civil servants who drew up the implementation for it.

It is time to tell the world, that they may not tell the Tamil nation what they want. They may not tell the Tamil people what our dreams and aspirations should be. They may not tell the Tamil people what to think.

It is time to tell them, that it is the Tamil people - not the policy makers in the capitals o the world – who decide how we give shape to our future, how we give life to our aspirations and how we ensure the survival of our nation.

It is simply time to tell them what we want. If they anticipate partition is difficult, it is time for them to take the steps now to plan a successful transition.

Because it is now time for the Tamil people to cash in their cheque, their promissory note of the right to self-rule at the bank of international justice.

Because we can. Don’t let them tell you otherwise.

So make sure you spell out for them our dream in all its glory. And tell them, as the Vaddokodai resolution urged us to three decades ago; we will not flinch till the sovereign state of Tamil Eelam is established.

The author identified four dominant themes that seriously impact on the sustainability of resettlement in the Batticaloa district. These are:
1. Lack of consultation and clarity
2. Lack of Preparedness and Planning
3. Restriction of Access and Mobility
4. Protection Concerns of the Displaced and Resettled Communities
Having looked at the first three themes in the first part of this article (published in the last issue), the author now turns to the fourth theme.

4. Protection Concerns of the Displaced and Resettled Communities
The climate is clearly one of fear and uncertainty. The general view held by communities and agencies is that the constantly changing politico-military dynamics of the East (with the split in the TMVP and Pillayan seizing control), has created an atmosphere of tense unpredictability. The Government, it appears, is keen to get political legitimacy for the paramilitary group.

Tension is rife as the number of clashes within the TMVP is increasing. There is de facto control of the district by key TMVP commanders with shifting loyalties and uneasy relationship with the military and police at the ground level. After the latest intra-faction truce and according to their internal structure it appears that Pillayan now directly controls the areas between Arayampathy and Chenkaladi including the Batticaloa town while other commanders like Sinnathambi, Veera, Riyaseelan, Mangalan master and others control their own patches of territory in the district. There is a palpable fear among communities and space for civil administration, human rights and humanitarian work is alarmingly shrinking.

This is obviously evident in Batticaloa. On the day of the ‘public’ meeting held by the TMVP (10th of December 2007) groups of civilians – including the displaced – were rounded up by armed cadres and forced to attend the meeting (which was a joint exercise by both Pillayan’s faction and Karuna’s commanders).

At approximately 8:20 a.m. around ten/twelve armed cadres were seen herding people into CTB buses in Alankulam on the Colombo-Batticaloa Road within sight of the police and army who stood by. This was repeated during the course of the day throughout Batticaloa – people were taken from Kovils, resettled villages and even bus stations. 12 bus-loads of people – including the recently resettled were taken from Vaharai and 7 buses taken from the Badulla Road area (Batticaloa West).

A meeting was held the day before in Pankudaveli (Batticaloa West) where the TMVP ordered that one member from each family must attend the public meeting. There are frequent reports of abduction and extortion by TMVP cadres. The construction industry in the district is one of the prime extortionary target and even the Government schemes like the world-bank funded housing program seems not to have been spared.

Normalcy and durable and sustainable resettlement cannot happen as long as the Government turns a blind eye to the climate of fear, insecurity and terror created by the different TMVP factions of what was the Karuna Group. They carry arms in public, have offices where they summon, inquire and detain civilians as they wish. They have forcibly taken over private property and set up offices across the district and have even begun setting up more fortified establishments by the main road as in Maavadivaembu. They engage in joint cordon and search operations with the security forces (though this is more prevalent in the Ampara district than in the Batticaloa district) all in broad daylight and in complete cooperation of the Government forces.

Given the overwhelming physical evidence in the district, bland denials may not absolve the Government of complicity. The Government must be held accountable for the violations of the TMVP/Karuna/Pillayan group who are roaming freely with arms and are engaged in serious violations including abductions, intimidation and extortion.

The situation is worsened by the increasing tension between the Muslims and the Tamils within the District (in Arayampathi, Eravur and Valaichenai in particular). Rumours that Pillayan is supporting Muslim armed groups in order to win favour is rife and the security situation is deteriorating with the recent abductions of Muslims – including recently that of businessman Hassanar-Hayathu Mohamed from Eravur.

The general sentiment is that the tension amongst the two communities will worsen before it gets better, particularly given the impending elections. It is widely felt that in this dimension the situation is much worse in Amparai than in Batticaloa. The impending elections will only help bring these destructive trends to the forefront as ‘democratic politics’ in the ‘liberated’ land.

Before the split within the TMVP, families faced a clearly defined enemy, though with a loose command and control structure. Now, with many commanders vying for control, families face the dilemma of whom to suspect or even to turn to. Before the split, the TMVP acted as a sort of ‘buffer’ between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan military. Now, even the agencies are unsure of whom to contact and communicate with when faced with complaints of abductions and harassment.

This also means that because of the presence of various factions and increasing confusion, responsibility can be easily shifted. So it is of little surprise that despite the publicised resettlement plans of the government, the culture of impunity and sense of lawlessness is widespread throughout the district. The security situation some people opined is worse for the communities now than before when you had predictable sources of threat with predictable reactions in predictable geography. Space for public gathering and advocacy is severely limited and fear, mistrust and insecurity is widespread and worsening rapidly.

‘Protection’ is an essential component of any resettlement intervention – most of the community members rank this as one of their top concerns. There is reluctance on the part of the government to accept a role for agencies in this sector in the same way as in shelter, water and sanitation and livelihood. Hence it has been very difficult to include this as a separate section in the resettlement plans.

Agencies, primarily with protection mandate have not been provided access. It was an uphill struggle, agencies reported, to get protection elements incorporated into the Government’s resettlement plans – ‘it was taken to the CCHA but don’t know what happened thereafter’. Given the extent of violations reported from the resettled area it is absolutely essential to ensure that ‘Protection’ gets headline attention as a separate sector in its own right.

The CCHA was necessitated because every issue in the areas had a security angle and a mechanism to include key decision makers from the security establishment was considered a good idea. But it appears as if the accommodation has gone to the extent to render the mechanism ineffective for immediate problem solving for operational purposes. The CCHA’s credibility as a useful body for solving protection concern is under threat.

The following in brief are some of the ‘Protection’ concerns that were repeatedly mentioned in the district.

• Abductions and forced recruitment
Abductions and disappearances are still occurring – and are on the increase by TMVP, both Pillayan and Karuna groups. As Pillayan seized control of the TMVP ‘at least 25’ abductions within and around the district were recorded although Pillayan did release a number of the underage cadres. For November, there have been a total of nine cases of recruitment and re-recruitment alone.

There have also been a number of complaints of forced recruitment and re-recruitment committed by the various commanders within the district. However, it must also be noted that most incidences of abductions and disappearances go unreported – there is a real fear of retribution if families complain to agencies. In the absence of any action taken by the military or the police who stands by as this continuous to occur, there is hardly anyone to whom the people could go to.

• Harassment and intimidation
Reports on harassment of IDP camps by the TMVP continue. The IDP camps in Palacholai and Savukaddy have been repeatedly harassed by armed groups at night – the former having a TMVP camp within close proximity to it. The displaced have been told not to go out after 7:00 p.m. at night – a clear indication that intimidation continues to play a significant role in the TMVP’s modus operandi. In November, one IDP was shot in Savukkady – a camp that has been repeatedly harassed by TMVP since as early as February.

• Harassment and intimidation of humanitarian workers
The overall climate for humanitarian work is gradually deteriorating. The morale of the staff is down given the number of killings and abductions in general of humanitarian workers island-wide. It is also sad to note that the malicious attacks on UNICEF etc at the national level and the lukewarm response of the agency is affecting the confidence levels of the staff in several humanitarian agencies in the ground. It has a ripple effect on the community who consider these organisations as having some clout to intervene on their behalf. Given the way the humanitarian community is responding to attacks – both physical and in the media – their credibility and relevance is taking a severe beating.

The security of national staff is a serious concern – even those handing out shelter material have been subject to threats. A driver from an agency was severely beaten up by personnel (who flashed ID badges) for overtaking their vehicle in early December. There have also been incidences of the STF stopping agency vehicles and asking for lifts. Intimidation of staff is a regular occurrence with unnecessary checking of vehicles and overly-stringent checking procedures at checkpoints.

• Looting
Looting of shelter material in the camp coincides with the mass returns. Most of the shelter material is re-used in the return areas and the continuous looting hampers agencies’ work. 6000 roof sheeting of UNHCR’s have been stolen to date and despite repeated complaints to the police, they fail to take any action. The GA had confirmed that security for the camps will be provided before and during the resettlements but to date, no police have been sent to the area. In all, 6700 roofing sheets which could have built 490 shelters for returnees have been stolen.

The inaction of the Police demonstrates the sense of lawlessness that permeates throughout the district. They know that looting coincides with returns but do not man the camps at nights. It is clear that the government needs the help of agencies working on the ground to execute an efficient and timely response – but this must be a symbiotic relationship. The government mechanisms must help and cooperate with agencies in order to implement an effective humanitarian response. This is clearly not happening in Batticaloa.

• Militarization of Return Areas
In Vaharai, the active presence of the military, the CID and the police in addition to TMVP cadres who are now occupying the Kadiraveli base formerly of LTTE, is sustaining fear and a militarised climate. Regular checks in the villages are made by all three groups – often asking the same questions and checking the same things. It is clearly uncoordinated and confusion is commonplace. Regular visits made by armed personnel is clearly intimidating and a harassment to communities trying to achieve some semblance of normalcy in their lives. Round-ups are on the increase throughout the district.

In Vaharai, the military maintains that they have identified who the LTTE supporters are and have proceeded to round up these suspects – including women, and photograph them with special IDs. These photographs are then circulated and the suspects are immediately called when any suspicion arises. The procedures of military and police differ from one another causing more confusion.

In Batticaloa West, after each return, there is an intense period of searches and round-ups – and in some incidences, the military have been accompanied by the TMVP. Once the entire return ‘process’ has finished, the newly resettled are often subjected to nightly checks by the military. Suspicions of LTTE connections is widespread (in Karadiyanaru and Pankudaveli for example) and the ‘culprits’ are arrested. Once released after interrogation, many are unwilling to go back to the village fearing further harassment. There is a gradual tick of ‘incidents’ allegedly by LTTE infiltrators in the area which threatens to take the situation in a downward spiral.

There have also been incidences of military harassment. For example, in Karadiyanaru, on the 11th of December, a father was beaten up when defending his daughter who was questioned about her and her husband’s previous ties with the LTTE. In Vavunatheevu and Paddippalai, there have been complaints of harassment of women returnees by the military. A number of women are left alone in their shelters as men go elsewhere to look for work.

Visitors staying overnight in both West Batticaloa and Vaharai are told to register themselves with the Police – or else face ‘severe consequences’. This includes construction workers and masons. An ordinary casual labourer looking to eke out a living through daily labour has to get a recommendation from the Grama Sevaka of his village endorsed by the Divisional Secretary of his division and can work only in projects of agencies that have been approved by the Government Agent and cleared by the Divisional Secretary.

In case of house construction the beneficiary family has to take the mason to the police and register him with them attesting to the fact that he is working on their house. For an agency building houses through 8-10 teams of masons with about 40 workers this can mean a logistical night mare. Frequent delays of construction work and permanent housing is now commonplace due to the tedious paperwork.

• Mine Clearance
Communities have been resettled in areas where demining has not yet been completed. Vavunatheevu for example has not been completely cleared, yet families have returned to the area. Surrounding agricultural land has not been demined and farmers are restricted from cultivating their lands. This problem is also common in Vaharai where resettled villages have been cleared but reportedly not its surrounding jungles – making fishing, gathering firewood, bees honey and other means of livelihood virtually impossible.

Since March, over a 100 UXOs have been found by communities – including in resettled areas. Villages in Kopaveli and Marapalaam have discovered UXOs and claymores – both newly resettled areas. There is a general atmosphere of confusion as agencies are given mixed information as to which areas are cleared and which are contaminated. According to the Batticaloa DS some areas have not been cleared and so, access is restricted – yet according to FSD and MAG, these areas have been de-mined.

Delays in clearing areas and delays in procedures to obtain landmine clearance certificates have now become a regular excuse for restricting movement and access to both civilians and humanitarian actors. While the real threat exists in some areas, in some areas people believe it is being used as an excuse to restrict mobility. Either way it is incumbent on the Government to clarify.

• Echilampatthu
Although not in the district, a protection situation in Echilampatthu must be highlighted. On the 3rd of December 17 people from the newly resettled villages were arrested on suspicion. 4 individuals were killed in 3 days (between the 3rd and the 5th of December) by unknown groups and 2 people severely beaten. The 60-odd (and increasing) resettled families fled the area and came back to Vaaharai. But due to some reason they are yet to be registered as IDPs by the authorities. Until then, they will not receive any government assistance and are subject to frequent checks and round ups. Many have again returned to Echilampatthu out of harassment and for fear of being arrested. While in Colombo it is clearly stated that registering as IDPs is not a problem, the reality in the ground was different.

A thematic history of the causes of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lankan was set out in the Appendix to the 2003  report on Sri Lanka by the World Bank. This is reproduced below.


Background
The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka has many root causes and consequences that are closely interlinked. However, given its complexities, it should not be assumed that these causes are part of linear historical processes where one event led to another. Often many of the issues that may be regarded as root causes arose within a single but extended context and equally as often, simultaneously. It is primarily within the context of ethnic politics that language and education policy can be located. However, for discussion purposes it is necessary to separate these issues as clearly identifiable themes that would emerge in any analysis of the Sri Lankan conflict. In general, these themes can be broadly identified as:

• Ethnic politics and the interpretation of the past;
• Politics of language;
• Politics of education; and
• Other factors, including employment and land.

Demographic Patterns
Sri Lankan society is an ethno-religious mosaic and within the ethnic groups, there are clear religious divisions as well. To a certain extent, ethnicity and religion also have a regional basis, which is a significant reason why the Tamil militancy has a strong geographical dimension, which extended to the demand of a separate independent state. Of the ethnic and religious groups, Tamil Hindus predominate in the Northern Province and maintain a significant presence in the Eastern Province. The Eastern Province is an ethnically mixed area where Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese are found in sizeable numbers even though Tamils have a slightly higher statistical edge. Indian Tamils—the descendants of laborers brought from Southern India by the British in the 19th century to work on tea and coffee estates—are concentrated in parts of the Central, Uwa and Sabaragamuwa Provinces. Sinhalese Buddhists predominate in all parts of the country except the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Muslims have a significant concentration in the Eastern Province, but generally are scattered throughout the country. Christians maintain a significant presence in the coastal areas as a result of over 500 years of constant European colonial presence and the consequent Christianization of significant numbers of the population in these areas. However, Christians are found in all parts of the country in small numbers. Malays are mostly concentrated in and around the city of Colombo and the Western Province.

By the time Sri Lanka achieved independence in 1948 from the UK, there were expectations that the country would become a model democracy. Universal adult franchise had been introduced in the 1931, democratic institutions and traditions had been in place and political violence was not an issue. Moreover, by the 1950s literacy in Sri Lanka was on the rise and there were no serious indicators of economic or social catastrophes of the years to come. However, even before independence, there were clear indications of ethnic politics that were to emerge later.

The Emergence of Ethnic Politics
Relations between Tamils and Sinhalese have not always or consistently been antagonistic. This happened only in times of external threats from South India after the formulation of clear Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic or cultural identities in the 9th (or 12th) century. These wars were wars of dominance fought between regional rulers and were not ‘race’ wars as defined later. Historical chronicles compiled by Sinhalese Buddhist monks defined these wars as campaigns undertaken to protect Buddhism and the Sinhalese nation. Mainly reinforced by formal education, many Sinhalese accept these problematic interpretations as fact today. In the eyes of many Sri Lankans, these interpretations seem to suggest a long and bloody tradition in which hope for reconciliation is minimal. Significantly, these interpretations—with their potent and emotional contents—have also found their way into school textbooks, which is an important aspect of social and political socialization in contemporary Sri Lanka.

Forces of Sinhalese nationalism perpetuating notions of eternal conflict with Tamils had been gathering strength since before independence. Many of them were Sinhalese-educated rural people whose nationalist aspirations for cultural transformation, power and status did not automatically materialize with independence. Soon after independence it was clear that a conflict was emerging between Sinhalese-educated rural elite and the English-educated urban ruling elite.

Meanwhile, one million Indian Tamils were disenfranchised in 1948 under the Ceylon Citizenship Act. Of this, approximately 350,000 were repatriated to India under the Indo-Ceylon Agreement of 1964. Over the years, subsequent governments conferred citizenship rights to the rest. The Ceylon Citizenship Act served to reinforce ethnic politics and reduced the electoral leverage of the Indian Tamils who remain an impoverished community today.

Ethnic Conflict and Language
In addition to the barriers imposed by the continued use of the English language as the official language after independence, the emerging nationalist forces perceived that Sri Lankan Tamils had access to a disproportionate share of power as a consequence of educational opportunities in the colonial period and were also disproportionately represented in the civil administration. Moreover, considerable mercantile interests were also controlled by non-Sinhalese groups. These fears and concerns were a basis for the politics of language that was to emerge.

As early as 1944, politicians proposed resolutions in Parliament to declare Sinhalese the official language, while other amendments proposed both Sinhalese and Tamil as official languages. A 1944 resolution specified that Sinhalese and Tamil would become the languages of instruction in schools, examinations for public services and legislative proceedings. The resolution was approved by 27 to 2 in the Sinhalese-dominated legislature. Committees were established to advise on how these changes were to be implemented, however, there was little progress in implementing the policy. In 1956, S.W.R.D Bandaranaike was elected Prime Minister with a main election promise of establishing Sinhalese as the official language of the country, replacing English. The new government fulfilled this promise—through the passage of the so-called “Sinhalese Only Bill” (Official Language Act, No. 33 of 1956)—soon after the election giving no status of parity to the Tamil language.

The language issue in many ways brought the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict into the forefront of Sri Lankan politics. In terms of the dominant strands of Sinhalese nationalism, the Sinhalese language along with the Buddhist religion necessarily had to occupy the pre-eminent position in society. This was perceived to be the only way the glory of ancient Sinhalese civilization could be revitalized. Even though Tamil has been decreed an official language along with Sinhalese in terms of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution (in 1987), the damage caused by the politics of language generally remain unaddressed. Moreover, the vast gap between the official recognition of Tamil as an official language and the practical implementation of the provisions and conditions it entails, is yet to be bridged.

Ethnic Conflict and Education
Since the 1970s, access to education—particularly access to higher education—has been ethnicized. In addition, many other aspects of education—including the structural organization of schools and universities, contents of textbooks and training of teachers—have impacted directly on ethnic conflict. Compared to other ethnic and religious groups in the country, Tamils have had strong cultural norms which valued education. Many Tamils attended English language schools which were the passport to higher education and better employment in the colonial period. As a consequence of wellfunded American missionary activities, the Tamil-dominated Northern Province had comparatively better facilities for English language and pre-university education.

There was also a limit beyond which Tamils could not be absorbed within the traditional land-based occupations in the arid areas where they predominated. This further encouraged many to seek employment through education. The net result was the relative over-representation of Tamils in higher education, professions and the administration in comparison to their status in the general population.

In this context, post independence Sinhalese nationalism sought to curb the Tamil presence in education and thus also in the professions and civil administration. While the passing of the “Sinhalese Only Bill” was one attempt in this process, more direct hurdles were placed on the path of Tamils’ realization of educational goals since the 1970s. The constitutional provisions in the 1972 Constitution favoring the Sinhalese language and Buddhist religion, along with their educational policies, convinced many Tamils that they had been perceived as a marginal community.

From 1971 onwards, a new “standardization” policy was adopted, which ensured that the number of students qualifying for university entrance from each language was proportionate to the number of students who sat for university entrance examination in that language. In real terms this meant that Tamil speaking students had to score much higher than Sinhalese speaking students to gain admission to universities. This also meant that for the first time, the integrity of university admissions policy was tampered with by using ethnicity as a basis. In 1972, a district quota system was introduced in order to benefit those not having adequate access to educational facilities within each language. These changes had a serious impact on the demographic patterns of university entry.

In general, these policies seriously impacted upon not only the chances of Tamils to gain access to higher education, but also on the overall process of ethnic relations as well. In 1977, the language-based admission policy was abolished and since that time various adjustments have been introduced on the basis of merit, district quotas, disadvantaged area quotas, etc. While the obvious ethno-linguistic discrimination of the 1971 policy has long been dismantled, many Tamil youth still feel that they are discriminated against in access to higher education.

Furthermore, the ethnic divisions in Sri Lanka tend to manifest within the education structure in a number of other ways—i.e., the organizational structure of educational institutions, the training of teachers and the content of textbooks and syllabi—which are much more long lasting and far more insidious than the more visible ethno-linguistic policies of the 1970s.

Related to the organizational structure of educational institutions, it is clear that language-based segregation takes place. This does not apply to privately-owned institutions in which instruction is in English, but applies to institutions with more than one language of instruction (such as some universities, mixed media schools and technical institutes) where a system of internal segregation takes place. In real terms Sinhalese students are segregated into Sinhalese-language schools and Tamil and Tamil-speaking Muslim students are segregated into Tamil-language schools. If they enter universities or technical institutes, this segregation is likely to continue unless they opt to, and have the money to receive, a non-segregated further education in English in private institutions.

The training of teachers poses similar problems, as most teachers in the system today are products of the segregated education system they are teaching in. Moreover, they are also trained in institutions that are internally segregated except in the training of teachers specializing in subjects such as English. Few teacher training institutions in operation today, have seriously taken into account the need to train teachers who can teach in a context keeping in mind the challenges of a multicultural society. There is a clear disjuncture between current state policy towards ethnic relations and the manner in which teachers are trained.

Since the early-1980s, many have stressed the role school texts play in shaping ethnic relations in the country. Ideally, school texts (e.g., texts used for teaching religion, language, social studies, etc.) should portray the multi-cultural reality of Sri Lankan society and address issues that are important in this context while approaching the prescribed subject matter. School texts have been written, supervised, produced and distributed by agencies of the state, meaning that their contents reflect state policy or thinking. Furthermore, ethnic politics have also been played out in the process of text production. In recent times some of the more problematic contents in these texts have been removed in the process of revision and re-writing. Ironically however, sometimes this has gone to the opposite extreme—e.g., in some texts all references to ethnicity and related issues have been removed.

Ethnic Conflict and Employment
As mentioned above, both language and education policies have placed barriers on employment, especially in the administrative and professional ranks in which Tamils were at one point “overrepresented.”

In the private sector—which for the most part continued to work in English—employment opportunities for Tamils and other minorities remained relatively open. As a result, today some of the leading business ventures in the country are Tamil-owned. However, as a result of the discrimination that has occurred in state sector employment practices over time, there is a tendency among many Tamils to perceive of themselves as generally discriminated against in employment. According to the census of public sector and corporate sector employment in 1990, Sri Lankan Tamils accounted for 5.9% of those employed in the state services. This represents a significant drop from earlier years.

Ethnic Conflict and the Issue of Land
The issue of ownership over and access to land has also been a consistent area in which ethnic politics in Sri Lanka have manifested, and have sustained themselves over the years. As noted, one of the peculiarities in the demographic patterns in Sri Lanka is the relative concentration of certain ethnic groups in certain geographical regions. The clearest site of politics of land and ethnicity has been in the sparsely populated areas of the dry zone in the North Central Province and the Eastern Province. When post independence governments decided to settle poor Sinhalese farmers from the densely populated wet zone areas of the country, many Sinhalese politicians and people in general viewed the process as a “reclamation and recreation in the present of the glorious Sinhalese Buddhist past.” The so-called “colonization schemes” became an integral aspect of Sinhalese Buddhist ‘nation-building.’

Not surprisingly, the Tamils had a completely different perception of the colonization of the dry zone. The notion of the ‘traditional Tamil homeland’ became a potent component of popular Tamil political imagination. Since Sinhalese irrigation settlements in the North Central and Eastern Provinces occurred under direct state sponsorship, it appeared to many Tamils as a deliberate attempt of the Sinhalese-dominated state to marginalize them further by decreasing their numbers in the area. The colonization schemes did alter the demographic patterns, particularly in the Eastern Province in a significant way.

A decision was made in the late-1970s to accelerate the development of the dry zone through the “Accelerated Mahaweli Program,” that provided for the opening up of dry zone areas further for agriculture and resettlement of people. Only in 1986, as a result of continuing Tamil agitations, did the government agree to allocate the remaining land under the Mahaweli Program on the basis of the ethnic distribution of each ethnic group in the total population.

Meanwhile, the Muslim community tended to reject the countervailing notion of a traditional Tamil homeland in the North East region. Growing cooperation between the security forces and Muslim home guards led to LTTE attacks on Muslim villages in the East, armed counter attacks on Tamil communities in the South East and to the eviction of 55,000 Muslims from the North in 1990 most of whom remain displaced today.

Loss of Confidence in Non-violent and Democratic Politics
Ethnic politics and fears of discrimination led Tamil politicians in the Federal direction from a very early stage of recent Sri Lankan politics. Since the 1930s, and much more clearly since the 1950s, Tamil political parties have been asking for greater political autonomy for the areas in which they predominate. Such a devolution of power has been recognized at different times as a means to diffuse tensions between the two groups. A number of pacts had been formulated to define the modalities for devolution of power, including the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact in July 1957 that offered a framework for regional devolution. But due to various political pressures, the provisions of the pact were never implemented. In 1965, the Dudley-Chelvanayagam Pact was formulated and agreed upon. But, yet again the provisions of this pact—quite similar to the earlier one—were annulled.

The failure to implement these proposals led to Tamil demands for separation, instead of Federalism that they had been mostly seeking up to that point. On the part of many Tamils—particularly Tamil youth from the north—the failure of these pacts also marked a disintegration of confidence in parliamentary politics in general. In 1977, the Tamil United Liberation Front won an overwhelming electoral victory on a highly charged political platform of separatism. In 1980, the District Development Council Act was passed in Parliament and elections to the councils were held in July 1981. But given the lack of government commitment to decentralization of power, this attempt also proved to be a failure. After this point, there were clear indications that the politics of Tamil society were shifting from the commitment to parliamentary democracy (held by its conservative leaders) to a commitment to armed struggle (held by considerable sections of Tamil youth). In 1979, the government enacted the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act as a an interim measure, but in 1982 it was amended to be part of the permanent law.

The Emergence of Armed Conflict
Until the early-1980s, ethnic conflict was primarily limited to the political arena where destruction to property and life was minimal. However, violence had occurred on number of occasions, such as in the passing of the “Sinhalese Only Bill” in 1956. Similar ethnic riots involving Tamils and Sinhalese occurred in 1958, 1977 and 1981, with the most violent and destructive taking place in July 1983. Many observers see the violence of July 1983 as a turning point in the conflict.

After the early-1980s, such sporadic cases of violence gradually gave way to institutionalized political violence which became a main feature of the conflict. At this stage, organized or institutionalized political violence was widely utilized by both the political parties in power and Tamil youth who organized themselves into armed guerrilla outfits. This development marked the militarization and the steady brutalization of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict.

The failure of parliamentary politics and the entrenchment of ethnic politics which led to frustration among Tamil youth, eventually made some of these youth organize themselves into armed groups for the ostensible purpose of seeking independence from Sinhalese domination. The first of these groups was the Tamil Tigers which later came to be known as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam or LTTE. In 1978, the Tamil Tigers carried out a series of bank robberies and also assassinated a number of police officers, many of whom were Tamil. Bank robberies and selected assassination of individuals within the Tamil community (who were considered traitors) later led to massacres of Sinhalese and Muslim civilians in the border villages and contested areas. By the 1980s, this phase in the evolution of political violence expanded to include indiscriminate bomb attacks in the Sinhalese-dominated south, particularly in Colombo. Subsequently, the conflict reached civil war proportions and Indian peacekeeping forces were sent to Sri Lanka in 1987. The Indian forces left in 1990 and the civil conflict between the Government and LTTE resumed three months later. The conflict escalated in the late-1990s with conventional battles being fought to capture territory.

This draws heavily from “The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: A Historical and Sociopolitical Outline”, by Dr. Sasanka Perera, of the Department of Sociology, the University of Colombo, December 1999. At the time this paper was written, Dr. Perera was a full-time staff member of the World Bank. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the CAS team and do not necessarily represent those of the World Bank or the Government of Sri Lanka.

We conclude our three part introduction to the 2000 year old Tamil classic on ethical living, the Thirukkural, by looking at two popular themes from its three books: love and courage.

We saw previously that concepts such as fairness and justice cut across one book to the other. The concepts which often appear in a personal context in the "Path of the householder" in the book of virtue reappear in a national context in considering the "wealth of nations".  Replaced much by many:  Many of the principles enunciated in the context of a country naturally lend themselves to the modern corporate world.

Whereas love in the sense of love for mankind is an important part of the book of virtue, and romantic love is the theme of the book of love, the Kural importantly places courage in the wealth of the nation.

We start first with a reprise of the foundation to the wealth of nations. As we saw in part II of this series, in the Thirukkural the wealth of nations is founded on good leadership, good advisors and expertise and on the qualities of the country: natural qualities (defensive location, a fertile land etc), good alliances (and its opposite, weak enemies) and a strong defence capability. We see this in the respective sections "merits of a king", "merits of ministers" and "qualities of a country".

Much of the principles enunciated in the context of a country naturally lend themselves to the modern corporate world. Here, the Thirukkural is similar to ancient Chinese classics such as the "Art of War" which in a modern context has been applied not just to physical war, but corporate strategy and in some American interpretations, to marketing, for example. But whereas the "Art of War" is a treatise on achieving victory, the Kural is in essence a treatise on ethics.

The approach is broad and all-encompassing. As Dr Albert Schweitzer said the Thirukkural addresses “the most varied questions concerning the conduct of man to himself and to the world"

For example the chapter called "merits of ministers" deals not only with the giving of advice but also the qualities of ambassadorship, the general ability to win over people to one's point of view, to judge and sway an audience, for example. But here again the Thirukkural is just as applicable to the modern corporate world as it is to politics and media.

The Kural considers the defensive capability of a nation in three parts: fortresses, the merits of the army, and military pride.

In the chapter entitled merits of the army in the book of wealth, the Thirukkural begins by telling us that:

"Foremost among a monarch's possessions stands
a conquering army, complete and fearless"

The Thirukkural's usual approach to a subject is to consider it from different angles. It describes the different facets of the ideal without necessarily giving instructions on how to achieve the ideal. As with the Chinese approach, the Thirukkural's aphorisms are meant to be a subject of meditation and personal interpretation.

So on the nature of the ideal army, the Kural looks first at tradition, desertion and defeat:

"Commanding a long tradition of valor, acquainted
with neither defeat nor desertion that defines an army"

It looks at unity and cohesiveness.

"That indeed is an army that stands together
even when faced with death's grim fury"

The sentiment expressed is of course open to denigration as fanaticism, but only when taken out of the military context, the context of the defence of the nation's wealth in which the Kural has carefully placed this subject. It would be difficult for a military strategist to disagree.

On the personal qualities of soldiers:

"Valor, honor, trustworthiness and a tradition
nobly upheld, these four are the army's protective armour"

On the importance of leadership:

"though courageous troops abound
there can be no army without commanders"

On size versus strike capability of an army:

"So what if a legion of rats roar like the sea?
The mere hiss of a cobra will deaden their din"

On the causes of failure:
"An army will prevail as long as there is
no desertion, no privation and no contention"

Consider how succinctly this line considers the need for absolute unity and the need for supplies and essentials, privation includes for example the starvation of a group or a country via embargos.

Interestingly the Kural tells us that even when an army is merely for decoration it may be useful:

"Even without winning offense and defence
an army of splendid appearance may still win acclaim"

But more importantly it tells us that where there is an army which is not purely for decoration, how defense may be followed by offense:

"Well trained armed forces will withstand every offense
then outflank and storm the foe"

The Thirukkural and Tamil culture are inextricably and symbiotically linked. We chose courage as the theme for the wealth of nations in this third part because it is such an important cornerstone in the hierarchy of Tamil values.

And this is echoed in the Thirukkural in the chapter called "military pride" which in a much more personal way defines the character of the soldier. Although we have considered the Kural in the context of the wealth of the nation, we must remember that the concept of duty ("dharma") is integral to Tamil culture.

So while the section on leadership is also an enunciation of the duties or ideal characteristics of the king, and we are also told the duties or ideals of ministers, ambassadors, householders, monks, here, this chapter of the thirukkural is mainly concerned with the soldier. Recognising the communal nature of the soldier's service, the ideal soldier is in fact part of the "qualities of a country". Compare for example with the householder who is in a separate book.

This chapter (military pride) begins, as it means to go on, with an attitude:

"Dare you not, my enemies, stand against my monarch
Many who did, stand now as stone monuments"

Note how the chapter starts in the first person.

It goes on to define the ideals in terms of scope of ambition, fearlessness and clemency.

"It is more gratifying to carry a lance which missed an elephant
than to hold an arrow that hit a thicket dwelling rabbit"

"Having hurled his spear at a battlefield elephant
the hero found another piercing his side and grasped it with glee"

"Intrepid courage is what they call valor
but clemency towards the defeated is its sharp edge"

There are many couplets on the soldier's attitude towards death which echo the culture which the Thirukkural shapes and is shaped by:

"Who would dare deride as defeated
men who die fulfilling valour’s vow?"

We find echoes of Homer's Achilles:

"To fasten the warrior's anklet on one who desire glory
more than life is to decorate heroism with distinction"

And yet if the Thirukkural extols martial valour it does so in the context of the country. Whereas on the other hand it sees love and associated concepts of charity, as a personal virtue of every householder.

For the Thirukkural, if the army is the foremost of a nation’s possessions, without love, life is hardly worth living:

"With love enshrined in the heart, one truly lives,
without it the body is but bones encased in skin"

The Thirukkural's chapter "possessing love" contains the most poignant poetry in the entire work:

"They say it is to know union with love
that the soul takes union with the body"

But consider, this where love is linked to sacrifice, and perhaps even back to the soldier:

"The unloving belong only to themselves
but the loving belong to others to their very bones"

"Life without love in the heart
is like a sapless tree in the barren desert"

We end here our look at a work which is widely considered to be the world's oldest and most complete treatise on the art of ethical living. So intrinsic is the Thirukkural to Tamil culture that it is taught in schools in Tamil Nadu and Tamil Eelam, and sworn in the law courts.

Mahatma Gandhi said: “I wanted to learn Tamil, only to enable me to study Valluvar’s Thirukkural through his mother tongue itself…. There is no one who has given such treasure of wisdom like him.”

We urge the interested reader to explore the Kural on his own.

There are a number of excellent translations available online (see references below) of which we prefer the American English Himalayan Academy translation, for its closeness to the meaning of the original.

As before we leave with you an excerpt from the ever entertaining book of love from NV Ashraf's comparison of translations:

 

132 Lovers’ quarrels Translators She     1311 I won't clasp your broad chest, A common dish for all women's eyes to gorge! * PS 1312 When I sulked, he sneezed: hoping I would forget and say "Bless you". PS He     1313 If I wear a wreath, she cries enraged: "For which woman's sake is this?" * PS 1314 If I say "I love you more than any one", She frowned asking, "Than whom, than whom?" * KV 1315 The moment I said we won’t part in this life, Her eyes were filled with tears. DZ 1316 "I remembered you", I said; "After forgetting?" said she withdrawing herself! * PS 1317 She blessed as I sneezed, but soon recalled it crying: "Thinking whom did you sneeze?" * VS 1318 When I suppressed my sneeze, she wept saying, "Whom are you hiding from me?" DL, NV 1319 If I try making up with her, she would ask enraged, "Is this how you coax others as well?" * PS, JN 1320 If I gaze at her in silence, she would fume and ask, "Thinking of whom this comparison?" * SI, PS

Attributions are as follows
GU - G U Pope
NV – NVK Ashraf
KK - K Kannan
KV – K Krishnasamy and V Ramkumar
PS - P. S Sundaram
SB - S Bharathiar 

References

1. Weaver’s Wisdom, Ancient Precepts for a perfect life. American English translation By Satguru Sivaya Subramuniyaswami and the monastics of the Saiva Siddhanta Order (Kauai, Hawaii), Himalayan Academy Publications (http://www.himalayanacademy.com/resources/books/weaver/)

2. The Sacred Kural of Tiruvaluva Nayanar by Dr. G. U. Pope, Laurier Books Ltd (available at amazon.com)

3. (Internet resources) http://www.thirukkural2005.org/
International Thirukkural Conference 2005 (Washington)

4. (Internet resources) Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thirukkural

5. (Internet Thirrukural Browser) http://www.cs.utk.edu/~siddhart/thirukkural/

6. (Interent resource) Comparison of translations at http://www.geocities.com/nvashraf/kur-eng/closeindex.htm 



 

In part 1 of this introduction to the 2000 year Tamil classic on ethical living, the Kural, we outlined the structure of the work as three books: the books of virtue, wealth and love. The foundational themes that cut across the books are the primal spirit (“God Primordial”), the ecosystem and virtue. The book of virtue is split into two main parts: “the way of the householder” and the “way of the renunciate” while the book of wealth is split into “Royalty”, “Ministers”, “Qualities of a country” and a general section.

The Kural is said to be a creation of a weaver of cloth. For the Kural is a tapestry of patterns depicting the network of relationships between man and the universe. It outlines a system of ethics whose objective is harmony and balance in this network. The Kural addresses the relationships between the individual, his family, his friends, the business world, his country, other countries, nature and God, among others. The Rev. G. U Pope, one of the earliest translators of the work termed it “an integral painting of a civilization which is harmonious in itself and which possesses a clearly recognizable unity."

The book of wealth is much concerned with the wealth of nations. It is organised around the necessary group structures and leadership required for the building of “wealth”: the section on “royalty” being entirely a treatise on leadership, whereas the “qualities” of a country are the foundational characteristics of a bountiful society. Yet the personal foundations for the group relationships explored later are laid in the “way of the householder”.

The terms “Royalty” and “Ministers” must be read in historic context, the modern equivalent being leadership and advisors, experts and administrators. “Royalty” is nowhere defined to be hereditary. Equally the Kural does not presume permanence in a nation, rather it assumes these are fluid: it warns that nations may fail as a result of not following the principles and new nations may arise.

And so, in this, Part 2 of our 3 part series we will first look at how some of the personal ethics outlined in the way of the householder become institutionalised where necessary into the wealth of nations.

We take an example of the conceptual threads in the book of virtue that are woven into the book of wealth, the notion of “impartiality”.

“Impartiality” deals with justice in a personal sense and is foundational to many themes that are taken up in the book of wealth. The chapter on impartiality in the “way of the householder” starts by describing “justice” in terms of the “modern” concept of objectivity and lack of bias:

“Justice may be called good when it acts impartially
towards enemies, strangers and friends”

“To incline to neither side, like a balanced scale’s level beam,
and thus weigh impartially is the wise one’s ornament”

The Kural redefines personal integrity, including the integrity of experts (“advisors” as they will be called in the book of wealth) in terms of impartiality

“Speech uttered without bias is integrity
if no unspoken bias lurks in the heart”

And in the context of impartiality, seeks to apply to business a principle of mutual benefit to counter-parties and society:

“Those businessmen will prosper whose business
protects as their own the interests of others”

Here is also the concept that unethically acquired wealth (and investment income thereof) is forfeit:

“However prosperous it may seem, all wealth gained
By loss of rightness must be relinquished that very day”

These are modern legal concepts, but in the Kural they are treated as the foundations of personal conduct, rather than institutionalised law. And to place in context the relative importance of justice to wealth:

“Though a man is profoundly impoverished
if he remains just the world will not regard him as poor”

Whereas the above are all extracts from chapter 12, entitled “Impartiality” in “the way of the householder”, the theme of justice is taken up in a broader, more institutionalised fashion in the book of wealth.

The introduction to the section on royalty is a chapter entitled “Merits of the king”. Justice is said to be one of four key qualities:

“ He is a light among rulers who is endowed with the four merits
of generosity, graciousness, justice and care for the people”

But consistent personal virtue is a prerequisite of leadership as is the courage to maintain justice

“The noble king is unswerving in virtue, restrains wrongdoing,
and courageously maintains his honor”

“the world is protected beneath the umbrella
of an ethical leader who can endure words bitter to the ear”

The Kural, written at a time when most of the world lived under the governance of arbitrary despots whose power arose from force rather than constitutional law, spends three chapters exploring the relationship between justice as the bedrock of government. These chapters are: the just reign, the unjust reign and avoidance of tyranny.

Firstly, “the just reign” defines justice in government

“Investigate well, show favor to none, maintain impartiality
consult the law, then give judgment – this is justice”

While protection from harm is the duty of leadership and government, failure in justice leads to the fall of government:

“All the world looks to the rain clouds for sustenance
all the people look to the King’s sceptre for protection”

“An inaccessible ruler who listens and adjudicates inattentively
will plummet from power and perish ..”

It is just leadership not brutal force that is integral to victory:

“Victory is not won by the lance
but by the King’s sceptre, provided it is not crooked”

While the “just reign” tells us of the virtues of justice, the following two chapters are scathing of its failures. The “unjust reign” tells us in its very first stanza:

“More malicious than a professional murderer is the monarch
who reigns his people with injustice and oppression”

A leader who is intellectually lazy, corrupt or unjust forfeits his claim to loyalty:

“Without thinking, a King rules crookedly and thus
forfeits his subjects loyalty, together with his own fortune ..”

But for the Kural, justice is not only intrinsic to sustaining government: its failure is calamitous in ecological terms:

“If the King acts contrary to justice, contrary seasons
will befall the earth and rain laden clouds will fail to come forth ..”

Ultimately leadership that is arbitrary and unconstitutional, in short, tyrannical, is doomed to fail:

“The tyrant who causes dread in his people
will perish quickly and inevitably ..”

Other prerequisites of leadership outlined in the book of wealth are: learning and wisdom (wisdom being the practical application), the assessing and seizing of opportunities - understanding time, place and resources (a form of ancient SWOT analysis where SWOT stands for strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats), the choosing and management of men, perseverance and equanimity.

But if these are the characteristics of leadership, the objective is the building and management of a “country”. This is the third theme of the book of wealth – “the qualities of a country”.

In the Kural, a country is not rigidly defined. It seems more akin to Thomas Paine’s definition of a group structure that arises organically because of man’s intrinsic social tendencies.

Says Paine in the “Rights of Man” (1791): Great part of that order which reigns among mankind is not the effect of government. It has its origin in the principles of society and the natural constitution of man. The mutual dependence and reciprocal interest which man has upon man, and all the parts of civilised community upon each other, create that great chain of connection which holds it together. The landholder, the farmer, the manufacturer, the merchant, the tradesman, and every occupation, prospers by the aid which each receives from the other, and from the whole. “

Compare the Kural’s introductory definition of a country:

“Where unfailingly fertile fields, worthy men
And wealthy merchants come together – that indeed is a country “

The Kural also implicitly assumes that one is free to choose the geographical location of one’s country and hence provides guidelines:

“Rain waters, underground waters and rivers shed from well-situated mountains,
plus strong fortresses are features of a fine country”

If the Kural considers healthy commerce as the foundational quality of a country, it also explains the importance of productivity gains, foreshadowing the economic paradigm shifts and scalability of modern technology:

“A land where prosperity comes easily deserves the name country
not one where wealth entails laborious toil“

In the “qualities of a country” the Kural considers not only the proper means of building wealth, including the building of alliances, but also the defence of wealth: the nature of fortresses, military strength and the benefits of an army. We leave the further discussion of a country for Part 3, along with more from the book of virtue.
For the Kural does not limit itself to such weighty topics.

The book of love takes the familiar Sangam poetry format of quotes: “He says”, “She says”, “She says to her friend ..” etc. By way of introduction, we leave the reader with the Kural’s equivalent of the “ man-eater” pop lyric:

(He says):

“A Goddess, a peahen or a woman
bedecked with jewels ? My heart is amazed ! ..“ [PS]

“I never knew Yama before but now I know
that it is feminine and has warring eyes …” [KK]
(Yama being the angel of death)

“She may have that feminine grace
but her look sucks life out of men who gaze ..” [NV, SB]

“Ah there goes all my might which foes dread in fight
when I face her brows beaming bright! “ [KV, GU]


Unattributed quotes are from the Himalayan Academy publication “Weaver’s Wisdom” (Reference 1).

Attributions are as follows
GU - G U Pope
NV – NVK Ashraf
KK - K Kannan
KV – K Krishnasamy and V Ramkumar
PS - P. S Sundaram
SB - S Bharathiar

References

1. Weaver’s Wisdom, Ancient Precepts for a perfect life. American English translation By Satguru Sivaya Subramuniyaswami and the monastics of the Saiva Siddhanta Order (Kauai, Hawaii), Himalayan Academy Publications (http://www.himalayanacademy.com/resources/books/weaver/)

2. The Sacred Kural of Tiruvaluva Nayanar by Dr. G. U. Pope, Laurier Books Ltd (available at amazon.com)

3. (Internet resources) http://www.thirukkural2005.org/
International Thirukkural Conference 2005 (Washington)

4. (Internet resources) Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thirukkural

5. (Internet Thirrukural Browser) http://www.cs.utk.edu/~siddhart/thirukkural/

6. (Interent resource) Comparison of translations at http://www.geocities.com/nvashraf/kur-eng/closeindex.htm

“Genocide is a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.”

So said Raphael Lemkin, the Polish Jewish academic, who first coined the term ‘genocide’ in the context of the Holocaust.

The ‘paradise’ island nation of Sri Lanka, is currently South Asia’s wealthiest country on a per capita income basis. Its economy has grown by over 6% in each of the last three years; foreign investment and tourism have boomed despite the civil war.

An international truce monitor examines the bodies of two youth abducted in the Sri Lanka Army-controlled area. Photo TamilNet

And yet over the last year hundreds of thousands of people, mainly Tamils, not only faced starvation but have suffered shellings and bombings, abductions and killings, torture and rape.

Jaffna is emblematic of the deprivations faced by the Tamils of Sri Lanka. The foundations life in this northern peninsula have been systematically destroyed to genocidal proportions. For the simple reason that the Tamils an ethnic minority in the Sinhala state of Sri Lanka.

Jaffna has a written history that is over 2000 years old; once a strategic port on the ancient silk route, it has been for millennia the cultural and political capital of the Tamil people of the island.

Jaffna’s present woes stem from its pre-eminent historic position as the Tamil cultural capital. And its history of political independence.

In 1983, when the country wide, anti Tamil pogroms erupted in Sri Lanka, Tamils in the south sought safe haven in Jaffna. Later that decade it became the political centre of the movement for Tamil independence.

Jaffna, the cultural and, then, the political capital of the Tamils, was also the home and core support base of the largest Tamil political parties since independence, all of whom as their names so clearly suggest, aspired to autonomy for the Tamil homelands in Sri Lanka: the Federal party which later merged into the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF).

In the late eighties, when the government of Sri Lanka entered into an accord with neighbouring India to contain the rebellious Tamils, the Indians recognised the importance of Jaffna. It was flooded with troops by the Indian peace keeping force (IPKF) in what later deteriorated into a well-chronicled brutal and hostile military occupation.

But the Indians were forced to withdraw within two years and Jaffna fell to the control of the the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam).

In the early nineties Jaffna had hope: it saw five years of uninterrupted governance by the LTTE, who though not elected, were undeniably a home grown leadership, a political and cultural product of the city itself. Few dispute that Jaffna was well-governed. The Times of London, for example, berated the LTTE for their “fanatical” commitment to the separatist cause but also described them as “fanatically” committed to law and order, squeaky clean, efficient and innovative. The fabric of life had a foundation of stability on which reconstruction could begin.

But genocide returned to Jaffna in the guise of a “war for peace”.

When the next president of Sri Lanka, Chandrika Kumaratunge, the daughter of two former nationalist prime ministers, was elected on a platform of a “ final war for peace” against the Tamil fighters, the western political establishment was keen to give her a chance.

Leading western newspapers, including the editorial of the Times of London reported the all out onslaught of the invasion of the Jaffna peninsula as a “war of liberation”. A broad front military invasion is the most destructive of civilian lives and property, as artillery and aerial bombardment supports an all out battle to capture the target town.

It is difficult to find a parallel for these tactics by a government against its “own population” in any other part of the world – for ironically the peninsula of Jaffna still was formally part of Sri Lanka and the people of Jaffna still entitled to the protection of “their” government.

There were previous incidents that met the legal definitions but one may argue that these were not sufficiently concerted.

The 1981 burning of the Jaffna Library and its entire collection, including historic handwritten manuscripts, was also an act of genocidal intent: a deliberate act by the state, no less, that aimed to destroy the history and cultural identity of a city which prided itself on both its millennia old history and its possession of the second largest library in all of Asia.

The decades long economic embargo of essential items to Jaffna throughout the 90s come close to aving as its objective “inflicting conditions calculated to bring about the physical destruction of a people”, part of the UN definition. For minimally if the embargo did not prevent births (also part of the UN definition), it also ensured that the children of Jaffna were chronically malnourished and physically undeveloped.

But these stretched foundations of life crumbled in 1995 with the “war for peace”. For almost all of the 500,000 inhabitants of Jaffna evacuated before the oncoming government soldiers reached them, one of the least documented, but largest movement of civilians peoples since the world war. The “exodus” of Jaffna is chronicled in the book of the same name, by the then chairman of Sri Lanka’s state television network, Vasantha Raja, who resigned and emigrated in protest.

According to the Swiss academic Julia Fribourg, the term ‘genocide’ includes the deliberate displacement of national groups from their homelands with an aim of destroying their cultural and habitational grounds.

But if the Sri Lankan state in 1995 achieved the single largest displacement of an ethnic population in the post war world, it went to great trouble to maintain its bona fides internationally and so to avoid the label of genocide.

The government, once its army had occupied the ghost city, invited its citizens back with the promise of protection. For an empty city was worthless in symbolic terms.

Suffering in the harsh openness of the Vanni region, half of the former population accepted the governments offer of return over the next few years. The rest followed the LTTE deeper into the Vanni and established from the jungle new habitats. Others made their way to Colombo and emigrated.

Those who returned accepted military rule as the price of returning home. They would have been aware of the government’s military presence, of emergency law and judged it bearable. Thus the current conditions of Jaffna cannot be blamed on the un-governability or political extremism of its population.

And yet the current conditions in Jaffna are undeniably genocidal. For no reasonable person could claim that they provide the “essential foundations of life”.

A Tamil woman cursing the passing Sri  Lankan forces.

Today Jaffna is merely an open prison, possibly the world’s largest. Never reconstructed from the destruction of the 1995 war, let alone the recent tsunami, it is a derelict and bombed out police city.

The ratio of soldiers of the army of occupation to civilians is higher that in a prison facility: every family is held hostage by one soldier. Then there is the navy, the militarised police and paramilitaries allied to the government.

Any form of social activity with possible political implications – including for example, meeting with visiting community leaders or multi faith religious delegations from Colombo – is photographed and recorded, the participants can expect visits from the state security forces.

Extensive records have been made over the last twelve years of participation in community or political activities. And almost all those who have shown some initiative – participants in local festivals, heroes day celebrations, journalists, student leaders, cooperative store workers who handout food rations, actors or actresses, aid workers, in fact any one who has participated in group activities for the benefit of the community – is a target for extra judicial arrest and disappearances.

To use a public phone one must provide not only ones own identification and address but also the details of the person one is calling, all of which will be recorded by the police state. Mobile phones do not work.

It is impossible to cross roads for up to three hours if an army convoy, filled with heavily armed Sinhala soldiers, is to pass. Ambulances are no exception.

Civilians are arbitrarily assaulted at army checkpoints. They can be arbitrarily subjected to intimate searches. People disappear routinely within a short time frame of having been through an army checkpoint.

Colombia, the kidnap capital of the world averages 700 kidnappings a year. Jaffna with its population of less than 450,000, with its extensive government military presence averages 6 a day. For in Jaffna it is the state which is accused for abducting, torturing and forever disappearing its citizens.

Earning a living has become impossible. Despite the shortage of food due to the embargo, fishermen are forbidden from fishing. When they are given permission of a few hours a day, they may not use their boats but must use their nets from the shore.

In Jaffna, where there is no media left, the entire family of six of a roadside boutique owner was shot for not providing free services to the Sinhala army.

It is increasingly harder to escape from Jaffna. Last year the borders to the Vanni were closed. Sea travel has been suspended.

But Jaffna has been under the control of the government of Sri Lanka for the last twelve years.

If there was ever an opportunity to undo “the destruction of the essential foundations of the life of a national group” then it would have unquestionably the period of the ceasefire: 22nd February 2002 to the 16th of January 2008.

It was a condition of the Cceasefire Agreement that Jaffna and other military occupied Tamil areas be demilitarised: that the soldiers be restricted to barracks, that civilians be able to return to a “normal” life.

It is ironic that the LTTE had to negotiate this “demilitarisation” on behalf of the people of Jaffna. For the conditions imposed on the people of Jaffna, so clearly calculated to “create bodily and emotional harm on an entire population”, are a violation of UN law on genocide.

But the trigger-happy Sinhala soldiers are everywhere: at temple festivals, exam centres, even at centres for psychological counselling for women traumatised by war.

Such is the symbolic significance of Jaffna to the Tamils, that the Sri Lankan state in 1995, believed whoever controlled Jaffna could claim sovereignty over the Tamil people. The international community agreed and largely endorsed the 1995 “Liberation” of Jaffna.

Jaffna, under the control of the Sri Lankan military throughout the entire period of the ceasefire and for many years prior, must be considered a showcase of the Sri Lankan government’s vision for the Tamil people once they are “liberated” from the LTTE. For Jaffna has been liberated for over twelve years.

More accurately, Jaffna must be considered the show-case of both the vision and implementation skills of the co-chairs of the peace process – the US, the UK, Japan, the European Union – who are also military and economic allies of the repulsive Sri Lankan State.

Many Tamil Diaspora members have family roots in Jaffna and consequently legitimate interests in the fate of this historic city and its province. The question for us when we engage with the international political and human rights machinery – be it the local member of parliament, the foreign office or the Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International – must be: what is your record of implementation in “liberated” Jaffna? Any promises being made for the “liberated” East must be measured against the actual progress achieved in long “liberated” Jaffna.

While it ought to be the responsibility of all the governments who engage in military and economic aid to the Sri Lankan state to ensure that their military and economic ally is not committing genocide, the co-chairs though long on words have achieved zero in implementation.

By their repeated refusal to impose sanctions on the Sri Lankan state, by their insistence in “constructive engagement” with the already prosperous south while aiding the military machine that daily throttles Jaffna, the United States, the European Union – especially, Britain - are indirect participants in the Sri Lankan state’s genocide.

It is important that questions be asked now about the record of the international political establishment that has unashamedly aided and abetted the inflicting of such suffering on the people of Jaffna and the rest of the Northeast

At the very least we need to disillusion both ourselves, and all people of goodwill everywhere, about the combined will and the ability of the international community to “prevent the destruction of the foundations of life” of the Tamil people in the ‘paradise’ island.