A Sinhala-dominated Sri Lanka is not in India’s interests, writes T S Gopi Rethinaraj, a Singapore National University scholar, in the November 2008 issue of Pragati, the Indian National Interest Review. A unified Sri Lanka under Sinhalese domination will be deeply inimical to India's interests. Colombo will permanently exploit India in the absence of a buffer that an Independent Tamil Eelam could provide, he wrote.

Pragati is published by The Indian National Interest—an independent community of individuals committed to increasing public awareness and education on strategic affairs, economic policy and governance.

In an article titled “Don't abandon the Tiger: A Sinhala-dominated Sri Lanka is not in India’s interests”, Rethinaraj writes "India has reached an impasse because of its stated policy to safeguard the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka and unwillingness to recognise LTTE’s standing in the conflict. Unless India overcomes this fixation, the Sinhalese dispensation will continue to exploit New Delhi and pursue its agenda without inhibitions."

Further, detailing the benefits of an independent Tamil Eelam to Indian Security interests Rethinaraj writes "A unified Sri Lanka under Sinhalese domination will be deeply inimical to Indian security and strategic interests. Presence of two states in India’s southern frontiers will act as a powerful deterrent to both successor states from pursuing policies that are prejudicial to the Indian Navy’s predominance in the region."

Full text of the article follows:

IN THE April 2008 issue of Pragati this writer had argued that the survival of the Tamil Tigers is India’s insurance policy against Sri Lanka swinging over to interests of powers that might seek to contain India in the Indian Ocean region. Now that the ethnic conflict has resurfaced as a factor in Tamil Nadu politics, India can ill afford to be seen as actively colluding with the Sinhalese to subjugate the ethnic Tamils. While the recent competitive jostling among political parties over the issue is largely due to fragile electoral alliances in the state, there is also growing public sympathy for Sri Lankan Tamils due to the grave humanitarian crisis generated by the military campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

India has reached an impasse because of its stated policy to safeguard the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka and unwillingness to recognise LTTE’s standing in the conflict. Unless India overcomes this fixation, the Sinhalese dispensation will continue to exploit New Delhi and pursue its agenda without inhibitions. India should also recognise that the Sinhalese majority is yet to show any inclination to moderate its racist vision for Sri Lanka’s future. Frequent reminders by Colombo’s ruling elite that the ethnic minority will have to accept the country as Sinhalese land only confirms that the ongoing war is not really about defeating the LTTE, but part of larger strategy to Sinhalicise the entire island. Sri Lankan government efforts to alter the demographic character of traditional Tamil areas by settling Sinhalese peasants and creating high security zones are mainly to weaken the Tamil resolve.

Since the LTTE remains the only roadblock to this Sinhalese agenda, its military defeat will ultimately result in the political, social, and psychological subjugation of Tamils living in the North, East and other parts of the island. The Sri Lankan state has mostly achieved this objective in areas not under LTTE control. This is the reason why this writer had argued earlier that ethnic Tamils in the island and India will lose leverage with Colombo once the LTTE is militarily defeated. However, the LTTE leadership should also realise that the Sri Lankan Tamils have the best opportunity to secure an honourable settlement when they are still militarily relevant and explore alternative ways to quickly resolve the ethnic conflict.

While the LTTE’s violent methods—forced recruitment, employment of child soldiers, and unrelenting militancy—are repugnant, their largely ethical conduct in the civil war has gone almost unnoticed. The LTTE has been mostly fighting a defensive war restricting their combat within what they perceive as traditional Tamil areas, and their guerrilla attacks have mostly targeted military bases and security forces. This is in contrast to almost all other militant/terrorist organisations in the world which mainly target civilian infrastructure and inflict massive civilian casualties.

Ironically it is the Sri Lankan state that has been deploying its firepower and aerial bombing capabilities over civilian areas in the north, resulting is massive civilian casualties and damages to residences, hospitals, and other civilian infrastructure. Unlike its antagonists, the LTTE has rarely been accused or found guilty of rape and other crimes against women and children during combat. The conduct of the Sri Lankan state reveals that the ongoing military campaign has an almost genocidal streak, with the deliberate targeting of civilian areas mainly aimed to deter civilians from supporting the LTTE.

Within India, especially after Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination, there has been a carefully orchestrated portrayal of the LTTE as the source of all troubles on the island. While the LTTE’s role in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi deserves the strongest condemnation, that singular episode alone cannot be the basis for India’s Sri Lanka policy or for condemning Sri Lankan Tamils to eternal suffering. Suggestions that the emergence of an independent Tamil Eelam will hurt Indian security interests are disputable, because its ethnic and political ties to India through Tamil Nadu will be much stronger than that of the Sinhalese dominated state. However, given a chance, most Sri Lankan Tamils will be happy to live under a greater Tamil Nadu—comprising traditional Tamil areas in the North and East of the island—as Indian citizens. But India failed to explore that option to integrate the North and East with Tamil Nadu when several opportunities presented that outcome before 1987.

The historical baggage—some of which dates pre-Christian times—also continues to remain a major impediment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The British failure to present a partition plan to accommodate the political aspirations of the Sinhalese and Tamils allowed earlier historical grievances to fester. Since Sinhalese-Tamil social relations never assumed violent proportions like the Hindu-Muslim problem in pre-1947 India, the problem could have been easily sorted if the Sinhalese majority had been reasonable in their approach toward the ethnic minority. Until 1956 all ethnic groups at least shared a common identity and future as Ceylonese. The Sinhala Only Act and failure of Colombo’s ruling elite to produce a multiethnic national identity and vision for Sri Lanka deepened the social divide and paved way for separatism.

Competitive pandering to Sinhalese-Buddhist extremism by political parties gradually resulted in the constitutional alienation, linguistic disenfranchisement, and denial of education and economic opportunities of Tamils. Failure of conventional political methods to address these grievances and various state-led anti-Tamil pogroms eventually led the Tamil youth (from which the LTTE would emerge as the pre-eminent force) to wage an armed struggle for political separation.

The racism and blatant government discrimination against Tamils in jobs, education, and economic opportunities that produced the original conflict are still intact. Hence attempts to equate Sri Lanka’s ethnic problem with various insurgencies faced by India are not only incorrect but an unfair characterisation of the Indian state. India represents very different social and political values and every conceivable religious, ethnic, and linguistic group in India enjoys constitutional equality and protection.

Thus viewing Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict through the prism of Indian federalism is misleading. India has always been keen in ending the ethnic conflict by actively engaging with the Sinhalese, and has consistently advocated a federal solution to Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict. This, according to New Delhi’s assessment, would meet the aspirations of all ethnic groups in the island. While the federal political structure has worked remarkably well in the context of India, where coexistence of several ethnic/linguistic states acts as buffer to any chauvinism from the Hindi heartland, it is unlikely to work in Sri Lanka where there are only two main ethnic groups. But Colombo is not even prepared to offer Tamils the Indian-type solution, which would still preserve their political dominance in Sri Lanka. The failure to take into account this deep Sinhalese-Tamil divide explains the stagnation in India’s Sri Lanka policy.

Colombo has always keenly followed political undercurrents in India and within Tamil Nadu and benefits from the prevailing chaos. It has not only been successful is driving a wedge between the concerns of Tamil Nadu politics and the central government, but has also carefully cultivated certain Indian bureaucrats and journalists whose views on the ethnic conflict are compatible to the Sinhalese project. Historically too the Sinhalese have cleverly played one Indian kingdom against another to have an edge over the Tamil Hindu Jaffna kingdom. India’s succumbing to this contemporary scheming is, in the long run, deeply inimical to its interests and security.

Unless India makes a course correction, some political parties are likely to exploit the situation to revive the long-forgotten separatist propaganda in Tamil Nadu. While the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government was more sensitive and remained equidistant from the two warring groups, the current United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government has been providing significant military assistance to the Sri Lankan government. This policy is inadvertently contributing to the Tamil subjugation project of the current Sri Lankan government.

India must not allow its long term interests to be corroded due to the machinations of the Sinhalese regime and its Indian supporters. It should intervene as it did in East Pakistan if Colombo does not show any sincerity and returns to its old ways. Indeed, a strong case could be made that an independent Tamil Eelam will not only be in India’s interests but permanently avoid exploitation by the Sinhalese. A unified Sri Lanka under Sinhalese domination will be deeply inimical to Indian security and strategic interests. Presence of two states in India’s southern frontiers will act as a powerful deterrent to both successor states from pursuing policies that are prejudicial to the Indian Navy’s predominance in the region.

India would do well to remember how it lost all leverage with China by meekly accepting the latter’s invasion of Tibet. India’s appeasement policies in response to developments in Tibet in the 1950s not only paved way for Tibet’s invasion, but emboldened China to lay claim over vast tracts of India’s territory. Of course India doesn’t have any border to settle with Sri Lanka, but it occupies its soft underbelly and a strategic position in the Indian Ocean. Colombo will permanently continue to exploit India in the absence of a buffer that an independent Tamil Eelam could provide.

Already, India has been shamefully remiss in failing to take the Sri Lankan navy to task over the issue of frequent killings of Indian fishermen. The fact that Sri Lankan navy could kill a few hundred Indian fishermen with impunity is a sign of the future behaviour of the Sinhalese state once it secures a military victory over LTTE and impose a solution on ethnic Tamils on its terms. Once the Sri Lankan state achieves that objective, India will be, according to a popular Sinhalese refrain, “discarded like curry leaves.”

Shops and commercial establishments in Tamil Nadu shut down and the state's roads wore a deserted look as a result of the traders' bandh (shut down) Friday on the Eelam Tamils issue. According to reports in the Indian media, the bandh was total all over the state as over 25 lakh traders, owing allegiance to 5,500 trade unions, took part in the peaceful agitation to show their solidarity with the Eelam Tamils.

All political parties in Tamil Nadu had extended their support to this bandh which took place from six in the morning to six in the evening in Tamil Nadu and Puduchery (Puthuchcheari). The shutdown of the private sector has drawn more participation than the government organised human-chain, observers said.

The organisors of the shutdown said the state-wide success of the bandh, even in rural areas, reflected that sentiments among Tamil Nadu public for Eelam Tamils running high, independent of state orchestration.

T. Vellaiyan, President of the Tamil Nadu Traders Union that called for the bandh, demanded an immediate halt to the genocide of Tamils in the war-ravaged island.

The bandh had a two point agenda: to condemn the Sri Lankan military's genocide on Tamils, and to express solidarity with the Eelam Tamils who had lost their livelihood in the island.

The bandh call had a rousing reception from traders of all strata of society: roadside tea-shops and grocery stores never opened, so did some of the largest cloth stores and hotels.

Asia's largest perishable goods market at Koyambedu in Chennai, which has roughly about 2500 wholesale shops, was completely shut down from 12 midnight Friday. Consequently, about half a million fruit/vegetable shops which get their supplies from here, were also shut down. This market employs about 10,000 workers and 500 drivers.

The traders' bandh affected all cities in Tamil Nadu. The public was affected because it was impossible to locate any store that had not downed its shutters. It was difficult to even buy a packet of milk, because the distribution was wrapped up by six in the morning.

Scheduled to be held originally on 17 October, the bandh was postponed to 31 October on account of the decision taken at the All Party Meeting organized by the Government of Tamil Nadu. Over 5.500 trade unions had come together to organize this bandh – they had distributed pamphlets highlighting the sufferings of the Eelam Tamils to all affiliated traders.

Moreover, traders from other Indian states, who run some of the most successful businesses in Chennai also extended their support to the bandh and cooperated by not operating Friday.

Mr. Vellaiyan was arrested by the Tamil Nadu Police for alleged 'enforcement' of the boycott following 'politically motivated complaints', the organisers said and added that they promptly secured his release.

News papers and television channels in India labelled this bandh a hundred percent success.

The debate on economic competition between nations focuses centres on fair and unfair competition. It is unfair competition to protect local markets from foreign manufactured goods. But it is “fair competition” for governments to subsidise local industries that have “strategic significance”: defence or nuclear energy for example.

Genocide is the ultimate form of unfair competition: as Black July 1983 illustrates. In fact, each stage of the slow genocide of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka has also been an economic project.

Having looked at how the Tamil industrial base was eliminated, the unequal impacts of the ‘open’ economy, the numbers which prove that reparation to Tamils is unaffordable and how the Sri Lankan state has breached its contract with Tamil taxpayers, the rest of this piece focuses on how the genocide by the Sri Lankan state is funded by Tamil assets and the impact of the new Tamil international economy on the relationship between the Tamils and the Sri Lankan state.

Genocide funded by Tamil assets

The Sinhala State has not evidenced the faintest intention of restoring economic parity to the Tamil people on the island.

Following the 2004 tsunami, which hit the North Eastern Tamil homelands harder – because the tsunami waves came from the direction of the North and were more powerful when they hit the Tamil coast – the Sri Lankan government blocked the joint aid distribution mechanism it had agreed with the Liberation Tigers in order to ensure aid reached Tamil areas.

As Karen Parker of the IED has pointed out, there is no adequate explanation for blocking international aid from those who have already lost everything – other than the deliberate destruction of a people (genocide).

The genocidal war against the Tamil people is also financed by the distress sale of Tamil assets.

To cement international relations and finance the war, real estate in the formerly Tamil areas are being pawned off by the state.

For example, after the government “cleared” the East in a 2007 offensive against the LTTE, it entered into an agreement for India’s National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) to build a coal power plant on formerly Tamil land, despite the protests of Tamil parliamentarians representing the Tamil refugees displaced from there.

The Sri Lankan State has also invited international oil firms to bid for oil drilling rights off the Northern coast of Mannar.

Every stage of this genocidal war is ultimately about money, not only in its fungible form, but also in the form of assets such as land, titanium and oil that can be transformed into money.

But even in this the Sri Lankan government is not original for financing genocide with money belonging to the victims is not such a new idea.  

Consider Nazi legislation following Kristallnacht – the pogrom named after the vast number of broken windows.

The Nazis decided they could blame Kristallnacht on the Jews because it had been “sparked” by the assassination by a 17 year old Jewish teenager of a German embassy officer, Vom Rath, in Paris.

This would help them finance, for example, the cleaning up of the streets afterwards.

Accordingly, a "fine of 1 billion marks was levied for the slaying of Vom Rath, and 6 million marks paid by insurance companies for broken windows was to be given to the state coffers.

Similarly, Sri Lanka blamed the Tamils for the pogrom and as The Economist noted, the state benefited by taking over the damaged Tamil businesses.

This pattern of profiting from and financing genocide from the victims’ own assets, has continued ever since.

New Tamil international economy

Following 1983, the Tamil economic base has shifted globally to countries where it is safe. The Economist presciently noted this too, 25 years ago, in its article of the 20th of August on the 1983 pogroms: “Another key factor in Sri Lanka’s recovery will be the brain-drain of Tamils. Thousands of Tamil professional people are said to have left the country since the violence began last month.”

“One leading Tamil entrepreneur – and Sri Lanka’s most successful entrepreneurs are Tamil – estimates that 90% of his fellow-industrialists are now contemplating emigration,” the magazine noted.

In their host countries, Tamils are among the most economically successful refugee groups. For example, 1 in every 50 doctor in the British National Health Service is Tamil, as are nurses and other medical workers.

This despite an estimated less than 1 in 400 of every British adult being Tamil.

As an indication of per capita Diaspora income, the average British doctor earns over £106,000 pounds (circa 200,000 USD) or about 4 times the national average.

Sinhala State looks for Tamil investors

But the Sinhala government, NGOs and think-tanks have also noted the relative post-1983 prosperity of the Tamil Diaspora. And in it, they see a potential source of new income.

“The Tamil Diaspora is seen by the Sri Lankan state as an important actor in the ongoing war against the LTTE that needs to be checked,” Jehan Perera writing for the Daily Mirror in Colombo explains.

“It is a fact that many, if not most, who left the country did so in circumstances that were extremely painful and bitter to them.  They left for an uncertain future into alien cultures and societies, in which they would be an underclass for many years,” he concedes. 

“But due to the essentially egalitarian and merit-based nature of the Western societies to which they migrated, many of them and their children have finally prospered.”

The Sinhala State hopes that, once again, they can benefit from Tamil prosperity.

They  hope the Diaspora will ignore previous breaches of contract and help finance the failing Sinhala State – including its present judiciary, police and army.

In order for this to happen, the LTTE, their current rival for the Kavalar/government role, must first be destroyed.

Mr Perera, for example, explains that the Tamil Diaspora has not engaged with the Sinhala State because: “A large part of the reason has been the confidence of the Tamil diaspora that the LTTE's armed struggle for separation, which they support, will end in success.  So long as this belief, and desire, continues there will be little incentive on the part of the Tamil diaspora to engage constructively with the Sri Lankan state. However, recent developments on the ground and in international politics suggest that the struggle for Tamil Eelam will not be successful”

Once the LTTE is destroyed, so the thinking goes, the Sinhala State has an opportunity to persuade the Tamil Diaspora to “engage with it” – by investing money of course.

In his article, Jehan Perera explains this line of thinking: “This means that if the Tamil diaspora wishes to come to the aid of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka, they need to be prepared to engage constructively with the Sri Lankan state, and find ways to do so.”

In short, the failing Sinhala State, having alienated all its Western donors on Human Rights grounds can turn to the families of the entrepreneurs and professionals who fled the 1983 pogroms to finance the “protection” of the “liberated” Tamil areas. 

They can be persuaded to invest in the hopes of creating a “new Tamil economy” that can then be taxed by the Sinhala State and will finance its burgeoning army, parliamentary bureaucracy etc. As they did pre-1983.

Notwithstanding the Tamil Diaspora are tax-paying citizens in their new countries, they should also help the Sri Lankan State with its development objectives.

Because, so the Sinhala thinking goes, if the Tamil Diaspora want their internally displaced relatives not to starve, they won’t have any other option.

Apparently, the Tamil cow keeps giving milk long after it has been sent to the slaughterhouse. Whoever said you can’t have your cow and eat it?

UNP parliamentarian Ravi Karunanayake ridiculed the war expenditure of the Rajapkse administration saying that the government has spent over forty million rupees to kill one member of the LTTE since 2004.

Sri Lanka Army (SLA) commander, Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka announced on Monday that at least 13,000 Tamil Tigers were killed by the security forces.

Quoting government estimates, Karunanayake said 583 billion rupees were spent for the war since 02 April 2004.

If the Sri Lankan military chief's estimates are to be trusted, Karunananayake said, 42 million rupees were spent to kill one Tamil Tiger.

As the Sri Lankan military inducted a new fighting unit and continued its offensive attacks in Vanni, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) staged air and sea attacks on military targets outside Vanni.

On Saturday November 1, Sea Tigers launched naval convoy and fought a fierce sea battle off the island's northern coast.

According to LTTE sources 20 Sea Tigers attack craft took part in the battle in the seas off Naakarkoayil in Vadamaraadchi East Saturday morning from 5:15 a.m. to 7:00 a.m., sinking an SLN Dvora Fast Attack Craft (FAC) and a hovercraft.

Sea Tiger officials further said that SLN engaged 20 vessels in the clash, but was forced to withdraw after suffering casualties.

A water-jet vessel of the SLN sustained damage in the sea battle and was towed back to Kaangkeasanthurai (KKS) naval base.

The Tigers said their Sea Tiger commandos reached their base, after defeating the SLN.

Seven Black Sea Tigers laid down their lives in the operation, the Tigers said.

Eleven days earlier, the Sea Tigers attacked two Sri Lankan Navy supply ships in the same area sinking one and damaging the other.

Air Attack

On Tuesday, October 28, an LTTE air craft carried out an attack on Thallaadi military base, the main artillery and Multi-Barrel Rocket Launcher (MBRL) launchpad of the Sri Lanka Army in Mannaar dropping three bombs on the base, inflicting heavy damage.

An hour later, another LTTE air craft dropped two bombs on Kelanitissa power station and returned to base safely.

The air raid at the Kelanitissa power station in Colombo late on Tuesday started a fire and killed one person and wounded two, hospital officials said.

Two turbines and air coolers sustained damage according to the sources in Colombo.

An MI-24 attack helicopter gunship of the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF), deployed in Vanni offensive, and a Bell helicopter used to transport the wounded soldiers from the battlefield, sustained damage in the bombing raid on the Sri Lankan garrison at Thallaadi in Mannaar, according to a reliable military source.

Sri Lankan military officials have claimed that there was no major damage caused by the Tiger air strike and said only one soldier had sustained injuries in the attack.

The raids on a Colombo power station and a northern military camp late on Tuesday are the eighth and ninth carried out by the "Air Tigers", known in the Tamil language as Vaanpuligal, since they shocked the world with their first attack in March 2007.

At a time of global financial crisis, Sri Lanka’s reliance on borrowing combined with plunging  foreign exchange reserves, spiraling inflation and poor fiscal policies are making Sri Lanka the most vulnerable in the region, according to international monetary experts.

In its annual report, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) directors expressed their concern on the risks of public debt distress arising from the increasing reliance on dollar-denominated, short-term commercial debt.

That risk has grown more acute since the dollar has strengthened against other currencies in the last month.  

IMF said the global financial crisis, which has drastically cut the availability of credit, had made "Sri Lanka's external accounts ...vulnerable to a reduction in international investor risk appetite."

Since October 2007, Sri Lanka has increasingly sought high-interest foreign commercial borrowings via syndicated loans and a sovereign bond issues to avoid local commercial loans that attract a rate of over 20 percent.

Rupee depreciation

IMF also said the real exchange rate of the rupee has been overvalued and the central bank's protection of it could create the risk of attracting short-term speculation and volatility.

Since mid-September, the Central Bank of Sri Lanka exhausted $ 600 million, 25 percent of its foreign reserve, to protect the local currency before it decided to allow 'limited depreciation' of the rupee.

After withdrawal of the 6-week long policy of defending the currency at 108 per dollar costing 100 million US dollars per week, the currency fell to 110 per dollar by the end of the week, its lowest level since late last year.

Bankers and currency dealers said they saw more rupee weakness and a foreign banker in Colombo said on condition of anonymity said:  “I expect we can see some more of the same, with depreciation of the rupee,"

FX reserves

In addition to the Central Bank’s attempt to peg the Sri Lankan rupees against US Dollars, Citigroup Global Markets Asia in a market commentary attributed foreigners exiting Sri Lanka T-bill and bond market for driving the decline in FX reserves.

Citigroup estimated foreign holdings to have fallen from $670 million in early October to around $380 million in bonds and bills combined by end of October.

"We also expect the FX reserves to continue to come under pressure - we think there is still more near-term pressure of foreigners liquidating their LKR bonds and bills, especially if LKR is at increased risk, thus, presenting possibly another $380m possible outflow (assuming foreign holdings could go to zero).

"How externally vulnerable is Sri Lanka? We think they are very vulnerable though how close is a bit unclear. We have repeatedly argued that Sri Lanka is the most extremely vulnerable country in the region, as highlighted in our recent report….” added Citigroup.

External borrowing

Analysts estimate the government will need external financing of between $4-$6 billion in 2009 to cover the budget deficit, short-term debt, and debt amortisation but point out the depreciating Rupee, record inflation and the global finacial downturn make it hard to raise debt.

James McCormack, Fitch Ratings' head for Asia-Pacific sovereign ratings  raised concerns about the instability of the exchange rate and said any sizeable depreciation of the rupee would impact the government's repayment capacity," said.

In addition Sri Lanka’s high inflation also had a negative impact on its capacity to borrow.

Eurasia Group analyst Maria Kuusisto in a report issued earlier this month said, with the inflation hitting 23.4 percent in October Sri Lanka would have to offer "painfully high interest rates" to raise debt.

"This would add expensive debt to Sri Lanka's already sizable foreign borrowing," she wrote.

Rating agencies blame increased government expenditure as the main reason for high inflation.

Sri Lanka sold its first sovereign bond for $500 million in October last year and on October 7 this year announced plans for two syndicated loans this year for up to $300 million each.

IMF is of the view that  the global crisis had drastically cut credit availability, making Sri Lanka's external account "vulnerable to a reduction in international investor risk appetite."

Citigroup also shared this view in its commentary saying “the recent announcement seeking proposals for a $ 300m syndicated loan looks very difficult under the current environment”.

Economic growth

In addition to increasein cost of borrowing SDri Lanka is also faced with a steep drop in revenues with its key revenue making industries facing the impact of global credit crisis.

With much of the developed world considered by economists to be in recession, analysts said Sri Lanka's exports growth will weaken this year, such as in its garment and tea sectors, the country's biggest and third-biggest export earners.

Sri Lanka’s $27 billion economy only grew 6.8 percent last year, slowing down from a two-decade high of 7.7 percent in 2006, and the IMF said it expects economic growth to slow to 6.1 percent in 2008 and drop even further to 5.8 percent in 2009.

The results of the U.S. presidential election this week are more an overwhelming rejection of the way the United States has been run in the recent past, particularly during the Bush administration, than merely a victory for Barack Obama.

The overwhelming enthusiasm during the campaign, and with the announcement of Obama’s victory, reflect how bad things are in the United States. The almost universal enthusiasm for Obama throughout the world, including Asia, is a clear expression of how badly the actions of the United States have affected the rest of the world.

There are many examples, but the worst is the way the so-called War on Terror has been manipulated to serve the interests of the greedy and of authoritarian governments at the expense of democracy, rule of law and human rights. The United States’ negative initiatives in the aftermath of 9/11 have generated many forms of global psychological warfare against human dignity, human freedom and the struggle to improve living conditions.

“Anti-terrorism” initiatives from the world’s most powerful country were exploited to the maximum by cynical leaders in other countries, mainly to deprive their own populations of basic freedoms and democracy. In many countries the War on Terror was manipulated to portray freedom of expression, publication and organization as subversive endeavors, and to deprive people of fair trials and protections against torture, illegal arrest, illegal detention and extrajudicial killings.

Through what are called “prevention of terrorism laws,” all these freedoms were sacrificed under the pretext of national security. In fact, with these laws in place, recent times have been the most insecure in many countries.

The existence of groups that might be portrayed as terrorists became a boon to unscrupulous leaders. In fact, the creation of terrorist responses through state-sponsored terror became a common element of ruling strategies in many places.

The “War on Terror” was not something that was meant to be won. It is, in fact, meant to be continuous so that populations may be continuously suppressed. The society that George Orwell foresaw in his novel 1984 is being realized in all too many places.

The manipulation of the media under the pretext of preventing terrorism has become more sophisticated than ever. Techniques are used to create confusion in the minds of people about themselves and their neighbours. By repeating various suggestions, doubts are created in the minds of the people as to the authenticity and credibility of any person or group that advocates democracy, rule of law and human rights.

A favorite theme concerns those accused of indirectly supporting terrorists. Anyone who seeks information – including lawyers, judges, journalists and intellectuals – that may be damaging to the leaders is portrayed as supporting the sinister plots of terrorists. Doubts are created concerning the intentions of such people, so ordinary people become confused.

In Asia, Sri Lanka is the most glaring example. Anti-terrorism laws and actions have now been extended to the deprivation of legal services to those considered “enemies of the state,” as demonstrated by a letter distributed to human rights lawyers by a group calling itself Mahason Balakaya, the Battalion of the Ghosts of Death. Death squads, operating under different names, have become part of peoples’ lives.

In the name of national security, Sri Lanka has come to resemble a police state. Similar conditions have been experienced in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Thailand and the Philippines, to name a few.

The American people have now rejected the government for which anti-terrorism was the core issue. The question is whether this will translate into genuine enthusiasm for democracy, rule of law and human rights.

The overwhelmingly positive response from countries outside the United States to the election of Barack Obama implies a deeply felt need for the United States to get its priorities right. People want to exorcise the psychosis of fear, cynicism and negativity and replace it with a belief in cooperation and human solidarity.

What really matters is not what the administration of Barack Obama will do. More important is what freedom-loving people throughout the world will do by creatively responding to the energies that have found expression in these times.

Movements for democracy, rule of law and human rights must take note of this new enthusiasm and work to create better conditions and develop strategies that prioritize human freedoms and human welfare. If the world passively waits for the next U.S. administration to take the lead, a great opportunity for a great change will be missed.

(Basil Fernando is director of the Asian Human Rights Commission based in Hong Kong)

The silence of Western media and government has emboldened the majority Sinhalese to embark on a renewed campaign to dispossess and kill the Tamil people.

The Tamil-controlled north-east of Sri Lanka thunders "day and night" under bombardment from the forces of the Sinhalese government in Sri Lanka's capital Colombo as they attempt to destroy Tamil autonomy.

Against this backdrop, "a great human tragedy" is also "exploding", according to Fr James Pathinathan of St Theresa's Church in Kilinochchi, the administrative capital of the de facto government of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

From the eye of the storm, Fr Pathinathan, who is also president of the local Justice and Peace Commission, reports that "deaths, injuries, displacements and attendant misery pervade the lives of innocent Tamil civilians... and the draconian economic embargo imposed slyly... has become a monstrous obstacle in giving relief and solace to the 170,000 persons recently displaced".

The Sri Lankan Government's economic embargo, involving the closure of roads and ports of access for food, medicines, and fuel for an already destitute population, has been compounded by its eviction of aid agencies from the north-east as it has increased the tempo of war in an apparent attempt to put a military end to Tamil aspirations for some kind of self-government.

War has broken out on various fronts in recent months, and the bombardment of Kilinochchi began a few days ago.

Government forces have driven Tamil civilians from their homes and farms, which, at least in the south, are in the process of being occupied by Sinhalese settlers.

This has extended a long process of violent colonisation, according to Tamil sources.

Church and aid agencies report that over 200,000 people have been "displaced" in the east of the Tamil homelands in recent months, now to be joined by 170,000 in the north.

Hopes for Sinhala victory lie not only in their numerical advantage, but also in the sheer quantity of explosives at their disposal and their ability to launch them from long range or from the skies.

Meanwhile, the silence of Western media and governments embolden the Sinhalese to embark on their campaign of pillage, rape and destruction.

The Tamils' defensive actions are driven by desperation that their race is threatened by genocide.

The depth of commitment of these people to Tamil Eelam, or the Tamil Motherland, is vividly demonstrated by sheer numbers.

Some 17,000 or more young Tamil men and women have already sacrificed their lives in the struggle for national liberation.

It is easy to see how Tamils believe that the Sinhalese are bent on wiping them out.

In 1948, Sri Lanka (then known as Ceylon) gained independence from the British.

Not long after, in 1956, the Sri Lankan parliament passed a Sinhala Only Act.

This relegated Tamils to the status of second-class citizenry.

It also exposed them to the repeated violence that culminated in the disgraceful race riots in 1983 when Sinhala mobs guided by voting-lists set out to destroy Tamil homes and even antiquities such as the library in Jaffna.

Sinhalese forces themselves invaded Jaffna and subjected the local population to barbaric treatment.

They were even prepared to murder journalists in their bid to intimidate the Tamil press.

Every day, Tamils in non-combat areas "disappeared", having been taken away in the backs of notorious white vans.

Underlying this conflict lies deep racist sentiment.

I personally have been astonished by the number of educated Sinhalese who boast of an "Aryan" heritage, compared to the "Dravidian" origin of Tamils.

The former implies some northern origin from lighter-skinned and educated forebears; the latter implies an origin in the jungles of India.

This antagonism is fuelled by fundamentalist Buddhist proclamations that ancient texts identify "foreign devils" who should be expelled.

This racism is supported in practice by the Marxist-Leninists of the People's Liberation Front (JVP) which holds 40 of the 225 seats in parliament and is part of the government coalition.

Proclaiming Lenin's doctrines of central dictatorship by the vanguard of the proletariat, it has vigorously urged military destruction of Tamil hopes for autonomy.

As bombs have begun to fall on the town of Kilinochchi, causing the population to flee, Fr Pathinathan has declared that "the call of the hour is urgent" and pleads for "the people of goodwill all over the world" to "protect the people of Vanni [north-east Sri Lanka] who are threatened with death and destruction and dehumanisation".

But few people seem interested.

With the Tamil homelands cut off more effectively than Biafra in the Nigerian civil war, who wants to see pictures of starving children?

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have stepped up attacks against Sri Lankan security forces and paramilitary groups attached to them in the Eastern province, especially in Ampaarai district, killing at least 14 in November alone and another 65 during September and October and wounding 112 in the past few weeks.

The political wing of LTTE in Ampaarai district released a statement on Friday, October 24 claiming that 65 Sri Lankan soldiers, including 45 Special Task Force members, were killed and another 98 wounded in attacks carried out by LTTE in the district in the previous 75 days.

In the latest incident, on Friday November 7, an LTTE ambush unit opened fire at a Sri Lankan Special Task Force (STF) road patrol, killing 4 Sri Lankan military personnel including 3 STF commandos and causing injuries to three, including two STF commandos in Ampaarai district.

The previous day, LTTE fighters clashed with the STF commandos for more than 30 minutes in Yala jungles in the border of Ampaarai district killing 3 STF troopers.

2 STF commandos sustained injuries in the clash, the Tigers said.

A day earlier, the army suffered the worst day of casualties in the East since a LTTE mine attack in September.

Ten STF commandos were killed Tuesday, November 5, night around 9:15 p.m., when the group of STF personnel were counter-ambushed by an elite commando unit of the Jayanthan brigade of the Tigers.

The counter-attack took place at Koappaaveli on Badulla Road. Two STF personnel sustained serious injuries in the attack, the Tigers said adding that there were no casualties on LTTE side, the Tigers said in a news release issued to media from Batticaloa.

Few days earlier, on Tuesday October 28, LTTE fighters in Batticaloa district attacked a key paramilitary camp of the paramilitary group TMVP in the early hours of Tuesday, killing four operatives and capturing six gunmen from the camp, located at Chengkaladi, 13 km northwest of Batticaloa city, according to the Batticaloa Command of the LTTE.

Despite the LTTE claim of their attack on the TMVP within a few hours of the raid, the Pillayan faction of the TMVP blamed Karuna operatives for the attack. The Sri Lankan Police said that the Tigers were behind the raid that killed four operatives, Pushpan, Rajan, Mani Master and Ravi.

The Political Wing of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), in a statement dated 30 October, condemned the Sri Lankan government for carrying out indiscriminate aerial bombardment and artillery barrage on civilians in Vanni.

“Today morning around 9.30am, Sri Lankan Air Force bombers entered the skies over Vallipunam in the Mullaithivu district and carried out extensive, indiscriminate bombing raids on the civilian housing scheme setup by the Caritas-HUDEC organization,” the statement said.

“A school student was killed and six more civilians including a baby were injured. Children and teachers attending the two pre-schools and the Vallipunam Kanista High School ran in all direction in fear and sought protection in bunkers and under bushes,” it said.

“Within few days of the Sri Lankan Government saying to the Indian Government that it will not carry out attacks on civilians, it has carried out attacks on Paranthan and Vallipunam civilian areas,” the statement noted.

The Sri Lankan army is also “continually carrying out discriminate artillery attacks on civilian settlements in Kilinochchi,” it noted.

Adding that “many civilians were killed, and injured” and many homes “destroyed”, the statement also cited the examples of Karialasingam Pirahalathan, 43, and Selvarasa Satheeswaran, 14, who were killed during bombing raids.

It also provided details of injured civilians, including Srinivasan Thimilarasan, 3 months, and Paramanathan Nivethini, a 17-year-old student.

“We strongly condemn the indiscriminate aerial and artillery attacks on civilians by the Sri Lankan military,” the statement concluded.

Sri Lankan Army Commander, Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka claimed that '80 percent of the fighting ability' of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has been 'eliminated' and troops would soon re-open a main supply route between Colombo and northern Jaffna peninsula.

According to the Fonseka the military had killed thirteen thousand LTTE fighters in the past two-and-a-half years.

"Over 80 per cent of the war against the LTTE has been completed after regaining 80 per cent of the areas under them and killing over 13,000 of their cadres,"

Addressing the troops attached to the Gajaba Regiment at the regimental headquarters at Saliyapura in the north-central Anuradhapura district on Monday, November 3, Fonseka said that the advancing troops were now just seven kilometers away from the Kilaly lagoon, which links the northern Jaffna peninsula to the Wanni mainland along the western coast.

'On reaching the Jaffna's Kilaly lagoon, the entire western part of Kilinochchi district would be sans terrorists, enabling the troops to re-open a main supply route to Jaffna shortly,' army chief told troopers.

'As the troops are now closing in on the Kilaly lagoon, depriving the terrorists of their western Pooneryn bastion, the troops have so far managed to eliminate 80 percent of the LTTE fighting ability after suppressing them. Thus the western sector of the A-9 highway would remain completely clear,' he added.

The army website reported Fonseka as further saying the 'capture of Mullaitheevu simultaneously mobilising many more battalions under four divisions would form a 50 km-long frontage to the east of the A-9 road, providing full security to the area afterwards'.

After capturing LTTE administered territory in western Vanni, for the past couple of months Sri Lankan forces have been trying to capturing LTTE’s administrative capital of Kilinochchi and Pooneryn which will open a land route to Jaffna.

The targeted killing last Friday of Mr. S. P. Tamilselvan, the LTTE's Chief Negotiator and the head of its Political Wing, along with five other LTTE officials, by the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) shocked the Tamil community. Across Diaspora centres and in the homeland, there is palpable grief and anger. The specificities of the attack - whether the SLAF knew Mr. Tamilselvan was at the location, for example - are irrelevant: the military has been trying repeatedly to kill him for years, frequently bombing his offices, residences and convoys. The assassination is a quintessential reflection of the Sinhala mindset. President Mahinda Rakapakse, along with the vast majority of Sinhalese, see the island's ethnic problem purely as a Tamil terrorist challenge. For all the lip-service (and there's not much of that about now) about power sharing, the south is single-mindedly focused on a military victory. The abandon with which the military has for two years blasted Tamil villages, driven hundreds of thousands of Tamils from their homes and continues to abduct, torture and murder Tamils is underwritten by the confidence the international community, despite its distaste, is nonetheless solidly behind Colombo’s war.

Both the Sinhalese and the international community have their legitimating theories. For the Sinhalese, once the LTTE is destroyed, the Tamils will docilely accept whatever limited (and decidedly undeserved) powers they are given. The leading members of the international community in Sri Lanka agree. But they also believe that once the LTTE is destroyed, the island can be 'developed' whereupon Sinhalese, Tamils and, for that matter, the Muslims, will come to see each other as fellow Sri Lankans and live happily ever after. Despite the decades of Sinhala oppression the Tamils have faced by successive governments since independence (i.e. three decades before Tamil militancy was triggered), the international community bases its strategy today off a utopian vision of an ethnic harmony to come. It is not that such a vision is impossible that is staggering but, rather, the belief it can be realized by enabling a violent Sinhala conquest of the Tamils followed by economic development.

The various reactions to the Sri Lankan military's assassination of Mr. Tamilselvan should serve as food for thought for anyone out there who still believes either that peace talks might end the bloodshed or, even more naively, that the international community will act to protect the Tamils against the rampages of the state. As President Rajapakse crowed in Parliament this week, he has secured the assistance of the international community to defeat the Tigers. As we have argued before, for all the noise about human rights (and much of that has dissipated now), the state actually wants for nothing. Ironically, the more the international community is convinced the LTTE can be defeated, the freer the hand the Sinhala state will have.

Let there be no mistake; irrespective of the extent of the casualties or suffering the Sinhala military inflicts on Tamil civilians, the international community will not restrain the state. Not, that is, until the military is checked on the battlefield by the LTTE's counter-violence. At that point, as in 2001, international peaceniks will rush back to help Tamils and Sinhalese solve 'their' problem. The insistence by some international actors, especially those who proudly proclaim their support and assistance for the Sinhala state, that 'there is no military solution' is duplicitous.

The solution must be political, we all know that. But it can be rammed down the Tamils' throats on the end of bayonet. Which is why several members of the international community advocating 'peace' in Sri Lanka have also banned the LTTE.

When Sinhalese unite

Last week Sinhalese reveled in Mr. Tamilselvan's assassination. Traditional drums were played in the street. Parties were organized at home. Some Buddhist temples held all night celebrations. For any Sinhalese who genuinely desires a negotiated solution, the killing of the other side's top diplomat should have been deeply worrying and regrettable. But very few in the south feel this way, something the Tamils need to bear in mind as they make their way in the time to come. For decades, when faced with violence and brutality by a Colombo government, many Tamils have rushed to the feet of the Sinhala opposition, voting it into power in a laughably futile effort to end their suffering, if only for a while. They have chased after the SLFP and UNP in turn, insisting, despite the evidence of their past suffering, that this time round it would be different.

In reality, for the Tamils, there is nothing to choose between the main Sinhala parties. This is because all of them are beholden to the sentiments of the majority of Sinhalese voters who, as is now starkly clear, bitterly oppose sharing of any power with the Tamils. The point was underscored this week by the reaction of the UNP - still the darlings, incidentally, of the 'peace through development' international community - to Mr. Tamilselvan's assassination. Firstly, the UNP hailed the killing as a 'great victory' for the (Sinhala) Air Force. It then went on to tacitly back Rajapakse's brutal war, saying there is 'no point' negotiating with the LTTE. Let us be clear; whenever the LTTE negotiates with the state, it is about the rights, powers and extent of self-rule that we, the Tamil people, are to have. The UNP, drunk with the same confidence in Sinhala military victory that the SLFP regime is, believes, like the government, that there is no point in negotiating with an enemy who is about to be defeated. The optimism may be misplaced, but the UNP sees no reason to hide it.

This week Tamils in the homeland and abroad have mourned Mr. Tamilselvan and his colleagues killed last Friday. We join them. Both Mr. Tamilselvan and Lt. Colonel Anpumani (Alex), who was also killed in Friday's airstrike, were friends of this newspaper. From the outset of the Norwegian peace process, concerned that the Tamil people be kept informed of developments, they, along with the LTTE's then Chief Negotiator, Mr. Anton Balasingham, went out of their way to ensure we were briefed on the peace process. We will miss them.

A time to struggle

Despite its bans on the LTTE, as the international community has openly acknowledged, every time the Tigers sit across the table from the Sinhala state, the interests they are negotiating for are those of the Tamil people. Whether it is a political solution - remember the fuss about the LTTE giving up independence for federalism? (Now the movement is thought to be weak, no one wants to use that word now) - or an interim administration or international aid for the Northeast, the Tigers were accepted by the state and the international community to be negotiating on behalf of the Tamils. Yet there is thundering silence after the Sinhala state assassinated the Tamils' chief negotiator. The international community has thus made it clear that any rights the Tamils secure depend entirely on the outcome on the battlefield. We therefore have to brace ourselves for an even more brutal military onslaught in the time to come. We must therefore be united in our resolve. Despite our skepticism, Tamil efforts to argue our case abroad, to win hearts and minds, must continue. But not in naïve optimism. If the state fails to defeat the LTTE then it will be compelled to negotiate with the Tamils. If it wins, we are lost. But, then, it was ever thus.

Sea Tigers, the sea faring arm of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) attacked two supply ships belonging to Sri Lanka inside high security zone, near a naval harbour in northern Jaffna peninsula, sinking one ship and heavily damaging the other.

Sri Lankan ships MV Nimalawa and MV Ruhunuwa which transport military and other supplies from south to Jaffna came under a predawn Black Tiger attack on Wednesday, October 22, in the seas off Kankeasnthurai harbour.

The Sea Tiger mission was led by Black Sea Tiger Lt. Col. Ilakkiyaa, the deputy commander of the Sea Tigers' female wing, who sacrificed her life with Black Sea Tiger Commando Lt. Col. Kuperan, LTTE officials told TamilNet.

The Sea Tigers also fought a sea battle with naval units defending the port of Kankesanthurai.

Shells launched from the seas off Vadamaraadchi during the clashes following the attack on ships, exploded near a civilian dwelling in Mallaakam seriously injuring a couple, according to the same sources.

"One of the merchant vessels -- MV Nimalawa -- is sinking and the other vessel was damaged," a defence official who declined to be named told AFP following the attack.

According to Sri Lankan newspaper, Sunday times, the intelligence authorities concerned with how the Sea Tigers managed to infiltrate the naval cordon to reach Kankesanthurai, a key point in the high security zone in the sea.

"The fact that they succeeded in infiltrating a high security zone in the seas, moving freely for a long distance to carry out an attack, is very worrying. It only underscores the need for further measures to make the HSZ (High Security Zone) foolproof," the paper said quoting an intelligence source.

Jaffna is controlled by government forces, but cut off from the rest of the island by LTTE-held territory and supplied entirely by sea or air.

The defence ministry painted the attack as "another cowardly attempt by the terrorists to deny essential supplies to the civilians living in war-affected areas."

However, observers pointed out Sri Lanka’s practice of using civilian cargo ships to supply arms to the 40,000 military personnel occupying Jaffna.

Activities of Kaangkeasanthurai harbour came to a halt on Wednesday following the early morning Sea Tiger attack, sources in Vadamaraadchi said.

Sri Lanka Army (SLA) and Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) jointly searched villages east and west of Kaangkeasanthurai harbour, and fishing boats in the seas off the same coastline, sources added.

A statement released by the political wing of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Ampaarai district stated that 65 Sri Lankan soldiers ,including 45 Special Task Force members, were killed and another 98 wounded in attacks carried out by LTTE in the district in past 75 days.

The statement released on Friday, October 24, accused the Sri Lankan government of ‘Sinhalisation’ of the district and urged Tamil and Muslim civilians in the district to join hands in supporting the liberation struggle.